Overcoming the Creswell–Foster divide in Australian strategy: the challenge for twenty-first century policy-makers

This article examines the continuing influence of the contending twentieth century schools of Creswellian continental defence and Fosterite expeditionary defence in Australian strategy. A context for analysis is developed through an examination of the contemporary globalised security environment which is marked by bifurcation into state-centric and multi-centric threats. The demands of this new security environment have led to the evolution of twenty-first century manifestations of the Creswell–Foster divide in the form of the defender-regionalist and the reformer-globalist schools of strategy. The article analyses how differences between these two schools, especially over the value of geography, have been exacerbated by the new dynamics of globalised security. In the future, however, overcoming the contemporary Creswell–Foster divide between the defender-regionalists and the reformer-globalists in Australian strategy is unlikely to occur in the exclusive arena of defence policy. Rather, what is required is the creation of an overarching national security strategy beginning with the establishment of an Australian Commission on Twenty-First Century National Security. Such a Commission could be modelled on the US Hart–Rudman Commission of 1999–2001 and be suitably adapted to Australian conditions. An Australian commission should be charged with producing a long-term report on holistic and ‘best practice’ security policy options for upholding and protecting Australia's vital national interests in the first quarter of the twenty-first century.     

The ‘arc of instability’ and Australia's strategic policy

The proposition that Australia faces an ‘arc of instability’ to its north has been an important feature of the Australian strategic debate in the early twenty-first century. Prompted by worries in the late 1990s over Indonesia's future and East Timor's uncertain path to independence, the ‘arc’ metaphor also encapsulated growing Australian concerns about the political cohesiveness of Melanesian polities, including Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. While tending to overlook the divergent experiences of countries within its expanding boundaries, the ‘arc’ fed from Australia's historical requirement for a secure archipelagic screen. As such it has became an important weapon in the debate over whether the locus of Australia's strategic priorities should be increasingly global in the ‘war on terror’ period or remain closer to home in the immediate region. The ‘arc of instability’ metaphor was consequently adopted by leading Australian Labor Party politicians to argue that the Howard Coalition government was neglecting South Pacific security challenges. It became less prominent following the Howard government's greater activism in the South Pacific, signalled by Australia's leadership of the East Timor intervention in 2003. But its prominence returned in 2006 with the unrest in both Honiara and Dili. In overall terms, the ‘arc of instability’ discussion has helped direct Australian strategic and political attention to the immediate neighbourhood. But it has not provided specific policy guidance on what should be done to address the instabilities it includes.     

Australia's ‘special strategic relationship’ with Japan: another ‘China choice’?

In July 2014, Australia's new Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, and his Japanese counterpart, Shinzō Abe, elevated the status of bilateral ties to a ‘special strategic relationship'. Both sides also agreed on intensifying their defence technology cooperation, including in the submarine space. As well, Prime Minister Abbott called Australia a ‘strong ally’ of Japan. Yet, the prospect of a further strengthening of Australia–Japan defence relations has led to criticism by Australian strategic commentators. In particular, critics argue that closer strategic relations with Japan could damage Australia's ties with a rising China. In a worst-case scenario, Australia might even become ‘entrapped’ in a Sino-Japanese conflict. However, this argues that a closer defence relationship is in Australia's strategic interests in the face of China's increasing challenge to the rules-based order in the region. China's uncompromising position in the South China Sea and its more assertive behaviour have led to a greater congruence of threat and risk assessment between Australia and Japan. Indeed, Australia and Japan are increasingly facing a security dilemma vis-à-vis China, albeit to varying degrees. Therefore, for Australia, promoting Japan's ‘security normalisation’ contributes to regional stability. As well, the article points out that closer strategic ties with Japan do not automatically come at the expense of Sino-Australia relations. China's leverage to ‘punish’ Australia for unwanted strategic behaviour is limited, and concerns about ‘entrapment’ in a Sino-Japanese war are exaggerated. However, the more China exerts coercive diplomacy, the closer Australia–Japan defence relations are likely to become.     

From forward defence to self‐reliance: Changes and continuities in Australian defence policy 1965–90

This paper shows that the focus of Australia's ‘declared’ defence policy has oscillated between local and regional defence, whereas its ‘operational’ policy—the views contained in internal planning and guidance documents—has taken a mid‐course, focusing on defending Australia's northern approaches. Australia's two policy domains coincided briefly in the mid‐1980s but have since diverged as we have again begun to emphasise regional defence. This shift could signal the end of ‘defence self‐reliance’. While representing a setback for the Hawke government, such a result is necessary as Australia's ‘operational’ policy is flawed and in need of replacement The danger is that, as in the past, Australian governments and their advisers will continue to adjust their rhetoric rather than their real policies to our changing circumstances.     

