America as a European power: the end of empire by integration?

Is the postwar partnership between Europe and America now a historical artefact? Much depends on whether the notion of America as a ‘European power’ still holds. The US attained this status through a strategy of ‘empire by integration’, extending its postwar ‘empire’ through negotiation and support for European integration, and envisaging a collectively powerful Europe as fundamental to the health of its most important security alliance. The election of George W. Bush, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the war in Iraq are often seen as producing deep ruptures both in American policy towards Europe and the transatlantic alliance. Yet, the embrace of a new US policy of ‘disaggregation’ of Europe is unproven, and in any event unlikely to mark a permanent shift. The US and Europe are surprisingly close to agreement on ends for the international order. Conflict over Iraq has obscured a significant increase in policy cooperation and convergence of strategy in the war on terrorism.     

Books Received

Abstract

YEARS FROM NOW, historians seeking a barometer of the decline in popular support for the Iraq War need only read Bob Woodward's trilogy on the George W. Bush administration's foreign policy. The first volume, Bush at War, which exanfines the planning for the war in Afghanistan in 200l, borders at times on the hagiographical.¹ The sequel, Plan of Attack, which examines the military and diplomatic approach to war in Iraq in 2oo3, is more reserved. Bush himself receives even-handed treatment, but many of his subordinates, in particular the secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and the civilian leadership in the Pentagon, are severely criticized. Woodward's disillusionment is complete by the summer of 2oo6, when he published the dfird and final volume, State of Denial, which details the failures of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, and shows no sign of the patriotism that coloured the earlier work. Bush at War, written with the smoke from 9/11 wafting in the airs could praise because it does not focus on Iraq: few objected to the means used and the ends pursued in Afghanistan. But Plan of Attack and State of Denial seek to explain a manifestly unpopular war.¹     

George W. Bush's City on a Hill

This paper explores the various and sometimes contradictory meanings of the metaphor of A City on a Hill, with an emphasis on how such an investigation can contribute to an understanding of the foreign policy of George W. Bush, especially in terms of the War on Terrorism in general and the war in Iraq in particular. The strands within the metaphor include religious, political, economic, and technological dimensions which too often exacerbate the confusions about national self-image many Americans have about our role in the world and about what has been called the right-wing Wilsonianism of the Bush White House. Greater clarity about the role of this metaphor in our history might help in minimizing what can fittingly be called the law of unintended consequences.     

Ten years on: Obama's war on terrorism in rhetoric and practice

Ten years after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC on September 11, 2001, the United States remains embroiled in a long‐term struggle with what George W. Bush termed the existential threat of international terrorism. On the campaign trail, his successor as US President, Barack Obama, promised to reboot the ‘war on terror’. He claimed that his new administration would step back from the rhetoric and much of the Bush administration policy, conducting a counterterrorism campaign that would be more morally acceptable, more focused and more effective—smarter, better, nimbler, stronger. This article demonstrates, however, that those expecting wholesale changes to US counterterrorism policy misread Obama's intentions. It argues that Obama always intended to deepen Bush's commitment to counterterrorism while at the same time ending the ‘distraction’ of the Iraq War. Rather than being trapped by Bush's institutionalized construction of a global war on terror, the continuities in counterterrorism can be explained by Obama's shared conception of the imperative of reducing the terrorist threat to the US. The article assesses whether Obama has pursued a more effective counterterrorism policy than his predecessor and explores how his rhetoric has been reconstituted as the actions of his policy have unfolded. By addressing his policies toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, Guantánamo Bay and torture, the uses of unmanned drone attacks and domestic wire‐tapping, this article argues that Obama's ‘war’ against terrorism is not only in keeping with the assumptions and priorities of the last ten years but also that it is just as problematic as that of his predecessor.     

