Iraq,Afghanistan and the future of British military doctrine: from counterinsurgency to Stabilization

The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have had profound effects on both the British and US militaries. Among the most important is the way in which they have challenged traditional assumptions about the character of unconventional conflict and the role of the military within comprehensive strategies for encouraging sustainable peace. In the UK, the most important doctrinal response has been JDP 3–40 Security and Stabilisation: the military contribution. Security and Stabilisation is an ambitious attempt to synthesize elements of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peace support and state‐building within a single doctrine that reflects the lessons learned from recent British operational experience. This article examines the purpose, impact and potential value of this important innovation in British doctrine. To do so, the article explores the genesis of Stabilization; analyses its impact upon extant British doctrine for counterinsurgency and peace support; discusses its relationship with the most important related US doctrines, FM 3–24: the counterinsurgency field manual and FM 3–07: the stability operations field manual; and debates the function of doctrine more broadly. It concludes by summarizing the primary challenges Security and Stabilisation must overcome if it is to make a serious contribution to the theory and practice of such complex interventions.     

Breaking the covenant: governance of the British army in the twenty-first century

This article argues that the military covenant between senior army commanders and soldiers is breaking down for two reasons: first, British forces are being engaged in new and controversial wars of choice, putting new and distinct pressures on the covenant; and second because senior military commanders have not fully appreciated the changes to their authority and power in governing the British army. It further suggests that military commanders, central staff and ministers need to acknowledge the scale of the internal challenges to the military covenant and develop appropriate responses. Drawing on examples from gender equality and sexual orientation, allegations of war crimes in Iraq, the military's duty of care and the proposed launch of a British Armed Forces Federation, this article argues that these challenges show that the military leadership has no choice but to rethink its outdated approach to governance of the British army, if it is to remain fi t for purpose. Without appropriate adaptation, army chiefs will have themselves contributed to the breaking of the military covenant, between the army and the individual soldier.     

Stalin and Togliatti: Italy and the Origins of the Cold War/Tito: A Biography

The 1956 Suez Crisis has attracted enormous attention and been widely seen as marking a sea change in Britain's position in the Middle East and within the Anglo-American special relationship. Yet in September 1951 the Attlee government had already signalled waning British power in pulling back from major unilateral military action to defend Britain's single most important overseas asset: the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and its huge operations in Iran. What this crisis revealed of British aspirations in the Middle East and within the special relationship has not received the attention it deserves. This article examines the Attlee government's decision to ‘scuttle’ from Abadan in September 1951. It first places the decision in the context of Anglo-American relations and great cumulative pressure in favour of British military action. It then weighs various considerations claimed in the extant literature to explain the British decision. In doing so it disagrees with suggestions that British military intervention was precluded by an understanding between Truman and Attlee that such action was acceptable only in a narrow range of circumstances for fear of retaliatory Soviet intervention in Iran. It also argues that accounts that correctly emphasise US opposition to the use of force as the key restraint on the Attlee government could and should have gone further. Specifically, it needs to be better appreciated just how the Truman administration actively undermined potential British recourse to military intervention, infused other potential constraints with extra weight and helped delay a Cabinet decision until a point when armed intervention was least likely to achieve British ends.     

‘Transformation in contact’: learning the lessons of modern war

The US and British armies have faced intelligent and adaptive enemies in Iraq and continue to do so in Afghanistan. While both armies have proved adept at fighting high‐intensity conflict, their initial performance against asymmetric threats and diffuse insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated how much each army had to learn about conducting counterinsurgency operations. This article examines one important means by which the US and British armies have transformed themselves into more flexible and responsive organizations that are able to harness innovation at the front effectively. It traces the development of the lessons‐learned systems in both armies from the start of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq to today. These changes have resulted in significant development within the organization of both armies. Reform of US and British army learning capabilities offers an important insight into the drivers of military change. The reformed lessons‐learned systems have been better integrated into training, experimentation, and doctrine and force development. While there are still challenges to be overcome, both armies have created robust structures that facilitate the movement of knowledge from recent experience at the front to the rest of the organization. As such, these reforms provide us with a useful case‐study that enhances our understanding of the role of ‘bottom‐up’ initiatives in military innovation.     

