美国国会“涉藏立法”的历史考察

近二十年来,美国国会通过立法活动提出并通过了一系列干涉中国西藏事务的"涉藏议案"。其主要内容包括:要求美国政府将对华政策与"西藏问题"挂钩;以"西藏人权"为借口干涉西藏事务;为"藏独"势力提供援助,等等。作为美国对华人权外交的组成部分,这些"涉藏议案"对中美关系产生了不容忽视的负面影响,不仅使美国对中国所谓侵犯"西藏人权"问题的干涉长期存在,而且也在很大程度上助长了西藏分裂势力在国外的分裂活动。     

汤姆斯父子入藏:美国插手中国西藏问题的开始

1949年夏秋,美国政府决定选派"无线电评论员"汤姆斯父子入藏"探险"。入藏之后,他们竭力鼓吹西藏是"独立国",要求美国政府援助噶厦中的分裂分子。在拉萨期间,汤姆斯父子竭力蛊惑噶厦官员组建游击部队,以游击战术阻止人民解放军进军西藏,表示美国会予以援助。美国虽未公开声称西藏是"独立国",但是开始援助并考虑派官员以"旅行家"名义再次入藏。汤姆斯父子入藏,是美国在新中国成立前采取干涉西藏问题的重大举措,企图阻挠中国共产党顺利解决西藏问题。     

"西藏问题"与肯尼迪政府对华遏制孤立政策考察

始于近代的所谓“西藏问题”是帝国主义侵略中国的产物。1949年后,美国是以该问题为借口干涉中国内政最为积极的西方国家。本文讨论了肯尼迪政府玩弄“西藏问题”国际化的手段,重点分析由中情局负责组织实施的一系列旨在破坏西藏稳定、分裂西藏的活动,认为其实质是借此对新中国实施遏制孤立政策。针对肯尼迪等人对中国的敌视态度,中国采取了必要的坚定立场,中美紧张关系在当时不可能得到根本缓解,更难以有所突破。     

美国“援华”与1947年蒲立德访华事件

在国民政府统治时期,中美两国关系得到了快速发展。美国在抗日战争和国共内战中都对国民政府提供了援助,"美援"也成为当时中美外交的一个频繁词,但两次援助的性质与结果截然不同。本文借助于对二战之后中美之间的关系分析,通过中美外交的一个侧面,即蒲立德1947年的非正式访华事件,包括对蒲氏的访华历程、访华结果和访华影响的分析,来达到对当时"美援"问题的再探究,     

援越抗美与中美关系

本着重考察中国从60年代到70年代对越南抗美救国斗争进行的大规模援助及其促动因素,以及在这一背景下中美关系所发生的微妙变化。这一时期,中国对越南的支持与援助在很大程度上,是由于美国对越南的武装干涉不断升级,威胁到中国的安全所致;中国对越南抗美救国斗争的有力支援,不仅在一定程度上决定了越南战争的最后结局,而且对当时的中美两国关系产生了极为深刻的影响。     

中国对藏传佛教事务管理权不容挑战

近日,美国国会众议院通过所谓《西藏政策及支持法案》,其重点是干预我西藏和四省藏区藏传佛教事务,特别是中央政府对藏传佛教活佛转世的管理权。众所周知,西藏地方自元朝正式纳入中央政府行政管辖开始,历代中央政府都对藏传佛教事务进行管理。1793年的《钦定藏内善后章程》对包括达赖、班禅在内的藏传佛教大活佛转世程序进行了权威规定。如今美国众议院置藏传佛教历史传统和宗教仪轨于不顾,强行干预我藏传佛教管理事务,显示了美国某些政客的别有用心,注定不能得逞。     

1949～1959年美国《纽约时报》涉藏报道初探

1949～1959年,美国《纽约时报》对西藏进行了多篇报道。在对华遏制的冷战语境下,其涉藏报道带有鲜明的意识形态色彩。从西藏和平解放到1959年西藏叛乱,《纽约时报》涉藏报道的基调是以负面消息为主,丑化中央人民政府在西藏的形象,其中相关社论还对西藏事务进行舆论干涉,不但歪曲了中国的西藏政策和西藏的本来面目,也在一定程度上误导了西方公众对西藏的认知。     

“自由”话语与冷战初期美国国内政治动员——以欧洲复兴计划为中心

面对第二次世界大战后欧洲的严峻形势,杜鲁门政府酝酿出台欧洲复兴计划。为了动员美国民众支持这一计划,杜鲁门政府构筑了一套以"自由"为核心的政治话语体系。他们从"自由"着眼,制造国家安全威胁,并将苏联视为"他者",与社会团体共同塑造了美国作为"自由捍卫者"的国际形象。借助宣传欧洲复兴计划这一有利时机,美国将强烈的道德因素注入追求国家利益的对外援助政策中。这不仅赢得了美国民众对欧洲复兴计划的认同和支持,而且为美国政府全面介入国际事务提供了"合法性"理由和意识形态上的支持。     

