Dispelling myths about conventions: ministerial advisers and parliamentary committees

There is a tension between a key principle underpinning liberal democratic governments and the associated political practice. Responsible government demands that the Executive is responsible to the Legislature. Governments, however, are generally inclined to evade or limit their accountability to Parliament wherever possible. In addition, ministerial advisers have thus far been excluded from the accountability framework of responsible government. This has led to an accountability deficit in terms of ministerial advisers appearing before parliamentary committees. Indeed, Ministers in the Australian Commonwealth and State of Victoria have claimed that there is a constitutional convention that ministerial advisers do not appear before parliamentary committees. This article challenges this claim and argues that there are no strong grounds based on precedent, reason, and the beliefs of political participants to conclude that there is a constitutional convention preventing ministerial advisers from appearing before parliamentary committees.     

Understanding the divergent development of the ministerial office in Australia and the UK

Large, politicised and separate ministerial offices are a feature of Australian government, while the UK ministerial office remains a hybrid unit which is part of the civil service. Using an historical institutionalist lens, and focusing on institutional factors, the article analyses why the separate partisan model evolved in Australia. It argues the Australian innovation was an historical compromise made in an unsuccessful attempt to move towards US-style political-administrative institutions. By contrast, the UK ministerial office has remained unified and hybrid, and, despite experimentation, resilient to structural and ideational change. There is ongoing pressure for more committed support for British ministers but strong forces have prevented moves towards larger offices, seen in the collapse of Extended Ministerial Offices. The article argues explanations for these divergent paths can be found in concepts such as critical junctures, path dependency and institutional resistance. The article contributes to an emerging comparative literature on advisory institutions.     

A New Model of Executive Power: A Montesquieuan Explanation of the Obama Presidency

Abstract

The perennial concern over executive overreach continues well into Obama's presidency, leading many to wonder if the “unitary executive” is here to stay. Discussions of executive war powers focus on three models. The Hamiltonian perspective gives presidents the lead position in foreign affairs; the second model, following Madison, presents Congress as the leader when initiating hostilities. Finally, Jeffersonians present emergency powers as extra-legal, giving presidents a sphere of actions that cannot be contained within constitutional discussions. Problematically, current scholarship implicitly or explicitly grounds these explanations in Locke's political philosophy. This occurs despite a dearth of references to Locke during the Constitutional Convention and infrequent references to his thought during early debates over executive-congressional divisions of war powers. Comparatively, all of these seminal American figures frequently mention Montesquieu, often fighting over the specifics of his theory. While scholars widely acknowledge this influence, they rarely mention him during discussions of war powers or the nature of executive power in general. This article examines the Montesquieuan understanding of executive power and shows how this model represents a viable alternative to the Lockean one. Most importantly, examining the executive from a Montesquieuan perspective provides solutions to current problems that the Lockean perspective does not.     

The Failure of ‘Liberal Developmentalism’: The United States's Anti-Communist Showcase in Guatemala, 1954–1960

This article examines the British involvement in the reorganisation of the Ottoman Empire's customs service. The study focuses particularly on the role of Sir Richard Crawford, who was appointed as a consultant to the Ottoman customs administration in 1909. In doing so, the article sheds fresh light on the position of European advisers as well as on British commercial diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire during the years preceding the First World War. This topic warrants further historical research as previous studies have not considered Crawford's position and the progress of the customs reform in detail. He introduced some important reforms, but proved unable to solve the complex question over the porterage service or to increase customs revenue as much as had been anticipated. War and revolution as well as the consequent disruption of trade; the vast geographical scope of the Ottoman Empire; and opposition from local and international stakeholders to his reforms explain to some extent why Crawford was unable to modernise the customs service as effectively as had been planned. In addition, Crawford's professional background and his personal characteristics were in some ways incompatible with the requirements of the demanding diplomatic world of Constantinople.     