Reassessing the special relationship

The resignation of Tony Blair as British Prime Minister and the transition from Bush to Obama in the US mark the end of the second revival of the US–UK special relationship. The classic era of the special relationship began under the Labour government in the 1940s, though it was Winston Churchill who inspired the concept. It ended with the resignation of Harold Macmillan in 1963. Margaret Thatcher revived close personal relations with the US President as a guiding principle of UK foreign policy and Tony Blair successfully revived them again, even though the end of the Cold War had transformed the framework of transatlantic relations. Over the past 60 years US–UK relations have embedded specific security arrangements which have persisted, largely unquestioned, through the ups and downs of political relations at the top: close links between the two countries' armed forces; access to defence technology and procurement; intelligence ties through the UKUSA Agreement; a semi-independent nuclear deterrent and provision of military bases in the UK and its overseas territories. Public debate on the costs and benefits of these links has been limited; successive governments have discouraged a wider debate. The Obama administration enters office with few of the personal ties to Britain and to English culture, which have underpinned the special relationship. Earlier US administrations have approached relations with the UK from the perspective of US interests, while many British political leaders have felt—and have hoped to find in Washington—a sentimental attachment to Anglo–American partnership. British foreign policy would benefit from a reassessment of the structures of US–UK relations in terms of British interests, costs and benefits.     

The coming revolution in foreign affairs: rethinking American national security

For the last two decades the US has pursued what some analysts have called the ‘fantastical idea’ of military transformation that would enable the US to change the very nature of war. Known as the ‘revolution in military affairs’, this process would use technology to provide the US with battlefield dominance that no opponent could overcome. Motivated by the politics of the Cold War, however, this exit from reality has proved less than effective in what has become known as the ‘war on terror’. The US has been pulled into nasty, ‘small’ wars, against enemies utilizing asymmetric tactics. The Bush administration has tried to destroy these groups through the use of military force, failing, or even worse refusing, to recognize that these enemies feed off the economical, political and social rot of weak and failing states. For the last eight years the US government has addressed the symptoms of a problem rather than the actual disease. If America wants to make serious progress with the most pressing national security risks, the next American president must enact a revolution in foreign affairs that sees a massive overhaul and substantial investment in the State Department and USAID. A critical mass of research exists to illustrate the links between development and security—it is time Washington gets serious and embraces a conception of security that is more holistic, and ultimately, more effective.     

Global multipolarity,European security and implications for UK grand strategy: back to the future,once again

The international system is returning to multipolarity—a situation of multiple Great Powers—drawing the post‐Cold War ‘unipolar moment’ of comprehensive US political, economic and military dominance to an end. The rise of new Great Powers, namely the ‘BRICs’—Brazil, Russia, India, and most importantly, China—and the return of multipolarity at the global level in turn carries security implications for western Europe. While peaceful political relations within the European Union have attained a remarkable level of strategic, institutional and normative embeddedness, there are five factors associated with a return of Great Power competition in the wider world that may negatively impact on the western European strategic environment: the resurgence of an increasingly belligerent Russia; the erosion of the US military commitment to Europe; the risk of international military crises with the potential to embroil European states; the elevated incentive for states to acquire nuclear weapons; and the vulnerability of economically vital European sea lines and supply chains. These five factors must, in turn, be reflected in European states’ strategic behaviour. In particular, for the United Kingdom—one of western Europe's two principal military powers, and its only insular (offshore) power—the return of Great Power competition at the global level suggests that a return to offshore balancing would be a more appropriate choice than an ongoing commitment to direct military interventions of the kind that have characterized post‐2001 British strategy.     

Workfare–Warfare: Neoliberalism, "Active" Welfare and the New American Way of War

Abstract:  In recent decades, welfare reform in the USA has increasingly been based on a political imperative to reduce the number of people on welfare. This has in large part taken place through the establishment of a "workfare" state, in which the receipt of state benefits requires a paid labor input. Designed to reduce expenditure on civil social services, welfare-to-work programs have been introduced. At the same time, the restructuring of US defense provision has seen the "military–industrial complex" emerge as a key beneficiary of state expenditure. Both of these trends can be characterized, this paper argues, as manifestations of neoliberal thinking—whether in the form of the "workfarism" that is undertaken to bolster the US economy, or the "defense transformation" that has been intended to enhance US war-making capacity. While these two aspects have been analyzed in detail independently, the aim of this paper is to probe the similarities, connections and overlaps between the workfare state and the recent American emphasis on high-technology warfare—the so-called "Revolution in Military Affairs"—and "defense transformation". There are, the paper argues, strong homologies to be drawn between the restructuring of the American defense and welfare infrastructures. Furthermore there are also instances where warfare and welfare are being melded together into a hybrid form "workfare–warfare", in which military service is increasingly positioned as a means of gaining welfare and, conversely, traditionally military industries are becoming involved in the area of welfare provision. The result, it is argued, is an emergent form of workfare–warfare state in the USA.     

