Baldwin Hyde,Clerk of the Parliaments in the Readeption Parliament of 1470–1

Baldwin Hyde, who served as clerk of the parliaments in the assembly held during Henry VI's brief restoration in 1470–1, has traditionally been thought to have been a party‐political appointee, who displaced his long‐serving predecessor. This article presents new evidence based on an analysis of Hyde's career, that suggests that far from being a placeman, he may, in fact, have been Faukes's own choice of successor.     

‘We have to cut our coat according to our cloth’: Hailsham,Chamberlain, and the Struggle for Rearmament, 1933–4

This article seeks to reassess the decision-making processes of the first stages of British rearmament in the early 1930s. In particular, it re-evaluates the role of Douglas Hogg, Viscount Hailsham, Secretary of State for War (1931–5), and his efforts to combat the determination of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, to limit expenditure and resist preparing the Army for continental warfare. Hailsham is presented as the first British cabinet minister to recognise the dangers posed by a resurgent Germany and to understand that this threat could only be resisted by force. It is argued that the conclusions of the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee, including a ‘continental commitment’, were significantly weakened in the course of the subsequent deliberations of the Ministerial Committee to which its recommendations were submitted. A struggle between Hailsham and Chamberlain was the key feature of the meetings of the Ministerial Committee, but has been overlooked by previous historians. Despite Hailsham's best endeavours, it was the power of the Chancellor which prevailed, with significant implications for the evolution of the country's grand strategy over the years before the outbreak of the Second World War.     

The Rebel Chief Whip: The Role of Leslie Wilson in the Fall of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1922

This article explores the crisis within the Conservative Party in 1922 over the continuation of the coalition with Lloyd George's section of the Liberal Party, focusing on the actions of the Conservative chief whip, Leslie Wilson. Previously unused papers relating to Wilson's career shed new light on his role in the fall of the coalition. Wilson co‐ordinated opposition to the continuation of the coalition in its existing form, helping to solidify the group of junior ministers opposed to Lloyd George into a cohesive and powerful faction, which then forced the Conservative Party leader, Austen Chamberlain, into making concessions. Above all, Wilson was influential in forcing Chamberlain to agree to a meeting of MPs at the Carlton Club on 19 October 1922, at which the rebels won a decisive victory, causing the resignation of Chamberlain as party leader and Lloyd George as prime minister, in one of the most important events in modern British political history.     

Fixing the Membership of the Lords and Commons: The Case of Sir John Cam Hobhouse and the Nottingham By-Election, 1834

When Melbourne replaced Grey in 1834 he looked to recruit men with experience to join his government. He enlisted Sir John Cam Hobhouse, but Hobhouse needed a seat in the Commons. This was achieved by a writ of acceleration, whereby Viscount Duncannon, one of the sitting MPs for Nottingham, was called into the Lords in his father's lifetime to release a seat in the Commons. Writs had normally been used to strengthen the power of the government in the Lords, and the resentment in Nottingham at this political fix was expressed in a full-scale contest with accusations that the town was being turned into a government nomination borough. Hobhouse might have hoped for a free run as he had already been appointed to the cabinet. Rather, he was forced to fight for the seat, and to go through most of the activities more frequently associated with general elections.     

‘The Costly Luxury of Protesting’: The Deselection of J.M. Maclean,MP

With the increase in the electorate as the result of the Second and Third Reform Acts in the latter half of the 19th century came a corresponding increase in the importance of political parties. With this increase in the importance of party came the fear that the Burkean definition of the MP as a representative, owing his electorate his judgment as well as his industry would be replaced by a narrower conception of the MP as a delegate, returned to vote according to the dictates of party or ‘caucus’, subject to rejection by his party prior to an election, rather than the electorate as a whole at an election. This article examines the case of J.M. Maclean, Conservative MP for Cardiff 1895–1900, deselected by his constituency executive for his opposition to the Boer War, using it to shed light on the reaction of constituency parties in instances where MPs were felt to have overstepped the proper bounds of party discipline. The article concentrates on the relations between Maclean and his constituency party, crucial in Maclean's deselection. The limits of political dissent in time of war are examined, and the limitations placed by party on the freedom of action of individual MPs. In addition, the article gives glimpses of the tensions present in the Conservative‐Liberal Unionist coalition which governed Britain between 1895 and 1906, particularly on perceptions of the controversial figure of Joseph Chamberlain among Conservative back benchers.     

