Political Staff in Executive Government: Conceptualising and Mapping Roles within the Core Executive

Political advisers are attracting increasing attention in Westminster jurisdictions. Typically, scholars focus on the corrosive impact they allegedly have on elements of Westminster convention and practice. We argue that a concern with accountability detracts from other important matters, including understanding and theorising ministerial advisers' roles. In this article we address these issues using primary data from a survey of ministerial advisers in New Zealand. We draw on Maley's typology to classify advisers' activities according to the contribution they make to executive government policy-making. We then theorise these activities through the lens of the core executive. We conclude that ministerial advisers are increasingly important actors in governing environments characterised by complex resource dependencies, modes of operation that are as often relational as they are hierarchical, and bargaining relationships that are often positive and not zero-sum in nature.     

Rationalising parliamentary systems

Public Choice analysis of democratic political institutions focuses on the issues that are most salient under US constitutional arrangements. Parliamentary systems offer different institutional arrangements and different challenges to the Public Choice approach. We outline a Public Choice account of parliamentary democracy which concentrates attention on the roles of electoral competition and disciplined political parties, while also offering a discussion of parliamentary procedure. The Public Choice approach is contrasted with the mainstream view of representative, responsible government in which disciplined political parties are often seen as a threat to parliamentary democracy.     

The last laugh: Western Australia's elections and the executive state, 1983–89

Aside from bribery and corruption associated with the police and organized ‘vice and crime’, Mr Tony Fitzgerald Q.C. highlighted in his ‘Report’ five criteria as areas of concern over the health and future of parliamentary democracy in Queensland. They were: 1. Decline of Parliament in terms of (a) sitting hours, and (b) consistent refusal by the Premier and Ministers to answer parliamentary questions and to be fully accountable and responsible to Parliament for public expenditures, ministerial expenses and extra‐parliamentary executive decisions; 2. Business deals, joint ventures and other financial transactions between government, its agencies and government favourites; 3. Lavish funding of the governing political party by recipients of its favours; 4. Political ‘stacking’ of the public service; 5. Use of taxpayers’ funds by Premier and Ministers to finance writs against critics.     

The Constitution and Democracy in Victoria: Westminster on Trial

This article provides a broad overview and critical appraisal of the major changes to the role and rationale of government and public administration in Victoria brought about by the Kennett Liberal‐National Coalition government (1992–99). It does so in order to revisit and highlight the fading relevance and viability of the Westminster system of 'responsible government' in the constitutional systems of the States. We show how the Victorian Constitution provides very few restraints upon a government seeking to undermine civil and political rights, weaken the Opposition, marginalise contestatory institutions and restrict information. Against the Westminster system, we defend a republican constitutional arrangement that is able to maintain the contestability of public power. To this end, we suggest a range of workable reforms designed to strengthen democracy and to improve the accountability of public power, particularly that of the political executive.     

Backup for ministers

This paper deals with the backup required by government ministers. It deals with Australia but the argument has wider implications. It sets out what backup the public service can and cannot provide, and argues that the limitations are due to its limited perspective. Ministerial requirements which are beyond the public service, and which may be met by politically appointed staffers working in ministers' private offices are examined. A major underlying reason why the public service cannot meet all ministerial requirements relates to the importance of governments ‘getting the politics right’. A philosophical argument is constructed to show that political scientists have a unique role to play as advisers to government ministers.     

Indigenous Participation in Constitutional Development

In 1950 the first four Solomon Islanders were nominated for the Advisory Council. Further constitutional reforms were made between 1960 and 1978, slowly preparing the Protectorate for a transfer of power through a unitary state operating under the Westminster system. British policy was guided by previous colonial experiences in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and to a limited extent by local circumstances, particularly through constitutional review committees. This paper addresses three central questions. Did Solomon Islanders make their own decisions when establishing the structure of their constitution and parliament, or were these decisions made for them by British and other advisers? What attempts were made to include Indigenous political structures in the governing process? To what extent did events elsewhere influence Solomon Islands political development?     

Administrative learning or political blaming? Public servants,parliamentary committees and the drama of public accountability

In theory, within Westminster systems the buck stops with the minister. Ministers are responsible for the actions of their departments and accountable for policy outcomes. In practice, it is often senior public servants rather than their ministerial masters who face the fierce questions of parliamentary committees when things go wrong. This article uses dramaturgy theory and blame theory to assess whether the nature of the parliamentary committee setting encourages or inhibits opportunities for a ‘learning’ type of accountability. Through a comparative study of committee appearances by public servants in the UK and Australia, the article argues that the adversarial nature of committee hearings encourages ‘blame games’ that do little to guarantee better decision-making in the future.

