The Supreme Court in Times of Hot and Cold War: Learning from the Sounds of Silence for a War on Terrorism

Justice William J. Brennan once remarked that the Court has never fully developed a jurisprudence of national security. It is simply too episodic, he said. ¹ Our present Chief Justice would, it would seem, largely agree, though his own research shows some greater willingness for the Court to superintend—at least after the fact ² —the actions of the executive in times of war or similar crisis. My assignment in this essay was to ask the question slightly differently; namely, has the posture of the Court differed in times of hot or cold war, and if so, how has it differed? As will be evident momentarily, that question is less helpful to our present circumstance than it might seem. Why? Because, frankly, we are in neither a hot nor cold war, but something quite different ³ —something that has the potential to be not only hot, but blistering, and something which will likely never be fully appreciated as having gone truly cold.     

One Hundred and Twenty-Five Years after Slaughterhouse: Where's the Beef?

You never know. Historical events intended for one purpose sometimes result in the unintended, and American history is far from immune to this tendency. Thus the Civil War—first considered by Lincoln as nothing more than an attempt to prevent Southern secession—ultimately went far beyond an effort to preserve the Union, far beyond ending African-American slavery, far beyond even ensuring continued western expansion. By 1866, the war had wrought changes in the relationship between the federal government and the states, the federal government and its people, as well as the states and their citizenry. Although they may well have been unintended and their extent unclear, these transformations doomed continuance of the Union as it had been—producing instead a new connection between the American people and their legal order that is still evolving.¹ One manifestation of such change was the Fourteenth Amendment adopted by Congress in 1866. Ratified by the states as part of the Constitution in 1868, five years later the Supreme Court first considered its meaning and scope; and thereby hangs a story rich in irony.     

Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief

Abstract

Abraham Lincoln's presidency was defined and dominated by war, yet Lincoln himself had very little direct experience with warfare; nor had the American presidency been truly tested by war when he took office. Lincoln had to negotiate very difficult political and constitutional terrain as he waged the Civil War: issues of executive authority, constitutional powers and their limitations, and the nature of civil liberties during war constantly bedeviled him. His guiding principle in all these matters, and the greatest lesson we can learn from him today, was his flexibility and his pragmatism.     

Books Received

Abstract

YEARS FROM NOW, historians seeking a barometer of the decline in popular support for the Iraq War need only read Bob Woodward's trilogy on the George W. Bush administration's foreign policy. The first volume, Bush at War, which exanfines the planning for the war in Afghanistan in 200l, borders at times on the hagiographical.¹ The sequel, Plan of Attack, which examines the military and diplomatic approach to war in Iraq in 2oo3, is more reserved. Bush himself receives even-handed treatment, but many of his subordinates, in particular the secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and the civilian leadership in the Pentagon, are severely criticized. Woodward's disillusionment is complete by the summer of 2oo6, when he published the dfird and final volume, State of Denial, which details the failures of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, and shows no sign of the patriotism that coloured the earlier work. Bush at War, written with the smoke from 9/11 wafting in the airs could praise because it does not focus on Iraq: few objected to the means used and the ends pursued in Afghanistan. But Plan of Attack and State of Denial seek to explain a manifestly unpopular war.¹     

The Invisible Dance: The Supreme Court and the Press

Abstract

In America, Tocqueville writes, men were born equal; they did not have to become so.¹ But he is not unaware of the radical democratic character of the American revolution of which Gordon Wood has reminded us.² Prior to 1776, Tocqueville observes, the democratic principle was “far from dominating the government of society.” It was the Revolution that made it “the law of laws.” “The war was fought and victory obtained in its name” (1:1, ch. 4. 59).     