The Politics of Empire: Douglas Hailsham and the Imperial Policy of the National Government, 1931–38

While the majority of high-profile imperialists were excluded from Britain's National Government during the 1930s, at least one leading imperialist of the era, Douglas Hogg, first Viscount Hailsham (1872–1950), was at the heart of British policy-making. Although historians have largely overlooked the multifaceted contribution of this leading Conservative to inter-imperial affairs, as a senior cabinet minister he made significant interventions in Britain's policy towards both India and Ireland. He was, both publicly and privately, at the forefront of attempts to resist Irish violations of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty and, at the same time, became one of the government's leading advocates of a progressive solution to India's constitutional development. The article demonstrates that the simplistic image of Hailsham as a diehard reactionary requires significant modification. His approach was characteristically underpinned by a belief in the sanctity of existing agreements and pledges—whether or not he intrinsically approved of them.     

Diehard Conservatism,Mass Democracy,and Indian Constitutional Reform,c.1918–35

This article explores the Conservative Party crisis over India to examine the relationship between diehard Conservatives and Britain's emerging democracy. Far from rejecting democracy outright, diehard rhetoric and mass communication demonstrates how they adapted to it and utilised it in pursuit of their objectives. The accommodation of diehard Conservatism within the Conservative Party was a necessary and mutual embrace. Contrary to popular image, it promoted Conservative unity and contributed to the party's remarkable electoral success. Unable to exact decisive victories, the capacity of diehard Conservatives to generate party crises over imperial questions, among grass‐roots and back‐bench Conservatives, ensured that they had a role in shaping the presentation and content of party policy. This had implications for leadership efforts to liberalise the party, and also popular perceptions of British imperialism and the feasibility of democracy in India.     

The Lost Leader: Sir Stafford Northcote and the Leadership of the Conservative Party, 1876–85*

Sir Stafford Northcote has gone down in history as a man who fell short of the ultimate achievement of being prime minister largely because of personal weakness, and lack of political virility and drive. The picture painted by Northcote's political enemies – most notably the Fourth Party – has been accepted uncritically. Yet, political motives lay behind the actions of these supporters, and their harsh black and white portrait is not illustrative of the complexity of the situation in which Northcote found himself. Although individual characteristics undoubtedly played a part in his final political failure, underlying dynamics and structural transformations in politics and political life were more significant. It was more than simply the misfortune in succeeding the exceptionally charismatic Disraeli as leader. Northcote was faced with unparalleled disruption in parliament from Irish Nationalist MPs; the starkly polarised debate on the eastern question left him detached as a moderate. His temperament was better suited to constructive government rather than to opposition. However, following general election defeat in 1880, Northcote was denied this opportunity. Equally, his position in the lower House denied him the capacity to define a clear political critique of the Liberal government. Northcote's leadership of the party reflected the changing nature of British politics as radicals, tories, Irish Nationalists and Unionists increasingly contested the consensual style more appropriate to the political world of Palmerston and the 14th earl of Derby.     

St Anselm and the English investiture controversy reconsidered

The Investiture Controversy in England has generally been viewed as a two-sided contest between king and pope. But in reality the struggle was between three parties — king, pope, and primate. St Anselm, devoted to his duties as God's steward of his office and its privileges, worked against both King Henry I and Pope Paschal II to bring into reality his idea of the proper status of the primate of all Britain. Anselm had a vision of a political model which he conceived as God's ‘right order’ in England, and all his efforts were directed toward fulfilling this vision.The Investiture Contest may be divided into two parts. The first phase began when Anselm was thwarted by Henry I's duplicity in the archbishop's attempt to force the king to accept the decrees of Rome at the height of a political crisis. Anselm may have seen these decrees as beneficial to the Canterbury primacy. From 1101 to 1103, Anselm wavered between supporting either party completely, meanwhile securing from Paschal all the most important privileges for the primacy of Canterbury. Each time Paschal refused to grant a dispensation for Henry, as Anselm requested, he granted Anselm a privilege for the primacy. Thus Anselm's vision of the primate as almost a patriarch of another world, nearly independent of the pope, was fulfilled by 1103.At this point, Anselm abandoned his vacillation between king and pope, and worked seemingly on behalf of Paschal, but in reality on behalf of the Canterbury primacy. During this second phase, Anselm's political adroitness becomes clear by a correlation, never before made, between the church-state controversy and Henry's campaign to conquer Normandy. By careful maneuvering and skilful propaganda, Anselm forced Henry to choose between submitting to the investiture decree or failing in his attempt to conquer Normandy. At the settlement, a compromise was worked out, Henry conceding on investitures, and Paschal conceding on homage. But investiture was only secondary to Anselm. He ended the dispute not when Henry submitted on investitures, but only when he had gained from Henry concessions which made the primate almost a co-ruler with the king, as his political vision demanded. Only after a public reconcilliation with his archbishop did Henry feel free to complete the Norman campaign.Thus the Investiture Controversy was a three-way struggle. Both king and pope compromised, each giving up some of their goals. But Anselm emerged from the contest having won nearly all his political objectives.     

