中国古代史官称谓内涵的嬗变

"史官"作为中国古代史学研究中经常提及和运用的名词或概念,是一个历史的范畴。早期的史官因其官为"史",故被后人称为"史官",后期的史官,则因其职为"记史"、"写史",而被称为"史官"。这种称谓的变化经历了天官和巫官、著作官和天官的分离过程,到隋唐时期,史官的称谓才固定为专指记录和撰述史事的官员。     

The Development of the Supreme Court Practice of Calling for the Views of the Solicitor General

"When the Supreme Court invites you, that's the equivalent of a royal command. An invitation from the Supreme Court just can't be rejected." ¹ The guest most frequently invited to the Supreme Court is the Solicitor General. Even before the practice of the Supreme Court calling for the views of the Solicitor General process developed, the Court occasionally invited the Solicitor General to participate as amicus in important cases by submitting a brief and/or participating in oral arguments before the Court. ² As then–Solicitor General Simon E. Sobeloff remarked to then–Attorney General Herbert Brownell in a 1954 letter about the landmark school desegregation cases, "The Supreme Court has expressly extended an invitation to the United States to participate in the reargument. While this by no means compels participation, such an invitation is not to be lightly declined." ³     

John J. Parker and the Beginning of the Modern Confirmation Process

Ideological concerns' dominance of the Supreme Court confirmation process has certainly become routine, especially in the form of issue-driven interest groups' influence over the agenda for Senate debates. More significantly, the Senate normally focuses on what Laurence Tribe has called “the net impact of adding [a] candidate to the Court” ¹ in terms of steering the Court toward adherence to a particular judicial philosophy, such as originalism ² or pragmatism, ³ or toward a specific outlook on a given constitutional issue. And when the President nominates someone with prior judicial experience, the candidate's decisions, as well as his or her prior speeches or other public activities, become fair game as supposed indications of his or her fitness for service on the Court.     

Beginning to Write Separately: The Origins and Development of Concurring Judicial Opinions

While political scientists and legal academics have both evinced a “fascination with disagreement on courts,” ¹ this scholarly concentration on conflict rather than consensus has tended to focus on dissent and dissenting opinions. As far as we can tell, there is no authoritative history of concurring opinions in the U.S. Supreme Court. This article is a first effort to correct that oversight by examining developments and change in concurring behavior from the founding through the White Court (1921). This period covers the emergence of an institutionally independent national judicial branch and ends before the start of the modern, policy‐making Court era, which we argue begins with the Taft Court and the creation of a fully discretionary docket.     

Oversimplifying the Supreme Court

I cannot tell you what a pleasure it is to be at the Supreme Court Historical Society. Of course, the Supreme Court is fortunate to have a Chief Justice who is also Chief Historian. I have read each of Chief Justice Rehnquist's books on the Court, and they are engagingly written narratives filled with a love and knowledge of this institution. The Chief Justice is steeped in the folklore of this remarkable Court as few have ever been. This is just one reason those of us throughout the federal judiciary admire and love the Chief. He has shown kindness to me ever since I was a young law clerk for Justice Lewis Powell. I don't know if it's appropriate or not to dedicate a speech, but I am going to do so anyway. This speech is for him.     

The Clerk, the Thief, His Life as a Baker: Ashton Embry and the Supreme Court Leak Scandal

On December 16, 1919, Ashton Fox Embry, law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Joseph McKenna, abruptly resigned from the position he had held for almost nine years. His explanation? His fledgling bakery business required his undivided attention. Newspapers that morning hinted at a different reason: Embry resigned because he had conspired with at least three individuals to use inside knowledge of upcoming U.S. Supreme Court decisions to profit on Wall Street.2 A grand jury returned an indictment against Embry and his associates a few months later, and Embry’s argument that he had committed no crime ultimately reached the Supreme Court, the very institution he was accused of betraying. Despite the sensational headlines and fierce legal battle arising from his indictment, the United States Attorney quietly dismissed Embry’s case in 1929, almost ten years after the story had broken. Few Court scholars have ever heard of Embry, and the memory of Embry, much like the case against him, has disappeared with time.3 This article unravels the “Supreme Court Leak Case” by reconstructing what happened almost eighty years ago.     

The Judicial Bookshelf

Laments about federal judges, Supreme Court Justices in particular, are nearly as old as the Republic. Those who say otherwise perhaps have either poor memories or a need to read more history. True, the Court has not been continuously caught up in strife, but controversies have occurred often enough to make Court-bashing a routine part of American political life.     

