Conservatives,the Constitution and the Quest for a ‘Representative’ House of Lords, 1911–35*

This article presents a new interpretation of Conservative attitudes towards house of lords' reform in the early 20th century. Coinciding, as it did, with the introduction of universal adult suffrage, the campaign to reform and strengthen the second chamber has traditionally been understood as a reaction against democracy. Conversely, this article, emphasizing the politics rather than policies of reform, argues that many Conservatives sought to establish a legitimate role for a second chamber within the new democratic settlement and that the campaign for reform is, consequently, better understood as a constitutional means of ‘making safe’, rather than resisting, mass democracy. The account sheds new light on how the impulse behind reform was frequently rooted in a commitment to democracy, how reform commanded the support of a wide cross section of the Conservative parliamentary party, and why the reform campaign had folded by the early 1930s. In doing so, it reframes an important episode that helped close the long‐19th‐century tradition of constitutional reform in British politics.     

Edwardian Conservatism and the Constitution: The Thought of Lord Hugh Cecil

This article presents an analysis of the political thought of Lord Hugh Cecil. It argues that in order to understand Cecil's thought it is necessary to emphasize the role of the constitution in his thinking. There are three reasons for this. First, his opposition to Chamberlain's tariff reform campaign was rooted in a view of the detrimental effects the policy would have on politics, evidence for which Cecil saw in the tactics used by the tariff reformers. Second, because his opposition to the Parliament Bill and to the home rule proposals, which lay behind the removal of the house of lords' veto, was similarly rooted in what he saw as the unconstitutional nature of these measures. Third, because Cecil was an active proponent of constitutional reforms that were designed to ensure that the second chamber could still exercise a restraining influence on government and so stand up for the interests of what he saw as the moderate majority of the people.     

Heir Not Apparent: Douglas Hailsham,the Role of the House of Lords,and the Succession to the Conservative Leadership 1928–31*

The moment that Lord Curzon was passed over and Stanley Baldwin succeeded Andrew Bonar Law as prime minister in 1923 is generally regarded as a turning point in British political history. From this time it appeared that members of the house of lords were barred from leading political parties and becoming prime minister. In an age of mass democracy it was deemed unacceptable for the premier to reside in an unelected and largely emasculated chamber. This understanding is seemingly confirmed by the career of the Conservative politician, Douglas Hogg, 1st Viscount Hailsham. Notwithstanding a late entry into political life, he was regarded as a potential successor to Baldwin. His acceptance of a peerage to become lord chancellor in 1928 has been seen as the moment when Hailsham's claims to lead the Conservative party ended. But although Hailsham never became Conservative leader, his experience undermines the suggestion that peers were unable to lead political parties in inter‐war Britain. Despite his position in the Lords, his chances of succeeding Baldwin never vanished. The crisis in Baldwin's leadership after the loss of the 1929 general election and the lack of a suitable successor in the Commons created the circumstances in which leadership from the Lords by a man of Hailsham's ability could be contemplated. Hailsham's continuing prominence within the Conservative ranks and specifically his contributions to the party during the years 1929–31, together with the thoughts of high‐ranking Conservative contemporaries, make it clear that he very nearly emerged as Baldwin's successor at this time.     

The Armada Tapestries in the Old Palace of Westminster

The tapestry series of the ‘Defeat of the Spanish Armada’ was a national artistic treasure which hung in the old Palace of Westminster from the mid 17th century until the fire of 1834. This article outlines the creation of the tapestries in the 1590s and covers the major treatments of them in illustrations of parliamentary interiors and in John Pine's 1739 engravings; it ends with a short account of the curious episode of the tapestry which escaped the conflagration. In the absence of any known historical record of how the tapestries were displayed, suggestions are offered about how many and in what order they hung in the two chambers occupied successively by the house of lords (before and after 1801), and about how they were physically supported on the walls of the Parliament Chamber.     

The Debate in the House of Lords on 'No Peace without Spain', 7 December 1711: A New Source

The debate in the house of lords on 'No Peace without Spain' in December 1711 was the first test of the strength of the administration of Robert Harley, earl of Oxford, in the upper House. Though there are more sources for this debate than is normal for proceedings in the Lords, few can claim to be by eyewitnesses. A newly 'discovered' anonymous letter from an eyewitness found in the papers of the lord great chamberlain's office in the Parliamentary Archives gives a detailed account of this important debate.     

The Politics of Chivalry: Sir Robert Walpole,the Duke of Montagu and the Order of the Bath

This article explores the complex circumstances surrounding the foundation of the order of the Bath in 1725, and seeks to correct the commonly‐held view that it was initiated by Walpole simply to augment the patronage available to his supporters in parliament. The proposal for a new order of chivalry based on the medieval ‘knighthood of the bath’ in fact emanated from the court, having been prompted by one of its central figures, the duke of Montagu. Walpole and his colleagues were by no means oblivious to the practical political value of such a move, but having only lately consolidated their position at court, their main priority was to seize a unique opportunity to flatter the new royal dynasty and garner popularity for it through the medium of the order's rediscovered history. The ministers selected the order's 36 founder‐knights with considerable input from senior courtiers, but ensured that those nominated were mostly peers and MPs who could evince ministerially useful connections between court and parliament. Though the order was later derided as a symptom of Walpoleian corruption, its foundation can be regarded as something of a turning point in Walpole's rise to power.