关于1940年美英“驱逐舰换基地”协定的历史考察

1940年 9月美国和英国签订的“驱逐舰换基地”的秘密协定 ,是第二次世界大战爆发后美国尚处在战争之外的情况下 ,两国间达成的第一个重要双边军事协定。经过近 4个月的谈判 ,英国获得了迫切需要的驱逐舰 5 0艘 ,美国以此换取了租借英国在西大西洋和加勒比海上的 8个海空军基地 99年的权利 ,以及英国政府的重要保证 :英国一旦战败 ,皇家海军决不投降也不会被凿沉 ,而是开到海外继续保卫帝国     

Where Are the Coast-Watchers’ Bones?

In October 1942, five British civilians and 17 New Zealand coast-watchers were executed by Japanese military forces, at Tarawa, Gilbert Islands (Kiribati), in the central Pacific. The bodies were buried in a mass grave, the location of which became obscured when the Japanese constructed military fortifications. A battle was fought at Tarawa in November 1943 whereby the US Marines defeated the Japanese defenders and took control of the island. In the battle more than six thousand men died and their bodies were buried in hastily prepared and often unmarked graves. Since the end of the war the remains of hundreds of Americans and some Japanese have been located and recovered from Tarawa but nothing among the remains has been identified as belonging to the 22 British subjects. A problem in locating the grave of the British has been a lack of any record of its position. In this paper the authors consider the documentary evidence including an important map and a report on the first attempt, using local knowledge, to locate the grave. The specific area of the grave is identified, the date of the executions is confirmed and the reasons behind the order to execute are discussed.     

The Trade Goes,and the Flag Follows? British State Intervention and Natural Resource Extraction in Colombia, 1989–2010

During the 1960s, agents of the Colombian state began carrying out a counterinsurgency campaign against elements of the domestic population considered ‘subversive’. Subversion, according to US counterinsurgency manuals, largely translated to involvement in social organisation. As a result, trade unionists, political activists and human rights defenders in Colombia became aggressively targeted. While violence in Colombia's past has been widely documented, recent British involvement has not. The official justification for British military and police assistance, beginning in 1989, was within the context of the drug war. By drawing on a wide range of sources including newly declassified documents from the UK National Archives in Kew, this article posits that British counter-narcotics assistance was contentious in nature and ineffective in outcome. Meanwhile, this assistance lent structural and active support to the counterinsurgency conflict. In this light, the protection of British capital interest in Colombia – specifically that of British Petroleum – is analysed as a persuasive underlying motive for British military and police assistance. Finally, British Petroleum's private security strategy in Colombia is investigated as a case study in the utilisation of counterinsurgency, with the result of the near-total elimination of social organisation within its areas of operations.     

Over‐promising and under‐delivering? Ambitions and risks in US defence strategy

Recent changes to US defence strategy, plans and forces have placed the United States at greater risk of over‐promising and under‐delivering on its global security ambitions. In 2012, the Obama administration released a new defence strategic guidance document to adapt to a shifting security environment and defence budget cuts. The guidance upholds the two long‐standing American goals of global pre‐eminence and global reach, but seeks to apply this military power by using new planning and regional concepts. It revises the Department of Defense's force planning construct, an important tool used to size US military forces, and identifies the Asia–Pacific and the greater Middle East as the two regions where the US military should focus its attention and resources. There are three major risks facing this revised US strategy: emerging security threats, the role of US allies and partners, and domestic constraints in the United States. Included in these risks are the proliferation of advanced military technologies, the US response to the rise of China, the continued prevalence of state instability and failure, the capability and commitment of NATO and other US allies, additional US budget cuts, political polarization in the United States, and interservice competition within the US military. In light of these risks, the United States faces a future in which it will continue to struggle to direct its military power towards its most important geopolitical priorities, such as rebalancing towards the Asia–Pacific, as opposed simply to respond to the many security surprises that are certain to arise. If the past is any guide, American political leaders will respond to the aforementioned risks in the worst way possible: by maintaining the current US defence strategy while slashing the resources to support it.     

