印度国大党与王公“土邦斯坦”的流产

印度国大党自成立之日至1936年对王公基本奉行不干涉的政策,但1937年后随着土邦民众政治觉悟的提高和印度国内政治形势的发展,国大党开始转向对土邦的公开介入政策,将土邦与英属印度的非暴力不合作运动连为一体。国大党对王公采取了正确的斗争策略,如国大党与广大土邦民众合作来对抗王公与少数英国殖民者的合作以及提出成立一个统一的联邦印度来对抗王公的"土邦斯坦"等。在国大党正确的斗争策略和广大民众运动的打击下,南亚次大陆的"第三个斯坦"走向流产。     

印度历史上的土邦问题

独立前,印度全境存在着约600个大小不等、分裂割据的土邦国。所有土邦加起来达500万平方英里,占印度总面积的45.3%,人口8600万,占当时印度总人口的1/3。1947年8月,英国被迫决定实行印巴分治,让印度独立。这些土邦面临着命运的历史抉择。经过反复较量,绝大多数土邦被迫加入印度(有少数几个加入了巴基斯坦),成为     

二战期间美国对印度自决的政策

太平洋战争爆发后,美国对英国殖民地印度的热情陡然上升。美国同情和支持印度的自决。为促使印度支持盟国的反法西斯战争,美国力促英国让步,并希望英国按照美国的榜样给予印度自由。然而,美国的两次努力均为英国拒绝。对美英关系可能恶化的担心,以及对印度国大党不妥协态度的不满,使美国最终停止了努力。美国对印度自决的态度经历了从积极支持到有限支持直至最终停止的过程,美国的非殖民主义在印度的实践反映了美国支持印度自决的政策底线,其意识形态诉求受制于它更高远的战略目标,这预示了美国战后在其他地区自决问题上的政策选择。     

太平洋战争爆发前英国远东政策的演变

1937年7月,日本发动了全面侵华战争,企图称霸亚太地区,这与英国维护在华利益、维护华盛顿体系的政策产生了尖锐矛盾。为了对付日本的挑战,英国对日采取了绥靖与争斗相结合,以绥靖为主的对策,对华采取了援助与背弃交互使用的两面政策。     

印度政府海外印度人政策的演变

海外印度人有2500万之众,分布甚广,其总体经济实力也很强。印度政府对待海外印度人的态度曾经非常冷淡,但在20世纪70年代之后情况略有变化,最近十几年则发生了质变。目前印度政府对海外印度人实行双重国籍政策,试图通过该政策借力于海外印度人的经济实力以实现印度经济腾飞的目的。     

日伪时期的南京英美侨民及其活动

侵华日军当局在南京大屠杀后,到1941年12月太平洋战争爆发前,基于其外交政策的需要,对继续留驻在南京的英美侨民,采取表面的礼遇、利用与事实上的限制、打击的两面态度与两手政策;而英美侨民则在艰难的条件下,与之进行了针锋相对的斗争.这是南京抗战史与中国抗战史的一项重要内容,呈现出纷繁复杂而又丰富多彩的内容与特点.这段过去被长期忽视的抗战史内容,应引起史学界的重视.     

试述英国对印度的殖民统治

英国对印度近200年的殖民统治,使印度人民陷入了深沉殖民奴役的苦难之中。英国在印度的殖民侵略和统治,带给印度人民的是灾难,但同时也造就了印度社会结构的基本框架。伴随着苦难,同时也使印度的传统的自然经济受到重大冲击,市场经济得到了发育,形成了民族市场经济的雏形;传统的王公统治和地方割据状态被彻底打破,代之以议会民主制度和联邦制的统一;英语得到了普及并成为印度的官方语言之一,打通了与欧美民族交往的渠道。当印度争取独立的斗争取得胜利后,市场经济、民主制度和英语普及就转化为积极因素,成为印度现代化发展的动力。     

周恩来赴印度三次规劝十四世达赖喇嘛

西藏和平解放后,1956年4月成立了西藏自治区筹备委员会,着手进行民主改革。西藏上层分裂分子大为恐惧,在西康地区发动武装叛乱。1956年11月,印度邀请十四世达赖喇嘛参加释迦牟尼涅槃2500周年大会。国外敌对势力和流亡的西藏上层分裂分子包围达赖,鼓动"西藏独立",策反随行官员,致使达赖和随行官员思想混乱并滞留印度。1956年底,周恩来在访问印度期间与达赖进行了三次谈话,阐明了党的方针政策,教育随行官员和达赖的家人,争取印度总理尼赫鲁的支持,为达赖最终安全返回西藏起到了关键作用。     

