H.G. Wells and the New Liberalism

This article offers a new interpretation of H.G. Wells's politicalthought in the Edwardian period and beyond. Scholars have emphasisedhis socialism at the expense of his commitment to liberalism,and have misread his novel The New Machiavelli as an anti-Liberaltract. Wells spent much effort in the pre-1914 period in thequest for a ‘new Liberalism’, and did not believethat socialists should compete directly with the Liberal Partyfor votes. It was this latter conviction that lay behind hismuch misunderstood dispute with the Fabian Society. His politicalsupport for Churchill was one sign of his belief in the compatibilityof liberalism and socialism, in which he was far from uniqueat the time. He also engaged, somewhat idiosyncratically, withthe ‘servile state’ concept of Hilaire Belloc. Althoughhe did not articulate his Liberal identity with complete consistency,he did so with increasing intensity as the First World War approached.This helps explain why key New Liberal politicians includingChurchill, Lloyd George and Masterman responded to his ideassympathetically. The extent of engagement between Wells andthe ‘New Liberalism’ was such that he deserves tobe considered alongside Green, Ritchie, Hobson and Hobhouseas one of its prophets.     

1932: A Neglected Date in the History of the Decline of the British Liberal Party

There is an historical consensus that the decline of the BritishLiberal Party, whenever it began, was essentially complete by1929 or 1931 at the latest. This article suggests that the possibilityof a Liberal revival still existed in the early 1930s, but thatit was thwarted by the formalization of divisions between Liberalsand Liberal Nationals which took place in 1932. These divisionswere not accidental, but the result of clear calculations onthe part of the Liberal National leadership. It is further arguedthat the events of this year were important in determining theelectoral politics of the following three decades—dominationby a Conservative party which set out to stress its ‘liberal’credentials and to persuade the electorate that it was the logicalrepository for the country's still significant ‘Liberalvote’. Meanwhile, an independent Liberal Party survived,but one which was far smaller and less electorally powerfulthan might have been the case if the party had remained united.     

Three's a Crowd?: Government, Owners, and Workers during the Nationalization of the British Coalmining Industry 1945-47

The passing of the coalmining industry into public ownershipon 1 January 1947 should have been an occasion for rejoicingby the Labour Party and its supporters, yet celebrations weremuted by the looming shadow of critical coal shortages Despitethis concurrence of nationalization and coal crisis, littleattention has been focused on possible linkages between thetwo events. More generally, scant consideration has been givento the question of what happened to the industry when facedwith nationalization. This article's principal argument is thatthe fuel crisis was rooted not (as other historians have argued)in the atrocious weather, but in the very process of nationalization—or,rather in the combination of a lack of preparation for publicownership and (even more importantly) in the preoccupation withnationalization at the expense of the ‘stabilization’of the industry before entering the uncharted waters of publicownership. The chief conclusion is that during the run-up toVesting Day neither miners nor owners had any substantial incentiveto improve industrial productivity and output The period wasat best a standstill, and in many ways—as the crisis indicated—wastedmonths that a fuel-starved Britain could ill afford ^*This article is based on my MA thesis, ‘Fresh Start orFalse Dawn⁷ the coalmining Industry and Nationalisation, 1945–7'I would like to thank my supervisors, Ranald Midne and PhilipWilliamson for their continued support, and also David Howelland the referees of Twentieth Century British History for theirvaluable comments on earlier drafts of this work.     

A Call to Action: New Party Candidates and the 1931 General Election*

Sir Oswald Mosley established his New Party in early 1931. It proposed to cut across the party and class divides, with the objective of providing a ‘national’ solution to the economic crisis of the time. According to Mosley, the ‘old parties’– meaning the Labour, Conservative and Liberal Parties – had revealed themselves unable to adapt to the post‐war age. In their place, he argued, a modern organisation, based on youth, vitality and a scientifically reasoned economic plan, was needed to save Britain from terminal decline. Few heeded his call, and the party ultimately paved the way for the British Union of Fascists to emerge in 1932. Nevertheless, the New Party fought the general election of 1931, offering an unsuccessful but suitably intriguing challenge to the National coalition and Labour Party. This article will assess the New Party's election campaign, concentrating on those who briefly rallied to Mosley's appeal only to fall foul of the ballot box. In other words, it provides a case study of those who contributed to a dramatic electoral failure, and traces a significant stage along Mosley's journey to fascism.     