Inevitability,masculinity, and the American military tradition: the committee on the conduct of the war investigates the American Civil War

This essay examines the work of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, a joint select committee of investigation formed by Congress during the American Civil War. During its tenure in the 37^th and 38^th sessions of Congress, the Committee investigated almost every aspect of Union military operations; however, its principal concern was the examination of Union military defeats. Members of the Committee on the Conduct of the War were influenced by the notion of inevitable Union victory. As self‐made men who had achieved a degree of success in the emerging market economy of nineteenth‐century America, Committee members exemplified the period's predominate concept of masculinity. Also skeptical of military science and distrustful of the United States military academy at West Point, the Committee showed a marked preference for volunteer soldiers and officers throughout the war. Believing that West Point generals who endorsed strategic maneuver were cowardly and disloyal, Committee members were frequently critical of regular army officers in their investigations. Confusing the rhetoric of ‘hard war’ with military competence, the Committee's disdain for military education caused it to endorse incompetent military leadership and advocate mediocre generals for high command.     

To justify a nation: Inter-war soviet nationalism

In 1972 an anonymous author wrote in the Soviet journal Veche: Why during the Fatherland War, when mortal danger hung over the country and when extraordinary strength of spirit was needed did “Soviet patriotism” prove insufficient, and it was necessary urgently to call to remembrance the Church, Aleksandr Nevskii, Peter I, and Suvorov that is princes, tsars and reactionary generals? Why were not the cult of the heroes of the civil war and the cult of the heroes of the class struggle not enough? ¹      

Turning Points in the Greek Resistance

Abstract

Resistance to enemy occupation has stood rather apart from the general history of the Second World War. Historians have been doubtful whether to treat it as a part of military and strategic history or a part of political and diplomatic history. Some have thought the less said about it the better, in any context. In the history of particular countries which suffered enemy occupation, the treatment of resistance has varied widely according to the outcome of the war. In some countries it has occupied a major place in their war-time history: Denmark and Yugoslavia, for quite different reasons, are important examples. In other occupied countries very little has been written about the occupation by professional historians: Greece is an outstanding example. Although Britain played a leading role in promoting resistance everywhere, the subject has not attracted, many professional historians, other than those who had a personal engagement in it during the war.     

South African War (1899–1902) Memorials in Britain: A Case Study of Memorialization in London and Kent

Abstract

Mass public commemoration of war dead is often held to be a twentieth-century phenomenon, with its genesis in the Great War. This article argues for a pre-history occasioned by commemoration of the South African War (1899–1902) that built on shifts in the form and function of war memorials that had begun in the middle of the nineteenth century.     

Shipboard relations between Pacific Island women and Euroamerican men 1767–1887

Abstract

In January 1942 over 1,500 Australian troops and civilians were captured by the Japanese in Rabaul and on New Ireland and New Britain. Through much of the war the Allies had either coastwatchers or soldiers on New Britain, but remained uncertain what had happened to those captured. Anxious to return to Rabaul after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the Australians found few survivors. Some officers and nurses had been shipped to Japan, and they were soon on their way home. Many of the Catholic missionaries had survived on the Gazelle Peninsula, but only a handful of the civilians, airmen, coastwatchers and soldiers were still alive and in Rabaul. Eventually the Australians learnt that over 1,000 prisoners had been on the Montevideo Maru which had been sunk in 1942. More than three years after the event Australians had to begin the accounting for their biggest single disaster of the Second World War.     

Conservative Party Agents in Second World War Britain

The Second World War placed great pressures on the machineryand personnel of all political parties. Conservatives formedthe view that their own machine had been especially hard hitby the challenges of the war years, and that this was a majorreason for the party's 1945 general election defeat. A supposeddecline in the number of full-time, salaried constituency agentswas a key component of this narrative of decline. This articleinvestigates what happened to the Conservative agency in wartime,using an unusually wide range of sources, including those ofaround a hundred constituency associations. It shows that thenumber of agents did fall as a result of the war, but that associationsoften worked hard to keep their agents, or to mitigate the effectsof their departure. It also explains the failure of headquarters'wartime efforts to reform the agency and centralize the employmentof agents. Although the party's relative organizational declinedid have significant emotional and practical consequences forit in 1945, Conservatives tended, post hoc, to overstate theextent of their wartime organizational collapse, in part becauseit allowed them to avoid damaging recriminations about the realreasons for their defeat. Ultimately, though, the war's effects,while significant, were essentially transient. Constituencycontrol of agents remained, and a professional standard wasmaintained. The Conservatives emerged from the war with an agencythat was different in detail from, but recognizably similarin form to, that which had predated the war.     