The United States and counterinsurgency: 'political first, political last, political always'

According to the status of forces agreement signed by Iraq and the United States in November 2008, US troops are to be withdrawn entirely from Iraq by the end of 2011. A few days later it was also revealed that the British force in Iraq, numbering about 4,100 troops, will be reduced to a contingent of just a few hundred military advisors by summer 2009. The counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, on the other hand, is to be intensified in the form of a ‘surge’ in military and political effort. Counterinsurgency operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq have long been at the centre of the security policy debate in the United States and elsewhere; a debate which seems unlikely to be resolved in the near future. But what exactly is counterinsurgency? This article offers some reflections on the practice and the politics of an especially complex form of military engagement. All military activity should be understood through the prism of politics, and counterinsurgency particularly so.     

Counterinsurgency Reexamined: Racism,Capitalism, and US Military Doctrine

The US has been engaged in coercive projects of counterinsurgency since the Indian Wars in the 19^th century. Racist constructions of the enemy have been central to this process. Counterinsurgency has called forth new waves of contestation at every juncture, which has in turn shaped the very texture of military doctrine. This article draws on archival research, historical geography, and Marxist theory to trace the dialectics of counterinsurgency and insurgency through a series of turning points in US imperial history from the development of small wars doctrine in the 1930s to renewal of counterinsurgency during hybrid wars in Venezuela and Latin America in the current conjuncture. Through a conjunctural analysis, we argue that racism performs fundamental work in achieving consent to counterinsurgency wars, allowing capitalism to survive challenges to its legitimacy.     

Colonial Dreams and Nightmares: British and French Perceptions of Republican Policies in Spanish Morocco (1931–1936)

Historians’ continuing interest in the origins of the Spanish Civil War has recently extended to the colonial policies of the Spanish Second Republic in Morocco, a relatively unexplored issue in previous decades, which has informed new approaches to the military uprising of July 1936. Foreign sources and archives, however, have been generally overlooked in this context. This article claims that British and French delegates in Morocco made critical observations about republican reforms in Spanish Morocco, which have much to add to this debate. They raised questions regarding the continuity of republican policies in Morocco and the anti-republican attitudes within the Army of Africa. They also challenged conventional knowledge concerning the difficulties encountered by alternative colonial projects in Morocco. In the end, their reports not only questioned metropolitan options but also anticipated the attitudes of the British and French governments, vis-à-vis the military rebellion.     

An African Cuba? Britain and the Zanzibar Revolution, 1964

This article examines the response of the British government to the revolution in Zanzibar in January 1964. It demonstrates that, once the safety of British nationals had been assured, British concerns centred upon the possibility that the new regime might become susceptible to communist influence. These fears appeared to be realised as British influence in Zanzibar diminished and the new government welcomed communist aid and advisers. In the aftermath of successful military interventions in support of moderate regimes in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, and under pressure from Washington to take decisive action, the British prepared a series of plans for military action in Zanzibar. None of these was enacted and the final plan was scrapped in December. The paper examines the range of factors that undermined British diplomacy and inhibited the government from taking military action in Zanzibar. In doing so it illustrates the complexity of Britain's relationship with postcolonial regimes in East Africa and the difficulties that it faced when trying to exert influence in a region recognised by both London and Washington as a British sphere of influence.     

The desert of the real and the simulacrum of war

As the global war on terror bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, a new inter‐and intra‐service struggle emerged within the military, between what we might call the ‘transformationists’ and the ‘neotraditionalists’. The transformationists put their faith in network‐centric warfare and precision munitions to resolve the intractable political, civil and religious conflicts of the twenty‐first century. The neotraditionalists, in contrast, go back to the future for lessons, to the ‘low‐intensity conflicts’ of Malaya and Vietnam, the ‘small wars’ that Marines fought in Central America in the interwar period, and even the instructions given to American servicemen deployed to assist the British occupation of Iraq during the Second World War. Lumped together under the rubric of ‘irregular warfare’, two new watchwords have had emerged from the neotraditionalist camp: ‘counter‐insurgency’ and ‘cultural awareness’. As the neotraditionalists reach out to social scientists to assist them in their efforts, a secondary civil war has erupted in the universities over whether academics should become involved in the new war efforts. Based on a week spent embedded with the 1/25th Marines at 29 Palms and extensive interviews with key proponents and critics, this article maps (and reflexively questions the practice of mapping) the future of warfare as it is planned, taught, gamed and operationalized by the US military.     