海外印度移民及印度政府的侨务政策

作为人口大国之一 ,印度与中国一样 ,有着庞大的海外移民群体及其后裔。目前 ,海外印度人已超过二千万人 ,分布在 1 1 0个国家和地区。上世纪 90年代以来 ,随着海外印度人对所在国和印度影响的增强 ,海外印度人在印度及海外都引起了比以前更多的关注。印度政府采取了一系列措施 ,以吸引更多的海外印度人投身印度国内的经济建设 ,为印度的发展作贡献。本文概述海外印度移民的基本情况 ,分析海外印度人与印度的联系及对印度的影响以及印度政府对海外移民的政策 ,希望从中能得到某些启示 ,从而对中国的侨务政策提供某些参考和借鉴。     

甘地的印度自治思想及其国家观

甘地的政治思想集中表现在他的“印度自治”(Hind Swaroj)思想上,而在“印度自治”思想中,他的独特的国家观尤其值得注意。我在《现代民族主义运动史》中提到,甘地的“印度自治首先是民族独立。为达到这个目标,以1919年为界,分为基本合作与基本不合作两个阶段,又包括在英帝国范围内的自治领地位和以后完全独立的要求。印度自治更深层次的涵义是印度独立后建立什么样国家的问题,也就是甘地的无政府主义类型的国家观。”但是,在这本书中,没有对这一观点进一步展开分析。在本文中;我将以事实和资料为基础,较为深入地探讨这个问题。     

Monarchical Display and the Politics of Empire: Princes of Wales and India 1870-1920s

This article analyses the evolving use of the institution ofthe British Monarchy as an instrument of imperial politics andpropaganda in the Indian empire. Through an analysis of a seriesof royal tours by Princes of Wales, ranging from the littleknown visits of Prince Alfred and Prince Albert Victor to thecelebrated tours of the future Edward VII, George V and EdwardVIII, it outlines the methods deployed by the Government tomake the monarchy appeal not just to an Indian audience, therebyhelping enhance the Raj's legitimacy and counter the risingtide of nationalist critique, but equally significantly, tothe British public to symbolize imperial power and assuage doubtsconcerning the future of the empire. Such a strategy depended,crucially, upon the persons of the Princes themselves and thearticle accordingly gives attention to the personality and politicalproclivities of these Princes and their perceptions of theirrole as guardians of the British imperial heritage. It is arguedthat this emblematic exploitation of royal prestige was of limitedeffectiveness and royal manipulation could not function in acontested paradigm, especially after the impact of the FirstWorld War and the advent of Gandhi. While the monarchical presencecould work to consolidate loyalty and power where it alreadyexisted, it was less successful in creating it when contested.     

不合作的悲剧：全印联邦方案流产探析

英国政府非常重视印度权力的移交问题。将政权移交给一个统一的印度政府可能在最大限度内维护英国在印度的政治利益、经济利益和战略利益。1918年《蒙塔古—蔡姆斯福德报告》提出由英属印度和印度土邦组成印度联邦的设想,此后,英国政府为实现这一设想作了很多努力,《西蒙委员会报告》、圆桌会议、《1935年印度政府法》、"内阁使团方案"一再重申并不断完善联邦方案。但是,由于国大党、穆斯林联盟等印度党派和教派不能互相妥协与合作,全印联邦方案最终流产,英国政府不得不实行印巴分治。     

英国退出印度的官方心态调整

英国财政困境与殖民统治问题是英国从印度退却的现实背景,然而,英国政府错误地认为自己仍然是印度独立进程的主导者,维持印度统一并把印度羁留在英联邦正是英国在此心态影响下制定的双重战略。内阁使团失败表明印度主要矛盾已经从殖民者与民族主义者对立转变为印度国大党与穆斯林联盟之间的利益斗争。随着印度局势恶化,英国政府的主导者心态转变为焦虑与无奈。蒙巴顿在形势压力下放弃统一印度的主张,承认了印巴分治的事实。英国政府在印度独立进程中的心态调整表明英国主动权非常有限,印度政治局势才是理解非殖民化的关键。     

