The naval battles of Roger of Lauria

Roger of Lauria's family was exiled from the kingdom of Sicily by Charles I of Anjou for its support of the Hohenstaufen cause but in the service of Aragon he became the most feared and renowned warrior of his generation. His six great naval victories during the War of the Sicilian Vespers closely determined the outcome of that struggle.Lauria's fame has been diminished by the minor place awarded to the War of the Vespers by modern medievalists and by its overshadowing by the Hundred Years War. But in fact it was an extremely important war in medieval history, witnessing the decline of the papacy and the kingdom of Sicily and the rise for a brief time of a new power in the Mediterranean: Aragon. Moreover, it was in this war that medieval warfare first began to acquire attributes characteristics of the later middle ages: supremacy of archers and infantry over mounted and mailed knights, appearance of disciplined and professional companies of mercenaries led by professional war leaders, and decline from chivalric warfare into nationalistic hatred and ferocity.Lauria's success lay in the superior qualities of his crews and in his own genius. Handling galley fleets successfully required mastery of the difficult nexus between land and sea for Mediterranean galley warfare was more amphibious than naval in the modern sense of the word. Lauria proved to be the greatest master of the science in the middle ages; a war leader deserving to be ranked with Richard Coeur de Lion, the Black Prince, and Nelson.     

LATE GALLEYS: The Fredriksvern Naval Shipyard and the coastal defence in Norway 1750–1814

From the early 18th century the Mediterranean galley experienced a new golden age in the Baltic Sea, as it was well adapted to the shallow sea with the islands and skerries found there. In Norway the Fredriksvern naval shipyard was founded in 1750 to build a galley fleet. For various reasons progress was slow, and when the galley fleet finally was built in the 1760s, it was probably the last one in Europe. New and more efficient inshore vessels were soon developed in the neighbouring countries, but they were not put into use in Norway in the 18th century. The explanation for Norway’s poor performance was probably too much peace: when Denmark-Norway became involved in the Napoleonic Wars, naval development was dramatically improved.     

King John's military reputation reconsidered

A measure that medieval chroniclers used for judging kings was success in battle. King John obviously failed this test with his loss of Normandy, 1202–04, and the failure of his 1214 continental campaign. Modern scholars prefer to depict the king as an able administrator, downplaying his military activity; they continue to follow medieval writers in labelling John an incompetent general, lacking boldness, even cowardly. In fact, John's poor military reputation is based on only a few comments in chronicles and verse narratives. While his defense of Normandy from the French was a disaster, partly because of his own failings, factors beyond his control contributed heavily to his loss of the duchy, such as the superior wealth of Philip Augustus. Critics neglect the link between the English king's warfare and his administrative activity, which aimed at raising men, money and other resources for wars. John conducted campaigns capably before and after the loss of Normandy. Some moderns accept traditional condemnation of his military skill, because of a misunderstanding of the nature of medieval warfare. Pitched battles were rare, and war consisted of seemingly aimless plundering raids and sieges of castles. John's supposed lack of boldness merely reflects a medieval commander's caution. His plans for the relief of Château Gaillard in 1203 and his 1214 two-pronged attack on Philip illustrate skill in strategy. Unlike many medieval generals John was skilled at siegecraft, seen at Rochester Castle in 1215. While King John's two greatest campaigns failed, costing him most of his continental lands, his failures in warfare are due neither to incompetence nor to cowardice.     

Sentiment vs Strategy: British Naval Policy,Imperial Defence,and the Development of Dominion Navies, 1911–14

This article examines British naval policy towards imperial defence and the development of autonomous Dominion navies in 1911–14. It shows that the Admiralty's main goal under the leadership of Winston Churchill was to concentrate British and Dominion warships in European waters, and ideally in the North Sea, to meet the German threat. Churchill's approach to naval developments in the Dominions was also shaped by his desire to fulfil the Cabinet's policy of remaining strong in the Mediterranean Sea. He made some concessions to sentiment in the Dominions, but his attempts to create a coherent imperial policy for the naval defence of Britain and its empire were ultimately unsuccessful. By 1914 it was clear that the Dominions would not provide the additional warships Britain required for the Mediterranean, and on the eve of war the Admiralty was beginning to prepare an imperial naval strategy that more accurately reflected the Empire's capabilities.     

