The Theology of Carl Schmitt's Political Theology

The theological turn in studies of Carl Schmitt is pronounced. This paper does not challenge this turn, but questions what theology means for Schmitt. Specifically, it challenges the assumption that Schmitt's political theology is grounded in divine revelation. By distinguishing between “theology in the sense of divine revelation” and “theology in the sense of epistemic faith,” it argues that Schmitt's political theology is epistemic in origin. Schmitt's political theology is not rooted in faith in divine revelation, but in the narrower notion that human cognition is, ultimately, rooted in faith not reason, revelation, or common sense.     

Pascalian Suite. Elements of an Apologia

Abstract

This article considers the thought of Claude Lefort as a response to Leo Strauss. It compares their views on the task of political philosophy as such, and on its specific relation to modernity, religion, and democracy. For Strauss, the revival of political philosophy under modern conditions requires a return to its ancient roots. While Lefort agrees that such a restoration is necessary, he argues that this requires a departure from ancient thought: political philosophy must recognize modern democracy as a new kind of regime, independent of theologico-political norms.     

Political Philosophy,Education, and Statesmanship

How are we to understand the connection between political philosophy, education, and statesmanship? Using Harry V. Jaffa's Crisis of the Strauss Divided as a guide, the following essay explores this question by reflecting on a teacher-student lineage that stretches across the twentieth century. It explains and defends Jaffa's understanding of political philosophy but argues that one of Jaffa's students improved or perfected Jaffa's approach. In doing so, Jaffa's student did what Jaffa had done for his teacher, and Jaffa's teacher had done for his teacher. While at first glance the teacher-student lineage might appear to trace a descent, from another angle it appears to be an ascent, or at least the preparation for a possible ascent.     

On Ambivalence and (Anti-)Normativity (or,Theology as a Way of Life?)

ABSTRACT

This essay argues that queer theory’s ongoing reflection about its own disciplinary identity yields insights that could benefit contemporary political theology. Exploring how internal discussions and debates on the queerness of queer theory can serve as an instructive analogy for similar conversations about the “theologicalness” of political theology, this essay proposes two potential insights that can be gleaned. First, political theology should continue to draw on and do theology, but it should not worry about venturing outside the bounds of what is presumed to be the theological. Theological reflection develops from, and also engenders, communicative and critical expressions, which are deeply important theological modes of political theology, central to its identity even as they appear at times to broaden or stray from it. Second, political theology should look more to politics, broadly understood as the various ways of ordering human life and the utilization and manifestation of power in that structuring, for the theology it offers. In these ways and more, this essay concludes, political theology, like queer theory, is both theory and praxis, a body of knowledge and way of life.     

Machiavelli: A Socratic?

Erica Benner and Leo Strauss have recently challenged the reigning consensus that, having concentrated on politics, Machiavelli was not a philosopher. Readers did not always consider Machiavelli's work to be unphilosophical; and whether a commentator considers Machiavelli to be a “philosopher” depends on his or her understanding of what a philosopher is. Neither Benner nor Strauss takes the activities and studies of professors of philosophy in universities today to be definitive. Instead, they look to an older tradition both describe as “Socratic.” Benner rests her argument primarily on Machiavelli's references to Xenophon, Plato, and Plutarch. Unfortunately, Machiavelli's references to the works of Xenophon and Plato do not include those that feature Socrates. Strauss points out the similarities between Socrates and Machiavelli's emphasis on the political and their appeal to the young, but he concludes that, although Machiavelli is a “political philosopher,” his use of philosophy to serve the desires of the demos means that he is not a “Socratic.”     

The vanity of dogmatizing: The three ‘versions’

This essay reevaluates the Weimar writings of Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss, specifically, their intellectual efforts to replace the political authority of Kantian liberalism with, respectively, a ‘political theology’ and ‘Biblical atheism’ derived from the thought of early-modern state theorists like Hobbes and Spinoza. Schmitt and Strauss each insisted that post-Kantian Enlightenment rationality was unraveling into a way of thinking that violently rejected ‘form’ of any kind, fixated myopically on material things and lacked any conception of the external constraints that invariably condition the possibilities of philosophy, morality and politics. They considered Kantian reason and liberal politics to pose serious threats to ‘genuine’ expressions of rationality and as dangerous obfuscations of the necessity of political order—of the brute fact that human beings stand in need of ‘being ruled,’ as such.     