The executive lawmaking agenda: Political parties,prime ministers,and policy change in Australia

In Westminster systems, governments enjoy a privileged position in the lawmaking process that they can use to deliver on their campaign promises and achieve their policy goals. What policy areas do governments seek to affect through lawmaking? How stable is the executive lawmaking agenda? How responsive is that agenda to changes triggered by elections or by transitions in prime minister? This study uses a dataset of 3982 Australian bills introduced between 2000 and 2017 to answer these questions. While it finds considerable stability in the policy content of executive lawmaking agendas, the analysis also indicates that Australia's executive lawmaking agenda is more responsive to changes in prime minister than to changes in the party in power. As the first application of the comparative policy agendas approaches to government bills in Australia, this article offers new insights into executive lawmaking priorities during an especially turbulent period in Australian politics.     

Agency Characteristics and the Use of Executive Orders

Past scholarship has offered varying explanations for why presidents choose to use executive orders. However, to this point, much of what we know of unilateral powers does not adequately address the role the bureaucracy plays in the president's decision. This research seeks to account for bureaucratic factors as a strategic presidential consideration in the employment of such directives. I classify executive orders from 1989–2012 based on which agency or agencies they apply to, and consider the importance of various characteristics (e.g. agency ideology, level of centralization, politicization, etc.) in determining which organs of the bureaucracy presidents will direct executive orders to generally. The results provide evidence that the White House directs fewer executive orders to agencies that have a politically independent leadership structure, and this result holds across a variety of measures judging an order's impact. The results demonstrate that the type of directive is crucial in determining a president's strategic decision to use executive orders, in line with previous research, and that agency centralization is one crucial component of this strategic calculation.     

Are governmental culture departments important? An empirical investigation

It has been often claimed that governmental culture departments are not particularly significant or important for governments as a whole. The extent to which this is true is investigated through a combination of quantitative and qualitative assessments of departmental significance using the United Kingdom and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport as a case study. Departments are assessed across a number of criteria incorporating expenditure, law‐making, policy centrality, ministerial career trajectories, press coverage, departmental age, executive centrality, manifesto coverage and staffing patterns. On these the British example demonstrates that culture departments are not significantly important for governments as a whole. The comparative implications of this finding are identified, and potential new research areas are indicated.     

Lord Falmouth and the Parallel Political Worlds of Ultra‐Toryism, 1826–32

The parallel political worlds of ultra‐toryism were those of Westminster and the provinces. Hoping to defend the protestant constitution from what they regarded as ruinous attacks, between 1826 and 1832 many ultra‐tories were unrelenting parliamentary opponents of constitutional change. However, far less is understood about their simultaneous involvement in the political world away from Westminster, apart from analysis of the duke of Newcastle's electoral activities and several county studies. This article examines the 1st earl of Falmouth's dogged ideological defence of the protestant constitution, as well as exposing his political pragmatism in Cornwall, thereby highlighting the lengths to which some ultras were prepared to go in pursuing their beliefs. Falmouth also exemplifies those ultras who, from March 1827 when Lord Liverpool resigned, became far more prominent in the struggle against ‘Revolution by due course of law’, beginning with their opposition to Canning becoming prime minister. Furthermore, a study of Falmouth's career between 1826 and 1832 at Westminster and in Cornwall, also highlights several of the ideological tensions within ultra‐toryism at this time.     

Checking Executive Power: A Simulation Model of Unilateral Executive Behavior

Abstract

What systematic influence does the court exert on unilateral authority? Though questions relating to the expansion and the exercise of unilateral executive power remain a perennial concern in political science, existing studies of the unilateral presidency generally focus on relations between the executive and the legislature, with less attention paid to the impact of the judiciary on executive behavior. Using a system of differential equations to model executive unilateralism and judicial constraints, simulation results identified four broad patterns of unilateral executive behavior and judicial influence. Overall, presidents strategically anticipate reactions from the courts and employ unilateral actions accordingly. Although they are cognizant of the court’s ability to strike down their actions, and thereby harming their preferred policy preferences and legacies, presidents nonetheless act unilaterally, albeit at a lower level. Results add to existing studies in separation of powers and constraints on unilateral executive behavior.     