Wellsprings of a ‘World War’: An early English attempt to conquer Canada during King William's war, 1688–97

The military historiography of early modern colonial America currently offers two contrary interpretations. One emphasises the exceptional nature of American warfare as a product of a process of military acculturation between the colonists and the native Americans; the other denies this acculturation in favour of the successful importation of orthodox European forms of warfare. By assessing the military history of the early years of King William's War, 1688–97, including in particular an early attempt to conquer French Canada in 1690 by Sir William Phips, this article contributes to this historiographical debate. King William's War (known on the European continent as the Nine Years' War) has been little studied in this context and the article argues that not only was military acculturation less relevant in the later seventeenth century, but also that the colonists' deployment of amphibious actions against the French demonstrated an increasing recognition that, strategically and militarily, they were required to draw closer to London's war policy and to replicate European combat.     

Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief

Abstract

Abraham Lincoln's presidency was defined and dominated by war, yet Lincoln himself had very little direct experience with warfare; nor had the American presidency been truly tested by war when he took office. Lincoln had to negotiate very difficult political and constitutional terrain as he waged the Civil War: issues of executive authority, constitutional powers and their limitations, and the nature of civil liberties during war constantly bedeviled him. His guiding principle in all these matters, and the greatest lesson we can learn from him today, was his flexibility and his pragmatism.     

An enduring influence on imperial defence and grand strategy: British perceptions of the Italian Navy, 1935–1943

The Mediterranean was a vital artery of the British Empire. It was a strategic corridor, linking Britain to its Middle and Far East possessions and precious resources. Its control was a central tenet of British imperial strategy, yet by the mid-1930s, this faced a new challenge from Fascist Italy. The Italian Navy was central to expansionist aspirations and forced British reappraisals of the allocation of defence resources both in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. It therefore came to exert a generally under-appreciated influence on pre-war British imperial defence policy and war planning. Although consistently viewed as vastly inferior to the Royal Navy, it was still seen as an impediment to Britain's ability to deliver imperial defence across the globe, or conduct a worldwide war against multiple enemies. This view persisted even after important defeats were inflicted on it in 1940–1941, and continued right through to 1943. Awareness of the seriousness with which the British viewed Italian naval strength adds important context to debates about British strategy in the Far East and over Winston Churchill's preference for a ‘Mediterranean first’ strategy. Italian naval power played a greater role in shaping the Allied prosecution of the Second World War than is commonly accepted.     

“本土安全”思想对中国近代海疆安全战略的影响

本土安全是近代中国海疆安全战略的终极目标。由于战略目标的局限,中国虽然拥有具备远洋作战能力的海军,但却无法在海军军备建设、军力部署,以及战略战备等方面摆脱海岸防御战略的影响。受本土安全思想的影响,中国的战略决策者在甲午战争中屡失战机,而近代中国海疆安全战略体系也因此崩溃。     

From experience to law: Leo Strauss and the Weimar crisis of the philosophy of religion

This paper is a study of the origins of Leo Strauss's thought, arguing that its early development must be understood in the context of the philosophy of religion of late Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany. More specifically, it shows that Strauss's early works were written against the background of Kantian philosophy and post-Kantian accounts of religious experience, and that his turn towards medieval law as a topic and ideal was precipitated by the critique of those accounts by radical Protestant theologians writing in the post-World War I era of crisis. Ironically, then, Strauss's investment in premodern Judaism—and his related rejection of modern philosophy—had important Christian origins.     

The Spanish American War’s ‘Most Durable Hero’: Admiral Pasquale Cervera and Popular Heroic Values in the United States, 1898–1909

The United States honored a host of military heroes during the Spanish American War including Pasqual Cervera y Topete, the enemy admiral who had experienced a humiliating defeat at the Battle of Santiago Bay, Cuba (3 June 1898) at the hands of US naval forces. Over the course of the war and in the year that followed, American public opinion of the admiral became positive and increasingly laudatory. By late 1899, Life Magazine, followed by other popular publications, claimed that Cervera was a better war hero then Admiral George Dewey and other American officers who had been wildly celebrated for their wartime heroics. The enemy admiral’s heroic rise was possible because of a fundamental change in the relationship between the press and the nation’s war heroes that sped up each champion’s ultimate decline. In the late nineteenth century Americans sought chivalrous, selfless men of action for their heroes. As journalists began covering each war hero’s daily life as they did other celebrities, however, they discovered character flaws in the nation’s homegrown champions. This examination of Cervera’s gradual rise as an American hero through his death in 1909 includes an overview of the American hero-making process and lifecycle and how celebrity journalism shortened the reign of most war heroes. After identifying the complicated set of values the nation sought in its war heroes at the end of the century, this study will also explain why journalists considered naval heroes as better representatives of those cherished ideals than those from the Army (including volunteer Theodore Roosevelt) until well after the end of the war. Roosevelt was honored as a hero during the war and won the 1899 New York gubernatorial election largely because of his wartime popularity, but was not considered selfless because of his clear political ambitions. American hero-worship of Cervera developed slowly, was considerably more subdued than the public enthusiasm displayed for America’s native-born champions, and was undoubtedly bestowed, in part, as a criticism of the failure of American heroes to live up to the heroic narrative created for them by reporters and biographers. Cervera’s ranking as Life’s ‘most durable hero’ of the war, while seemingly nonsensical, begins to make more sense when the Spanish admiral is reconfigured as a national cultural hero instead of an American military champion. Despite his enemy status, Cervera came to epitomise important military values of the day, because of the rapid decline of the nation’s American-born war heroes brought about by celebrity journalism.     

