加、美在中国联合国代表权问题上的分歧（1964—1966）

加拿大要求与中国发展关系的愿望始于新中国成立之初 ,但直至 2 0世纪 70年代初才得以实现 ,其曲折的发展过程 ,从某种意义上说 ,为后人提供了较大的研究空间。但遗憾的是 ,我们对于加拿大启动对华政策的关键阶段——— 6 0年代中后期的研究还很不够。比如 ,加拿大与美国在中国     

分歧与协调:佐藤内阁对联合国中国代表权问题的政策选择

亲台反华的日本佐藤内阁在1971年联合国中国代表权问题上费尽心机,不仅是为台湾当局继存于联合国的“逆重要问题案”的始作俑者,甚至一度对美国将安理会席位交归中华人民共和国的主张持“保留意见”。但随着尼克松访华计划的公布,视日美关系为日本对外关系核心的佐藤内阁迅速调整政策,公开与美国政府在联合国图谋“两个中国”并存局面。佐藤内阁顽固追随美国在联合国中国代表权问题上的政策立场,不仅遭到日本国内要求调整对华关系的反对力量的猛烈攻击,同时也使执政的自民党在对华政策上的内部分歧越发难以调和,并最终导致佐藤内阁失去调整对华政策的历史契机。     

台美英围绕联合国中国代表权问题的交涉（1951-1955）

中国代表权问题不仅是美苏为首的两大阵营对抗的最重要的冷战问题之一,而且是美国阵营内部歧见纷呈的问题。朝鲜战争爆发后,维护台湾在联合国的中国代表权符合美国的战略利益,但是英国并不紧随美国的指挥棒合拍地起舞。台湾利用美苏阵营的尖锐对抗,以小搏大,竭力争取美国支持直接否决反对台湾在联合国的中国代表权的方案。台美英三方均有各自的立场与考量,有时限的“缓议案”是三方博弈后的产物。随着美苏阵营对抗的渐趋缓和,台湾当局所能做的必定越来越多的是妥协与退让。     

美国与联合国中国代表权问题

对致力于推动中美关系正常化的尼克松与基辛格而言,如何处理联合国中国代表权问题似乎颇为棘手。实际上,与北京改善关系是他们处理此问题的战略前提,如何避免美国国内保守阵营的攻击则是两人制定具体战术的出发点,至于蒋介石政权的反应则基本不在他们的考虑范围内。1971年中国成功恢复在联合国的合法席位,虽与尼克松政府的相关政策不无关系,但其根本原因则在于中国自身,即只要中国不发生内乱,任何力量都无法阻止其加入联合国的步伐。而只要北京不让步,台北当局被驱逐出联合国就是必然的结局。     

美国与1966年联合国中国代表权问题

1964年以后,国际社会支持中国恢复在联合国席位的力量日益增强。在1966年联合国关于中国代表权问题的讨论中,为阻止中国进入联合国,美国投入了极大的精力。在这一过程中,美国及其盟国和蒋介石集团发生了尖锐的矛盾,经过讨价还价,美国在盟国的压力下作了相应的让步,美蒋最终达成妥协,中国仍然被排除在联合国之外。     

20世纪70年代初台湾当局对美“外交”与联合国中国代表权问题

1971年第26届联合国大会前一年内,在尼克松政府的要求和现实的压力下,台湾当局在联合国中国代表权问题上不断让步,但最终还是没能保住其在联合国的席位。在决策过程中,蒋介石表面上不断展示强硬立场,实质上却并非如此。他手下的高级"外交官"们为保住台湾当局在联合国的席位而倾向于妥协,但在威权体制下难于向蒋介石进言。     

1961年美蒋关于外蒙古联合国代表权问题的争论

20世纪60年代,国际社会支持中国恢复联合国席位的力量日益增加,为了阻止中国进入联合国,美国搬出外蒙古问题,企图通过让外蒙古进入联合国这一“迂回”手法,达到保护国民党席位的目的。在策划该计划的过程中,美蒋发生了激烈争吵。经过数轮讨价还价,美蒋最终达成妥协,从而为外蒙古进入联合国打开了方便之门。     