Yorkshiremen Go to the Polls: County Contests in the Early Eighteenth Century

Abstract

'William Mabane and Huddersfield Politics, 1931–1947: "By Any Other Name a Liberal"'. This article seeks to explore the impact of the split in the Liberal party's ranks in 1931–32 through a detailed case study of the constituency of Huddersfield. It suggests that Liberals and Liberal Nationals offered viable alternative versions of the Liberal creed, even though there were few examples before 1945 of the two groups confronting one another. In Huddersfield the sitting M.P., William Mabane, despite defecting to the Liberal Nationals, was largely successful in blurring the distinction between the groups and in sustaining at least a thread of unity between them. In the post-war era this would assist the process of Liberal reunion in Huddersfield, in contrast to the experience of most of the rest of the country. This, in turn, enabled Huddersfield to survive as an outpost of Liberal strength at a time when the party faced the very real prospect of extinction as a national political force.     

The Liberal Party and Patriotism in Early Twentieth Century Britain

Many historians have highlighted the role played by ‘languagesof patriotism’ in the political appeal of the BritishConservative Party in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.The present article engages with this debate by pointing tothe fact that the Liberals, in the Edwardian period at least,could also articulate patriotic languages That this was thecase is demonstrated by an examination of Liberal attitudesto the Education Act of 1902, the tariff reform controversy,and the issue of the ‘land question’. The widelyheld view that the Conservatives enjoyed a complete monopolyon patriotism is called into doubt. Furthermore, this articlecontends that the Liberal Party's use of patriotic rhetoricprovides a new means of making sense of their policies in thisperiod. These policies, it is suggested, cannot simply be understoodas expressive of a ‘new Liberal’ system of thoughtincreasingly influenced by collectivist ideas ^*I would like to thank Jon Parry for his very many helpful commentsand suggestions on earlier drafts of this article. The researchpresented here was assisted by the financial support of Christ'sCollege, Cambridge, and the Arts and Humanities Research Board.     

George V and Repulicanism, 1917-1919

This article is a study of the British monarchy's reaction towhat it saw as a republican threat at the end of the First WorldWar. It challenges the widely received view that the most importantrepublican moment in modern British history was in the early1870s. Written from previously unused material in the RoyalArchives, it chronicles the emergence of Palace worries aboutthe rise of militant socialism, which the royal family equatedwith republicanism; and it illuminates the tactics designedby the King and his advisers to take the republican edge offthe labour movement and to deal with the immediate social andeconomic crisis. Lord Esher summed up Palace policy in the phrase‘the "democratization" of the monarchy’. In practice,this meant expanding the royal family's social and charitablepurposes to ensure the Crown's survival. The policy would havean enduring influence on royal thinking and behaviour. ¹ This article was written for the Visiting Fellows' Colloquium,All Souls College, Oxford. It expands a line of argument thatwas put more tentatively and with far less documentation inChapter 6 of my book Royal Bounty: The Making of a Welfare Monarchy(London, 1995). By gracious permission of Her Majesty the Queen,I have been able to make use of material from the Royal Archivesat Windsor.     

A New Liberal Descent: The 'Labourer' Trilogy by Lawrence and Barbara Hammond

In 1906, citing the complexities of what he would subsequentlyterm the ‘Great Society’, the New Liberal GrahamWallas called for ‘a fresh approach to the question: What,under modern conditions constitutes history?’ A burgeoninggroup of historians, including among others R. H. Tawney, theWebbs, J. H. Clapham and W. J. Ashley, responded to this needby establishing economic and social history as a legitimatefield or historical study. However, beginning with The VillageLabourer in 1911 followed by The Town Labourer in 1917 and TheSkilled Labourer in 1919, Barbara and Lawrence Hammond completeda historical enquiry that more than any other of its time definedfor progressives an answer to Wallas' query. This article examinesthe Hammonds' unique achievement in terms of its contributionto New Liberal politics and to the growing field of economicand social history. It sets their overtly political and literaryapproach against the growing trend towards professionalizationamongst contemporary historians and compares their radical treatmentof industrialization to the orthodox Liberal conclusions ofnineteenth century Whig historians. The groundwork is thus laidfor an exploration into the implicit assumptions that definedthe shape and character of the Hammonds' New Liberal descent;an exploration that enhances our understanding of both Englishprogressivism and the development of social history as a legitimateapproach to studying the past.     

'[…;] all poetry is difficult […]: the limitations of Seferis' modernist poetics

Abstract

In Greece, as in several other countries in the period between the two World Wars, one of the serious charges frequently made against Modernism was that it was impossibly bad mannered towards the reader – that it made no effort at all to communicate and that modernist poetry was ‘difficult’ or ‘obscure’. For example, as early as 1931, Kostis Palamas – the poet who had had an enormous impact on Greek literary affairs in the first half of this century – in a charming if not somewhat condescending letter addressed to George Seferis, noted that the poems of <inline-graphic href="splitsection4_in1.tif"/>were ‘cryptographic’ and stated that he was personally unable to find the ‘key’ that was needed for deciphering such difficult poetry (Palamas 1931). A few years earlier, Seferis himself had noted in his journals that whenever he tried to read Valery's poems to Palamas and his circle, they had reacted by saying that they did not have time to solve ‘puzzles’ (1975: 62).     

