Spinoza and architectural thinking

ABSTRACT

Although Spinoza makes few remarks about architecture, his use of architectural examples, understood in the context of his metaphysics and theory of knowledge, reveal the architect to be a distinctive kind of human thinker. In this paper I explore the kind of thinking the architect does, first by demonstrating that Spinoza distinguishes the architect's adequate way of conceiving a building from inadequate ways of imagining one, and second by considering how Spinoza might have understood the architect to translate that adequate thinking into the practice of building and construction. I argue that for Spinoza, the architect integrates imaginative, rational, and intuitive thinking, and the parallel forms of bodily action, to understand and construct a building in its causal connections to its component materials, environment, and users. To understand the true idea of a building is therefore to understand its embeddedness in the world and its functional place in a network of modal relations.     

Spinoza on Fictitious Ideas and Possible Entities

The aim of this article is twofold: to provide a valid account of Spinoza’s theory of fictitious ideas, and to demonstrate its coherency with the overall modal metaphysics underpinning his philosophical system. According to Leibniz, in fact, the existence of romances and novels would be sufficient to demonstrate, against Spinoza’s necessitarianism, that possible entities exist and are intelligible, and that many other worlds different from ours could have existed in its place. I argue that Spinoza does not actually need to resort to the notion of possible entities in order to explain the incontrovertible existence of fictions and fictitious ideas. In order to demonstrate this, I will first show how, according to Spinoza, true ideas of nonexistent things need not be regarded as fictitious ideas. Then I will show by which means Spinoza can justify the real existence of fictions and fictitious ideas in the human mind through our present knowledge of actually existing things, to conclude that fictitious ideas neither add anything to what we already know of things, nor do they increase the extent of the existing conceivable reality by demanding the existence of possible non-actualised entities.     

Dhammapada Traditions and Translations

The Dhammapada is probably the most frequently translated Buddhist text in the world today. This article looks at the history of translations of the Dhammapada since it was first translated into English in the nineteenth century. I start by comparing the little known first English translation by Daniel Gogerly from 1840 with the influential 1870 translation by Max Müller. The paper then examines the main translations which have appeared since the mid-twentieth century. I show how they represent Buddhist, Hindu and other views on the Dhammapada and that they continue to be influenced by the pioneering nineteenth-century translations. I argue that translations of the Dhammapada are conditioned not only by the viewpoints of the translators but also by the existence of a tradition of translating the Dhammapada . Both factors I conclude have contributed to the importance placed on the Dhammapada as a representative Buddhist text.     

Six Tibetan Translations of the Ratnagotravibhaga

The Ratnagotravibhaga （abbr. RGV） is one of the most influential texts among Indic works that teach the Buddha-nature doctrine in Tibet. No translation of the text seems to have existed in Tibet before the 11th century, inasmuch as no catalogue of the imperial period （the 9th century）,