Fantastic topographies: neo-liberal responses to Aboriginal land claims in British Columbia

This paper presents an analysis of the referendum on Native land claims that took place in British Columbia (BC) in the spring of 2002. The province's Liberal Government claimed that the referendum was needed in order to secure a public mandate for a set of negotiating principles that would breath new life into the supposedly stalled treaty process. Drawing evidence from government press releases, politicians' statements and media coverage, we argue that the BC Government and its supporters employed a discourse centred on neo-liberal economic logic in order to justify the exercise. Furthermore, we charge that this discourse relies on an erasure of the historical–geographical contexts of Native–newcomer relations in the province. By drawing on Cindi Katz's socio-spatial metaphor of 'topographies', we suggest that Native space in British Columbia needs to be understood as a series of situated and grounded experiences of colonialism and capitalist production. Then, extending the metaphor, we highlight the ways in which the referendum supporters' rhetoric contains a vision of future topographies of Native experience that adhere to the private property ethic of neo-liberal economics. We conclude that the politics surrounding the treaty process must be understood as a contest over the terms of Aboriginal citizenship and not merely as a conflict over the allotment of land and resources.     

The Information Research Department,British Covert Propaganda,and the Sino-Indian War of 1962: Combating Communism and Courting Failure?

Britain's post-war interventions in former colonial territories remain a controversial area of contemporary history. In the case of India, recent releases of official records in the United Kingdom and South Asia have revealed details of British government anti-communist propaganda activity in the subcontinent during the Cold War period. This article focuses attention on covert or unattributable propaganda conducted in India by the Foreign Office's Information Research Department (IRD). It specifically examines the 1960s: a time between the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border war in 1962, and the Indian general election of 1967, when IRD operations peaked. The Indian government welcomed British support in an information war waged against Communist China, but cooperation between London and New Delhi quickly waned. Britain's propaganda initiative in India lacked strategic coherence, and cut across the grain of local resistance to anti-Soviet material. The British Government found itself running two separate propaganda campaigns in the subcontinent: one focused on Communist China, and declared to the Indian government; and a second, secret programme, targeting the Soviets. In this context, Whitehall found it difficult to implement an integrated and effective anti-communist propaganda offensive in India.     

The Matabeleland Massacres: Britain's wilful blindness

This article explores an episode of post-colonial state violence in the newly independent Zimbabwe, namely state-sanctioned atrocities by the army unit known as Fifth Brigade, perpetrated against the Ndebele of Matabeleland and Midlands region. This episode of political and ethnic violence that occurred between 1983 and 1987 is referred to as both the Matabeleland Massacres and Gukurahundi. Members of the British government in Zimbabwe, which included a British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) on the ground, were intimately aware of the violence that resulted in the death of between 10,000 and 20,000 people. This article analyses official British and US government communications between the British High Commission, Harare, and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Cabinet Office, the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Defence, London, as well as between the US Department of State and the US Embassy in Harare. Analysis of the documents dated between January and March 1983 sheds a critical new lens on Gukurahundi, establishing what knowledge was available to the British and US governments about the persistent and relentless atrocities taking place; the diplomatic approaches pursued by both governments in response; and their rationale for same. The hitherto unavailable material presented here was obtained by Freedom of Information requests to various British Government offices and to the US Department of State. Analysis establishes that the British High Commission, Harare, had detailed knowledge of events unfolding in Matabeleland from an early stage of Gukurahundi, yet senior members of BMATT and the British diplomatic team in Harare, in contrast to their US counterparts, were consistent in their efforts to minimise the magnitude of Fifth Brigade atrocities. That the British government chose to adopt a policy of wilful blindness towards the atrocities undoubtedly constituted naked realpolitik.     

