Nation-building from (below) the grassroots: Everyday nationalism in Ukraine's bomb shelters

Life has profoundly changed for Ukrainian citizens since the beginning of the Russia–Ukraine war. While millions have fled Ukraine as refugees and displaced persons, others have remained in their cities to take up arms, volunteer, and/or shield for safety. Despite the devastation at all levels of society caused by Russia's ongoing attacks, Ukrainians' expressions and practices of nationhood have endured and even evolved in light of their country's war-torn reality, as is especially evident in the country's bomb shelters. As hegemonic theorising in nationalism studies often centres on the territorial state and its institutions, this paper instead considers the experiences of ordinary individuals who hold important colloquial and vernacular knowledge. Specifically, the project examines the everyday lives of Ukrainians at—or below—the grassroots within bomb shelters in the heavily attacked cities of Chernihiv, Kyiv, and Kharkiv to reveal how Ukrainian nationalism has manifested and even been (re)produced amidst the conflict. In demonstrating that nationalism has served as both a sentiment and expression of self, the findings emphasise its significance in the current conflict as a motivating and unifying force in Ukrainians' everyday lives.     

Imperial nationalism as the driver behind Russia's invasion of Ukraine

The roots of Russia's invasion of Ukraine are to be found in two areas. The first is the revival of Tsarist imperial nationalist and White Russian émigré nationalist denials of the existence of Ukraine and Ukrainians. Russian imperial nationalists believe the eastern Slavs constitute a pan Russian nation of Great Russians, Little Russians and White Russian branches of one Russian nation. The second is the cult of the Great Patriotic War and Joseph Stalin and the revival of Soviet era discourse on Ukrainian Nazis (i.e., nationalists). A Ukrainian nationalist in the Soviet Union and Vladimir Putin's Russia is any Ukrainian who seeks a future for his/her country outside the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Russian World and who upholds an ethnic Ukrainian (rather than a Little Russian) identity. The Russian World is the new core of the Eurasian Economic Union, Russian President Vladimir Putin's alternative to the EU's Eastern Partnership. In the contemporary domain, Ukrainian nationalists are Nazi's irrespective of their language preference or political beliefs and if they do not accept they are Little Russians. Putin's invasion goal of denazification is a genocidal goal to eradicate the ‘anti-Russia’ that has allegedly been nurtured by Ukrainian nationalists and the West.     

Imagining Ukraine: Regional Differences and the Emergence of an Integrated State Identity, 1926–1994

Abstract. When Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, it did not possess an integrated Ukrainian state identity. Serious differences between those regions which entered the Russian empire and the Soviet Union before 1939 and those annexed since 1939 hampered the creation of a post-Soviet state identity. Just as the Ukrainian and Russian languages dominate in different regions in Ukraine, attitudes towards economic reform also vary by region. Russian-speaking areas are more conservative in regard to economic reforms than Ukrainian-speaking ones. But despite these regional differences, Ukraine is not on the verge of civil war. Two public opinion polls taken in 1991 and 1994 in Lviv (in Western Ukraine) and in Donetsk (in Eastern Ukraine) document that the citizens of Ukraine possess a common desire for peace and stability. This desire overshadows Ukraine's regional differences and will help create the new post-Soviet Ukrainian state identity.     

Putin,national self-determination and political independence in the twenty-first century

This contribution focuses on the right of nations to self-determination after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It suggests that sovereignty and territorial integrity are not as secure as once thought. A number of articles and statements issued by Vladimir Putin are analysed to identify nationalist themes which he uses to reject Ukraine's right to exist outside the Russian state. Key themes include a primordial account of national origins, the conflation of state and nation, and a refusal to recognise a right to self-determination of territories that had once been part of Russia. Putin's nationalism draws on imperial nationalism, state nationalism, revanchism and majoritarianism to underwrite his claims. Such views are widespread among established states, contributing to the instability of the contemporary world. It is argued that a reconfiguration of the relationship between state and nation is long overdue, as is the inflexible nature of territorial integrity.     