The ideological roots of failure: the application of kinetic neo‐liberalism to Iraq

This article argues that American policy towards Iraq went through four major shifts between the invasion in 2003 and the announcement of the surge in 2007. The best way to understand the Bush administration's evolving policy towards Iraq is by examining the ideological parameters within which it was made. The article assesses various approaches to understanding the relationship between ideology, policy making and foreign policy, concluding that ideology shapes the paradigm and analytical categories within which foreign policy is made. A major change in foreign policy originates either from the decision‐maker consciously recognizing and attempting to rework the ideational parameters within which policy is made or in reaction to ‘discrepant information’ or ‘anomalies’ that destabilize the paradigm and its analytical categories. The article goes on to examine the extent to which both neo‐liberalism and neo‐conservatism shaped George W. Bush's foreign policy. It identifies a series of major analytical categories that originate from within these two doctrines and shaped policy towards Iraq. The article argues that the four major shifts in Bush's policy towards Iraq were forced upon the administration by the rising tide of politically motivated violence. Ultimately this violence forced Bush to abandon the major analytical categories that, up to 2007, had given his policy coherence. In order to extricate his administration from the quagmire that Iraq had become by 2006, Bush totally transformed his approach, dropping the previously dominant neo‐liberal paradigm and adopting a counter‐insurgency doctrine.     

Australia,US torture and the power of international law

ABSTRACT

Australia cooperated extensively with the George W. Bush administration during the ‘war on terror.’ However, in doing so, Australia failed to condemn, and in some instances, condoned US torture and detention programs. Does Australia’s conduct demonstrate a failure of international law and human rights to constrain Australia’s actions? Although the Howard government was heavily criticised for failing to uphold human rights in the fight against terrorism, international law was not forgotten. This article argues that international law shaped Australia’s cooperation with the US. Australia strategically used international laws to legitimise its cooperation with the US in the face of evidence of US torture. International law was not dismissed to pursue national security interests but used to legitimise Australia’s security policies.     

A war in search of a rationale

The recent publications of memoirs by former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet and former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith have reopened the debate over the origins of the Iraq War. Both men—who were widely blamed for the ‘intelligence failure’ on weapons of mass destruction and the exaggerated connection between Al‐Qaeda and Iraq—purport to set the record straight about what really happened inside the Bush administration during the run‐up to the war. Yet, both men have actually produced books marked by a strange combination of self‐pity and disingenuousness. This article looks at their attempts at self‐justification in light of the growing evidence that the decision to invade was made in mid‐2002; if true, their arguments that they were participating in a genuine policy debate rather than a search for a rationale become problematic. Rather than exculpating themselves, their memoirs instead serve as damning indictments of both men, showing how Tenet and Feith enabled the President's decision to wage war on Iraq as a matter of choice rather than necessity.     

Justifying the use of force in a post‐9/11 world: striving for hierarchy in international society

This article examines the justifications made for war by President Bush in Afghanistan and Iraq, cataloguing all the administration's statements that justify or support these wars. These discourses reveal a radical departure from the post‐1990 trend of United States presidents, with international law and human rights being almost absent. The justifications point to a hegemonic US attempting to establish itself as the guarantor and provider of freedom and peace, attempting to establish a hierarchically structured international society.     

War is its Own Justification: What Americans Think about War

Abstract

The authors deal with the morality of war in American culture. They argue that a war ethics that was characteristic of the Cold War has given way to a warrior ethics as it has developed in post-Vietnam America, in print media, popular sentiment, and film. According to this warrior ethics, the citizenry's support for soldiers, regardless of the justice of war, is understood to create social solidarity. Wars are easily justified because, at bottom, war is understood to be its own justification. It unites a country. This popular conception of war both props up more high-minded, political rationales for war and undermines traditional just war ethics. The article uses the war in Iraq as a case study. It analyzes the Bush administration's defense of the war alongside similar accounts of the just war theory given by Richard John Neuhaus, Michael Novak, and George Weigel.

