Writing the First Draft of History: Anthony Lewis as Supreme Court Correspondent

The legendary Washington Bureau Chief and columnist of The New York Times , James Reston, with a push from Felix Frankfurter, decided that the paper of record would have its own correspondent specializing in the Supreme Court. ¹ With his eye for excellent young talent, ² Reston chose Anthony Lewis, already a Pulitzer-Prize winner before his thirtieth birthday, ³ and sent him to Harvard for the 1956–57 academic year as a Nieman Fellow to study law.     

Wilson, Brandeis, and the Supreme Court Nomination

In late January 1916, many readers of the New York World chuckled as they looked at Rollin Kirby's editorial cartoon entitled, "The Blow that Almost Killed Father." In the drawing, Kirby showed a Wall Street big-shot—one who looked a little like J. P. Morgan—prostrate in his desk chair, the ticker-tape machine broken and leaning against the desk, a picture of the New York Stock Exchange askew on the wall, and a newspaper dropped to the ground, its headline blaring " Brandeis for the Supreme Court ."     

The Other Supreme Court

相似文献   

The History of the Per Curiam Opinion: Consensus and Individual Expression on the Supreme Court

Readers of Supreme Court opinions have become so accustomed in recent years to the multiple concurrences and dissents that accompany important opinions that it is difficult to recall that this is a relatively recent phenomenon. It is only in the past century that the Court's traditional balance of the institutional and the personal has shifted from an insistence on presenting what Learned Hand termed "monolithic solidarity" to the world. That insistence began with Chief Justice Marshall's determination that the Court should resolve its cases, not seriatim, with each Justice writing separately, but instead in a single, unified opinion. The resulting culture of the Court, one that discouraged both dissenting and concurring opinions as assaults on this unified front, persisted from Marshall's day into the 1930s.3 The Court in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries thus deliberately submerged the idea of a personal voice in the fiction of a collective voice, one that spoke for the institution rather than for the Justice who served as its designated scribe.     

Pivotal Politics,Presidential Capital,and Supreme Court Nominations

We analyze the Supreme Court nomination process in order to provide a general explanation of presidents' propensity to win confirmation battles even in the face of an ideologically hostile Senate. The analysis serves two purposes. First, we argue that employing the conventional measure of the Senate's power to constrain the president's choice of nominees–the median senator–provides an inaccurate picture of this process. In its stead we argue that the filibuster pivot (or the sixtieth most liberal or conservative senator) more accurately captures the Senate's power over the president (Krehbiel 1998). Second, we argue that even under this more stringent spatial constraint, presidents still have the ability to win most confirmation battles with the Senate. Indeed, our results indicate that presidents often overcome situations where the Senate should reject their nominees, or where it should force them to make a less desirable choice, by invoking political capital.     

Here Lies the Supreme Court: Revisited

相似文献   

Many Voices,One Court: The Origin and Role of Dissent in the Supreme Court

E pluribus unum—out of many, one—is the phrase emblazoned on the Seal of the United States, which refers to the notion that a single American voice emerges from the many diverse groups that constitute the nation. The legislative and executive branches of government often act as one voice through legislative bills and executive acts, aggregating diverse interests that reflect the national will. The notion of e pluribus unum, however, is not often applied to the judiciary, a branch of government the members of which are viewed, not as outlets for the will of the people, but as gatekeepers of the rule of law. But while the Supreme Court may not speak directly for the people, its opinions speak to the people, and the methods used by the Justices to express those opinions have revealed changes in the conception of the Court's voice throughout history.     

Punctuated Equilibrium and the Supreme Court

In the legislative and executive branches, policy scholars have used punctuated equilibrium (PE) theory to describe and explain patterns of change. However, there has been little examination of how PE might apply to courts and legal policy change. This article addresses that gap by providing evidence that legal policy change—here conceptualized as changes in what precedents the Supreme Court most often cites—is governed by PE theory. After making a prima facie case for the applicability of PE theory to the Court, I leverage network rankings of Supreme Court decisions to create a proxy for legal policy change that improves on existing measures. Using both a stochastic process model and an analysis of the punctuations the measure uncovers, I find strong evidence of PE processes.     

The Supreme Court and Juvenile Justice

For so many things I thank the Historical Society profoundly, but place right at the top of my list the delightful opportunity your invitation has given me to read the prior Annual Lectures—interesting, exciting, thoroughly intimidating—touching on the Court's history, its cases, its people, even its wives (the subject of Justice Ginsburg's 1999 lecture). Wholly apart from the Society's many initiatives to preserve the Court's history and increase public awareness of its contributions to our nation, the now nearly three dozen Annual Lectures alone offer an amazing insight into this great institution.