Rethinking Russian–Ukrainian relations: a new trend in nation‐building in post‐communist Russia?

This article analyses new trends in the assessment of Russian–Ukrainian relations by representatives of the Russian elites in the late 1990s. It sees a discussion of the historic roots of Ukrainian separatism in the Russian media and attempts to identify the origins of the ‘Russian national homeland’ outside Kyiv Rus as the first steps towards a revision of traditional Russian perceptions of Russian–Ukrainian relations. The article argues that the new trends have become particularly visible following the signing of the Russian–Ukrainian inter‐state treaty in May 1997, which it regards as an important landmark in Russia's acceptance of the independence of Ukraine.     

Russia resurgent? Moscow's campaign to ‘coerce Georgia to peace’

Russia's military incursion into Georgia in August 2008 and formal recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia raise fundamental questions about Russian regional policy, strategic objectives and attitudes to the use of armed force. The spectacle of maneouvre warfare on the periphery of Europe could form a watershed in post‐Cold War Russian relations with its neighbourhood and the wider international community. The speed and scale with which Russia's initial ‘defensive’ intervention to ‘coerce Georgia to peace’ led to a broad occupation of many Georgian regions focuses attention on the motivations behind Russian military preparations for war and the political gains Moscow expected from such a broad offensive. Russia has failed to advance a convincing legal case for its operations and its ‘peace operations’ discourse has been essentially rhetorical. Some Russian goals may be inferred: the creation of military protectorates in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; inducing Georgian compliance, especially to block its path towards NATO; and creating a climate of uncertainty over energy routes in the South Caucasus. Moscow's warning that it will defend its ‘citizens’ (nationals) at all costs broadens the scope of concerns to Russia's other neighbour states, especially Ukraine. Yet an overreaction to alarmist scenarios of a new era of coercive diplomacy may only encourage Russian insistence that its status, that of an aspirant global power, be respected. This will continue to be fuelled by internal political and psychological considerations in Russia. Careful attention will need to be given to the role Russia attributes to military power in pursuing its revisionist stance in the international system.     

A tale of two regions: geopolitics,identities, narratives,and conflict in Kharkiv and the Donbas

In 2014 Russia occupied and then annexed the Ukrainian region of Crimea, and subsequently incited and later directly supported a rebellion in southeastern Ukraine, ostensibly in both cases to protect the Russian-speaking population. Although the Crimean gambit was quickly resolved in Russia’s favor, at least on the ground, the fighting in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine continues with huge loss of life, well over 2 million internally displaced persons, and massive damage to infrastructure. On the other hand, in the neighboring Kharkiv region, the population remained loyal to the Ukrainian state and Russian incitements to rebellion were rebuffed. This paper delves deeper into the mindset of the residents of eastern Ukraine to ascertain why support for Russia differs between these two regions. It focuses on the identities, memories, and narratives of the main groups of residents inhabiting the Donbas and Kharkiv Oblast. Then it compares the attributes of these main groups to each other to illustrate their differences. It characterizes the geopolitical narratives promoted by Russia to generate support for its actions to re-construct the Russian geostrategic area of control and demonstrates where and with which group these emotive narratives were successful and where and why they failed.     

Imperial versus National Discourse: The Case of Russia

Abstract. It is inaccurate and misleading to apply the term ‘nationalism’ to Russia prior to the present day. Both Tsarist and Soviet leaders sought to maintain an empire and not a nation‐state, and their national consciousness was imperial rather than national. The lack of Russian nationalism was crucial for Russian history since it explains the failure of both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. Modern societies cannot be successfully constructed upon the basis of imperial thinking. The absence of Russian nationalism also has significance for nationalism theory. Russia possessed the social, political and cultural characteristics that have been adduced as ‘causes’ of nationalism by a wide variety of scholars, yet Russia failed to develop a nationalist movement. This suggests that what is crucial to modem nationalism is the appearance of a particularist, secular ideology, since the most notable aspect in which Russia differed from Europe was Russia's universalistic, religious and imperialist discourse of national identity.     

