Nationalism,populism or peopleism? Clarifying the distinction through a two-dimensional lens

Prompted by recent scholarly debates on the distinction between populism and nationalism, we elaborate on the Laclaudian understanding of populism as an antagonistic form of us-building/community-making that relies on the extension of equivalential chains between demands. From this heuristic perspective, populism can be understood as an empty form to be filled with different contents, such as nationalism. Our radically anti-essentialist stance combines Laclau's formalist conceptualisation of populism and Brubaker's work on nationalism. We highlight the ontological dimension of populism, as a form of us-building, and the ontic dimension, as an array of discursive repertoires that fill the form, such as ‘the people’ for peopleism. We explore the ontological–ontic distinction through the case of Narodism in Serbia. Conceptualising populism two-dimensionally contributes both to debates on the ‘core’ of populism and to cases where articulations of ‘the people’ coincide with expressions of nationhood, civilisationalism and culturalism, rather than being entirely the same.     

Constructing Gendered Workplace ‘Types’: The weaver–millworker distinction in Dundee's jute industry,c. 1880–1910

Victorian and Edwardian Dundee was labelled a ‘woman's town’ due to the high proportion of women who worked in the city's staple jute industry. In this article, drawing on a range of contemporary sources, I use the work of feminist historians and Foucauldian notions of discourse to interrogate this label and explore why and how working women came to be marked as particularly problematic. Further, in questioning this label, I demonstrate how two specific workplace ‘types’—the weaver and millworker—were identified and constructed in contrast to one another. This article probes the processes through which these two ‘types’ were created, contested and performed in relation to the segregations and working conditions of their respective workplaces, and argues for a markedly spatial interrogation of gender identities and the category ‘working woman’.     

‘No distinction exists as to religion,profession, or sex’: Imperial Reform and the Electoral Culture of the East India Company's Court of Proprietors, 1760–84

As contemporaries frequently pointed out, and often in disparaging terms, the governing institutions of the British East India Company contained an almost unprecedented ‘democratical’ element. By this, they were referring to the Company's General Court of Proprietors, its sovereign deliberative body, composed of all East India stockholders. Ownership of certain proportions of stock conferred the rights to participate in debate, to vote on policy, and to elect on an annual basis the directors who governed the day-to-day affairs of the Company. These electoral rights were granted solely by virtue of stock-ownership and made no distinctions based on sex, social status, nationality or religion. This article examines the ways in which women, non-Britons and religious minorities, in particular, took advantage of the opportunities for political participation opened up by the politicisation of the East India Company's general court in the 1760s, as well as the ways in which this was discussed and debated by contemporaries both in parliament and the press. Tracing the political activities of Mary Barwell, William Bolts and Joseph Salvador provides a unique window into a variety of ways in which the Company offered an alternative venue for political activity for groups often otherwise excluded from the formal politics at Westminster. In doing so, it also shows how the democratic elements of the Company's general court played a significant role in shaping the reform of the East India Company between 1767 and 1784, a process which ultimately led to their curtailment.     

Rethinking the Politics–Religion Distinction

William T. Cavanaugh argues that the politics–religion distinction presupposes covert commitments that inappropriately support a “migration of the holy” from the church to the state. Despite his strong critical instincts, several of his genealogical propensities appear to stand in tension with his commitments to constitutional democracy and the universality of grace. By contrast with Cavanaugh, John Rawls’ post-metaphysical reformulation of the politics–religion aims to identify a public criterion compatible with a plurality of comprehensive doctrines. Although I commend Rawls for retaining some form of this distinction, I question the possibility of a post-metaphysical standpoint and its compatibility with his commitment to what he calls the “fact of pluralism.” Drawing on Bernard Lonergan’s transpositions of human nature and grace in this paper’s final section, I develop an alternative account of the relationship between politics and religion that aims to harmonize some of the strongest insights from the work of Cavanaugh and Rawls.     