"As a moral problem, war is ultimately a problem of policy, and therefore a problem of social morality." John Courtney Murray     

Myths, Motivations and 'Misunderestimations': the Bush Administration and Iraq

This article explores the myths and motivations behind US foreign policy towards Iraq in America's 'war on terrorism'. It argues that the foreign policy of the Bush administration is widely misunderstood and that much of the debate about Iraq policy that has taken place has been conducted at an unhelpful level of analysis. It addresses arguments that the Bush administration is motivated by oil, revenge or hubris as well as the more mainstream arguments that an attack on Iraq would provoke instability through the entire Middle East, as well as encouraging further acts of and support for murderous terrorism; that there is no urgency to act against Iraq as containment and deterrence remain adequate means to manage this threat; and that Iraq should be a lower priority than dealing with North Korea. It does this by analysing the development of American foreign policy thinking on the war on terrorism, what motivates it, and why it rejects the arguments of its critics. The article explains the intellectual process by which the US decided upon this course of action and how Europe's failure to understand this process added to its incomprehension of American policy. It does not argue that European's opposition would have been swept aside had they better understood the Bush administration, the central disagreement about the necessity and prudence of military action versus containment remains, but that such an understanding would have allowed for a better and more focused level of debate than the one which has got us to this point. Nor does it argue that the Bush administration approach is necessarily persuasive or justified, merely that its case is reasoned and explicable in terms of America's foreign policy traditions.     

War in Iraq, Revolution in America

In this lecture in honour of John Whitehead, Strobe Talbott reflects on the history of the international system, the emergence of the nation-state and the role the US has played in the formation of post-Second World War international institutions. He draws a distinction between the typical Westphalian nation-state, exemplified in Europe, and the United States, a nation based on the 'exertion of political will and championship of political ideas'—a distinction that helps to account for the strain of 'exemplary exceptionalism'; in the history of US foreign policy. Turning to a dichotomy of approach in the foreign policy of the current Bush administration, the author draws attention to the continuation of a tradition of 'moral clarity' on the one hand and on the other hand the introduction of a new concept that saw the preeminence of American power reordering a dangerous world. He believes the Bush 'revolution' in foreign policy reached its peak with the Iraq war and that there is now hope the US will recommit itself to the international institutions severely damaged over the past two years and will begin a new era in which America takes a leading role within a multilateral framework.     

The Bush administration and Asia Pacific multilateralism: unrequited love?

This article challenges the presumed multilateral aversion of the George W. Bush administration. It argues that, at least in its approach toward the Asia-Pacific, this administration has been a more active and stimulatory advocate of multilateral approaches than is commonly acknowledged. The article begins by documenting the Bush administration's multilateral activism in the Asia-Pacific and examines those factors which appear to have contributed towards it. It then goes on to demonstrate, however, that Bush's at times unexpected enthusiasm for multilateral approaches has encountered a high degree of regional reticence. For a part of the world that has been affording an increased prominence to multilateral institutions and activities, this finding is initially both surprising and significant. The article concludes by seeking to account for this apparent anomaly and by considering its possible implications for the emerging regional architecture.     

A Religious Response Veiled in a Presidential Address: A Theological Study of Bush's Speech on 20 september 2001

Abstract

The speech met the moment. The moment was like none experienced before. The speech transformed a presidency and rallied a nation. But what was this pivotal response to a critical moment in American history? Was it a call to a just and holy war? Is God really on the president's ‘side’? This article analyzes the speech delivered by President George W. Bush on 20 September 2001, to a joint session of Congress and to a troubled nation. It was a speech that depended on intimations of righteous indignation, a clear demarcation of good and evil, and a God who is not neutral. The article looks at the religious themes overtly and subtly stated in this speech, to discern what was actually a religious response to a global crisis that took the form of a presidential address.     