试论1949-1951年中国的印度政策与西藏的和平解放

新中国建立前夕 ,美国积极侵略西藏 ,独立后的印度也企图延续它从英国继承的西藏政策和在藏权益 ,西藏地方分裂分子在美印等国的支持下蠢蠢欲动 ,西藏面临更为严峻的形势。以毛泽东为首的中国领导人决定以军事力量为后盾和平解决西藏问题 ,他们精辟地分析了有关国家在西藏问题上的矛盾冲突 ,利用印度维持其在藏利益的政策 ,找出了外交上的突破口 ,在坚决反对其干涉内政的同时争取与之早日建交并修正此前的对印政策 ,有效地制约了美国对西藏的干涉 ,使西藏和平解放顺利实现。     

略论美援与中美抗日同盟

略论美援与中美抗日同盟任东来中国抗日战争是世界反法西斯战争的一部分。抗战期间,中国曾得到国际上许多反法西斯国家和人民的支持与援助。美国对华援助是其中最重要的部分。中国国民政府通过争取美国的援助,既加强了自己抗战的实力,也增加其与国内政治对手斗争的资本...     

美国中央情报局在中国西藏的准军事行动新探(1949～1969)

1949～1969年,美国中央情报局在中国西藏从事了一系列准军事行动,其实质是为美国远东战略利益服务,目标是利用西藏分裂势力遏制与分裂中国。其具体内容包括:为西藏叛乱分子提供情报和准军事训练技术;在西藏实施公路袭扰和破坏行动;为达赖集团提供军事物资和活动经费;开展针对中国的情报活动,等等。     

Making of the Seventh NWS: Historiography of the Beginning of the Nuclear Disorder in South Asia

ABSTRACT

Efforts to explore Pakistan's nuclear weapons options had been underway since 1972 alongside Pakistan's quest for nuclear energy. However, the American concerns about Pakistan developing a nuclear weapons capability did not surface until after the Indian test in May 1974. The Indian nuclear test marked the beginning of the nuclear disorder in South Asia and paved way for Pakistan's nuclearization. This article assesses US non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan under the Gerald Ford administration from 1974 to 1977. The administration attempted to curb Pakistan's latent proliferation potential by pressuring France and Pakistan to cancel their plutonium reprocessing agreement. Though it remained unsuccessful in its attempts to restrain Pakistan's nuclear development, the administration tried to develop a quid pro quo with Pakistan by pushing the country to choose military aid over bomb. Pakistan chose the bomb for it felt that US non-proliferation policy in South Asia was skewed in favor of India.     

Shale gas and the revival of American power: debunking decline?

The spectre of American decline is once again animating both observers and practitioners of US foreign policy. The global financial crisis, a faltering American economy and continued costly and controversial military engagements overseas have been presented as conclusive proof that American foreign policy will soon lack the resources needed to sustain its previous international hegemony. Arguments of domestic weakness have been linked to analyses of the economic vitality of America's competitors to demonstrate a seemingly watertight case for relative decline. The inexorable rise of China has been presented from various quarters as evidence that the American era will soon be drawing to a close. Yet, such declinist arguments continue to suffer from fundamental weaknesses, overestimating the likely future strength of America's rivals while concurrently downplaying the capacity of the US to rejuvenate its economy and thus revivify its liberal universalist creed. The most interesting development in this regard has been the sudden resurgence of the US energy sector. Written off less than a decade ago as being in terminal decline, the American oil and gas industry has staged a remarkable recovery. Vast reserves of shale gas and accompanying tight oil offer the potential to aid the revival of the American economy, with some forecasts pointing to US energy self‐sufficiency within two decades. Notions of US relative decline may yet prove premature. The geopolitical impact of American energy self‐sufficiency is likely to be very significant, making an important contribution to a reversal of the US trade deficit, a revival of America's industrial base, and the possibility of a corresponding relative decline in power for conventional fossil fuel exporters.     

The future of US–Brazil relations: confrontation,cooperation or detachment?