French–German relations: the Strasbourg–Kehl encounter, 1945–55

German–French relations have proved to be pivotal to the course of modern European history. Recent success, however, has somewhat obscured our memory of the difficult path that has been trod. Directing our attention to Kehl, a small village on the upper Rhine, we can revisit the difficulties inherent in resolving feelings of mutual animosity and longstanding historical problems. Kehl stands for the quest for reconciliation at the local and regional level. In the immediate postwar era, French dreams of continued influence over the Rhine valley would have to be put aside just like German anger over their treatment by the French.     

Dealing with ‘genocide’: the ICRC and the UN during the Nigeria–Biafra war, 1967–70

This article examines how international and humanitarian organizations participated and positioned themselves in relation to discourses on genocide during the Nigeria–Biafra war (1967–70). During the first half of the conflict, the powerful Biafran propaganda regularly accused the Nigerian government of genocide against the Biafran population. The article looks at the way in which the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), one of the main humanitarian organizations present on the ground, reacted to Biafran accusations. In doing so, it analyses how information received from delegates in the field were apprehended and used—or not—by the headquarters. It shows that the ICRC attitude towards public denunciation was more nuanced than is often presented. Furthermore, the article sheds light on the involvement of the UN in the promotion of the counter-discourse developed by the Nigerian government to deny the genocide accusations. With a focus on the outcomes in the field, it fathoms the leeway the organization had in this situation—a civil war—and how it used it. The limits of the counter-discourse, illustrated by the persistence of the accusation of genocide by groups like the French doctors, reveal the complexities involved in the usage of this term by relief workers. Finally, in studying the way in which these international and humanitarian organizations dealt with genocide claims, this article contributes to the history of the violence that took place during the war.     

Changes in Japanese strategy in 1939–1940 and the internationalization of the Sino–Japanese War

In the early stage of the Sino–Japanese War, Japan was trying hard to limit the conflict to within a scope where it could be resolved bilaterally between only the two nations involved. However, her actual behavior was in stark contrast to her wishful desire to be at peace with the United States, pushing the latter step by step instead in the direction of aiding China and thwarting Japan. Caught in a dilemma created as the United States abrogated the American–Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, and faced with the changes in the European situation, Japan’s policy makers were eventually pushed by their obsession with the “New East Asian Order” and by their yearning for the “Extended New East Asian Order” which was to include Southeast Asia, deciding to steer the Sino–Japanese War in the direction of “international resolution,” which was just an alternate route to the same goal sought by China. Subsequently, not only did Japan refuse to withdraw from China, she actually took one step further in an expansion southwards, trying to kill several birds with one stone. The war thus spilled over from China to encompass a much greater area. In this process, Japan’s diplomatic corps was often several steps ahead of the military, reflecting the carefully considered background in Japanese policymaking.     

Substantiating the cohesion of the post-cold war US–Japan alliance

Notwithstanding current disarray, the post-cold war US–Japan alliance has enjoyed its most cohesive status in its history. Japan altered its passive cold war alliance policy and became a more active and equal partner with the United States. Even though there exist many explanations of what has caused this cohesiveness, there is hardly any attempt to substantiate the level of alliance cohesion itself. The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate the cohesion of this alliance by employing concrete operational indicators: homogeneity in goals, threat perception, strategic compatibility and command structure. By investigating how these operational indicators have changed over time, the author proves substantially that the post-cold war US–Japan alliance has developed more cohesively.     

Explaining the demise of the national–New Zealand first coalition

This article considers the fall of New Zealand's first coalition government under the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system, through the prism of a ‘unified’ model of Cabinet durability. This model incorporates both the ‘structural attributes’ of the government at the time of its formation, as well as the stochastic ‘critical events’ that occur over its lifetime. However, the conventional attributes of the National–New Zealand First coalition were considered favourable, and the critical event that precipitated its demise did not by itself appear to be a sufficient condition for termination. It is argued that the hitherto unspecified structural attribute of intra‐party stability was a significant factor for this particular coalition, and that this case also demonstrates the cumulative impact of non‐terminal events in undermining the incentives for continued cooperation between coalition partners.