“台湾当局”对非洲农技“外交”与联合国中国代表权问题(1960～1971年)

20世纪60年代,中国在联合国的代表权问题进入了关键时期,为了争取非洲国家的支持,"台湾当局"在非洲展开了农技"外交"。1945年联合国成立时,非洲在联合国只拥有4个席位,到1971年已增加到42个席位。新中国成立     

美英“特殊关系”的构建与冷战的起源(1944-1950)

冷战起源是冷战史研究中的基本问题之一。美英“特殊关系”的设想（1944—1945）、迅速发展（1946—1947）和正式确立（1948—1950）三个阶段中的发展及其与苏联外交政策的战略互动,推动着冷战逐渐变为现实。美英“特殊关系”的形成和发展离不开植根于历史和现实中的战略基础——两国深厚的历史文化渊源,以及最高决策层之间密切的个人友谊网络;盎格鲁一撒克逊民族的恐惧感与冷战思维的发展;基于对外在威胁的相同理解而产生的捍卫资本主义政治经济体系的共同责任感与战略利益。冷战的起源伴随着全球规模的势力均衡的形成,然而,新的势力均衡对美英两国有着截然不同的意义。美英“特殊关系”是无形的,而冷战是有形的。无形的“特殊关系”推动着冷战的发展,有形的冷战也考验着无形的“特殊关系”。美英“特殊关系”的构建在无形之中构成了有形冷战起源的决定性因素。     

美英在新中国参与对日媾和问题上的争议

旧金山会议前后 ,美英围绕究竟“哪一个中国”将参与对日媾和的问题 ,立场一度严重对立 :美国支持台湾国民党政权而英国支持新中国。双方为此持续争议 ,直到美国以非常手段迫英国就范。文章认为 ,围绕中国签约权问题的分歧实际上反映了美英两国在远东存在的重大利害冲突、不同的现实处境以及两国外交的不同理念 ,也揭示出即使在冷战高峰时期 ,国家利益和历史传统在一国外交中仍发挥着不可忽视的作用。     

Australia and the 1947 United Nations Consular Commission to Indonesia

ABSTRACT

The Netherlands’ colonial empire was a source of wealth, pride and prestige, being seen by some as an essential element of Dutch identity and the key to the Netherlands’ status as a European power. The most prized of the empire’s components was Indonesia. When nationalists declared the independence of the Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1945, Dutch colonialists refused to take it seriously, but they soon discovered that the Indonesians were willing to fight for their newly-declared freedom. They also found that international opinion, especially as expressed in the new United Nations (UN), defended the Republic’s right to exist. Australia has been acknowledged as an important contributor to international recognition of Indonesian independence through its actions in the UN Security Council and its membership of the UN Committee of Good Offices (CGO). This article, however, focuses on a lesser-known part of the story: Australia’s role in the UN Consular Commission, established at the same time as the CGO. Although the Commission was active for only a short period in late 1947, it deserves recognition on a number of counts: for its pioneering work in UN peacekeeping; as an early example of Australian diplomacy in its region; and for how an examination of its activities, and the responses of the Dutch, the Indonesians and others, can be useful for understanding the course of the Indonesian independence struggle in the years that followed.     

Lost at Sea: Finnish government,shipping companies and the United Nations embargo against China during the 1950s

Finnish Cold War foreign policy was based on the desire to stay out of all international disputes. Yet, during the 1950s, two Finnish tankers, Wiima and Aruba, received an enormous amount of foreign attention when they tried to sail to Communist China. The United Nations had urged all countries, including non-members such as Finland, to stop selling strategic goods to China, which had intervened in the Korean War. The embargo created a highly profitable opening in the shipping market for anyone willing to transport such goods, and Finnish companies tried to fill it. This article suggests that they were in fact undermining the embargo more extensively than has been generally known. When the Finns were criticized for their actions, they interpreted this as a sign of the ruthlessness of great powers. At first, the Finnish government failed to recognize that these companies drove the country into the middle of international conflict and then took little decisive action to steer the country out of it. The allegedly pragmatic Finnish foreign policy was in this case actually based on unreliable information and incorrect assumptions.     