Choosing between America and Europe: a new context for British foreign policy

Power in Britain has changed hands from a prime minister who sought to balance intense UK‐US consultation on foreign policy with the ambition to be ‘at the heart of Europe’ to one whose approach towards both the United States and the European Union has yet to be tested. It is an appropriate moment, there fore, to assess how these two contextual poles of British foreign policy‐making have changed over recent years and what this might mean for UK foreign policy choices. The premise of this article is that the days are now largely over when the UK can or should start out by trying to build an Anglo‐US position on a foreign policy challenge before trying to tie in the European and transatlantic positions. The UK is now a central player in the development of increasingly activist European foreign policies, whether these can later be coordinated effectively with the United States or not. A strong, bilateral relationship continues to serve the interests of both sides on multiple levels, but this relationship does not sit upon the same foundations as during the Cold War. There are now significant underlying factors, especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 in the US and July 7 2005 in the UK, that pull the US away from Europe and the UK, while pushing the UK towards Europe as the first port of call in developing foreign policy strategies. It is also notable that, today, UK positions on most global issues and foreign policy challenges tend to conform more closely to the dominant EU line than to the United States. On balance, the UK might think about European integration more from a US than from a European perspective, but it now thinks about global problems more from a European than from a US or transatlantic perspective.     

Atlantic consumption of French rum and brandy and economic growth in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Caribbean

Why did the production of rum in the French West Indies not achieve the same success within the French Atlantic as it did in the British Atlantic world? Surveying the history of rum production in the French Caribbean in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this article contends that the reason why no regional trade in rum developed in French North America resulted from fierce industrial and institutional competition from brandy producers in metropolitan France. Rum, nevertheless, remained significant within the culture and economy of Native Americans and African Americans. This article seeks to add nuance to the wider debate of the ability of the trans-border diffusion of new ideas to stimulate and institutionalize industrial and economic growth in the Atlantic world. French entrepreneurs were no less ‘entrepreneurial’ than their British counterparts, but real constraints on consumption on both sides of the Atlantic created insufficient demand.     

‘The Cow is Still the Most Important Figure in Indian Politics!’: Religion,Imperial Culture and the Shaping of Indian Political Reform in the 1930s

This essay assesses the impact of imperial culture, particularly constructions of India and hinduism, on British responses to the Indian nationalist movement in the 1930s. The essay draws on personal and governmental papers, paying special attention to the language and vocabulary employed by British policy makers concerned with Indian affairs. The major issue addressed here is the British presumption that the 1935 Government of India Act, a plan for a federated India with British central control, would defuse nationalist agitation. Such a sanguine view of this proposal seemed misplaced, given the popular success of the nationalists, especially Gandhi, and given the explicit demands of Indians for full self‐government. However, such an optimistic assessment drew on presumptions about Indian political and social behaviour, and especially on conceptions of hinduism. Policy makers in Britain and India argued along well‐established lines, that hinduism inculcated moral and physical weakness, among other deficiencies, and that a British offer of compromise would attract many Indians who feared continuing confrontation with the Raj. Moreover, colonial advisors relied on a belief that social and caste divisions within hinduism would recur within the nationalist ranks as well. This sense that Indians would respond to half‐measures of reform persisted until the 1937 provincial elections. Though British administrators predicted only a moderate showing by the Indian National Congress, the polling proved otherwise, as Congress took power in the majority of the provinces. The Raj lasted another decade, but the confident cultural assumptions sustaining it took a fatal blow.     

Why the General said No

Based upon recently published volumes of French diplomatic documents, this review article examines the course of the negotiations for British entry into the European Economic Community from 1961 to 1963 and the reasons why France vetoed Britains application. It is clear that even before the British government launched its application, the French government was aware of the threat it posed to the cohesion of the Community and to French interests. It therefore pursued tactics of delay. The British, who were in a hurry to join, vainly sought to convince the French of their conversion to the Gaullist conception of a con–federal Europe that would be independent of both the Soviet Union and the United States, even dangling the prospect of nuclear cooperation before President de Gaulle. The latter's position inside France was relatively weak until he won a referendum on the direct election of the president in October 1962 and his party triumphed in the legislative elections the following month. De Gaulle then felt secure enough to tell Prime Minister Macmillan quite bluntly at their Rambouillet meeting on 15–16 December 1962 that he did not believe that Britain was ready for EEC membership. He had thus already made up his mind to exclude Britain before the Nassau agreement between President Kennedy and Mr Macmillan in which the former agreed to supply Britain with Polaris nuclear missiles, although this agreement confirmed his belief that Britain was excessively dependent upon the United States. Although economic questions—particularly those relating to the system of agricultural support and to Britain's request for special concessions to Australia, Canada and New Zealand—did play an important part in de Gaulle's decision, it is clear that political factors were uppermost in his mind. He did not want either a diluted Community or one in which there was a possible rival to French leadership.