从理论上讲,西敏制下的大臣再不能推脱责任。大臣需要对其部门的行动、对政策结果负责。但在实践中,出了问题,通常是高级官员而非各部大臣面对议会专门委员会的激烈质询。本文借用演剧理论及责备理论评估议会内委员会的设置是有利于还是不利于学习型的问责。通过比较英澳两国议会委员会的样态,作者认为委员会听证的对抗性质只是鼓励“责备”,并不利于未来的正确决策。     

‘Slightly Constitutional’ Politics: Fianna Fáil's Tortuous Entry to the Irish Parliament, 1926–7

Fianna Fáil is Ireland's largest political party since 1932, and has been in office for almost 60 years, mostly as a single-party government. Despite this impressive electoral and parliamentary history, the party's constitutional origins are fraught with ambivalence towards Irish state institutions. Fianna Fáil's early years, perhaps eclipsed by subsequent electoral successes, have received relatively little attention from historians and most general works content themselves with a couple of lines about the oath of allegiance with an underlying assumption that entry to the Irish parliament was inevitable. The aim of this article is to show how the process that brought Fianna Fáil into parliamentary politics was haphazard and unpredictable. Through extensive use of party literature and parliamentary party minutes from the 1920s, this article presents a detailed account of Fianna Fáil's evolving attitude towards the oath of allegiance and how it succeeded in overcoming ideological reservations to take its seats in the Irish Free State legislature.     

‘But Private Notes for My Own Memory’? Parliamentary Diaries,Parliamentary History and the Politics of Information in Early Stuart England*

Early modern parliamentary diaries are a standard source for historians, and have long been used as a supplement to the official journals in reconstructions of debates and business at Westminster. This article adopts a contrasting approach and examines what diaries – viewed as sources in their own right – reveal about parliament and its members, methods of contemporary note-taking, and the circulation and readership of political information. It begins with a review of the evidence for why, how, and to what ends members kept parliamentary diaries, before exploring the extent of their dissemination in early Stuart England. While recent literature has emphasized the circulation of materials relating to Jacobean and especially Caroline parliaments during the early 17th century, the article recovers the existence of a simultaneous interest in the parliamentary proceedings of the Elizabethan era. At a time when the future of parliament seemed uncertain, it argues that the evident market for, and readership of, Elizabethan material reflects contemporaries’ increasing recognition of parliament's significance within the English state and their changing attitudes towards parliamentary history. Moreover, while Elizabethan parliamentary diaries and journals seemingly reinforced memories of a past ‘golden age’ of parliamentary rule, the article contends that contemporaries’ production, dissemination, and reading of that material was a conscious form of political action in response to the constitutional crisis of their day.     

安纳波利斯会议在美国制宪史上的地位

安纳波利斯会议原是邦联国会为协调北部各邦之间贸易冲突而开,会议报告却发出了召开修改《邦联条例》以应对邦联危机的费城会议的决定;汉密尔顿和麦迪逊是这次会议的主角,协调贸易冲突的失败,更坚定了他们这些“国家主义者”建立强大中央政府的信念,并开始思考建立新国家的若干原则,从而为费城会议上的大辩论奠定了理论基础。因此,安纳波利斯会议在美国制宪史上占有重要的地位,是美国宪政体制由邦联向联邦制转变的一次探索性的会议。     

Did 1979 Make Much Difference? An Alternative View of Select Committee Reform in the 1970s and 1980s*

An emphasis on the distinctive nature and effectiveness of the post-1979 ‘departmental’ select committee system has tended to dominate the academic literature. This article demonstrates that, on the contrary, many of the most important elements of these changes in the parliamentary environment were already in place by the mid 1970s, and, in particular, that MPs were working effectively to challenge government on select committees well before the advent of the departmental committees. It therefore concludes, contrary to the impression given by conventional accounts of the development of select committees, that the 1979 changes should be seen largely as a sensible restructuring; they were not, as has been claimed, the key event in the advance of select committee scrutiny, but, instead, should be regarded as one step in a gradual process of reform and improvement that began in the mid 1960s.     

Sovereignty and inconvenience: The significance of Bentham's exasperation

This article explores the meaning of ‘inconvenience’ and ‘convenience’ in legal and philosophical reasoning. The argument is that such considerations were crucial in the practice of Australian courts in marking out the boundaries of judicial propriety in relation to parliamentary proceedings. This argument is made with recourse to usages of the terms in constitutional debates of the seventeenth century. The older meanings of these terns have now been lost to Australian constitutional law. Hence, I argue, the problem of the boundaries of judicial propriety must be the subject of broader or more theoretical considerations such that the political preferences of judges will be less capable of insulation from their judgments.     

The Australian Senate as a 'House of Review'

The contested term 'house of review', which is commonly applied to the Senate, is discussed in light of evidence from recent political debates. The Senate is seen to review government action in general rather than simply legislation forwarded from the House of Representatives. Review implies scrutiny of a government held responsible for decisions. It is to be distinguished from the process of negotiating over the substance of policy in which responsibility is shared between the government and other parties. If review is associated with holding responsible governments accountable, it is not an intrinsically upper house function but a parliamentary function which a Senate with an anti-government majority is better fitted to perform. Strong bicameralism is not inherently incompatible with responsible government.     

