The Japan-Australia security declaration and the changing regional security setting: wheels,webs and beyond?

The March 2007 Japan-Australia Security Declaration has garnered more than its share of hyperbole. Described variously as an historic milestone for peace or an agreement designed to encircle China; the declaration's actual strategic consequences are somewhat unclear. The purpose of this article is to provide a critical analysis of the security declaration and to assess its impact in the context of the changing patterns of the region's security setting. Some have argued that it marks a small but qualitatively significant shift in the essential features of the regional security architecture. The article assesses this claim and argues that while the declaration is of some diplomatic importance, and clearly contributes to improving cooperation in disaster relief and other humanitarian operations, it is of little strategic significance to the broader patterns of East Asian security over the short to medium term. Each side's operational constraints, their different strategic priorities, most obviously their perceptions of China, as well as the continued military predominance of the US, means that the agreement will be of little immediate significance for East Asian security. That said, it remains an important development for the respective parties and is a leading edge indicator of broader forces for change that are increasingly present in East Asia.     

Anchoring trilateralism: Can Australia-Japan-US security relations work?

Editor's Note: Both Japan and Australia are evaluating how to manage their respective alliances with the United States at a time when no clear international order has yet emerged to replace Cold War bipolarity. As America's two closest allies in the region, both of these countries have a growing interest in exploring how their own security relations should develop in conjunction with or independent of their US affiliation. Two major workshops were convened in Tokyo and Brisbane during July 2004 to consider this question, employing a rich array of approaches and perspectives to the task. The two authors served as the rapporteurs for the respective workshops and have collaborated here to summarise and assess the results.     

Asia‐Pacific security regimes: Conditions and constraints

Security regimes constitute an important test of the ‘liberal’ school of thought in contemporary international relations. In the Asia‐Pacific, interest is growing over how they may contribute to that region's future order and stability. It is argued here, however, that Asia‐Pacific security regimes cannot succeed unless ‘realist’ power‐balancing strategies are first applied, affording time for patterns of structural leadership to shape enduring security norms and institutions. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is arguably the region's first potential post‐cold war security regime. Its fate, or that of its successor security regimes in the Asia‐Pacific, depends upon satisfying four critical conditions for regime building and upon winning the acceptance of China and the United States, the region's two key ‘structural leaders’. While the ARF does not at present seem close to satisfying these criteria, it may help to provide the breathing space necessary for a successful transition from a competitive cold war environment to a more cooperative climate in the Asia‐Pacific.     

Guaranteeing Europe’s security? Enlarging NATO again

At the end of 2002, NATO will again decide to enlarge its membership. This process of enlargement of the Alliance is driven by summit timetables; summits require commitments and grand gestures, and in Prague that could involve invitations to seven or more states to accede to the Washington Treaty. But there are three sets of issues into which this plays uncomfortably. First, there is an EU‐NATO and EU security agenda (also including enlargement) which is a significant and difficult set of issues. Second, NATO itself is undergoing change, particularly after the attacks of 11 September 2001 and enlargement complicates those reform processes. Third, the wide European agenda, and in particular relations with Russia, throw out complicating factors. Is there a way of managing all of these dilemmas?     

Afghanistan: ‘spoilers’ in the regional security context

The ongoing international military withdrawal from Afghanistan has set the stage for energising the activities of Afghanistan's external stakeholders to re-evaluate their activities. The possible return of the Taliban in some form could compel Afghanistan's current external partners—Iran, India and Russia—to turn into limited spoilers. The absence of an international guarantor in Afghanistan from December 2014 is likely to encourage Pakistan—a greedy spoiler—to intensify its meddling as a means to reposition the Taliban—a total spoiler—at the helm of Afghan affairs. The combination of limited, greedy and total spoilers threatens to undermine security and state-building processes.     

Who you gonna call? Theorising everyday security practices in urban spaces with multiple security actors – The case of Beirut's Southern Suburbs

Who do urban residents turn to in everyday security incidents? Why do some go to the police in certain locations, others to armed nonstate actors or kinship networks? We explore the ways in which residents and security actors – state and nonstate – negotiate everyday (in)security in contested urban spaces with multiple security actors. We consider how hybrid security assemblages are shaped by physical and social space and how everyday security practices shape space. We use Beirut's Southern Suburbs (Dahiyeh) as a site of theorisation, bringing local vernacular experiences into dialogue with Bourdieu's concepts of capital, habitus, doxa and field to develop a spatially dynamic analytical framework. Using this framework, we map security actors' different types and sizes of capital and how this capital is affected by residents' habitus and doxa within the everyday security field. We introduce the notion of ‘translocal habitus’ to capture the impact of families' origins outside Dahiyeh on everyday security dynamics. The framework we develop contributes to the spatialisation, vernacularisation and pluralisation of everyday security studies, furthers the spatialisation of Bourdieu and adds to the literature on hybrid forms of governance. Our analysis is based on extensive fieldwork, including over 150 interviews and ‘street chats’ with residents and security actors in and around Dahiyeh.     

The framework nation: can Germany lead on security?

