Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes on phrenology: Debunking a fad

ABSTRACT

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. (1809–1894) was a Boston physician, a professor of medicine at the Harvard Medical School, and a writer of prose and poetry for general audiences. He was also one of the most famous American wits of the nineteenth century and a celebrity not bashful about exposing costly, absurd, and potentially harmful medical fads. One of his targets was phrenology, and the current article examines how he learned about phrenology during the 1830s as a medical student in Boston and Paris, and his head-reading with Lorenzo Fowler in 1858. It then turns to what he told readers of the Atlantic Monthly (in 1859) and Harvard medical students (in 1861) about phrenology being a pseudoscience and how phrenologists were duping clients. By looking at what Holmes was stating about cranioscopy and practitioners of phrenology in both humorous and more serious ways, historians can more fully appreciate the “bumpy” trajectory of one of the most significant medical and scientific fads of the nineteenth century.     

A Falling Out: The Relationship Between Oliver Wendell Holmes and Theodore Roosevelt

Theodore Roosevelt is often credited with founding and shaping the modern American presidency. With his appointment of Oliver Wendell Holmes to the Supreme Court of the United States, Roosevelt also set in motion a force that would transform the judiciary. However, it did not go as Roosevelt had planned. Holmes' refusal to conform to Roosevelt's desires in Northern Securities Co. v. United States demonstrated that Holmes was his own man and not Roosevelt's instrument. The decision brought an abrupt halt to what had been becoming a close friendship between the two men. Over the years the rift deepened. The bitterness that grew between them reflected more than a difference of opinion over law and economic principles; it reflected the type of disillusionment that comes only when a friend fails to live up to expectations.     

An ineluctable minimum of natural law: François Gény, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and the limits of legal skepticism

During the first few decades of the twentieth century, legal theory on both sides of the Atlantic was characterized by a tremendous amount of skepticism toward the private law concepts of property and contract. In the United States and France, Oliver Wendell Holmes and François Gény led the charge with withering critiques of the abuse of deduction, exposing their forebears’ supposedly gapless system of private law rules for what it was, a house of cards built on the ideological foundations of laissez faire capitalism. The goal was to make the United States Constitution and the French civil code more responsive to the realities of industrialization. Unlike the other participants in this transatlantic critique, François Gény simultaneously insisted on the immutability of justice and social utility. His “ineluctable minimum of natural law” would guide judges and jurists toward the proper social ends, replacing deduction with teleology. The problem was that nearly all of Gény's contemporaries were perplexed by his conception of natural law, which lacked the substance of the natural rights tradition of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the historicist impulse of the early twentieth. No one was more perplexed than Oliver Wendell Holmes, whose more thoroughgoing skepticism led him to see judicial restraint as the only solution to the abuse of deduction. The ultimate framework for this debate was World War I, in which both Holmes and Gény thought they had found vindication for their views. Events on the battlefield reaffirmed Gény's commitment to justice just as they reignited Holmes’ existential embrace of the unknown. In a sense, the limits of their skepticism would be forged in the trenches of the Great War.     

H.G. Wells and the New Liberalism

This article offers a new interpretation of H.G. Wells's politicalthought in the Edwardian period and beyond. Scholars have emphasisedhis socialism at the expense of his commitment to liberalism,and have misread his novel The New Machiavelli as an anti-Liberaltract. Wells spent much effort in the pre-1914 period in thequest for a ‘new Liberalism’, and did not believethat socialists should compete directly with the Liberal Partyfor votes. It was this latter conviction that lay behind hismuch misunderstood dispute with the Fabian Society. His politicalsupport for Churchill was one sign of his belief in the compatibilityof liberalism and socialism, in which he was far from uniqueat the time. He also engaged, somewhat idiosyncratically, withthe ‘servile state’ concept of Hilaire Belloc. Althoughhe did not articulate his Liberal identity with complete consistency,he did so with increasing intensity as the First World War approached.This helps explain why key New Liberal politicians includingChurchill, Lloyd George and Masterman responded to his ideassympathetically. The extent of engagement between Wells andthe ‘New Liberalism’ was such that he deserves tobe considered alongside Green, Ritchie, Hobson and Hobhouseas one of its prophets.     

The Reign of Grace: Liberalism and Heresy in the New World

This article examines the controversy surrounding The Reign of Grace (1888), a pamphlet published in Dunedin by William Salmond (d. 1917), a Presbyterian intellectual. It came in for harsh criticism. James MacGregor, a conservative minister, and Adam Johnston, a layman, wrote rebutting pamphlets. The controversy occurred during a period in which Presbyterianism's leadership was dividing along liberal and traditionalist lines. It dominated proceedings at the Presbytery of Dunedin for months, featured at the 1888 Synod of Otago and Southland, and received some coverage abroad. At stake was Salmond's proposal for an extended “reign of grace” that allowed for postmortem repentance. His opponents considered this an attack on Christian mission. I discuss the controversy in terms of Salmond's views on the Bible, his challenge to the Westminster Confession, and his specific proposition for extending grace's “reign.” I argue that while the debate reflected a stark liberal–traditionalist polarisation — something seen particularly in regard to the Confession — there was something further at play. Regarding Salmond's extension of grace's reign, the debate was not between liberals and traditionalists, but between a man largely standing alone against an array of liberals and traditionalists who found his idea dangerous.