US–Brazilian relations sunk to one of their lowest points ever following last year's exposure of the US government's massive surveillance of the South American giant—including the correspondence of President Rousseff and the business operations of Brazil's national oil company, Petrobras. Brazilian authorities responded angrily. The Brazilian president called off a highly valued state visit to Washington, denounced the US for violations of sovereignty and human rights, and proceeded to bypass the US to purchase nearly $5 billion worth of fighter aircraft from Sweden. In fact, US–Brazil ties have not been constructive for more than a generation. Yes, relations are mostly amiable, but with limited cooperation, considerable discord and some open clashes. Washington views Brazil primarily as a regional actor, and wants its cooperation mainly on inter‐American issues. For Brazil, regional collaboration means working with other Latin American nations—not the United States. Brazil usually wants the US to keep a distance from the region. The US is no more enthusiastic about Brazil assuming a global role; differences over some of the world's most dangerous political and security challenges have made Washington uneasy about Brazil's engagement in international affairs and critical of its foreign policy judgements. Relations will probably improve, but they could get worse. The two governments need to acknowledge that their relationship is fragile and troubled, and take steps both to rebuild trust and to avert further deterioration and new confrontations. They have to be more careful with each other.     

二战期间苏联犹太人反法西斯委员会代表团的盟国之行评析

1943年6月至12月,由米霍埃尔斯和费费尔组成的苏联犹太人反法西斯委员会代表团对美国、英国等西方盟国犹太人社团进行了长达半年的友好访问。访问的主要目的是宣传动员西方犹太人支援苏联的反法西斯战争,同时还有为苏联获取美国原子弹研制情报提供服务之意。访问期间,代表团与西方盟国的犹太名流和犹太人组织进行了充分的交流,建立了密切的关系;通过广播演讲、参加各种群众集会等方式,在西方犹太人舆论界形成了强烈的亲苏氛围;为苏联军民争取到大量的金钱和物资援助,从而有效地配合了苏联政府的战时对外宣传政策,对卫国战争的胜利作出了重要贡献。     

美国对中国“文化大革命”的反应(1966～1968)

196 6年 7月 ,迫于国际局势的压力 ,约翰逊政府提出了“遏制但不孤立”中国的政策 ,但该政策提出后并没有得到有始有终的实施。美国学者的一种观点认为 ,其原因在于中国的“文化大革命”运动阻碍了美国的外交努力 ,使中美之间失去了一次改善关系的重要机会。然而 ,美国国务院最新解密的外交政策档案显示 ,这一观点的准确性值得怀疑。美国对“文化大革命”运动的反应有自己的政策考虑 :它为中国这场内乱设定了目标 ,即希望这场运动导致中国政局发生有利于美国的变化。 1 96 7年中后期 ,随着“文化大革命”局势的渐趋稳定 ,美国的期望落空 ,美国政府内强硬派人士拒绝进一步尝试新的对华政策     

Beyond the carrot and stick: the political economy of US military aid to China, 1945–1951

By applying the rent-seeking assumption and sifting through both the archival materials and published historical documents, this article revisits the US–China relationship during the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949) and the early Cold War period, when the United States was caught in the conundrum of aiding the Chinese Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek. As military aid is usually regarded as an important representation of broader economic aid, this research mainly concentrates on the US military assistance to postwar Nationalist China. This topic is important, as it signifies a direct American involvement in the Chinese Civil War, when the influence of the United States in postwar world politics was overwhelmingly predominant. As a result, postwar Chinese history might be reevaluated in a broader global postwar context. In addition, this article also tells the story about rent-seeking behaviors in the complicated US–China military relations during the early Cold War period at both micro and macro levels. When it came to US military assistance to China, the formulation of policy was perennially in the name of one's best interest.     

‘The Constructive Use of Abundance’: the UN World Food Programme and the Evolution of the International Food-Aid System during the Post-War Decades

This article studies the expansion of multilateral economic development aid in the early 1960s by exploring the history of the United Nations (UN) World Food Program. It analyses the pivotal role played by key development economists within the UN Secretariat, such as Hans Singer, alongside US policy-makers in the Kennedy administration in framing and directing the debate on multilateral food aid. It specifically argues that this period marked a shift in how food aid was perceived and utilised by donor and recipient countries - as well as international organisations like the UN and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Ultimately, what began in the 1950s as a bilateral method to feed the hungry through the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities evolved into an international food-aid system by the 1960s centred on the utilisation of surplus agriculture for economic development. This change showcased both the common goals and competing interests of US and UN policy-makers as food aid now joined the wider debate on various doctrines of development.     

Out of Balance: Evaluating American Strategy in Vietnam, 1968–72

Abstract

This paper examines the ineffective implementation of American military strategy in the Vietnam War’s final years. While the Nixon administration conceived a comprehensive strategic concept aimed at winding down the war in South Vietnam, civilian and military leaders struggled to realize, in an effectual manner, Nixon’s wide-ranging political objectives. American officials in Saigon and Washington found it near impossible to balance the competing strategic imperatives of combat operations, diplomatic negotiations, Vietnamization, and the withdrawal of US forces from South-east Asia. This inability to reconcile imbalances within the American strategic framework helps explain more fully the outcome of US political and military efforts in South Vietnam.