Clyve Jones and Parliamentary History

The ‘constitutional revolution’ which occurred in Ireland after 1691 meant that parliamentary management became one of the prime functions of the viceroyalty. Interest focused on the Commons, where supply legislation was drafted. But the upper House, though smaller, less busy, and on the whole more easily managed, could not be ignored, since it could still cause major problems for government. The situation for the incoming ministers in 1714 was problematic, since the Lords had been a tory stronghold, and the ‘Church party’, buttressed by the bishops, remained powerful. The situation was a mirror image of Westminster in 1710, when Robert Harley's tory ministry had to cope with a whig-dominated house of lords. This essay analyses the means by which Lord Lieutenant Sunderland (1714–15), and his successors, Lords Justices Grafton and Galway, brought the Irish upper House under control, constructing a court party with some of the elements which Clyve Jones has identified as having been crucial to Harley's strategy in 1710–14: moderate or non-party men, pensioners and placemen depending on government largess, new episcopal appointments and a block creation of peerages. In Ireland it was the new peers who played the most important part. The whigs were able to make some inroads into the episcopal bench, previously a stronghold of toryism, until the issue of relief for dissenters rekindled anxiety over the maintenance of the ecclesiastical establishment, prefiguring future problems.     

Recently Discovered Lords' Lists and their Uses, 1833–42*

This note deals with previously unpublished lists which identify the party affiliations, whig, Liberal, and Conservative, of members of the house of lords from 1833 to 1842. They were prepared by the chief whips (or in one case the party leader) of their respective parties, and can thus be considered authoritative. Such information is invaluable in properly understanding the political history of the house of lords, and therefore of the nation.     

Moyes,Menzies, and the Vietnam War: New Insights Into the Public Correspondence Between the Prime Minister and the Bishops

In March 1965 a group of Anglican bishops signed an open letter to the prime minister of Australia, Sir Robert Menzies, expressing its concerns about the rapid deterioration of the situation in Vietnam. The letter had been composed by the retired Bishop of Armidale, John Stoward Moyes. The bishops urged Menzies to use his influence with the United States Government to ensure that the possibility of a negotiated settlement of the conflict could be explored to the full. The letter, and the prime minister's public response, thrust John Moyes and his episcopal co‐signatories into the centre of a national debate on Vietnam. Following Menzies's brusque reply, Moyes composed a second and more critical open letter. The prime minister then issued a more detailed response one week before he committed Australian combat troops to the Vietnam War. The initiative taken by Bishop Moyes constituted the first major instance of public debate in Australia concerning the wisdom and morality of the government's policy on Vietnam.     

Benedicto Kiwanuka and Catholic Democracy in Uganda

In this article, I introduce Benedicto Kiwanuka (1922–72), Uganda’s first prime minister and most prominent modern Catholic politician, and explore how his religious and political sensibilities — especially his vision of democracy — intersected with Catholic thought and historical experience in Buganda and Uganda. Far from turning him into a “Catholic tribalist” looking to empower Catholics vis à vis other religious groups, Kiwanuka’s Catholic identity was a core component of his political commitment to non-sectarian democracy, the common good, and pan-ethnic nation-building. He saw in Catholicism the possibility of envisioning political solidarity during a moment of social rupture, and he and his Democratic Party used Catholic and biblical discourse and theology to help undergird a broader political commitment to liberal democratic nationalism during Uganda’s transition to independence (1958–62). At the same time, Kiwanuka’s prophetic commitment to principle — an uncompromising dogmatism often expressed in religious and theological language — also helped cost him the opportunity to lead Uganda into and beyond independence.     