Military command in the last decade

On 11 September 2010, the United States commemorated the ninth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. In those nine years, British forces have been engaged in military operations of unexpected location, intensity, scale and duration. While the performance of British troops has been repeatedly praised on these operations, there has been growing disquiet among commentators and, indeed, among the military establishment itself about the conduct of these campaigns. Specifically, the issue of British military command has come under increasing scrutiny. This article examines command frictions at the strategic and operational levels and seeks to provide a sociological explanation of these difficulties. It claims that British commanders have failed to identify a coherent strategy over the past decade while in‐theatre operational command has often been characterized by an ad hoc‐ery, incoherence and inconsistency. The article suggests that a ‘laissez faire’ command culture has been evident at strategic and operational levels. While individual mistakes may not be irrelevant, the article explores the way in which this command culture may be a product of institutional pressures within defence and, above all, a product of inter‐service rivalry. However, the laissez faire system of command in the armed forces may also be a reflection of much deeper cultural presumptions and preferences within British professional society itself which has always had a strong tendency towards pragmatism, decentralization and shorttermism. The article concludes by offering some suggestions as to how military command might be reformed in light of its potentially profound cultural origins.     

The United States and Myanmar: a ‘boutique issue’?

Myanmar has been one of a number of countries that the new American Executive branch selected for policy reconsideration. The Obama administration's review of relations with Myanmar, characterized as a ‘boutique issue’ during the presidential campaign, has received considerable attention in 2009, and in part was prompted by quiet signals sent by both sides that improved relations were desirable. Begun as an intense policy review by various agencies, it has been supplemented by the first visits in 15 years to the country by senior US officials. The policy conclusion, that sanctions must remain in place but will be supplemented by dialogue, is a politically realistic compromise given the strong congressional and public antipathy to the military regime and the admiration for Aung San Suu Kyi, whose purported views have shaped US policies. US claims of the importance of Myanmar as a security and foreign policy concern have also been a product of internal US considerations as well as regional realities. US—Burmese relations since independence have been strongly influenced by the Cold War and China, whose strategic interests in Myanmar have been ignored in the public dialogue on policy until recently, with US policy focused on political and human rights concerns. Attention is now concentrated on parliamentary and local elections to be held in 2010, after which the new constitution will come into effect and provide the military with a taut reign on critical national policies while allowing opposition voices. Future relations will be strongly influenced by the transparency and freedom both of the campaigning and vote counting, and the role—if any—of the opposition National League for Democracy. Strong scepticism exists in the US on prospects unless the Burmese institute extensive reforms. The Burmese military, presently controlling all avenues of social mobility, will have a major role in society for decades. The article initially evaluates US policies towards Myanmar prior to 1988, when a military coup marked a negative shift in US—Myanmar relations, from cooperation to a US sanctions regime. It looks at the influence China's involvement in Myanmar and the role Aung San Suu Kyi have had on the formulation of US policy towards the country and assesses the prospects for the US‐Myanmar relationship under the Obama administration.     

The Causes of Iran's 1953 Coup: A Critique of Darioush Bayandor's Iran and the CIA

This article presents a detailed criticism of Darioush Bayandor's book Iran and the CIA. Bayandor argues that certain Shi'a clerics, rather than the US Central Intelligence Agency, were the main actors responsible for overthrowing Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in August 1953. Bayandor presents no major new evidence to support this claim. He gives too much weight to certain statements, draws unwarranted inferences from others, and discounts or disregards a wealth of evidence that conflicts with his account. He overemphasizes the role of civilian crowds in the overthrow of Mosaddeq and underemphasizes the role of Iranian military units organized by the CIA. And he fails to acknowledge the importance of US and especially British efforts to foment opposition to Mosaddeq before the coup.