Sir Edward Grey,Germany, and the Outbreak of the First World War: A Re-Evaluation

ABSTRACT

Historians have variously condemned British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey for contributing to the escalation of the July Crisis of 1914, and praised him as an heroic advocate of peace. Addressing this conundrum, this article first assesses historiographical debates around the significance of Grey's policy towards Germany in the events that led to the outbreak of the First World War. It then traces Grey's foreign policy vis-à-vis Germany on the one hand, and the Entente on the other. Finally, it provides an innovative analysis of Grey's policy from the vantage point of Berlin, arguing that in July 1914 decisions taken by the governments of other countries escalated the crisis and were taken regardless of Grey's position. The article concludes that current historiography overestimates British agency in July 1914 and that Grey was not as important to the outcome of the crisis as both his critics and his defenders have claimed. His actions could not change the minds of those on the continent who were bent on war.     

Leo Amery's Imperialist Alternative to Appeasement in the 1930s

Leo Amery has long been seen as one of the leading figures inthe anti-appeasement movement. However, key aspects of his caseagainst government foreign policy are not addressed in previouswork. This article considers Amery's reputation pointing outthat it is problematic to characterize him as an ‘anti-appeaser’because he did not rule out concessions to Germany and was willingto see Germany dominate Central Europe. However, he differedfrom the government in advocating a Danubian economic bloc tocreate stability and satisfy some German desires. This flowedfrom Amery's imperialism and his economic nationalism. Meanwhile,he fervently opposed colonial concessions, believing that Germangrievances could only be satisfied in Europe. Considering whetherAmery was an ‘anti-appeaser’ or a ‘real appeaser’,the article analyses Amery's doubts over whether to supportNeville Chamberlain over the Munich agreement. It concludesthat although Amery disagreed with Chamberlain more on tacticsthan strategy, these alternative tactics were significantlydifferent from government policy. As such, aspects of the anti-appeasementcase should be seen as being more nuanced than previously recognized,and the imperialist dimension of it should be understood.     

'A Matter of Regret': Britain, the 1983 Grendada Crisis, and the Special Relationship

When the USA launched a military intervention in Grenada inOctober 1983 it was against the wishes of its closest ally,Britain, who felt deliberately misled as to Washington's intentions.As a former British colony and member of the Commonwealth, withthe Queen as Head of State, Grenada remained of interest toBritain. This article will provide a detailed analysis of Anglo-Grenadianrelations and the events and contacts between the USA and Britainduring and after the 1983 crisis and assess the role of the‘special relationship’ in shaping Britain's reactionto the intervention. I conclude that the conventional wisdomthat Britain was ‘in the dark’ about what was happeningis not entirely accurate. ^*The views expressed in this article represent those of theauthor alone.     

The Treasury Resignations of 1958: a Reconsideration

This essay re-examines the resignation of the Conservative TreasuryMinisters in January 1958. It focuses on the political economyof both party and official discussion of inflation, and paysparticular attention to the issue of whether the debate In 1957-8witnessed a dispute between ‘monetarists’ and ‘Keynesians’.it shows that the Chancellor, Thorneycroft, and other Conservatives,including Macmillan, saw the contribution of the monetary systemto inflation in terms of inadequate government control overthe banking system and private credit as much as in terms ofthe level of public expenditure. It concludes that the theoreticaland policy assumptions underpinning the 1957–8 debatehave no direct link with, and did not anticipate, Thatcheriteideas, but that there was an indirect link in terms of sharedperceptions of the social politics of inflation. ^* I would like to express my thanks to the Minda de GunzbergCenter for European Studies. Harvard University for appointingme to a Visiting Scholarship during my sabbatical in the autumnof 1997, during which time this article was written.     