Paving the Way for Baghdad: The US Invasion of Panama, 1989

ABSTRACT

In December 1989, the United States unleashed its might against Panama. The invasion, Operation Just Cause, was the largest military operation conducted by the US since Vietnam and its first post-Cold War intervention. US troops invaded a foreign country, quickly occupied it, and withdrew before engendering a violent insurgency. Although George H. W. Bush authorized an illegal invasion which invited international denunciation, its quick and successful resolution concealed serious issues. Senior officials who served Bush senior, but who badly failed his son, also drew important lessons from the invasion. Just Cause demonstrated how a small and mobile force using overwhelming firepower could decapitate an enemy regime and establish the conditions for the development of a democratic state. The invasion also prefigured the justification for US interventionism in the post-Cold War: spreading democracy and protecting human rights. An easy victory on the surface, the Panamanian intervention paved the way for a greater calamity on the Tigris decades later. Just Cause provided US policy-makers with a false sense of confidence and optimism that paved the path for the invasion of Baghdad in 2003.     

The U.S. presidential election and the Bush v. Gore supreme court decision

The 2000 presidential election produced over two dozen different law suits including two separate decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court. The purpose of this essay is to examine the most important of these decisions, George W. Bush v. Albert Gore, Jr., highlighting its logic and geographic implications     

‘An Angel Directs the Storm’: The Religious Politics of American Neoconservatism

Abstract

In his inaugural speech, President George W. Bush suggested that the mission of America to spread freedom and democracy in the world is a divinely authored mission. The intention first announced in Bush's inaugural to globalize an American Christian vision of freedom and democracy, and of free market capitalism, reflects the theological underpinnings of the neo-conservativism of the Bush administration. In this article I trace the remarkable continuities between the neo-conservative political theology of Bush and his acolytes and more mainstream Niebuhrian approaches to democracy and the ‘manifest destiny’ of America. I then subject the emergence of an American imperium, and the political theology associated with it, to a critique in dialogue with early Christian critics of Roman Empire, and with the Christian pacifist tradition as recently retrieved by North American theological ethicists John Howard Yoder and Stanley Hauerwas.     

The United States, The United Nations and Iraq: 'Multilateralism of a kind'

Much is made of the need for any second war against Iraq (following Desert Storm of 1991) to be sanctioned by a resolution of the UN Security Council, approved necessarily by all five Permanent Members. Yet only two of the five, the USA and the UK, show any enthusiasm for renewed war in the Persian Gulf; and British policy is undeniably following rather than leading American actions on the diplomatic and military fronts. What are the sources of this American policy? Some critics say oil; the latest arguments of proponents invoke humanitarian concerns; somewhere between the two are those who desire ‘regime change’ to create the economic and political conditions in which so‐called western political, economic and social values can flourish. To understand the present crisis and its likely evolution this article examines American relations with Iraq in particular, the Persian Gulf more generally and the Middle East as a region since the Second World War. A study of these international relations combined with a critical approach to the history of American actions and attitudes towards the United Nations shows that the United States continues to pursue a diplomacy blending, as occasion suits, the traditional binaries of multilateralism and unilateralism—yet in the new world‐wide ‘war on terrorism’. The question remains whether the chosen means of fighting this war will inevitably lead to a pyrrhic victory for the United States and its ad hoc allies in the looming confrontation with Iraq.     

Enlightenment and nuclear order

Applying the method of enlightenment correctly to the area of nuclear non‐proliferation would require a major effort to critically evaluate ideologies. Liberal arms control—despite its many successes and merits—has devised over the years a whole set of ideological tenets and attitudes. Some of them have been transformed into beliefs that could be termed myths. The most prominent ideological myth of the liberal arms control school is the notion that the Nuclear Non‐proliferation Treaty of 1968 (NPT) was in essence a disarmament agreement, not a non‐proliferation treaty. To depict the negotiations as a premeditated effort of enlightenment, where the governments of this world came together to solemnly decide that some of them would be allowed to have some nuclear weapons for an interim period while the others would renounce their possession immediately, is pure. It would be equally wrong to qualify the ‘grand bargain’ as one between the nuclear haves and the nuclear have‐nots. Another myth of the liberal arms control school is the notion that—in order to gain support for the NPT—the superpowers had altered their nuclear weapons strategy in the 1960s. Again, this contention is not borne out by the development of nuclear strategies and doctrines. The third myth is the contention that there was an abrupt shift in US non‐proliferation policy as George W. Bush came into power. The major changes in US non‐proliferation policy had already started during the Clinton administration and some of them can be traced back to the tenure of President George W. H. Bush senior. They all reflected the changed international environment and represented necessary adjustments of the non‐proliferation strategy. The Clinton administration left some of the traditional paths of arms control and rightly undertook some changes that were necessary because traditional instruments of arms control were no longer adequate. The Bush administration continued that policy, but in a more radical way.     