Justices Seeking the Presidency

The separation of powers in the Constitution of the United States has never been absolute in either theory or practice. This is especially true in the quest for public office. At least one President, William Howard Taft, aspired to be a Supreme Court Justice. Several Supreme Court Justices seriously considered becoming President. These are a few stories about those ambitions.     

From Normative Debates to Comparative Methodology: The Three Waves of Post-Charter Supreme Court Scholarship in Canada

This article surveys the literature on the Supreme Court of Canada following the 1982 introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and argues it has taken place in three distinct “waves.” The first involved tentative, prospective, and normative arguments about the impact of the Charter on national unity and Canada’s political institutions. The second was characterized by the legitimacy debate, the dialogue debate, and qualitative examination of how other political actors responded to Supreme Court decisions. By contrast, the third wave, initiated by American scholars drawing from American research, has been less normative, more comparative, and methodologically rigorous. While this comparative shift has been beneficial, the retreat from normative questions contributes to a misplaced sense that important debates are now settled. We urge scholars to engage in intellectual cross-fertilization by drawing from third-wave contributions to address normative questions about the Supreme Court’s increasingly important role in Canadian politics.     

Punctuated Equilibrium and the Supreme Court

In the legislative and executive branches, policy scholars have used punctuated equilibrium (PE) theory to describe and explain patterns of change. However, there has been little examination of how PE might apply to courts and legal policy change. This article addresses that gap by providing evidence that legal policy change—here conceptualized as changes in what precedents the Supreme Court most often cites—is governed by PE theory. After making a prima facie case for the applicability of PE theory to the Court, I leverage network rankings of Supreme Court decisions to create a proxy for legal policy change that improves on existing measures. Using both a stochastic process model and an analysis of the punctuations the measure uncovers, I find strong evidence of PE processes.     

Justice Jackson and the Second Flag‐Salute Case: Reason and Passion in Opinion‐Writing

In 1943, the Supreme Court handed down West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. ¹ With Justice Robert H. Jackson writing for the six‐Justice majority, the Court upheld the First Amendment right of Jehovah's Witnesses schoolchildren to refuse to salute the flag or recite the Pledge of Allegiance, state‐imposed obligations that the children and their parents contended were acts of idolatry that violated biblical commands. Judge Richard A. Posner has said that Justice Jackson's effort “may be the most eloquent majority opinion in the history of the Supreme Court.” ²     

A Transformed Triangle: Court, Congress, and Presidency in Civil Rights

The relative permeability of the three elements of a triangle-the Supreme Court, Congress, and the president-to civil rights interest groups has varied over time. For almost two decades after World War II, the Supreme Court was the groups' preferred arena because Congress was resistant and presidents could thus do little or were hesitant to act. For a brief time in the mid-1960s the president and Congress became supportive of civil rights groups' claims while the Court also remained accessible. Starting in the late 1960s executive and legislative support for civil rights moderated, with presidential support declining significantly in the 1980s. When the Supreme Court adopted that latter stance, Congress became the body through which to protect civil rights by reversing the Court's decisions. In this examination of the "transformed triangle" in civil rights policymaking, we look at this change over time and at "flip-flops" in litigation as one administration changes the position espoused by its predecessor, and we also give some attention to the Supreme Court's response to congressional reversal of its rulings.     

The History of the Per Curiam Opinion: Consensus and Individual Expression on the Supreme Court

Readers of Supreme Court opinions have become so accustomed in recent years to the multiple concurrences and dissents that accompany important opinions that it is difficult to recall that this is a relatively recent phenomenon. It is only in the past century that the Court's traditional balance of the institutional and the personal has shifted from an insistence on presenting what Learned Hand termed "monolithic solidarity" to the world. That insistence began with Chief Justice Marshall's determination that the Court should resolve its cases, not seriatim, with each Justice writing separately, but instead in a single, unified opinion. The resulting culture of the Court, one that discouraged both dissenting and concurring opinions as assaults on this unified front, persisted from Marshall's day into the 1930s.3 The Court in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries thus deliberately submerged the idea of a personal voice in the fiction of a collective voice, one that spoke for the institution rather than for the Justice who served as its designated scribe.     

The Supreme Court in Times of Hot and Cold War: Learning from the Sounds of Silence for a War on Terrorism

Justice William J. Brennan once remarked that the Court has never fully developed a jurisprudence of national security. It is simply too episodic, he said. ¹ Our present Chief Justice would, it would seem, largely agree, though his own research shows some greater willingness for the Court to superintend—at least after the fact ² —the actions of the executive in times of war or similar crisis. My assignment in this essay was to ask the question slightly differently; namely, has the posture of the Court differed in times of hot or cold war, and if so, how has it differed? As will be evident momentarily, that question is less helpful to our present circumstance than it might seem. Why? Because, frankly, we are in neither a hot nor cold war, but something quite different ³ —something that has the potential to be not only hot, but blistering, and something which will likely never be fully appreciated as having gone truly cold.     