Transformation or stagnation? Rethinking Australia's defence

State on state conflicts are being replaced by hybrid wars and asymmetric conflicts in which there is no clear cut distinction between soldiers and civilians and between organised violence, terror, crime and war. Given the enormous changes in Australia's security environment, it is time to rethink our defence strategy which has four major failings. It is based on a misplaced geographical determinism that ignores the diverse and globalised nature of modern conflict. It has shaped the Australian Defence Force for the wrong wars. It gives insufficient weight to the transnational threats that confront us. And it fails to recognise that modern defence forces must win the peace as well as the war. Australia needs a strategy for the future not the past and a transformed defence force structured for the very different security challenges of the 21 st century.     

‘Days of Rage’ Downunder: Considering American Influences on ‘Home-Grown’ Terrorism and ASIO's response in 1970s Australia

Between late 1969 and mid-1972 there were 176 premeditated and politically motivated attacks against a range of mostly government, military, judicial, diplomatic and commercial targets in Australia. Most were undertaken by radical left-wing actors. Such incidents and the organisations and individuals who carried them out can be examined through the lens of ‘home-grown’ terrorism. This article corrects the popular and historiographical amnesia associated with these events and demonstrates that like the moderate social movements of the ‘long Sixties’ that sustained Australia's ‘Years of Hope’, the home-grown terrorist actors who contributed to Australia's ‘Days of Rage’ were, most especially, influenced by American developments, cultural productions and actors. Further, in its attempts to understand and deal with these new threats, elements of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) were similarly influenced by a range of American ideas and events including social science research methodologies.     

From Commonwealth Responsibility to the National Interest: Australia and Post-war Decolonisation in South-East Asia

This article re-examines the drivers of post-war Australian foreign policy in South-East Asia. The central argument is that the motive of Commonwealth responsibility has not been given sufficient explanatory weight in interpreting Australia's post-war engagement with South-East Asia under both Australian Labor Party and Liberal-Country Party (Coalition) governments. The responsibility expressed by Australian policy-makers for the decolonisation of the Straits Settlements, Malayan Peninsula and British Borneo Territories cannot be adequately understood within a cold war ideological framework of anti-communism. Nor can it be explained by the instrumental logic of forward defence. The concept of responsibility is theorised as a motivation in foreign policy analysis and applied to Australian involvement with British decolonisation in South-East Asia between 1944 and 1971. The article finds that in its approach to decolonisation, Australia was driven as much by normative sentiments of responsibility to the Commonwealth as it was by instrumental calculations of cold war strategic interest. This diminished with the end of Indonesia's ‘Confrontation’ of Malaysia in 1966 and subsequent British commitment to withdraw from East of Suez. Australia's policy discourse becomes more narrowly interest-based after this, especially evident in Australia's negotiations with Malaysia and Singapore over the Five Power Defence Arrangements from 1968 to 1971.     

The paradigm shift: 11 September and Australia's strategic reformation

This article argues that the perceptual shock of 11 September transformed the mental picture which shapes the Australian government's approach to national security. The expansive and transformationalist range of strategic concepts introduced post-11 September by key government ministers and the prime minister in their public commentary, and formally expressed in a variety of post-11 September policy releases, have been substantial enough to conclude that the central geostrategic narrative underpinning Australia's pre-11 September strategic posture has been diluted sufficiently to render it ‘one of many’ shapers of Australia's post-11 September strategic orientation. It is this article's finding that the perceptual shock of 11 September has been sufficiently consequential to produce a paradigm shift in Australian strategy.     

Australia and India: the Indian Ocean and the limits of strategic convergence

Many Australian observers see Australia and India as ‘natural’ partners whose strategic perspectives are likely to become ever closer in coming years. This article will examine recent developments in the Australia–India security relationship and consider some possible limits to the strategic convergence of Australia and India, particularly in Indian Ocean security. It argues that Australia's challenge in coming years will be not only to address areas of common interest but to also actively engage with India on the interests and expectations of littoral states and extra-regional powers in the security of the Indian Ocean.     

Australia–Taiwan relations: the evolving geopolitical setting

Compared to its relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), Australia's relations with Taiwan are often underrated. As a substantial trading partner and as a polity that has transformed into a robust ‘Asian democracy’, Taiwan constitutes a significant if highly complex dimension of evolving Australian foreign policy. A workshop was convened at the Australian National University in early May 2007 to consider the evolving geopolitical, economic and socio-cultural dimensions of bilateral relations between these two regional actors. Among the basic themes emerging from workshop deliberations were how the growth of Chinese power would effect stability in the Taiwan Straits and throughout maritime Asia; how Chinese power would shape future order-building in the region and any role that Australia and/or Taiwan might play in that process; how Taiwanese democracy would factor into any future regional order and what Australia's future Taiwan posture should be given that that country is committed to a ‘one China policy’ acknowledging the PRC as China. Among the conclusions reached were that Australia must intensify its diplomatic efforts toward both Beijing and Washington to ensure that potential Sino–American differences over Taiwan do not escalate into military conflict and that time and generational change may work to facilitate a peaceful solution to this protracted security dilemma? ? The authors would like to thank Bruce Jacobs for his review of earlier drafts. View all notes.     