The Spanish American War’s ‘Most Durable Hero’: Admiral Pasquale Cervera and Popular Heroic Values in the United States, 1898–1909

The United States honored a host of military heroes during the Spanish American War including Pasqual Cervera y Topete, the enemy admiral who had experienced a humiliating defeat at the Battle of Santiago Bay, Cuba (3 June 1898) at the hands of US naval forces. Over the course of the war and in the year that followed, American public opinion of the admiral became positive and increasingly laudatory. By late 1899, Life Magazine, followed by other popular publications, claimed that Cervera was a better war hero then Admiral George Dewey and other American officers who had been wildly celebrated for their wartime heroics. The enemy admiral’s heroic rise was possible because of a fundamental change in the relationship between the press and the nation’s war heroes that sped up each champion’s ultimate decline. In the late nineteenth century Americans sought chivalrous, selfless men of action for their heroes. As journalists began covering each war hero’s daily life as they did other celebrities, however, they discovered character flaws in the nation’s homegrown champions. This examination of Cervera’s gradual rise as an American hero through his death in 1909 includes an overview of the American hero-making process and lifecycle and how celebrity journalism shortened the reign of most war heroes. After identifying the complicated set of values the nation sought in its war heroes at the end of the century, this study will also explain why journalists considered naval heroes as better representatives of those cherished ideals than those from the Army (including volunteer Theodore Roosevelt) until well after the end of the war. Roosevelt was honored as a hero during the war and won the 1899 New York gubernatorial election largely because of his wartime popularity, but was not considered selfless because of his clear political ambitions. American hero-worship of Cervera developed slowly, was considerably more subdued than the public enthusiasm displayed for America’s native-born champions, and was undoubtedly bestowed, in part, as a criticism of the failure of American heroes to live up to the heroic narrative created for them by reporters and biographers. Cervera’s ranking as Life’s ‘most durable hero’ of the war, while seemingly nonsensical, begins to make more sense when the Spanish admiral is reconfigured as a national cultural hero instead of an American military champion. Despite his enemy status, Cervera came to epitomise important military values of the day, because of the rapid decline of the nation’s American-born war heroes brought about by celebrity journalism.     

To not reinstate the past:

Abstract

Most interpretations stress a qualitative shift in colonial policy at the end of World War II, reflecting a major reorientation of outlook towards development, welfare and ultimately independence. There are, however, continuities before and after the war that call for a shift of emphasis.

Because the British Solomon Islands Protectorate is conventionally represented as an extreme case of backwardness and severity before the war, it should present the putative contrast sharply. On the contrary, the pre-war administration field staff had aspirations for a more progressive regime, but these were thwarted by the protectorate's poverty and were shelved by the eruption of the war. The war-time destruction prompted administrators to consider afresh the problems of colonial development, coinciding with Colonial Office demands for post-war development submissions. Proposals proved too ambitious for the limited imperial purse, but even the attenuated plans proved unrealistic given the acute shortages of material and human resources.

Thus, while ‘post-war thinking’ began well before the war, the era of ‘post-war development’ could not properly begin until several years after the end of the war.     

War in the mental hospitals: sychiatry and clinical files (1940 – 52)

Abstract

Is there a connection between war and madness? How have psychiatrists responded to the problem of those ‘driven mad by war’? This article tries to answer these questions by drawing on clinical records for three Italian psychiatric hospitals in the period from 1940 to 1950. While these problems have been researched and debated for combatants during the World War I, in the case of the World War II, as this article shows, it is necessary to take into account the impact of war not only on soldiers but also on civilians who were equally involved in the trauma of war.     