The Supreme Court as a Policy Arena: The Strategies and Tactics of State Attorneys General

Presently, state governments are more active and more successful in the U.S. Supreme Court than at any time since the New Deal. These rates of activity and success are a function of two coincident forces—the emergence of the Republican Court and the increased capacity of the states to pursue their policy goals aggressively before the High Bench. In this analysis, we seek to offer a better-defined portrait of the states' evolving advocacy in the Supreme Court. Using archival and survey data, we find that, as a group, the states are more capable Supreme Court litigators, that their perceptions of the Republican Court have encouraged them to increase their pursuit of policy goals through litigation, and that they are "procedurally rational"—i.e., their estimates of success enter into their decisions to engage the Court.     

Historical Consensual Norms in the High Court

There is a substantial political-science literature that discusses the notion of consensual norms in the US Supreme Court. Most of this literature assumes that consensual norms exist, rather than proving their existence. Caldeira and Zorn ( American Journal of Political Science 42: 874-902, 1998) use the method of cointegration developed in econometric time-series analysis to prove the existence of a single consensual norm in the US Supreme Court. This study applies cointegration analysis to historical time-series data on dissenting and single judgments to examine whether there is a single consensual norm in the High Court of Australia. The study finds that a single consensual norm does not underlie decision making in the High Court. This result is explained on the basis that the institutions underpinning decision making and the approach to decision making are different between the Australian High Court and the US Supreme Court.     

The role of attitudinal,institutional and environmental factors in explaining variations in the dissent rate on the High Court of Australia

This paper examines the role of attitudinal, institutional and environmental factors in explaining the dissent rate on the High Court of Australia (hereafter High Court) using data for the period 1904–2001. The paper's main conclusion is that the majority of attitudinal and institutional factors tested are important predictors of variation in the dissent rate while the urbanisation rate, which is used to measure socio-political complexity, has no statistically significant effect on the High Court's dissent rate.     

The 'Haves' and the 'Have Nots': An Empirical Study of the Rational Actor and Party Capability Hypotheses in the High Court 1948–99

The High Court has always played an important political and social role. However, recent debate over implied rights in the Constitution has brought judicial power into focus, making it an important topic for assessment. One framework that has been used to test judicial power in Canadian, English and United States appeal courts is the notion of party capability theory. This paper analyses reported and unreported decisions of the High Court since 1948 in light of party capability theory. It attempts to identify what impact (if any) both the experience and resources of the litigants has had on which parties win and lose on appeal over an extended period. The main conclusion is that there is little evidence to support the thesis that stronger parties persistently come out ahead.     

(Re)introducing Wiley Rutledge

With the rarest of exceptions, when Supreme Court Justices leave the Court, they are soon all but forgotten. ¹ Constitutional law is unrelentingly presentist, so closely intertwined with politics and society that sitting (or recently departed) Justices necessarily speak to the issues more directly than those from another era. If that were not enough, being forgotten is virtually inevitable for those whose careers are short. One of those men was Wiley Rutledge who served from February 1943 until his death at age 55 from a cerebral hemorrhage, six and a half years later. Until John M. Ferren's recently published and marvelously researched Salt of the Earth, Conscience of the Court , ² Rutledge even lacked a true biography. ³ That has been a shame, because the two dominant themes of Ferren's book show that Rutledge is worth knowing: He was a good man and a good judge. Indeed, on what probably was the most fractious Court in American history, ⁴ Rutledge was the sole member both personally liked and intellectually respected by every other member. ⁵     

Roman Pottery Research in Britain and North-West Europe: Papers Presented to Graham Webster. Edited by A.C. and A. S. Anderson

The Court House at East Meon was a country residence of the medieval bishops of Winchester. Of this residence, the great hall, a solar, and a garderobe block survive largely intact. The Court House is remarkable not only for its fine state of preservation but also because of the detailed record of its development to be found in the magnificent records of the bishopric of Winchester. Until recently, there had been disagreement as to the date of its construction but the discovery of the original building accounts has allowed this to be established with certainty. Unlike larger bishopric residences which could accommodate the entire episcopal household for long periods, it seems to have served partly as a retreat for a select number of the bishop's household or friends. Although the name ‘Court House’ is not recorded until 1647, it is used here to denote the medieval house. All places referred to in the text are in Hampshire, unless otherwise stated.