One continent,two federalisms: rediscovering the original meanings of Australian federal ideas

Federalism is usually described in political science as a single body of ideas—in Australia's case arriving in the 1840s–50s and moving to constitutional reality in the 1890s. This article re‐examines the origins and diversity of federal ideas in Australia. It suggests that federal thought began influencing Australia's constitutional development significantly earlier than previously described. This first Australian federalism had a previously unappreciated level of support in British colonial policy and drew on Benjamin Franklin's American model of territorial change as a ‘commonwealth for increase’. The revised picture entrenches the notion of federalism's logic but also reveals a dynamic, decentralist style of federalism quite different from Australia's orthodox ‘classic’ or compact federal theory. In fact, Australian political thought contains two often‐conflicting ideas of federalism. The presence of these approaches helps explain longstanding dissent over the regional foundations of Australian constitutionalism.     

Not My Taxes! Explaining Tax Resistance and its Implications for Australia's Welfare State

In discussing Australia's need to increase taxes to pay for future social security, Michael Keating worries that voters see taxes as a ‘burden’ and that ‘the link between taxation and citizenship has been broken’. This paper deals with the problem of tax resistance (preferring lower taxes even when tax cuts risk public services) for Australia's welfare state. First, I describe how two Australian fiscal institutions—a residual welfare system and visible income taxes—promote tax resistance among voters. Second, I draw on these insights to develop several explanations for tax resistance: voter self-interest, voter hostility to minorities, voter disengagement (low trust and lack of interest in politics), and individualistic attitudes. The main conclusion is that tax resistance in Australia is institutionalised, making it easier to mobilise interests around low taxes, and harder to advocate for alternatives. Results of multivariate analysis using AES 2004 data indicate that an ‘anti-tax coalition’ can build on three diverse publics; one of higher and middle-income earners attuned to self-interest, another hostile to welfare beneficiaries, and another ‘tuned out’ of politics and willing to support any call for tax cuts. Inevitably, the debate about the welfare state is shadowed by a debate about voter willingness to pay taxes that finance it.     

Professionalism and Australia's Security Intellectuals: Knowledge,Power, Responsibility

This article examines critically the systemic 'professionalism' which has overtaken Australia's defence and security community in the 1990s. It focuses on the unhealthy convergence of academic security studies at the Australian National University with an overriding foreign policy priority of the Australian Government: the formation of a new regional identity based on themes of 'engagement' and 'enmeshment' with Asia. It argues that the main consequence of this 'professionalist' trend is a mode of inquiry that expunges politics, ethics and responsibility from academic discourse on security. The article also addresses briefly an emerging postmodern politics of dissidence in the disciplines of security studies and political geography which has transformed our understanding of the role and social responsibility of security intellectuals.     

Can Australia save the world? The limits and possibilities of middle power diplomacy

Australian policymakers have always harboured a desire to ‘punch above their weight’. On occasions they have succeeded. At a time when Australia's strategic, economic and environmental future is inextricably bound up with that of its immediate neighbours and the wider world, there are compelling reasons for hoping that they still can. This paper explores some of the most important aspects of Australian foreign policy during the Rudd era and asks whether the Australian government can play a constructive—even an exemplary—role in finding solutions for some of the planet's most pressing problems.     

Killing the goose that laid the golden egg? Australia's resource policy regime in comparative perspective

A common criticism of the minerals resource rent tax (MRRT) was that it would ‘kill the goose that laid the golden egg’ for the Australian economy. Mining companies, their industry associations, and the Liberal–National Coalition all argued the MRRT would reduce Australia's attractiveness for mining investment, and lead to ‘capital flight’ as resource firms shifted towards lower-taxing competitors. To evaluate this claim, it is necessary to compare Australia's resource policy regime – including, but not limited to, its taxation elements – against those of its principal competitors. This article undertakes such an evaluation by comparing Australian resource policies with those of nine of its major mineral and energy competitor countries. This survey reveals that Australia's comparatively high mining tax rates are partially offset by its ‘non-interventionist’ approach to resource policy, and that it has retained good rankings on international political risk surveys. There is some evidence of short-term market response to the mining tax, but there is little evidence of sustained capital flight occurring due to the MRRT. These data collectively suggest that the MRRT did not significantly undermine Australia's attractiveness for international mining investment, despite widespread perceptions to the contrary.     