After the Death of God: Postsecularity?

These recent volumes clearly show that the work of the recent generation of French philosophers, and the philosophy they continue to inspire, offer a splendid resource for theologians and theorists of religion. They stage a challenge to received divisions between philosophy and theology, deconstructing the secular/non-secular bifurcation on which they rest. In this vein, the contribution of the 'postsecularists' is to emphasise the centrality of issues of social justice at the heart of the religious sensibility.     

The Interplanetary Dialectic: Freedom and Equality in Ursula Le Guin's The Dispossessed

In his most recent work, Homeless and at Home in America, Peter Lawler diagnoses our country's twin intellectual impulses, libertarianism and Darwinism, as expressions of the modern, disjunctive soul; torn between the desire to conquer nature for the sake of individual autonomy and the inclination to scientifically deprivilege ourselves as merely another part of nature, many Americans have managed to incoherently embrace a kind of libertarian sociobiology. Lawler attempts to demonstrate that each perspective promises only a partial view of the truth and that a deeper anthropology that properly includes both our natural inclinations and our eros to transcend nature can be accounted for by what he calls a "Thomistic Realism." The theoretical crux of this Thomistic realism is a "science of theology" that articulates the relation between reason and revelation, navigating between the mutual exclusivity espoused by Leo Strauss or any decisive theoretical synthesis. The purpose of this article is to fully explain the meaning of Lawler's science of theology and the extent to which it is influenced by but ultimately departs from Strauss's view.     

Protection — Evil

Abstract

This article is premised on Heinrich Meier's dichotomy between political theology and political philosophy, the latter of which stakes its claims on “human wisdom.” I will examine one of the most famous political allegories claimed on this ground: that of the Hobbesian social contract. Then I will unpack this allegory into a set of five propositions that make up something I call the ontopolitical set. My argument is that in order to stand up as political philosophy, make rational sense, one must believe in the truth of all the five propositions of the ontopolitical set. If at least one of them is not a candidate for belief, then the whole set will collapse and the legitimacy of the modern Leviathan does not measure up to human wisdom, because it cannot be rationally justified. If this should be the case, we are left with political theology.     

Reasoned and Inspired Beliefs: A Study of Islamic Theology

Abstract: In most cases, Islamic theology has been examined as a sub‐field of Islamic legal studies. Ignaz Goldziher and Joseph Schacht for instance, see a link between Islamic law and theology. However, Islamic materials from the formative period of Islamic thought show that Muslim scholars distinguished between disciplines dealing with theological themes and those dealing with legal and jurisprudential topics. In this article, the author defines theology and identifies the major trends that contributed to the development of theological doctrines in Sunni and Shi‘ite Islam. He argues that, during the various historical periods, the scope and reach of Islamic theology depended on the political, social, and intellectual environment. He concludes that, in the end, Muslim theology could only be understood in a context radically different from its counterpart in Judaism and Christianity.     

Science and Theology Diverse Resolutions of an Interdisciplinary Gap by the New Priesthood of Science

Abstract

In an age where the trend towards secularization has been slowed down, new religions and ideological movements are competing with the more traditional positions to be found in society. Those who are anxious to justify their own particular position share only one criterion for comparison with those holding other positions: a belief in the epistemological efficacy of science. A new priesthood of scientist has emerged to offer justification in the name of science for a variety of ideological positions and to explain to a bewildered public what the real relationship is between the various disciplines of science and those of theology or moral and political philosophy. This paper describes the variety of positions taken up by the new priesthood, typifying these as Fundamentalism, Orthodoxy; Liberalism, Modernism, Agnosticism and Atheism.     

