PRICE UNCERTAINTY AND PRODUCTION-LOCATION DECISIONS UNDER FREE ENTRY OLIGOPOLY*

ABSTRACT. This paper departs from earlier work on location theory under uncertainty by considering an oligopoly case where the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of imperfectly competitive and identical firms are examined. It will be shown that once a Cournot competitive equilibrium is introduced, the demand function plays a central role in the choice of location, and the effects of changes in fixed costs, mean product price and price variability on the firm's optimum location and output are independent of absolute and/or relative risk aversion. These striking results are in sharp contrast with the well-known results obtained in previous contributions to the location literature.     

SPATIAL ENTRY DETERRENCE UNDER OLIGOPOLY*

ABSTRACT. This paper examines colluding, oligopolistic firms in a linear market. By assuming that rivals do not compete for consumers at their market boundaries, it is shown that an equilibrium exists without adopting a convex transportation cost function. Two price profiles are derived. The first describes firm prices in the absence of threatened entry. The second details profit-maximizing prices which forestall entrants. Given infinite relocation costs, threatened entry leads to price adjustments by the incumbent firms.     

COMPETITIVE AND IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE LABOR MARKETS IN URBAN AREAS*

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I present a model incorporating two kinds of spatial labor markets: a centralized competitive market at the central business district (CBD) and dispersed local markets across economic space under imperfect competition. Wage differentials and the size of the two types of markets are endogenously determined by rational choices of workers as well as profit maximization of firms. Workers can exercise rational choices with respect to market places where they commute and supply their labor. In this model, I attempt, in effect, to integrate the Hotelling-type paradigm and the Samuelson-type paradigm in a consistent spatial setting.     

SPATIAL PRICING IN INTERDEPENDENT MARHETS*

ABSTRACT. Conditions for spatial price equilibrium are derived for a set of firms in oligopolistic spatial competition, distributed at fixed locations in a heterogeneous region where consumer purchasing patterns are a probabilistic function of the price distribution rather than a deterministic function of proximity to firms. The resulting prices vary with accessibility to consumers or with the degree of local spatial monopoly, and result in non-zero profits for firms. Conditions describing the existence and stability properties of this spatial price equilibrium are defined, and are shown to be equivalent for two different hypotheses concerning disequilibrium pricing behavior: a partial price adjustment model and a Bertrand game. For two different profit goals, total profit maximization and profit rate maximization, it is shown that a spatial price equilibrium exists and is at least locally quasi-stable.     

ZONE PRICING*

ABSTRACT. Our purpose is to study a spatial price policy often encountered in the real world, known as zone pricing. This price policy consists in determining simultaneously several delivered prices together with the geographical zones in which they apply. It is shown that zone pricing approximates perfect spatial price discrimination and that the firm's profit increases with the number of zones. Furthermore, the number of markets supplied by the firm rises with the number of zones. Finally, zone pricing is compared to other standard spatial price policies and possible extensions are discussed.     

SPATIAL MONOPSONY AND MONOPOLY PRICING IN A STOCHASTIC ENVIRONMENT*

ABSTRACT. In this paper some of the important properties of the behavior of a spatial monopsonist (monopolist) facing a stochastic supply (demand) curve are derived. Under uncertainty, price setting and quantity setting behavior are no longer equivalent. Hence, spatial price discrimination has to be compared with spatial quantity discrimination with respect to expected profits. I prove three general theorems on how the ranking of the behavioral modes, in terms of expected profit, depends on how the stochastic component enters the supply (demand) and supply (demand) price functions. In particular, I prove that under monopsony one would expect a high probability of excess demand, in the sense that the firm would accept all deliveries at the preset price.     

城市社区型营业性场所的人本主义布局模式

随着我国市场经济的深入发展和社区理念的引入,当前社区各类场所的规划都越来越受到重视。本文以人本主义的方法论入手,结合城市社会生活空间结构原理,还深入到存在主义"引力区"构成、商娱空间行为场所认知构成、社区资源可接近性－可获性构成及社区阶层化构成,总结出城市社区型营业性场所的四种布局规律。