Nuclear proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran

Since the mid-1980s, Israel, thGawdat Bahgate United States, and other Western powers have accused Iran of pursuing nuclear weapons capability. Iranian officials have categorically denied these accusations and claimed that their nuclear program is designed for civilian purposes. This essay examines the history of Iran's nuclear program since the late 1950s and analyzes the forces that shape the country's nuclear policy. These forces include perception of security threats from Pakistan, Iraq, Israel, and the United States; domestic economic and political dynamics; and national pride. The following section will discuss the European and Russian stance on Iran's nuclear ambition as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency's efforts to reach a compromise that would satisfy the international community's concerns and Tehran's demands. The essay concludes with some predictions on how Iran's nuclear program is likely to evolve in the next few decades.     

The Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran in Exile

This paper examines the political, organizational, and ideological shifts necessitated by the chief Iranian oppositional group, the progressive Islamist Mojahedin-e Khalq (People's Mojahedin) organization, beginning with its exile from the Islamic Republic starting in June of 1981 through the present day. An analysis of these shifts is presented as a chronological series of evolving relationships including the Mojahedin's collaboration with a broad-base of oppositional groups and individuals during its Paris exile and founding of the National Council of Resistance (NCR); the Mojahedin's relocation to Baghdad and subsequent foundation of the National Liberation Army (NLA); and the Mojahedin's courtship of Western governments and international organizations to promote its cause. Following the depiction of the transformations undertaken by the Mojahedin throughout these three phases is an analysis of both the status of the organization as a result of these changes and an assessment of the price of exile.     

The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Holocaust: Anti-Semitism and Anti-Zionism

Iran espouses the most radical anti-Israeli or anti-Zionist position in the Muslim Middle East, calling for the elimination of Israel. Drawing on anti-Jewish traditions in Shi^ci Islam, Ayatollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic, maintained that Zionism is the culmination of the Jewish-Christian conspiracy against Islam and undermines its historical mission. Fusing together Islamic and European anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist ideologies, Iran became a disseminator of Holocaust denial in the Middle East and a sponsor of Western Holocaust deniers. Iran's Holocaust denial, which aims at demolishing the legitimacy of the Jewish state, denies Jewish history and deprives the Jews of their human dignity by presenting their worst tragedy as a scam.     

The Life of the Law in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Beyond the esoteric deliberations of Islamic jurists and their exegesis of criminal and private law doctrines, Iranian law lives a life of its own. It is a life of routine practices of judges, court clerks, lawyers and clients, each of whom is striving to turn the law to their own advantage. It is also a life of contested legality, a relentless struggle over the right to determine the law in a juridical field which is infused with strife and hostility. These conflicts are reproduced daily as two competing conceptions of law, and their corresponding perceptions of legality clash in pursuit of justice. The Iranian judiciary’s concept of law, its reconstruction of Islamic jurisprudence and methods of dispensing justice, which on the surface are reminiscent of Max Weber’s “qādi-justice,” collide with the legal profession’s formal rational understanding thereof. However, Iranian judges are not Weberian qādis, and the legal profession is not a homogenous group of attorneys driven by a collective commitment to the rule of law. To understand their conflict, we need to explore the mundane workings of the legal system in the context of the transformation of Iranian society and the unresolved disputes over the direction of its modernity.     

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1989 Edition)

On 3 December 1979, almost one year after Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi left Iran, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran replaced the monarchical constitution of 1906. The new constitution was to guarantee that the monarchy was abolished and the Islamic Republic system of government was enforced in its place. The constitution was to observe the Islamic and the nationalistic aims of the revolution with regard to the demands of a public that came from various social, religious, ethnic, and political backgrounds. Thus the 1979 constitution included differing components, which necessitated the amendments and the modifications that were added to the constitution in 1989. The constitution and its development are subjects that have been discussed in detail by scholars of modern Iran, among whom Asghar Schirazi stands out for his comprehensive study of the constitution. The following translation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran highlights the relationship between the 1979 text of the constitution and the 1989 amendments in an attempt to contribute to the ongoing discussions on this subject.     

From Yugoslavism to Serbism: The Serb National Idea 1986–1996

Abstract. During the 1986–96 period, the intellectual debate on Serb national goals was characterised by a previously unparalleled diversity of views. The draft of the Serbian Academy's Memorandum, which sparked this debate in 1986, advocated an ‘integrative’ Yugoslav federation whose primary aim would be to foster Serbism, that is, to facilitate Serb political and cultural unification. After 1988, the differences between Yugoslavism and Serbism became obvious as advocates of Serb unification rejected Yugoslavia as a costly mistake. In rejecting Yugoslavism, some Serb intellectuals insisted on the regeneration of Serbia and its population, while others argued for the primacy of the unification of all Serb-populated lands into one state. The resulting diversity of views may be perhaps explicable by a persistent disagreement among the intellectuals concerning the basis of Serb national identity, as well as by their focus on an exclusivist and collectivist view of national goals; the latter, it is suggested, is a result of the continuing use of the idea of Serb unification as a part of the programme of Serb national liberation from foreign domination.