Can Germany lead on security? This article aims to address this question by looking at recent German contributions to European defence cooperation. In 2013 Germany introduced the Framework Nations Concept (FNC) as a systematic and structured approach towards joint capability development. The concept relies on the idea that bigger nations take the overall responsibility for coordinating the contributions of smaller partners in a capability package. The framework nation model as such is not new but the initiative has been welcomed as a potential game changer in European defence cooperation and as confirmation of Germany's commitment to NATO. In light of the Ukraine crisis, measures to adapt NATO and to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance have become more urgent. Allies and partners increasingly want Germany to extend its role as Europe's dominant economic and financial power to matters of security and defence. The framework nation model allows Germany to take international responsibility, while avoiding debates about leadership and hegemony. Moreover, as a framework nation, Germany can advance flexible cooperation among a smaller number of allies without undermining its commitment to multilateralism. But the FNC initiative also raises further questions: what is the added value of the framework nation model compared to similar formats; what should be the place of smaller groupings in the evolving Euro‐Atlantic security architecture; and how reliable is Germany in the role of a lead nation?     

Enhanced European Union–Australia security cooperation through crisis management

ABSTRACT

Since January 2003, the European Union (EU) has launched over 30 civilian and military crisis management missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy. These missions have involved the participation of both EU member states and third states. In order to help facilitate the participation of third states in these missions, the EU established the Framework Partnership Agreements on crisis management, setting out the legal framework for third-state participation. In April 2015, Australia became the seventeenth country to sign such an agreement with the EU. This agreement reflects both the common interest and values shared by Australia and the EU and the extent to which EU–Australia relations have evolved and deepened over the years. In addition, the increased engagement and socialisation of Australian military and civilian personnel with individual EU member states through their participation in such operations as the International Security Assistance Force operation in Afghanistan, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Combined Maritime Force have further facilitated opportunities for security cooperation at the EU level. Shared concerns and interests on counterterrorism, counter-piracy, instability and capacity-building have also opened up opportunities for increased cooperation between the EU and Australia. This article assesses the significance of the Framework Partnership Agreements on crisis management for EU–Australia relations within the area of security cooperation, and examines future prospects for cooperation.     

Sovereignty for security?: the discourse of sovereignty in Estonia

This investigation of the construction and operationalisation of state sovereignty in Estonia specifies how international integration is constituted in the Estonian sovereignty discourse, particularly how the inside and the outside of the state are demarcated in that discourse. The focus on this post-Soviet European Union applicant state is significant because if we understand sovereignty as a discourse, its political functions are inseparable from the specific context in which the inside and the outside of the state are constructed. Broadening the empirical scope of the constructivist international relations and critical geopolitics research on sovereignty therefore also enables me to substantiate and elaborate arguments made in that research.The Estonian sovereignty discourse hinges on the question as to whether or not international integration strengthens Estonia’s national security against the Russian threat. Different assumptions and positions on that issue make possible a highly selective deployment of pro- and contra-EU arguments that promulgate Estonia as European while minimising the influence of foreign institutions on Estonia’s citizenship and minority rights policies. While eagerly pursuing EU and NATO memberships, Estonia is not passively adopting but selectively appropriating political rhetoric and practices from these organisations. Concerns about the loss of sovereignty in Estonia are not examples of mere ignorance or irrational fear of changes, as is conventionally assumed, but are integral to, and reinforced by, the ways in which international integration is framed in political debates.     

HIV,AIDS and security: where are we now?

HIV/AIDS is one of the greatest single causes of death and suffering on the planet. Over the last decade the societal impact of HIV/AIDS has been widely discussed in terms of national and international security. This article assesses the securitizing move and suggests that HIV/AIDS was only partially securitized at best and both the political consensus and strength of evidence were overestimated. It argues for greater nuance in our understanding of the link between HIV/AIDS and security, and the effects of its securitization, suggesting that neither is straightforward, and both are subject to case sensitivities.     

Gender Justice and (In)security in Pakistan and Afghanistan†

ABSTRACT

This article argues that gender justice becomes a politicised issue in counterproductive ways in conflict zones. Despite claims of following democratic principles, cultural norms have often taken precedence over ensuring gender-sensitive security practices on the ground. The rightness of the ‘war on terror’ justified by evoking fear and enforced through colonial methods of surveillance, torture, and repression in counter-terrorism measures, reproduces colonial strategies of governance. In the current context, the postcolonial sovereign state with its colonial memories and structures of violence attempts to control women’s identities. This article analyses some of these debates within the context of Pakistan’s and Afghanistan’s security dynamics. It begins with the premise that a deliberate focus on the exclusion and limitation of women in Muslim and traditional societies sustains and reinforces the stereotypes of women as silent and silenced actors only. However, while the control of women within and beyond the nexus of patriarchal family'society'state is central to extremist ideologies and institutionalisation practices, women’s vulnerabilities and insecurities increase in times of conflict not only because of the action of religious forces, but also because of ‘progressive’, ‘secular’, ‘humanitarian’ interventions.     

Italian foreign and security policy in a state of reliability crisis?

This article focuses on Italian foreign and security policy (IFSP). It looks at three examples of the country's policy-making which reveal its poor results as a security provider, namely: Italy's tardy reaction to the violence in Libya in 2011, its prompt reaction to the Lebanon crisis in 2006, and its efforts to be included in the diplomatic directorate, the P5+1, approaching relations with Iran in 2009. The article considers whether government action has bolstered the reliability of IFSP and also discusses the country's FSP in terms of its basic differences from that of its partners in the European Union, France, Britain and Germany, envisaging how Italy could react to build more credibility. Italy's policy is observed through a three-pronged analytical framework enriched by concepts of the logic of expected consequences. The article concludes that IFSP is predictable, but it must still reveal that it is reliable, and explains why this is the case.