Howard's way? Public opinion as an influence on Australia's engagement with Asia, 1996–2007

Using the typology developed by Douglas Foyle, this article argues that John Howard behaved as a ‘pragmatist’ in dealing with situations where public opinion was relevant to Australia's engagement with Asia. Howard adhered to his own views on the relevant issues while attempting to lead public opinion in the direction he believed desirable. During the 1996–2007 period the most relevant issues relating to the impact of public opinion on Australia's Asian engagement were Australia's relations with Indonesia and Asian immigration. In the case of Australian–Indonesian relations the Howard government had to deal with various situations where an activated public opinion threatened to undermine the long term Australian approach that gave primacy to Indonesian concerns. Political leadership entailed developing a response that the government believed to be appropriate to Australia's long term objectives, while also attempting to persuade the public that this was the case. In the second instance policy developed in a more ‘deliberative’ context: Howard modified his earlier stance that was critical of Asian immigration, but continued to adhere to a strongly ‘integrationist’ position. This position was consistent with both his own views and his perception of public attitudes on the matter.     

Resource nationalism or resource liberalism? Explaining Australia's approach to Chinese investment in its minerals sector

Since 2005, a burgeoning wave of Chinese investments has set off a new ‘minerals boom’ in the Australian iron ore and coal mining sectors. While normally a welcome development, the state-owned and strategic nature of the investors has raised concerns in Australia about how these should be regulated. As a result, in February 2008 the Australian government declared an intention to more closely screen foreign direct investment (FDI) from state-owned sources, which both supporters and detractors alike have claimed is evidence of ‘resource nationalism’ in Australia's approach towards its trade and investment relationships with China. This article challenges this understanding through an examination of the characteristics of Chinese mining FDI, the dilemmas these present to the Australian government, and the relatively restrained nature of its response. Through this, Australia's FDI policy is explained as a defensive move against the potential for strategic behaviour by Chinese investors resulting from their state ownership, rather than any national program to subject minerals trade and investment to political control. On this basis, the article argues that Australian government policy instead evidences a ‘resource liberalism’ approach, which intends to ensure that the governance of Australia's minerals trade and investment with China remain market-based processes.     

Australia's Nuclear Horizon: Moving Beyond the Drumbeat of Risk Inflation

The 2006 Switkowski review report commissioned by the Howard government highlighted some of the economic and foreign policy benefits that could flow from a major expansion of Australia's uranium export program. It also identified the long-term advantages for Australia's energy security flowing from the development of a national nuclear industry. The report has been condemned by anti-nuclear groups, who argue that proposals for Australia's continuing and, possibly, deeper involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle are unacceptable. The primary risk identified is that Australian uranium exports will contribute to global nuclear proliferation pressures, but claims concerning nuclear-related terrorism are also an increasingly common theme in anti-nuclear commentary. These arguments, in turn, are framed within a broader set of assumptions about the ‘immoral’ nature of any engagement in the nuclear fuel cycle. This article examines the most prominent claims put forward by anti-nuclear proponents and argues that many of them are based on an unnecessary inflation of risk.     

Unintended consequences: an examination of Australia's ‘historic policy shift’ on East Timor

The Howard government's foreign policy objectives concerning East Timor remain the subject of intense historical debate. Given that some Indonesians harbour suspicions about Australia's role in East Timor's independence, it is important to reflect on Australia's diplomacy throughout this period. This article draws on 15 interviews with former politicians and officials—including Prime Minister John Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer—to argue that in 1998, Australia's foreign policy was focused on supporting Indonesia's democratisation process and maintaining the bilateral relationship. It was only when Indonesia moved towards a ‘special status’ of autonomy for East Timor that Australia reconsidered its own position. Although rarely acknowledged, Australia's policy shift actually precipitated outcomes that it had sought to avoid. As such, Habibie's decision to allow self-determination in East Timor can only be viewed as an unintended consequence of Australian diplomacy—independence was never the objective of Australian foreign policy.     

Deliberation and Resecuritization: Australia,Asylum-Seekers and the Normative Limits of the Copenhagen School

In the lead-up to the Australian federal election in 2010, both major political parties represented the ‘unauthorised’ arrival of asylum-seekers as a security issue. This article explores the dynamics of this resecuritization of asylum in Australia, suggesting the case has important implications for both the securitization framework and Australia's treatment of asylum-seekers. The relationship between securitization and calls for an open debate about asylum-seekers challenges the securitization framework's normative claims about political debate and deliberation as a progressive development illustrative of desecuritization (the removal of issues from the security agenda). This case also illustrates that without political leadership to engage with the social and cultural context that allows the securitization of asylum to resonate with large segments of the Australian population, the exploitation of this issue for short-term political gain will continue.