Book reviews

Book reviewed in this articles. Constructivism and international relations: Alexander Wendt and his critics. Edited by Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander. Agents, structures and international relations: politics as ontology. by Colin Wight. Harry Potter and international relations. Edited by Daniel H. Nexon and Iver B. Neumann. The ethics of territorial borders: drawing lines in the shifting sand. by John Williams. The parliament of man: the United Nations and the quest for world government. by Paul Kennedy. Peace at any price: how the world failed Kosovo. by Iain King and Whit Mason. The first ten years of the WTO, 1995‐2005. by Peter Gallagher. Normalization of US‐China relations: an international history. Edited by William C. Kirby, Robert S. Ross and Gong Li. Of law and war. by David Kennedy. War and the law of nations: a general history. by Stephen C. Neff. The making of a terrorist: recruitment, training and root causes. Edited by James Forest. Economic justice in an unfair world: toward a level playing field. by Ethan B. Kapstein. The next great globalization: how disadvantaged nations can harness their financial systems to get rich. by Frederic S. Mishkin. Italy and Albania: financial relations in the fascist period. by Alessandro Roselli. International law and sustainable development: lessons from the law of international watercourses. by Alistair Rieu‐Clarke. From world war to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt and the international history of the 1940s. by David Reynolds. War and state formation in ancient China and early modern Europe. by Victoria Tin‐bor Hui. A time for peace: the legacy of the Vietnam War. by Robert D. Schulzinger. The rift between America and old Europe: the distracted eagle. by Peter H. Merkl. The geopolitics of Euro‐Atlantic integration. by Hans Mouritzen. Managing EU‐US relations: actors, institutions and the new transatlantic agenda. by Rebecca Steffenson. Designing democracy: EU enlargement and regime change in post‐communist Europe. by Geoffrey Pridham. The year of Europe: America, Europe and the energy crisis 1972‐4. Edited by Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon. Albania as dictatorship and democracy: from isolation to the Kosovo war, 1946‐8. by Owen Pearson. I. B. Military and society in post‐Soviet Russia. Edited by Stephen L. Webber and Jennifer G. Mathers. Russian conservatism and its critics: a study in political culture. by Richard Pipes. The Middle East in international relations: power, politics and ideology. by Fred Halliday. Constructing international relations in the Arab world. by Fred H. Lawson. The trouble with Africa: why foreign aid isn't working. by Robert Calderisi. Security dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes region. Edited by Gilbert M. Khadiagala. In the line of fire: a memoir. by Pervez Musharraf. China's rise in Asia: promises and perils. by Robert G. Sutter. Making China policy: from Nixon to G. W. Bush. by Jean A. Garrison. Hungry for peace: international security, humanitarian assistance, and social change in North Korea. by Hazel Smith. How Bush rules: chronicles of a radical regime. by Sidney Blumenthal. The one percent doctrine: deep inside America's pursuit of its enemies since 9/11. by Ron Suskind.     

The British road to war: Blair, Bush and the decision to invade Iraq

The British decision to go to war against Iraq with the United States has been widely criticized for being based on inaccurate and exaggerated assessments of the threat posed by Iraq. This article shows that the case for military action made by the British government was based on a measured analysis of the threat, on the conviction that the continued containment of Iraq through sanctions was not effective or morally acceptable, and that the human rights violations of the Iraqi regime were of a such a scale that they could no longer be tolerated. The article then assesses the judgements of the British government in the light of the information that has come to light since the war against Iraq in 2003.