The Cold War as history

Jonathan Haslam's Russia's Cold War is the latest effort by a western scholar to synthesize new research and findings on the Soviet role in the Cold War. Citing an array of published Russian archival material, Haslam seeks to resuscitate the traditional western Cold War view that the conflict was the inevitable result of communist expansionism. However, the material cited by Haslam does not support such a conclusion and he ignores conflicting evidence and views. The Cold War was a war of choice not necessity, the result of distorted perceptions and calculations by both sides, aided and abetted by generations of ideologically aligned historians.     

Mapping anomalous democracies during the Cold War

During the Cold War, a number of societies established stable democracies despite having low levels of modernisation and relatively few democratic neighbours. Threshold levels of modernisation and neighbouring democratic societies are consistently related to the endurance of democracy. Meanwhile, the Cold War superpowers often supported autocracies, making it even more difficult to maintain democracy. Analysing these stable but ‘deviant’ democracies provides an opportunity to examine how domestic factors influence regime stability. In particular, such historical cases advance understanding of contemporary patterns of democratic stability. Previous research has not systematically identified deviant democracies before 1989. This research note does so using a large-N analysis of 125 societies during the first phase of the third wave of democratisation, from 1975 to 1988. It identifies 11 deviant democracies, including Bolivia, Botswana, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago, and Turkey.

冷战期间,若干社会建立了稳定的民主体制,尽管它们现代化的程度较低,左邻右舍民主化的不多。民主的持久与否一向与一个国家的现代化基础水平、也与左邻右舍是否为民主政体有关。而冷战期间超级大国往往支持独裁政权,这又使得民主更难维持。分析那些稳定却并非标准的民主国家,使我们得以了解国内因素如何影响政体的稳定性。这些历史的案例增强了我们对当代民主稳定模式的理解。以往的研究没有系统地确认1989年以前的非标准民主国家。本文对第三次民主浪潮第一期125个国家包括玻利维亚、博茨瓦纳、哥伦比亚、科斯特黎加、多米尼加、洪都拉斯、印度、牙买加、毛里求斯、特立尼达和多巴哥、土耳其等做了大量案例分析。     

冷战时期东南亚地区主义的特征

冷战时期 ,以东盟为依托的东南亚地区主义有其鲜明特征。首先 ,东南亚地区主义是一种囿于主权的地区主义 ,以主权平等为核心的国际法基本原则成为东盟成员国的行为规范 ,尊重主权、不干涉内政、和平解决争端等原则在地区合作中得到切实遵循和维护 ;其次 ,东南亚地区主义的基本内容是进行政治经济上的合作 ,尤其是安全上的合作 ,但这种合作并不以政治经济一体化为目标 ,它是一种开放式的地区主义 ;最后 ,东盟奉行灵活、非正式的决策方式 ,表现出东南亚地区主义低组织化、低制度化的特征     

The Cold War in retrospect

The Cambridge history of the Cold War is a three‐volume work by 75 contributors, mostly from the United States and the United Kingdom, and is intended as ‘a substantial work of reference’ on the subject. The bulk of the text deals, in frequently overlapping chapters, with the main protagonists of the conflict—viz. the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China—and the areas in which they clashed. At the same time, it aims to go ‘far beyond the narrow boundaries of diplomatic affairs’, although it is not always successful in doing so. In analysing the origins of the Cold War, the contributors pay perhaps too much attention to ideology as opposed to geopolitics, a flaw which is made easier by the absence of sufficient historical background. On the other hand, the duration of the conflict and the failure of various attempts at détente is more successfully explained in terms of the zero‐sum game nature of the conflict and its progressive extension from Europe across the rest of the world. When it comes to the end of the Cold War, the overall conclusion is that this came about through both a shift in the international balance of power following the Sino‐Soviet split and the political and economic problems of the Soviet bloc. It is generally agreed that Mikhail Gorbachev's willingness to abandon old shibboleths both at home and abroad was a major factor in bringing about the end of the conflict. The three volumes, while not always an easy read, are the outcome of considerable research and expertise in both primary and secondary sources and will repay careful study.     

The hidden rationality of Sweden's policy of neutrality during the Cold War

The long-dominant view of Swedish neutrality policy during the Cold War holds that it aimed to reduce tension in peacetime and to keep the country out of a new major war. The main dissenting view is that the policy primarily served peacetime purposes, including domestic politics, and that it would not have worked in a war. Sweden would then either have been attacked by the USSR because it was a Western country in its path of attack, or it would have been drawn in on the allied side because of its cooperation with the West, including tolerating overflights by allied bombers. This article presents a third perspective, namely that Sweden's leaders in the 1950s understood that neutrality would probably fail in wartime, but that they aimed to stay out of the violent initial nuclear exchange. This conclusion is supported by evidence hitherto overlooked in the existing research.     

The Cultural Cold War

Book reviewed:
Hugh Wilford. The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War: Calling the Tune? London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003. xvi + 328 pp. Illustrations, index. $115.00 (cloth).     

The Old Cold War

James McAllister . No Exit: America and the German Problem , 1943 – 1954 . Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press , 2002 . vii+264 . Index and bibliography. $ .     

Neutrality and submarine warfare: Germany and Spain during the First World War

The Spanish government maintained official neutrality during the Great War because deviating from neutrality would supposedly endanger the nation’s already limited political and social stability and even threaten the survival of the monarchic regime. In August 1914 there were no direct Spanish interests in the conflict and no benefit to be obtained from any intervention by Spain, which was very weak in military terms and in the international arena. Nevertheless, Spain’s geographic location and its commercial dependence on the Entente made it especially vulnerable to the pressures of France and Great Britain, both of which attempted to take advantage of the services that Spain could offer in the economic war; Spain’s importance increased with the prolongation of the fight. Germany, in contrast, could not hope for more from Spain than its strict neutrality because of its highly important political and economic ties with the Entente and its defencelessness before England and France, from which Germany could not protect it. Because Germany could not wait for Spain’s participation next to her, the primary target of German diplomacy had to be to resist the influence of the Entente and maintain Spanish neutrality while preventing Spain from inclining towards favouring the Allies. To achieve this objective, Berlin fed, with vague promises, the idea that a Spanish collaboration would be rewarded with the annexation of some territories. On this basis, we can begin to study German–Spanish relations during the Great War, which came to be determined by incidents that were caused by the submarine war. The dependence on the Entente also helps to explain the last evolution of the relations between Germany and Spain, which could follow no other policy than that imposed by the final development of the war: taking up a position near the winners and distancing from, and nearly rupturing ties with, Germany. Using both Spanish and German documentation allows us to reach different conclusions that aim to contribute substantially to understanding the relationship between Spain and Germany during the Great War.     

论冷战的历史根源

1990年11月,美国总统布什在巴黎正式宣布冷战结束。而关于冷战的讨论并没有随之完结,事实上,只有当人们从长达近半个世纪的冷战梦魇中醒来之时,才有可能将其作为一个完整的历史过程,进行全面系统的考察,重新认识其历史全貌,并对其作出恰如其分的历史定位。本文就冷战的历史根源问题谈一些新的认识。