Backup for ministers

This paper deals with the backup required by government ministers. It deals with Australia but the argument has wider implications. It sets out what backup the public service can and cannot provide, and argues that the limitations are due to its limited perspective. Ministerial requirements which are beyond the public service, and which may be met by politically appointed staffers working in ministers' private offices are examined. A major underlying reason why the public service cannot meet all ministerial requirements relates to the importance of governments ‘getting the politics right’. A philosophical argument is constructed to show that political scientists have a unique role to play as advisers to government ministers.     

The Constitution and Democracy in Victoria: Westminster on Trial

This article provides a broad overview and critical appraisal of the major changes to the role and rationale of government and public administration in Victoria brought about by the Kennett Liberal‐National Coalition government (1992–99). It does so in order to revisit and highlight the fading relevance and viability of the Westminster system of 'responsible government' in the constitutional systems of the States. We show how the Victorian Constitution provides very few restraints upon a government seeking to undermine civil and political rights, weaken the Opposition, marginalise contestatory institutions and restrict information. Against the Westminster system, we defend a republican constitutional arrangement that is able to maintain the contestability of public power. To this end, we suggest a range of workable reforms designed to strengthen democracy and to improve the accountability of public power, particularly that of the political executive.     

Northern Ireland Representation at Westminster: Constitutional Conundrums and Political Manœuvres

This article focuses on the issue of Northern Ireland's representation at Westminster. It investigates the political context of the decision to increase Northern Ireland's representation in the house of commons at Westminster from 12 members to 17 in 1978–9. Exploring this episode in more detail, it is argued, provides a more informed overall understanding of the history of devolution in the UK and of the way issues concerning Northern Ireland often overlapped with questions of constitutional change in Scotland and Wales. The article also throws light on the matter of Northern Ireland MPs and their voting rights at Westminster during Northern Ireland's experience of devolution prior to 1972.     

Executive Branch Management and Presidential Unilateralism: Centralization and the Issuance of Executive Orders

Despite the useful simplifying assumptions of recent work on unilateral power, archival analysis shows the issuance of executive orders is a process rife with transaction costs as presidents bargain with the bureaucracy over formulating their scope and substance. As a result, presidents must create what Williamson (1985) called “governance structures” to minimize those costs, with the Office of Management and Budget's clearance process at its heart. As with legislative policy formulation, presidents assert more centralized control over executive orders (EO) production on items that affect large numbers of departments, on matters of executive reorganization, and on significant matters. Political contexts are trumped by managerial concerns. Orders dealing with implementation of recently passed statutes or other presidential “clerkship” functions tend to follow a far less centralized formulation process.     

Searching for the Right Balance? Managing Foreign Policy Decisions under Eisenhower and Kennedy

Foreign policy decision making during a U.S. presidential administration's tenure in office is dynamic. The evolution model of decision making suggests that Presidents will use three structures to make decisions: a formal interagency process, and informal process based in a small group of senior advisers, and a confidence–based process where the President seeks often-private advice from the advisers he trusts the most. This essay goes beyond the evolution model by focusing on how Presidents and their senior advisers continually re-evaluate decision making, often concluding that the process needs major restructuring. Pressures to change are typically institutional; however, whether meaningful changes in the process are actually implemented depends on the President's idiosyncratic decision style. Case studies of Eisenhower (a preference for a formal style) and Kennedy (a preference for an informal style) illustrate how both men contemplated significant changes in their decision making process, but neither could ultimately implement them.     