Yoram Hazony and Leo Strauss on the Relation between Philosophy and Revelation

This essay challenges Yoram Hazony's ostensible correction of Leo Strauss's account of the tension between philosophy and revelation in Hazony's book The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture. While Hazony persuasively demonstrates the value of the Hebrew Bible, notably the half that he calls the “History of Israel,” as a work of rational political theory, emphasizing the difference in function between the Torah and the Christian “New Testament” (which serves chiefly to “bear witness” to particular events, rather than account for the permanent character of human and political life), he wrongly accuses Strauss of sharing the position of the radically antiphilosophic Christian theologian Tertullian that the Bible and classical philosophy are “absolutely oppos[ed],” even though Strauss, unlike Tertullian, takes the side of philosophy rather than the Bible in this conflict. Contrary to the impression Hazony conveys, Strauss readily acknowledged that the believer, no less than the philosopher, is obliged to make use of reason in his quest for truth and noted the critical areas of agreement between the Torah and classical philosophy. He simply emphasized the conflict between philosophy's reliance on reason as the ultimate guide to truth and the dependence of the Bible on belief in divine revelation, a dependence that Hazony implausibly seems to deny. And Hazony's challenge to the very distinction between reason and revelation threatens to weaken our appreciation of both sides of this tension, which Strauss identified as the source of the West's “vitality.”     

Justifying Multiculturalism: Social Justice,Diversity and National Identity in Australia and New Zealand

Multiculturalism has been criticised for emphasising cultural recognition over resource redistribution for minority cultural and ethnic groups. Moreover, critics argue that cultural diversity fails to provide enough common ground upon which to sustain civic nationalism. This paper examines the development of multiculturalist and biculturalist policies in Australia and New Zealand, and argues that these have in fact been justified in terms of a negotiated balance between two civic values: the value of diverse cultural expression, and social justice understood in egalitarian terms. The tension between these values has shaped the debate around multiculturalism in both cases. Both the social justice and value of cultural diversity arguments are deployed to reinforce conceptions of national identity in Australia and New Zealand.     

On “Natural” Uncertainty: The Philosophical Underpinnings of Uncertainty in Economics,with Special Reference to Knight and Strauss

Abstract

While current discourse has failed and will continue to fail to adequately integrate uncertainty into economic theory, this work explores how political philosophy can provide a better understanding of uncertainty. Specifically, political philosophy can answer most of the questions posed by Frank Knight's proposition of uncertainty in economic theory. In elaborating on Knight's reservations relating to Pragmatism, this work suggests that Knight's approach might well be revised to more adequately embrace the recent developments in American philosophy, especially those suggested by Leo Strauss. Significantly, it can be argued that Strauss provides a stronger foundation for the proposition of uncertainty in economic theory than Knight's application of Pragmatism around 1921. An understanding of uncertainty, which is based on Strauss, might be referred to as “natural” uncertainty, and this form of uncertainty may provide a point where political philosophy might begin to gain some traction within economic theory.     

Stewart,Kant, and the Reworking of Common Sense

Summary

Dugald Stewart was the first metaphysician of any significance in Britain who attempted to take account of Kantian philosophy, although his analysis appears generally dismissive. Traditionally this has been imputed to Stewart's poor understanding of Kant and to his efforts to defend the orthodoxy of common sense. This paper argues that, notwithstanding Stewart's reading, Kant's philosophy helped him in a reconsideration and reassessment of common sense philosophy. In his mature works—the Philosophical Essays (1810), the second volume of the Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1814), and the second part of his historical ‘Dissertation? (1815–1821)—Stewart's analysis of Kantian philosophy is far from being uniform. In the first two works, he takes a cautious approach to transcendentalism, showing some interest in the challenge it might represent for common sense; in the last, he turns to rash criticism. This change may appear confusing and inconsistent unless considered in the light of a precise ‘nationalistic’ strategy. In fact, once Stewart had taken from Kantian philosophy what he deemed useful for his own aims, he eventually dismissed it in order to show that his reworked version of common sense was the most original and most consistent outcome of the whole Anglo-Scottish philosophical tradition.     

