Passing Nonincremental Policy: Presidential Influence in Congress,Kennedy to Carter

This article represents an important step in understanding early, modern presidents’ strategic use of signing statements by taking a sharp focus on the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. In contrast to recent presidents who have used the instrument increasingly to challenge legislative provisions, Eisenhower's use of signing statements was rather complex—from political credit-claiming, explaining the provisions of bills to the American public, and reinforcing his views on the federal-state balance of power—to maintaining bipartisan relations on foreign policy, shaping implementation of congressional bills, and selectively criticizing Congress for overspending. The theoretical framework devotes particular attention to the interplay of contexts—electoral, institutional, and economic—on Eisenhower's use of signing statements by policy area across his two terms.     

Contrasting Models of White House Staff Organization: The Eisenhower,Ford, and Carter Experiences

Analysts of the presidency agree that White House staffs may be organized along one of three lines: a competitive model, a hierarchical model, or a collegial model. This article details the interaction patterns of the Eisenhower, Ford, and Carter senior White House staffs in an empirical test of the basic assumptions of these models of staff organization. These three administrations represent very different conceptual approaches to the problem of staff interaction. The results of the analysis of private and group meeting access by the senior staff with the President clearly indicate that our models do not capture the full range of staff interaction and that other factors need to be given more serious consideration in our conceptualizations of the operation of the White House.     

Clinton,Congress, and Cuba Policy Between Two Codifications: The Changing Executive-Legislative Relationship in Foreign Policy Making

We examine the changing dynamics of institutional control over U.S. policy toward Cuba that have played out during the time between two codifications of Cuba policy: The 1996 Helms-Burton legislation that codified the long-standing embargo policy as law, and the 2000 bill that wrote travel restrictions into law. The study of who makes U.S. foreign policy has long been characterized by a debate over the respective roles of the president and Congress in this area, but-in theory, at least-Helms-Burton should have put an end to the scholarly debate about who makes Cuba policy: With codification, Congress does. But the practice of making Cuba policy has been more complicated than it might have first appeared in March 1996. We track the politics of Cuba policy between these two codifications and try to understand what they mean for who makes Cuba policy now, and speculate about what these dynamics may more generally mean.     

User Fees and Family Policy: Attempting to Recover Costs for State-Provided Child Support Enforcement Services

This study looks in depth at three family policy issues surrounding one state's attempt to recover costs for child support enforcement services provided to nonpublic assistance families. The issues are whether a cost recovery user fee should be assessed; to whom the fee should be assessed; and how to develop a fee structure to meet criteria established by the policy agents. The original study was mandated by the state legislature. Recommendations were made to the legislature to continue one small fee, discontinue another unpopular fee, and institute three new broad-based fees that would allow for nearly full cost recovery. In an election year the legislature accepted the first two recommendations but chose not to pursue the three new fees. Implications for policy development are drawn, focusing on the impact of user fees on service recipients and the role of the public sector in providing services that are available in the private sector in an era of tighter budgets.     

President Clinton and the Republican Congress, 1995-2000: Political and Policy Dimensions of Veto Politics in Divided Government

This article melds alternative theoretical perspectives on veto threats to explain President Clinton's influence over legislative outcomes in the 104th-106th Congresses (1995-2000). Formal models of executive-legislative relations–in particular the "coordination model"–yield an incomplete understanding of veto politics and executivelegislative conflict from 1995-2000. Explaining Clinton's success through veto politics requires a recognition of the unique context of legislative conflict from 1995-96. Presidential- congressional relations in the 104th Congress turned on "blame-game" politics that Clinton manipulated to his advantage. Clinton's second term heralded a return to "normal politics" during which the Republican majority's response to his veto threats coincided better with the basic tenets of the coordination model. Quantitative analysis of Clinton's public threats and secondary analysis of bill histories are brought to bear to test the theoretical framework.     

Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights:

I would hope that the nations of the world might say that we had built a lasting peace, based not on weapons of war but on international policies which reflect our own most precious values. These are not just my goals, and they will not be my accomplishments, but the affirmation of our nation's continuing moral strength and our belief in an undiminished, ever-expanding American dream. ¹
President Jimmy Carter, Inaugural Address, 20 January 20, 1977     

Profiling House Members: The Policy Dimensions Approach

Abstract

With decreasing debate, a unidimensional approach to the study of roll-call voting in Congress has increasingly achieved acceptance. We argue in favor of an alternative, the policy dimension approach, and suggest that such an approach has the advantage of allowing us to examine sets of policy positions that deviate from a unidimensional model, and to explain these policy profiles.     

The White Paper on European Governance: Implications for Urban Policy

This paper discusses the recent European Commission White Paper on European Governance, arguing that the document offers interesting possibilities for the future development of the European Union (EU), how it is governed and more particularly for 'European Urban Policy'. However, the paper argues there are problems with its use of the term governance as a strategy for reform and with a number of its proposals to widen access to the European Commission (EC) and the policy process. With regard to urban policy it is suggested that the White Paper's emphasis on a greater role for sub-national government and citizens' is to be welcomed. Although once again it is unclear whether the Commission has fully thought through the implications of its proposals both for itself and the groups it wishes to engage with. More specifically it is argued that the Open Method of Coordination is broadly similar to the methods whereby both current urban (and spatial) policy have been developed and should be embraced. Overall the White Paper is something of a mixed bag; however, this is to be expected of a document which is primarily intended to stimulate discussion about the future of EU governance.     

The Wrong King: Apocalypse and Transformation (or Not) in the White House

Abstract

Jonathan Z. Smith has argued that apocalyptic discourse grew out of a political desire to remove the "wrong" king from the throne. Later, though, the same discourse was used to prevent a "wrong" king from taking the throne. Thus apocalyptic discourse can either motivate or resist transformative change. In US political history it has served both purposes. This article focuses on the trend in presidential discourse, especially in foreign policy, since Franklin D. Roosevelt to use apocalyptic language to resist transformation. The electorate's desire to prevent substantive change was the determining factor in the presidential election of 2008. In Barack Obama's first year in office, though he seemed to promote transformation, his dominant message was a reassuring one: The threat of fundamental change would continue to be contained both at home and around the world. No "wrong" rulers would be allowed to disturb the security of America.