Misunderstanding Executive Representation: Causes and Consequences

Prevailing beliefs about executive representation tend to rely on implicit assumptions that are not carefully examined. I argue that there is confusion regarding both the type of representative role adopted by presidents, and the legitimacy of the representative role of the executive. Presidents are often associated with the "virtual" form of representation, which is consistent with the symbolic role of the president, but the fact that the president, as an elected official, satisfies the requirements of an actual representative is overlooked. Identifying and distinguishing the representative roles in the executive demonstrates the conflict between the two. The institution links the executive with a very large, heterogeneous constituency, requiring presidents to address individual interests, while at the same time endowing the office with national leadership qualities that call for attention to a broader, national interest. An examination of executive representation demonstrates the structural nature of both representative roles, which, while not easily reconciled, are fundamental institutional characteristics.     

中国与奠边府战役

50多年前的奠边府战役,是越南抗法战争中具有决定性意义的重大战役。中国对奠边府战役的胜利作出了重大贡献,主要表现在以下四个方面:在中国军事顾问的直接帮助下,越南人民军迅速发展壮大,初步具备了进行大规模攻坚战的能力;中共中央建议以越西北为主要战略方向并为越方采纳,这是越南人民军得以顺应敌情变化、举行奠边府战役的重要前提条件之一;中共中央、中央军委和中国军事顾问对奠边府战役的各个环节都提出过重要建议,对确保战役的胜利起了重大作用;由中国人民解放军帮助训练的越南炮兵、高射炮兵部队及时回国参加奠边府战役,中国援助的武器装备和其他军用、民用物资及时运到越南,满足了奠边府战役的需要。     

The Politics of Executive Nominations in the Post-Nuclear Senate

In response to an ever more inefficient, intrusive, partisan, and plodding executive nominations process, a variety of increasingly potent reform measures have been recently enacted within Congress. The solutions have ranged from cutting the number of appointments requiring Senate confirmation to reducing the power of the filibuster on most nominations. Although these reforms may speed the nominations process, they may also influence the balance of power between Congress and the presidency by allowing more unilateral and unrestricted appointments. Is Congress conceding confirmation for expediency? In this investigation, I explore recent reforms with respect to the speed and outcomes of the executive nominations process as well as the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches.     

‘No distinction exists as to religion,profession, or sex’: Imperial Reform and the Electoral Culture of the East India Company's Court of Proprietors, 1760–84

As contemporaries frequently pointed out, and often in disparaging terms, the governing institutions of the British East India Company contained an almost unprecedented ‘democratical’ element. By this, they were referring to the Company's General Court of Proprietors, its sovereign deliberative body, composed of all East India stockholders. Ownership of certain proportions of stock conferred the rights to participate in debate, to vote on policy, and to elect on an annual basis the directors who governed the day-to-day affairs of the Company. These electoral rights were granted solely by virtue of stock-ownership and made no distinctions based on sex, social status, nationality or religion. This article examines the ways in which women, non-Britons and religious minorities, in particular, took advantage of the opportunities for political participation opened up by the politicisation of the East India Company's general court in the 1760s, as well as the ways in which this was discussed and debated by contemporaries both in parliament and the press. Tracing the political activities of Mary Barwell, William Bolts and Joseph Salvador provides a unique window into a variety of ways in which the Company offered an alternative venue for political activity for groups often otherwise excluded from the formal politics at Westminster. In doing so, it also shows how the democratic elements of the Company's general court played a significant role in shaping the reform of the East India Company between 1767 and 1784, a process which ultimately led to their curtailment.     

Annual Meeting, 1851

The choir-stalls from St Katherine's-by-the-Tower, c. 1365, are the only ones to survive, in part, from the important group of English metropolitan royal ecclesiastical furniture commissions of the mid-fourteenth century. It will be argued that the surviving seating with many of its misericords provides important clues as to the much-debated stylistic origins of the later fully-canopied choir-stalls at Lincoln, c. 1370 and Chester, c. 1390, cathedrals. It will be suggested that the loss of the most important royal commissions at St Stephen's Chapel, Westminster and St George's Chapel, Windsor, is mitigated to some extent by the remarkable but incomplete survival of the choir-stalls at St Katherine's Hospital.