English towns in the late middle ages: the case of Great Yarmouth

Historians are divided over the economic fortunes of English towns in the late middle ages. Many argue for a ‘general crisis’ while others emphasize the variety of urban experience. Great Yarmouth is a striking example of a town facing protracted difficulties. Its decline in relation to other English towns between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries is particularly marked. Fourth among provincial towns in the 1334 tax return, Yarmouth ranked eighteenth in 1377 and twentieth in the subsidies of the 1520s.Yarmouth's problems become apparent soon after 1350, but while the Black Death may have killed one-third of its inhabitants, it is not the main cause of the town's misfortunes. Yarmouth depended heavily on two industries: shipping and fishing. The former was undermined by the early stages of the Hundred Years War, and the latter by competition from the Low Countries. A silting harbour which drove away trade and the high cost of building and repairing the town walls added to Yarmouth's difficulties.Whether economic decline is measured in terms of totals, for example total volume of trade, or in terms of individual production or wealth, Yarmouth fared badly. In the second half of the fourteenth century, Yarmouth's trade was much reduced and the town's leading burgesses seem much poorer than their counterparts before 1350. While Yarmouth clearly was in decline from about 1350 onwards, the town's experiences cannot be used to prove the case for a ‘general crisis’. They have to be seen in the context of the continuing prosperity of Norwich and the revival of Ipswich.     

Ruling from afar: government and information management in late medieval Sicily

In 1412 Sicily lost its independence and became part of the Crown of Aragon. To rule the island, the new monarchs developed a system of long-distance government, through the action of local viceroys. But how did this system work in practice? This article engages with the lively historiographical debate about late medieval Sicily and more generally the Aragonese conglomerate by examining the series of libri quictacionum (‘books of quittances’) produced by the financial office, the Conservatoria regii patrimonii. It shows that the management of information – by means of a new genre of documents, an innovative record-keeping system and an apparatus of marginal annotations – became crucial in establishing effective government at a distance and in strengthening royal control over Sicilian institutions and officers. Moreover, these books and the documents they encompass highlight the social dynamics of the island and the emergence of an urban class: the Aragonese promoted the inclusion of the principal members of the latter into central government by granting them offices.     

Robert,earl of Gloucester,and the daughter of Zelophehad

Robert, earl of Gloucester, the leader of Mathilda's party in England during Stephen's reign, has a good press because the main source for his activities is his admirer, William of Malmesbury. This article re-assesses Robert's role and character by concentrating on chroniclers other than Malmesbury and on charter evidence. It finds, by these methods, that Earl Robert may have been in some ways an attractive man, but that he was also a practised curialist, a ruthless factionalist, a plunderer of church lands, and a man who made acquisition of his neighbours' lands one of his main objects. New evidence is presented to account for his behaviour in the crucial months at the end of 1135 and beginning of 1136 when Stephen made himself king. Robert is found to have had little choice but to cross to England because his lands in the southern Marches were under threat from a Welsh rising. His alienation from Stephen in the next few years is traced to a failure at court against his rivals, the Beaumont group. His subsequent private war against the Beaumonts in Dorset and Worcestershire is further evidence against Malmesbury 's portrayal of him as a man of pure principle. conduct of the war against Stephen after 1139 can be shown to have had serious flaws. The result was a rebellion against him by his own sons and the repudiation of his methods (if not his acquisitions) by his successor Earl William. Evidence is presented that Earl William sparked off the movement amongst the magnates to draw up private treaties to contain the Anarchy. In view of all this, it is not surprising to find indications that Earl Robert lacked any real commitment to the claims of his half-sister, the empress.     