An Alternative Approach to Canadian House of Commons Reform

Empowering backbench Members of Parliament in order to restore the effectiveness of the House of Commons has been a central theme in Canadian parliamentary reform for at least fifty years, but results are widely seen as disappointing. This article argues that unrealistic expectations, fostered by adherence to a traditional conception of the Westminster model of representative and responsible government, are part of the problem. A modernized conception of parliamentary government, recognizing the House as a forum for competing political parties between elections, could help us to better understand the House and improve its contribution to democratic governance. The proposed approach suggests innovative procedural options for legislative debate, Question Period, and other activities. It also offers a consistent basis for addressing issues such as floor-crossing, coalitions, and prorogations. More broadly, it points to the need for an integrated approach to the House, elections, political parties, public education, and citizen engagement in order to respond to contemporary democratic challenges.     

Entangling alliances? The UK's complicity in torture in the global war on terrorism

The global war on terrorism gives rise to a range of legal, political and ethical problems. One major concern for UK policy‐makers is the extent to which the government may be held responsible for the illegal and/or unethical behaviour of allies in intelligence gathering—the subject of the forthcoming Gibson inquiry. The UK government has been criticized by NGOs, parliamentary committees and the media for cooperating with states that are alleged to use cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (CIDT) or torture to gain information about possible terrorist threats. Many commentators argue that the UK's intelligence sharing arrangements leave it open to charges of complicity with such behaviour. Some even suggest the UK should refuse to share intelligence with countries that torture. This article refutes this latter view by exploring the legal understanding of complicity in the common law system and comparing its more limited view of responsibility—especially the ‘merchant's defence’—with the wider definition implied in political commentary. The legal view, it is argued, offers a more practical guide for policy‐makers seeking to discourage torture while still protecting their citizens from terrorist threats. It also provides a fuller framework for assessing the complicity of policy‐makers and officials. Legal commentary considers complicity in relation to five key points: identifying blame; weighing the contribution made; evaluating the level of intent; establishing knowledge; or, where the latter is uncertain, positing recklessness. Using this schema, the article indicates ways in which the UK has arguably been complicit in torture, or at least CIDT, based on the information publicly available. However, it concludes that the UK was justified in maintaining intelligence cooperation with transgressing states due to the overriding public interest in preventing terrorist attacks.     

‘Rushworth Shall Not Take Any Notes Here’: Journals,Debates and the Public, 1640–60

This article focuses on, and rethinks, the issue of parliamentary ‘secrecy’ during the mid 17th century, by comparing the official journals of the house of commons with the kinds of information that emerged in the public domain in the 1640s and 1650s, not least in printed newsbooks. It suggests that scholars have too readily assumed that MPs sought rigorously to uphold the principle that parliamentary proceedings were not fit matters for public consumption, and the idea that their activities at Westminster should be protected from the public gaze. It argues that this has involved paying excessive attention to occasional comments and orders which suggest that MPs resented public scrutiny of their activity, as well as a failure to distinguish between different motives for achieving ‘secrecy’, between attitudes to the availability of different kinds of information, and between principles and political practice. The aim of the article, in short, is to offer a more nuanced appreciation of the ways in which MPs sought to professionalise and formalise public access, even to the extent of rethinking ideas about political accountability.     

Size and Executive-Legislative Relations in Australian Parliaments

In parliamentary systems of government, size of parliament (in absolute terms and, especially, relative to the parliamentary executive) is an important, but often underemphasised, aspect of constitutional design. An analysis is provided of change in the size of national and sub-national parliaments and ministries in one parliamentary democracy, Australia, during the twentieth century. The ratio of executive to non-executive members of parliament has grown dramatically in all Australian parliaments, due to differences in incentives to increase the sizes of parliament and the executive. It is argued that this process has contributed to the weakening of parliaments and limited the potential for parliamentary reform. A proposal for institutional redesign is brieflly discussed.     

The 18th-century traditions of representation in a new age of revolution

What happened to shared historical experiences in the discursive processes of constitutional reform in Sweden and Finland? This article examines the use of 18th-century history in early 20th-century politics. Building on a long-term survey of Swedish and Finnish estate and parliamentary debates, it analyses the political implications of differing national historiographies in the two successor states of the 18th-century Swedish realm, focusing on how the ancient past and collective (and often selective) memories of the Age of Absolutism, the Age of Liberty and the Gustavian Age were used by parliamentarians in constitutional debates. The analysis demonstrates how the Finnish polity continued to be profoundly influenced by these 18th-century constitutions even after the Russian Revolution, while Sweden took the post-French Revolution constitution of 1809 as its point of departure. In both countries, interpretations of the long 18th century were ideologically motivated in an age of the parliamentarization of government and the democratization of the representative system. This leads us to a discussion of the history-political significance of the common and differing understandings of representative government in the two interconnected countries.