A reader in international relations and political theory

Jerusalem is the holy city for Leo Strauss. It is the symbol of Judaism; moreover it is a root of Western culture together with Athens. But it would be wrong to label Strauss' philosophical thought with such definitions as ‘Jewish philosophy’. Therefore it is surprising that many contemporary interpreters strive to find a confessional or religious foundation in Strauss' thought. On the contrary, many of Strauss's texts testify his choice in favour of Athens, i.e., of philosophy. Yet the choice of Athens does not imply a rejection of Jerusalem. Strauss is convinced that Jerusalem plays a central role in Western civilisation and considers the indifference to religion and the ideologisation of philosophy completed in the modern age as causes of Western crisis, i.e., of contemporary nihilism. Philosophy and religion are forced to live side by side (like philosophy and politics) because neither reason nor revelation can express the ultimate word on the good and the just, i.e., on truth.     

On the Tragedy of the Modern Condition: The ‘Theologico-Political Problem’ in Carl Schmitt,Leo Strauss,and Hannah Arendt

This article addresses Eric L. Santner’s claim that “there is more political theology in everyday life than we might have ever thought” by analyzing the “theologico-political problem” in the work of three prominent twentieth-century political thinkers—Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss, and Hannah Arendt. Schmitt, Strauss, and Arendt share a preoccupation with the crisis of modern political liberalism and confront the theologico-political problem in a similar spirit: although their responses differ dramatically, their individual accounts dwell on the absence of incontestable principles in modern society that can justify life-in-common and the persistence of the political order. Their writings thus engage with the question of the place of “the absolute” in the political realm. In particular, Arendt’s indirect approach to the theologico-political problem is crucial to understanding the radicality of a political world in which traditional certainties can no longer be re-established. The theoretical trajectory I present suggests that the dispersion of political theology in everyday life has a specific corollary: modern politics operates within the tragic and paradoxical nature of its unstable and common origins that cannot be incorporated in exceptionalist versions of the body politic.     

Stanley Hauerwas,With the Grain of the Universe: The Church's Witness and Natural Theology

Abstract

The dualism between logos and praxis is still a root-cause of contemporary theological and religious discourse. Consequently, interreligious dialogue is divided as a field either related to comparative theology or philosophy or in pursuit of a common action for social justice. Instead of the traditional logos and the liberationist praxis, this paper will argue the Tao as an alternative paradigm that overcomes this dualism and is more germane to this age of globalization in the ecological crisis. It will propose three reconfigurations of interreligious dialogue; (1) from an "either-or" mode of thinking to a "bothand" way of life (T'ai-chi), (2) from an epistemology of knowing to a discernment of the way toward life in and through sociocosmic narratives of the exploited life (ch'i), and (3) from an ideologically motivated action based on a historico-anthropocentric subjectivity to a participatory embodiment in an intersubjective communion with the theanthropocosmic trajectory (Tao).     

In Praise of Heresy: Hus,Luther, and the Ethos of Reformation

Reformation is confined neither chronologically nor geographically but is best understood as a series of efforts to recover particular visions of Christian faith and practice. These endeavours always have potential for religious and social change. The martyred Bohemian priest Jan Hus (1372–1415) has often been characterised as a forerunner of the European Reformations and Martin Luther frequently referred to him. Past scholarship has evaluated the relation between Hussite history and the Reformation, Hus and Luther, in a variety of ways arguing either for organic connections or dismissing the possibility of causal connections. I argue that what Hus and Luther shared was not theology, common principles of reform, or visions of religious practice as much as a particular ethos. That ethos can best be understood within the idea of heresy. This article examines what Hus and Luther were striving to achieve, assesses the assumptions about Hus current in the sixteenth century, evaluates the Hus myth, and argues for a reconsideration and rehabilitation of heresy, a concept that epitomises the shared ethos that made Hus relevant to sixteenth‐century reformers.     

III 'Gender' is not enough: the need for a feminist consciousness

In the final commentary, Cynthia Enloe thinks again about Gillian Youngs' question: why do many IR academics find it so difficult to take feminist analysis seriously? She argues there are two fears: the first, for men, concerns how their own relationships with masculinity are affecting what they see as a ‘serious’ topic of investigation; the second is the fear of appearing feminized by colleagues making a judgement on the topic's seriousness. Cynthia Enloe argues that ‘gender’ alone is insufficient for transforming IR into a more reliable and useful discipline. What is needed is a feminist consciousness informing work on gender.