“SEEING” THE PAST: TEXT AND QUESTIONS OF HISTORY IN THE RĀJATARAṄGIṆĪ

Traditional scholarly opinion has regarded Kalha?a's Rājatara?gi?ī, the twelfth‐century Sanskrit chronicle of Kashmiri kings, as a work of history. This essay proposes a reinvestigation of the nature of the iconic text from outside the shadow of that label. It first closely critiques the positivist “history hypothesis,” exposing its internal contradictions over questions of chronology, causality, and objectivity as attributed to the text. It then argues that more than an empiricist historical account that modern historians like to believe it is—in the process bracketing out integral rhetorical, mythic, and didactic parts of the text—the Rājatara?gi?ī should be viewed in totality for the kāvya (epic poem) that it is, which is to say, as representing a specific language practice that sought to produce meaning and articulated the poet's vision of the land and its lineages. The essay thus urges momentarily reclaiming the text from the hegemonic but troubled understanding of it as history—only to restore it ultimately to a more cohesive notion of historicality that is consistent with its contents. Toward this end, it highlights the concrete claim to epistemic authority that is asserted both by the genre of Sanskrit kāvya generally and by the Rājatara?gi?ī in particular, and their conception of the poetic “production” of the past that bears a striking resonance with constructivist historiography. It then traces the intensely intertextual and value‐laden nature of the epistemology that frames the Rājatara?gi?ī into a narrative discourse on power and ethical governance. It is in its narrativity and discursivity—its meaningful representation of what constitutes “true” knowledge of time and human action—that the salience of the Rājatara?gi?ī may lie.     

Perceptions and Misperceptions of Regime Stability and Iran's Convoluted Rise to Regional Influence

This article seeks to explain revolutionary Iran's convoluted rise to regional prominence over the last three decades. We hold that perceptions and misperceptions of regime stability (both of one's self and of others) by the relevant actors have played a major role in Iran's recent. The main logic is that the success of many strategies employed by relevant regional actors to augment their regional influence (both Iran seeking more influence and others seeking to stem that influence) have crucially hinged on making correct assessments of regime stability. This study has both theoretical and empirical findings. Theoretically, we find that failures to accurately estimate regime stability stem from three main sources: (1) objective uncertainties regarding the target state's level of regime stability, given the high strength of societal forces shaping state‐society relations in the Middle East and given the distinct variation between autocrats in terms of their ability to develop effective counterrevolutionary/repressive tools; (2) ideological blinders, from which both the United States and regional actors frequently suffer, which have often led them to be falsely optimistic regarding the existence of either subversive opportunities or opportunities to stabilize regimes facing domestic pressures; and (3) incorrect theories regarding sources of regime stability which lead experts and policymakers to overlook factors which may destabilize a regime. This article has two major empirical findings. First, Iran's rise may be at least partly attributed to Iran demonstrating a slightly better learning curve at the tactical level (i.e., learning subversive skills from its Lebanese experience in the 1980s–1990s and applying them to Iraq in the 2000s–2010s) as well as at the strategic level (i.e., understanding the limits of its subversive capacities and correctly assessing when it can engage in successful stabilizing operations). Second, two errors committed by the United States have been far more consequential than those committed by Iran for the regional balance of power: First, the George W. Bush Administration myopically opened up subversive opportunities for Iran when it invaded Iraq in 2003 by thinking that it could stabilize a democratic regime and insulate it from outside influence; second, on two occasions Washington overestimated the transformative effect that its concessions to Iran would have in terms of sufficiently empowering reformists so as to bring about complete regime transformation from within.     

Studying Public Policy through Immigration Policy: Advances in Theory and Measurement

This essay provides a critical review of the field of immigration policy studies from the perspective of measurement and modeling. It serves to contextualize and broaden the views presented in the special issue. As such, we combine insights from American and comparative politics, pinpoint key limitations and challenges in the field, and identify areas of strength within each subfield which could inform theory and measurement development for the other. Ultimately, the concerns about conceptualization, definition, and measurement that we identify and discuss herein, do not apply only to immigration policy studies but to policy studies writ large.     

Ulama in Islamic Law‐Making and Adjudication in Contemporary Egypt

The article examines the legislative and judicial tasks of Islamic jurists and how they carried it out in constitutional or general legal structure. While the Pakistani experiment was inspired by the Iranian model of jurists' involvement in legislatures, Egypt took a different path by not recognizing any official role for Islamic jurists with ambiguous recognition of Islamic jurisprudence. The legislative role could take the form of incorporating Islamic jurists into the legislature, establishing a committee partially made up of Islamic jurists, or handing over some legislative task to an Islamic jurisprudential institution. Despite the fact that Islamization was intended to respond to the people's requests, it employed autocratic and authoritarian mechanisms. The project attempted to replace the typical class of socially recognized jurists with appointed committees entrusted with Islamic codification. The experiment was challenged for its operation and its Islamicity but never introduced Shari'a courts or Islamic clerical legislation.     

Do We Need a GCC Bank to Facilitate the Economic Turnaround of the GCC Region?

Amidst the ongoing crisis of plummeting oil prices, the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) terrain has become a haunt of economists and financial analysts to tackle the ongoing challenges in the region. GCC constituents are gearing themselves with a robust political will that they hope could result in a turnaround of their economy by adopting a policy of economic diversification in nonoil‐based sectors. With this background supported by extensive qualitative scan of literature pertaining to the reforms proposed by the six members of the GCC to drive the economy forward amidst ongoing economic crisis, this article seeks to underscore the prospect of a shared initiative by the GCC constituents in institutionalizing a GCC bank as a potent innovative solution which may serve to provide an edifice for pushing forth the region's economy in nonhydrocarbon segments contingent upon the individual needs of the GCC constituents. As an exploratory study, this paper sheds light on these issues besides discussing the fundamental functions of the GCC bank.     

Double‐Thinking and Contradictory Arrangements in Iranian Law and Society

Although thinking double thoughts and living dual lives are not specifically Iranian traits, Iranians have, nevertheless, become more susceptible to them for historical reasons, which may be traced back to when Persians became Muslims. The gradual normalization of double‐thinking over the centuries has given rise to social and political patterns of behavior and institutional arrangements which oscillate between opposing regimes of truths and different sets of ethical concerns, often without merging them into a new process. Once double‐thinking is normalized at the level of society, it helps people to cope with the cognitive dissonance they experience in circumstances where it is difficult to change attitude and behavior. It also affects the organization of society by making contradictory arrangements appear normal. It promotes reflexive thinking and subversive action as much as it facilitates misrecognition of sociopolitical suppression and legitimization of symbolic violence. This state of affairs generates a form of modernity which appears, at least on the surface, to be comfortable with contradictory social arrangements, while deep down it remains ill at ease with its inner contradictions.