European Ukrainians and their fight against Russian invasion

Is there evidence of significant ethno-linguistic/ethno-national rallying around the nation in Ukraine—as social science would have us expect in times of conflict? And, if so, might we expect this ethno-linguistic/ethno-national identity to rise with the prolongation of war? Or instead, is Ukrainian “civic-ness” the primary rally call that shaped and shapes collective identity in Ukraine? And if this collective identity is not ethno-linguistic in orientation then what values and political dispositions are bringing Ukrainians together in a time of crisis and war? Whilst political science might suggest that violence and extended periods of war can produce rallying to ethno-linguistic/ethno-national identity—original panel survey data collected among the Ukrainian population in March/April 2019, January/February 2021, and 2 December 2021/16 February 2022 coupled with a cross-sectional nationally representative survey collected 19–24 May 2022 provide evidence that ongoing regional war, crises, and now all-out invasion by Russia have shored up civic and not ethno-linguistic/ethno-national identities. Moreover, this civic identity is bounded to pro-European pro-democratic orientations.     

Cartoon epic heroes in indigenous Siberian revival: The meaning of ethnicity in Putin's Russia (Respond to this article at https://www.therai.org.uk/publications/anthropology-today/debate)

This article outlines a motivation for the Russian Federation's incursion into the Crimea, which concerns the Putin administration's relationship with Russia's citizens, rather than the outside world. I use a case study from Siberia – the Sakha people's revival of their national epic, the Olongkho – to explore the possibility that Putin's behaviour during the Ukrainian crisis serves to legitimate his authority within Russia, by appealing to conceptions of ethnicity that have their roots in Soviet‐era social engineering. Rather than deducing the Putin administration's motives from the events and relationships they immediately concern, I explore motivations emerging from the configuration of values, perceptions, and conventions that shapes and reproduces social difference in Russia. The Sakha Olongkho revival shows how the perceptions of ethnicity fostered during the Soviet era have become powerful indexes of morality and authority. Individual Sakha citizens now demonstrate their identities and values through adopting a stance towards a reified conception of Sakha ethnicity expressed in their choices of recreation, fashion and consumption. Sakha ethnicity has become integrated into the process whereby hierarchical social groupings emerge within Sakha society according to their avowal of specific tastes and norms. The relatively small size of the Sakha population – which is nevertheless the dominant ethnic group in their republic, Sakha (Yakutia) – enables us to see trends affecting the rest of Russia in microcosm. Thus, I suggest that former Soviet ethnicity has become so closely woven into Russia's morality that Putin's invasions of foreign states, in the name of the ethnic Russian community, bolster his claim to be a moral person and a legitimate and authoritative national leader.     

The future of NATO enlargement after the Ukraine crisis

Russian President Vladimir Putin claims that his country's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 was partly in response to NATO enlargement. NATO leaders counter that eastern enlargement is not a cause of the Ukraine crisis, and they argue that enlargement does not threaten Russia, but rather it creates stability for all of Europe. This article examines the history of NATO–Russian tensions over enlargement, considers how NATO's enlargement policy factored into the Ukraine crisis, and reviews options for the future of enlargement. Drawing on diplomatic history and geopolitical theory, the article explains Russia's persistent hostility towards NATO's policy of eastward expansion and highlights NATO's failure to convert Russia to its liberal world‐view. The alliance's norm‐driven enlargement policy has hindered the creation of an enduring NATO–Russia cooperative relationship and helped fuel the outbreak of conflict in Georgia and Ukraine. In light of this, NATO should alter its current enlargement policy by infusing it with geopolitical rationales. This means downgrading the transformative and democratization elements of enlargement and, instead, focusing on how candidate countries add to NATO capabilities and impact overall alliance security. A geopolitically‐driven enlargement policy would prioritize countries in the Balkan and Scandinavian regions for membership and openly exclude Georgia and Ukraine from membership. Ultimately, this policy would have the effect of strengthening NATO while giving it more flexibility in dealing with Russia.     