The Politics of Citizenship in 1940s Britain: The British Nationality Act

The article examines the enactment of the British NationalityAct, 1948. The legislation created a legal status—Citizenshipof the UK and Colonies—that included Britons and ‘colonial’British subjects under a single definition of British citizenship,and entrenched their right to enter the UK. Between 1948 and1962, some 500, 000 non-white British subjects entered underthe legislation, despite documented evidence of elite suspicionof non-white Commonwealth migration. The article argues thatthis apparent contradiction can only be understood by examiningthe legislation in the context of past migration patterns andBritain's international position in 1948. The legislation wasonly marginally related to migration; it was rather an attemptto maintain a uniform definition of subjecthood in the faceof Canada's unilateral introduction of its own citizenship,and it was an affirmation of Britain's place as head of a Commonwealthstructure founded on the relationship between the UK and theOld Dominions. ^* For comments on earlier drafts, I owe my thanks to John Dorwin,Katie Goebs, Iain McLean, and Desmond King.     

Politicians versus Historians: Lord Avon's 'Appeasement Battle' against 'Lamentably, Appeasement-Minded' Historians

In retirement, Sir Anthony Eden, seeking to safeguard the anti-appeaserimage cultivated following his resignation as Neville Chamberlain'sForeign Secretary in 1938, proved extremely sensitive to theway in which his political career was presented in memoirs,biographies, and histories. Eden, who accepted the earldom ofAvon in 1961, saw himself as refighting old politcal battles,except that by the 1960s his attack was directed increasinglyagainst what he described as ‘lament-ably, appeasement-minded’history professors rather than former politicians. During 1966–7objections to Frederick Northedge's The Troubled Giant evenled him at one stage to consider legal action for defamationof character. The ensuing dispute, highlighting Lord Avon'spreoccupation with the verdict of history, illuminated alsothe varying, often conflicting, perspectives adopted towardsthe past by historians and politicians. ^*Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the BISA BritishInternational History Group Conference at the University ofExeter, September 1996, and the Millennium after 25 Years Conferenceat the LSE, October 1996. I am grateful to the Countess of Avon,the Marquess of Salisbury, the Borthwick Institute of HistoricalResearch at the University of York, the Master and Fellows ofChurchill College at Cambridge, and the Archivist of CarmarthenshireRecords Service at Carmarthen, for permission to quote fromthe papers of the first Earl of Avon, The Marquess of Salisbury,the Earls of Halifax, Lord Strang, and Viscount Cilcennin respectively.I am particularly indebted to Muriel Grieve, Professor Northedge'swidow, for assistance in my research and permission to quotefrom her husband's correspondence and publications, as wellas to Sir Bryan Cartledge, who helped Lord Avon with his memoirs.     

An Unequal Apportionment: The Conflict over Space Between Protestants and Catholics at the Beginning of the Wars of Religion

Although theological and political aspects of the Wars of Religionhave been extensively studied, their spatial dimension has oftenbeen neglected. Despite the plethora of urban monographs, spacehas been considered as the setting rather than the object ofconflict. On account of its scarcity, space brought a varietyof benefits and accordingly generated strategies of appropriationand exclusion for which the two confessions were unequally prepared.If Charles IX was the first to ‘tolerate’ Protestants,he almost always confined them to domestic space or excludedthem from the centre of towns. Employing a sociology of dominationdrawn from the work of Pierre Bourdieu, this article seeks toexamine the unequal situation of the two confessions from aspatial perspective, refusing to explain this difference solelyby recourse to theological concepts. On the contrary, it attemptsto show how, in a manner that requires explanation, socioconfessionalinequalities were transformed into spatial ones.

The space which before any other seems to me to raise the problemand manifest just that strong social and historical differentiationbetween societies is the space of exclusion—of exclusionand imprisonment. Michel Foucault, La scène de la philosophie(1978)¹

     

The Labour Party and the League of Nations: The Socialist League's Role in the Sanctions Crisis of 1935

When the Labour Party—influenced by the NEC and the TUCGeneral Council—decided to support League of Nations sanctionsagainst Italy in 1935 this signalled its recognition that itwas necessary to challenge the fascist dictators with collectiveforce. The way in which this decision marked the discreditingof pacifism within the Labour Party has been fully examined.The Socialist League—the organ of the Labour left—alsounsuccessfully opposed the sanctions policy. Nevertheless, existingaccounts have focused on its chairman, Cripps, and his refusalto trust the ‘capitalist’ and ‘imperialist’National Government to impose sanctions. Instead, this articleconsiders the Socialist League as a whole and highlights divisionsthat emerged within it over sanctions. The official SocialistLeague line demanded ‘mass resistance’ against theNational Government. However, a sizeable minority—particularlythose with overtly pro-Soviet affinities—decided to supportcollective security now that the Soviet Union had joined theLeague of Nations. These internal divisions seriously weakenedthe Socialist League case. They explain how the NEC–TUCwas able so conclusively to defeat its radical anti-capitalistarguments, thereby gaining a fuller mandate with which to developits policy of armed collective security before the Second WorldWar.