Astrology in the service of the crown: Bartomeu de Tresbens,physician and astrologer to King Pere the Ceremonious of Aragon

Bartomeu de Tresbens (fl. 1359–75) was a physician and astrologer in the service of King Pere the Ceremonious of Aragon and his son Joan, both of them keenly interested in providing patronage for astronomy-astrology. Tresbens dedicated a set of astrological treatises in Catalan to Pere. He was the author of the most outstanding body of astrological work written in the vernacular in the medieval West. However, it has scarcely been studied: only his longest treatise has been edited, though insufficiently analysed, whereas his other works remain to be researched. This paper outlines Tresbens’ life and his relationship with the monarchy, and presents an overview of his works. Tresbens is revealed to be a distinguished individual whose case can help us understand the role of astrologers in medieval European courts.     

King Pedro IV of Aragon, royal propaganda and the tradition of royal speechwriting

In the medieval Crown of Aragon it was customary for the corts to begin with a proposicio or opening speech made by the king. These Aragonese royal speeches were not merely confined to a brief summary of the political situation or a series of points to be considered but were elaborately constructed political sermons, in which affairs of state were portrayed in terms of Christian morality and nationalist pride, with the aid of exempla drawn from the Bible and other religious and classical works. An example is the speech made by Pedro IV ‘the Ceremonious’ of Aragon against the rebellion of the Judge of Arborea in Sardinia. A copy of this speech survives written in the king's own hand which raises the interesting question of whether the kings of Aragon were themselves responsible for the ideas expressed in these speeches and for composing them or whether their efforts were confined to reading out propaganda which was primarily the creation of royal officials.     

The Arctic in the middle ages

The rather sparse and dubious data about Arctic regions known to Antiquity were taken over, mostly via Pliny, by the middle ages and reinforced and expanded in significant ways. This paper, which was delivered as an Inaugural Lecture at the University of Groningen in November 1982, reviews the activities and reports of medieval explorers, colonists and traders in or about the Arctic and considers the handful of medieval writers who display some real knowledge about Arctic regions. The generality of medieval writers on history and geography knew little or nothing. Even so, it is shown that here and there references are made to many of the features which are thought of as typically Arctic in the modern popular consciousness, with the exception of igloos and muskoxen. Commercial connections with the Arctic through Novgorod and Bergen are examined, and some account given of contacts with Iceland and the disappearance of the Norse settlement in Greenland. Polar bears and white falcons in western Europe, both of nearly indisputable Arctic origin, are discussed, attention is drawn to the very inadequate portrayal of the Arctic on medieval maps, and the paper closes with a glance at Olaus Magnus's account of northern peoples published in 1555.     

The prince and the churl: The traumatic experience of Philip Augustus

Historians have recently argued that by the late Middle Ages a number of Mediterranean economies, notably southern Italy and parts of Spain, stood in a “colonial” relationship vis-à-vis other Mediterranean or northern European regions. For Sicily it has been argued that its economy was based on the exchange of agricultural products, principally grain, for imported manufactures, mainly textiles. Sicilian cloth manufactures were too weak to withstand foreign competition, which created an unbalanced and externally dependent structure of exchange and radically curtailed any chance of autochthonous economic development. This article discusses the empirical evidence upholding these statements about Sicilian textile manufactures. It includes an evaluation of the proportion of foreign imports to local production and consumption, of the socially distinct markets to which foreign and local manufactures catered, and of the nature, quality and extent of local production; the discussion is set in the context of the economic and social transformations taking place in Europe after 1350. The final part briefly analyses the institutional structures and constraints peculiar to Sicilian manufacture, such as the relationship between city and countryside and the apparent lack of any craft organizations. In the light of the extensive evidence for textile manufactures, the author concludes that the empirical basis for the argument that Sicily had a “colonial” dependence on cloth imports is insufficient, that local manufacture was quite capable of withstanding foreign competition of comparable quality, and that the explanation for Sicily's economic development in the late medieval and modern periods must be sought in its own social structures and in the result of the conflicts that arose within them.     

New Chinese Military History, 1839–1951: What’s the Story?

Since 1990, New Chinese Military History in the West has remedied scholarly neglect of Chinese warfare and changed the usual stories of modern China. These studies disproved Orientalist assumptions of a unique “Chinese way of war” or a strategic culture that avoided aggressive confrontation. Scholars also challenge the assumption that Confucian immobility led to a clash of civilizations and decisive defeat in the Opium Wars, First Sino-Japanese War, and Boxer War of 1900. In fact, Qing officials were quick and successful in creating a new military regime. New military histories of the warlords, the Sino-Japanese Wars, and the Chinese Civil War show that developing new types of warfare was central in creating the new nation. All these wars split the country into factions that were supported by outside powers: they were internationalized civil wars. The article also asks how the choice of terms, labels, and categories shapes interpretations and political messages.