Radicals,Tories or Monomaniacs? The Birmingham Currency Reformers in the House of Commons, 1832–67*

Benjamin Disraeli described Thomas Attwood as a ‘provincial banker labouring under a financial monomania’. The leader of the Birmingham Political Union, Attwood's Warwickshire accent and support for a paper currency were widely derided at Westminster. However, the themes of Attwood's brief parliamentary career were shared by the other men who represented Birmingham in the early‐ and mid‐Victorian period. None of these MPs were good party men, and this article illuminates the nature of party labels in the period. Furthermore, it adds a new dimension to the historical understanding of debates on monetary policy and shows how local political identities and traditions interacted with broader party identities. With the exception of Richard Spooner, who was a strong tory on religious and political matters, the currency men are best described as popular radicals, who consistently championed radical political reform and were among the few parliamentary supporters of the ‘People's Charter’. They opposed the new poor law and endorsed factory regulation, a progressive income tax, and religious liberty. Although hostile to the corn laws they believed that free trade without currency reform would depress prices, wages and employment. George Frederick Muntz's death in 1857 and his replacement by John Bright marked a watershed and the end of the influence of the ‘Birmingham school’. Bright appropriated Birmingham's radical tradition as he used the town as a base for his campaign for parliamentary reform. He emphasized Birmingham's contribution to the passing of the 1832 Reform Act but ignored the currency reformers' views on other matters, which had often been at loggerheads with the ‘Manchester school’ and economic liberalism.     

太平天国早期萧朝贵与杨秀清关系考辨

“天兄”代言人萧朝贵与“天父”代言人杨秀清之间并非纯粹的同盟、挚友,两人在合作共事的背后,隐藏着鲜为人知的矛盾。在太平天国的孕育期,“天兄”曾通过揽权、培植私党、代理首辅,试图创造超越“天父”权威的神话。在金田团营的关键时刻,萧朝贵还利用直接命令、诋毁中伤、孤立压制等手段欲使病重的杨秀清脱离上帝会的权力核心,实现自己的政治抱负。但“天兄”（萧朝贵）与“天父”（杨秀清）之间的关系也不能简单地视为对手、仇敌,两者微妙的政治、宗教关系以及太平天国生存的主客观环境,都决定了萧朝贵的“夺权”仅是一股无法逾越地表的政治暗潮。     

Anti-Venizelist criticism of Venizelos' policy during the Balkan Wars (1912‒13)

Abstract

Although the Balkan Wars are regarded as a defining moment in modern Greek history that led to the expansion of Greek territory, they also constitute an important chapter in the history of internal Greek politics: the Greek prime minister Eleftherios Venizelos consolidated his position as the country's most competent politician; the Palace, at the head of the victorious Greek army, regained much of its lost prestige after the unsuccessful Greco–Turkish war of 1897; and most importantly, the old parties began to function as a united front against Venizelos. This reaction was majorly triggered by Venizelos' handling of the country's foreign affairs in 1912?13. The anti-Venizelists' rhetoric against Venizelos diplomacy invested heavily in tradition and the role of the king and was a harbinger of the national schism of 1915?16.     

‘Which Way?’ Big Man,Road Man,Chief: Bernard Narokobi's Multifaceted Leadership Career

ABSTRACT

Among the topics that Bernard Narokobi addresses in his numerous writings is the place of traditional Melanesian leadership styles in a modern Papua New Guinea. This article explores Narokobi's leadership status to show how far-reaching and multifaceted his leadership career was: he was at once a traditional Melanesian bigman, a chief, and a modern public figure. The actions he took in these roles were for him a matter of the highest principle, something that at times had severe political consequences. Because in Melanesia the scope of the ritual that takes place upon an individual's death is an index of their status, an analysis of the mortuary rituals undertaken upon Narokobi's death provides insight into the significance of his leadership at every level from his clan up to the national level of Papua New Guinean society.     

The Race Relations Policy of the First Wilson Government

This article seeks to explore the evolution of a race relationspolicy in the first period of the Wilson government. It is arguedthat Wilson adopted a triple approach. This included the followingcomponents: a tightening of immigration control to satisfy seniorfigures in his government who had been badly shaken by the Smerhwickelection result; a commitment to outlaw racial incitement which,it was hoped, would influence favourably Commonwealth and widerworld opinion; the introduction of race relations machineryto promote integration and reconciliation, advocated both bymore progressive elements in his own party and in the widerpolitical world. In 1965 he attempted to ensure that all theseapproaches were kept in balance and that the issue of race,rising up the political agenda in the early 1960s, ceased tocreate the prospect of dangerous disagreements with his mainpolitical opponents. In the short term he overcame a range ofchallenges and secured a political agenda in which issues concerningimmigration became less confrontational. After marginalizationof immigration issues in the 1966 election Jenkins had spaceto pursue the more liberal aspects of the policy. The exodusof East African Asians, together with Enoch Powell's determinationto use the lessons of Smethwick to exploit differences withthe Conservative leadership, ensured that Wilson's success was,however, short-lived.