Ukraine's Geopolitical Choice, 2009

A noted specialist in international affairs and former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine reviews and analyzes the history of independent Ukraine's relations with Russia and the West following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The author proceeds to examine the multifaceted Western position toward Kyiv as it has evolved through June 2009, paying due attention to the European Union and NATO. He then discusses the factors contributing to the volatility of Ukrainian-Russian relations following the Orange Revolution of 2004, including a range of specific concerns as well as more general Russian desires for a compliant government that would pay deference to key Russian interests. Concluding sections focus on Ukraine's future geopolitical trajectory in the run-up to the country's presidential elections in early 2010 and on internal problems (constitutional, market, and energy reform) that will command urgent attention once the political situation stabilizes and the outlines of a constructive engagement that could be pursued by the West are at hand. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: F500, F520, P200. 1 figure, 1 table, 39 references.     

Constitutional democracy and civic nationalism

ABSTRACT. This article seeks to bring to the fore the intrinsic link between constitutional democracy and the civic nation, relying on Jürgen Habermas's theory of democracy. This theoretical framework will serve as the basis for a communicative understanding of civic nationalism, underscoring the notable role played by language. Attention will be given to the normative dimension that allows for the legitimisation of national divisions of a civic space bound by universal rights. The prime motivation behind this article is thus political‐philosophical, although empirical examples, drawn particularly from the French revolutionary discourse, will be brought to bear. And since a civic nation construed in communicative terms has necessary linguistic implications, cases of multilingual and multinational states will be examined.     

Policing the near abroad: Russian foreign policy in the South Caucasus

This article tries to understand Russia's policies towards the South Caucasus and answer the question of whether there is a tension between Russia's interests and policies. An attempt is made to identify Russia's strategic interests in the region and the crucial factors that shape Russian policies. Based on the assumption that today's Russia gives de facto support to the secessionist regimes in Georgia, the author attempts to explain what the Kremlin's motives are in supporting the secessionist regimes. The author investigates whether Russian support for the separatist regimes in the South Caucasus is a reaction to the foreign policy orientation of the parent states or a part of Russia's security political interests. On the one hand, supporting instability in the South Caucasus cannot be a part of the Kremlin's strategic interests, because that can pose a threat to the North Caucasus. On the other hand, however, Russian policies are not designed to achieve long-term stability in the South Caucasus, and controlled instability seems to suit the Kremlin. Why Russia vies for coercive hegemony and supports secessionism are the central questions of this article.     

The Crimean War and its lessons for today

Orlando Figes's book The Crimean War: a history, based on English, Russian, French and Turkish sources, throws a new light on the Crimean War in a number of ways. It shows that the conflict was far from being a small war, but a landmark event. It was the only example of a war between Britain and Russia—and it led to enormous casualties. It also represented a stage in medical history, since most of the casualties were caused by disease. In Britain, it marked a new advance in the power of the press, which did much to fuel anti‐Russian sentiment. The war was also fuelled, on both sides, by religious and nationalist sentiment—but its most important cause related to the fate of the Ottoman Empire, then in decline, and fears that its collapse could result in a dangerous power vacuum. The war still has a significance for the present day because the collapse of communism has failed to resolve the antagonism between Russia and the West. Here, the book throws an important light on the development of British and western attitudes towards Russia, many of which were shaped in the nineteenth century. The book deserves attention, both here and in Russia.     