Being international in times of war: Arthur Sweetser and the shifting of the League of Nations to the United Nations

Transnational actors are increasingly surfacing when it comes to understanding the global dimensions of the modern nation-state. Thinking of the modern state from the diversity of its personnel and its many intersections with private and semi-private actors or institutions with a transnational reach, the new diplomatic history acknowledges the embeddedness of states in border-crossing agencies. What has been conceptualized as ‘network diplomacy’ grasps both the role of transnational epistemic communities for the making of particular policy fields and the perception of diplomats as an integral part of transnational initiatives. Taking the League of Nations as a case study, this article analyses how its personnel attempted to spell out ideas of network diplomacy and to make their exposed position at the intersection of transnational civil society, state politics and international institutions work to effect political change. We focus on the transnational career of Arthur Sweetser (1888–1968) who, as a journalist, a long-term member of the League secretariat, the UN staff and the US administration, was at the forefront of developing new techniques of diplomatic practices beyond institutional mandates. Sweetser’s trajectory allows us to illuminate the mechanisms of network diplomacy by probing into multi-layered negotiation processes that engaged state practices, international institutions and the border-crossing agency of individuals. Characterizing him as transnational enables one to interlink his mobile trajectory with a particular scope of action that unfolded beyond the political demarcation of the nation-state and its instituted logics of rule and diplomacy. We further carve out the main features of a diplomatic practice that was formally non-existent yet crucial to the transfer of League principles, practices and personnel to the new United Nations.     

美国社会组织与联合国人权规范的起源

二战爆发后,美国社会组织在对战争与和平问题的研究中提出依靠国际组织保障人权的规范构想。美国政府则并未重视人权议题,人权在敦巴顿橡树园会议上只处于边缘地位。社会组织在此后掀起大规模的游说活动,要求提高人权议题的地位,这使得美国政府考虑融合社会组织的人权规范构想与主权规范原则。旧金山会议上,美国说服其他大国接受其人权立场,极力否决拉美国家的人权提案,体现出美国借人权话语行使霸权的实质意图。最终出台的《联合国宪章》多处涉及人权,奠定了此后联合国人权规范的基础。但是,社会组织与美国政府围绕人权的争论凸显了宪章人权条款的复杂特征,这使得美国在此后联合国人权规范的发展中面临更多的挑战。     

The United Nations at Niagara: Borderlands Collaboration and Emerging Globalism

In 1946 a group of Western New York and Southern Ontario business leaders proposed locating United Nations headquarters on Navy Island, Canadian territory in the Niagara River. One of the most visionary proposals ever to come from the region, it was a genuinely binational project, grounded in the symbolism of the peaceful relationship along the Niagara after the War of 1812. The proposal revealed a high level of cross-border economic and cultural integration in the Niagara region that had been strengthened by the shared experience of World War II. However, the region was increasingly marginalized from its national and state/provincial cores as it struggled to integrate itself into an ever more globalized economy.     

The enforcement problem in Resolution 2094 and the United Nations Security Council sanctions regime: sanctioning North Korea

This article deconstructs United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2094 through the preambulatory statements, objectives, obligations, and implementation and enforcement provisions of UNSC Resolution 2094. The article proceeds in three parts. First, it reviews the academic literature on UNSC sanctions and their application in the North Korean case. Second, it deconstructs UNSC Resolution 2094 according to the common structural components of international legal instruments to assess the level of congruence between the objectives of UNSC Resolution 2094, its enforcement mechanisms and outcomes. Third, it explores the weaknesses of UNSC Resolution 2094, focusing on the gap between the objectives and enforcement mechanisms found in the resolution. The inability of the UNSC sanctions regime to prevent North Korea reaching the cusp of becoming a nuclear weapons power is evidence of the international community's weak leverage over Pyongyang, a situation arising from the vulnerability of South Korea to a North Korean attack and the cross-cutting strategic priorities of China; the absence of economic linkages between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the primary sanctions-sender state in the USA; and North Korea's commitment to a nuclear weapons capability as the foundation of its medium-term economic development strategy, its institutional governance structure and associated ideological commitments.