The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European System

Abstract

Among the colourful characters that populate eighteenth-century military history, the French-born comte de Bonneval (1675–1747) has been kept alive in historical memory longer than most. His surprising conversion to Islam and contribution to Ottoman military reform long made him a popular subject for biography in his own right. Nowadays, he mainly features in biographies of Prince Eugene of Savoy. Both were commanders in the Habsburg army, and for nineteen years they were close companions in war and peace.¹ The circumstances that turned Bonneval's friendship with Eugene to enmity also led him in 1729 to offer his services to the Ottoman Empire. For most scholars, this is the moment when his actions became of lasting historical significance. The Ottomans, who suffered in the eighteenth century a series of military defeats, employed foreigners to help them reform their army. After converting to Islam and renaming himself Ahmed Pasha, Bonneval became the first of these when the grand vizier, Topal Osman, invited him in 1731 to reform the Ottoman artillery corps. He moved to Constantinople, added the sobriquet ‘Humbaracl’ (bombardier), and became a noted figure at the court of Sultan Mahmud I. Until Bonneval's death in 1747, Europeans having dealings with the Ottoman regime looked to him for assistance in navigating its internal politics.²     

‘History Has Begun a New Chapter’: US Political-Opinion Journals and the Outbreak of the Korean War

In the pages of the United States’ leading political-opinion journals, different ideological camps had very different answers to the issues raised by the outbreak of war in Korea in the summer of 1950. Left liberals placed a great deal of blame for the outbreak of war on South Korean President Syngman Rhee, while conservatives and hawkish liberals used the occasion to lambast President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson. Hawkish liberals welcomed the possibility of a global showdown with Communism, while conservatives disapproved of US intervention in Korea for reasons both political and constitutional. In sum, the debate that dominated the pages of US opinion journals in the first weeks and months of the Korean War was both heated and robust, and exposes the ideological fault lines of the early cold war. To wit, hawkish liberals held positions that anticipated the birth of neoconservatism some two decades later. And conservative voices utilised their newfound platforms in The Freeman and The American Mercury to attack the Truman administration on a whole host of foreign-policy issues, revealing in greater detail than has previously been shown the role that international affairs played in the birth of the New American Right.     

Preserving Law and Order: Britain, the United States, and the East German Uprising of 1953

Feverishly the strikers watched for signs of intervention bythe American and British occupation forces. It was beyond theircomprehension . . . that the nations of the free world withwhom they felt themselves allied, should stand idly by whilethe Soviet Union crushed the rising with its war machine. Insome places rumour had it that American tanks had crossed thezonal border, that American aircraft were to drop weapons.¹     

Blurring the Borders. How the Central Banks of the European Neutrals During the First World War Became Part of the State Machinery: Examining the Case of Norway

Abstract

This article analyses the relationship between the central banks and governments in the neutral countries during the First World War, with focus on the Norwegian development. It examines how independence was challenged, and the framework is a concept of central bank independence, which regards non-lending to the state as vital to the functioning of the central banks. This is a novel approach to the development during the war as the perspective has barely been discussed in the literature in Norway, and also seems to be disregarded in the standard international literature on central bank development. From this perspective the article argues that the Norwegian central bank’s pre-war independence was substantial compared to other central banks. Moreover, the distinct borders between central bank and government also safeguarded Norges Bank’s autonomy longer than in comparable countries after the outbreak of war. However, by the end of the war, Norges Bank had become one of the neutral central banks most interwoven with the state. Based on the historical development in different countries, the article questions the notion of the standard literature that lending to the state in a crisis was a central bank duty.     

侵华日军中“笔部队”的“文学报国”

在日本文学史上,有一批为法西斯军国主义侵略战争高唱赞歌、涂脂打气;为日本国民战争狂热鼓噪喧嚣、推波助澜;为天皇笔战、为天皇献身的法西斯作家——“笔部队”。他们包括长期在军队服役并直接参与作战的“军人作家”;受日本内阁情报派遣到侵华前线体验战争的“从军作家”及受报社、杂志社派遣或自愿赶赴前线的“民兵”。“笔部队”的这些作家受军国主义思想的影响,在扭曲的“大亚洲主义”和狭隘的“文学报国”思想支配下,本着“吾为君书,吾为君亡”的精神,心甘情愿地投身于侵略战争。