Identity,war, and peace: public attitudes in the Ukraine-controlled Donbas

ABSTRACT

Contrary to Russia’s expectations, military intervention into Ukraine only strengthened the Ukrainian civic nation. As a number of polls demonstrate, since 2014 there is a growing trend that the vast majority of Ukrainians, also in the government-controlled areas of the Donbas, identify themselves, first and foremost, as Ukrainian citizens. Regional and local identity is not their primary choice anymore and there are clear indicators of a strong civic identity that favors a unitary Ukraine. The lack of progress for a solution of the conflict in the Donbas impacts upon Ukrainian public opinion which, in turn, puts pressure on the Ukrainian authorities: there is a wide acceptance of a diplomatic solution to the conflict and readiness for some compromises but the reintegration of the occupied territories should take place according to pre-war conditions, without any federalization of Ukraine. Also, without establishing a stable security regime in the Donbas there is little support for an implementation of the political part of the Minsk-2 agreement. However, closer to the frontline, the more Ukrainians are ready for compromises. The promise of peace by new President Volodymyr Zelenskyy puts a question on what compromises his team may accept and justify in the eyes of Ukrainians.     

Ambassador George Buchanan and the July Crisis

During the July Crisis, the United Kingdom was put under strong pressure from Russia and the latter's ally, France, to declare it would fight alongside them. Britain had made the entente cordiale with France in 1904 and a Convention with Russia in 1907. The British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, George Buchanan, was the key figure in diplomatic communication between Britain and Russia at this time and his performance has drawn diverse comments over the decades. Some analysts believe he genuinely sought to restrain Russia from war, but was undermined by his own government, who too easily accepted St. Petersburg must mobilise its army. But others feel Buchanan's reports of Russian mobilisation were ill-informed and unhelpful to the government in London. This article examines Buchanan's performance, arguing that he attempted to preserve peace for a time and does not deserve some of the criticisms levelled at him. Nonetheless, the preservation of the Triple Entente was a priority for him and, after about 28 July, once it became clear that European war could not be avoided, he became tardy in reporting Russia's war preparations, appearing more interested in defending his hosts’ behaviour than in providing an accurate analysis of events.     

Carl Schmitt in the Kremlin: the Ukraine crisis and the return of geopolitics

The protracted crisis in Ukraine has exposed fundamental political differences between leaders in western Europe and their counterparts in Russia. The very existence of the European Union was meant to have refuted geopolitics as a useful theoretical lens through which to view power relations in Europe. After all, the European project is based on the idea that boundaries no longer matter and that national sovereignty is obsolete. And yet, geopolitics remains critically important—certainly for Europe's potential enemies, but also for Europe itself. It is poignant that to advance our understanding of this new constellation we are well served to turn to the insights of a classic, if hugely controversial, German political thinker: Carl Schmitt. Schmitt's political philosophy is relevant in three aspects. First, as a source of inspiration—even if only indirectly—for the contemporary Russian political establishment. Second, the behaviour of Putin's Russia, particularly since 2008, can be best understood through some of the key concepts that preoccupied Schmitt: sovereignty, the political and geopolitics. Third, Schmitt's philosophy can serve as a point of departure for reflecting on the possibility of a more robust response by Europe to the Russian intervention in Ukraine. What Europe needs is a more hard‐nosed realist approach, which recognizes that Russia's expansionist ambitions can only be constrained by its own readiness and willingness to deploy power both politically and, if necessary, even militarily.     

The last refuge of a scoundrel: patriotism,militarism and the Russian national idea*

In a nation‐state, where ethnic and territorial borders coincide, patriotism may easily have an exclusivist‐nationalist component, and be used to serve the goals of politicians hoping to mobilise the population for destructive goals. In a multinational state like Russia, the militaristic patriotism that Yeltsin's and Putin's administrations promote can also carry that risk. The Russian state leadership's use of a militaristic patriotism as a means to generate popular support risks unleashing ethnic chauvinism and the military domination of civilian institutions. Such phenomena cast doubt on the prospects for Russia's state‐building process to proceed along liberal democratic lines. Non‐governmental organisations, such as Russia's Committee of Soldiers' Mothers , however, have devised an alternative vision of patriotism, relying on rule of law and the observance of civil rights, and thereby hold out a slim hope for reframing Russian patriotism and building a peaceful democracy.