STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION OF RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY AND HOUSING TENURE CHOICE*

ABSTRACT. This study is devoted to studying households'decisions to move and whether to rent or own after moving. It employs dynamic discrete choice models which condition households'decisions on their circumstances at every point in time during the length of the observation while accounting for individual heterogeneity. The results show that key dynamic elements, captured by means of lagged dependent variables, as well as household heterogeneity, are significant determinants of the tenure choice and mobility decisions. Moreover, homeowners are found to be responsive to housing market conditions when adjusting their housing stock. Housing-price appreciation is found to discourage renters from becoming homeowners. Finally, our results reject the proportional monetary transaction costs specification suggesting that monetary transaction costs might be fixed.     

PRICE AND LOCATION CONJECTURES IN MEDIUM- AND LONG-RUN SPATIAL COMPETITION MODELS*

ABSTRACT. This paper examines medium-run and long-run equilibria in unbounded (circular) and bounded (linear) one-dimensional multifirm markets. A price-location adjustment model is outlined that dows simulation of the spatial equilibrium when these firms anticipate reactions from their nearest spatial rivals. Thus, the market equilibrium is derived from the interdependent but atomistic decisions of the competing firms and is not imposed by some outside observer or agency. Ail conjectures are exogenous; the three well-known price conjectures (Greenhut-Ohta, Hotelling-Smithies, and Losch) are highlighted; and the relevant comparative statics are provided.     

MILL PRICING AND SPATIAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION MONOPOLY PERFORMANCE AND LOCATION WITH SPATIAL RETAIL MARKETS*

ABSTRACT. Most of the monopoly spatial price discrimination literature explicitly assumes uniform population density over space. It also implicitly assumes that firms (plants) are spatially isolated from each other with production and retail points that coincide in location. While departures from these assumptions have been explored separately in the literature, it remains to examine performance and location when these assumptions are relaxed simultaneously. What emerges in this paper is a model where density functions approximate a pair of cities isolated from other cities. Each city has its own retail market, while the location of a single production or wholesale point is determined by characteristics of the two markets. Comparisons of mill pricing and spatial price discrimination found in the spatial monopoly literature can be interpreted as special cases of the more general framework provided here.     

THE COMPARATIVE STATIC RESPONSE OF RENTAL HOUSING TO A PRICE CHANGE: INFLATION AND GOVERNMENT POLICY*

ABSTRACT. A two period consumer choice model is presented in which housing is treated as a quality differentiated good. The short-run comparative static response of rental housing to a price change is examined via an example, an exogenous increase in the inflation rate. Two stylized facts are alternately used; interest income is taxed, and interest rate ceilings are imposed on small savings deposits. The partial equilibrium distributional impact of inflation, in the context of rental housing markets, is also discussed.     

ANALYSIS OF A DYNAMIC RESIDENTIAL LOCATION CHOICE MODEL WITH TRANSACTION COSTS*

ABSTRACT. This paper incorporates transaction costs in a residential location choice model. An individual's choice is assumed to be an outcome of a two-stage process: a decision to change, or to undertake a transaction and, conditional on a change occurring, a choice of a new alternative. The dynamic choice model is aggregated to yield a Markovian model of residential location patterns. It is shown that recent contributions to dynamical urban modeling correspond to special cases of the deterministic version of this model. The Markovian model is used in a theoretical analysis of the influence of transaction costs on the properties of the stationary state. The effects of residential mobility rates and of interdependencies among individuals, caused by supply-side and density-related interactions, are also analyzed. It is shown how these dynamical factors modify the stationary state, thereby demonstrating the type of errors which may occur with static models that omit them.     

HETEROGENEOUS TASTES AND RESIDENTIAL LOCATION*

ABSTRACT. In a simple urban model, where the only spatial distinction made is between center and suburb, we introduce a uniform distribution of preferences for land. Under a logarithmic utility function, we examine how the location and consumption decisions of individuals differ in consequence of their different preferences for land. Comparative statics indicate that the qualitative response of the city at equilibrium to changes in per capita income and transportation cost is not affected by the introduction of such heterogeneity. Possible extensions are also briefly discussed.     

EXCLUDING THE POOR FROM LOW INCOME HOUSING PROGRAMS: THE ROLES OF STATE AGENCIES AND USAID IN JAMAICA*

This paper investigates why low-income housing agencies in Jamaica do not accomplish their self-imposed progressive mandates to assist large numbers of poor people. To expose what produces gaps between policy and practice, the analysis focuses on how housing programs are organized, both in Jamaica's two largest state agencies and in USAID. The crucial organizational features include the housing agencies' sources of funding, reliance on the private sector, and associated motives and interests. Among the three agencies, a set of inter-related forces block low income access to housing assistance: (1) most of the policy influences of international development agencies such as USAID, (2) the pervasiveness and increased penetration of market logic into low-income housing programs, (3) state agency bureaucratization and careerism, and (4) an elitist neglect of the housing needs of the poor. Prejudices against the poor based on the belief that they do not repay housing loans are not justified by empirical evidence, much less by the fact that the programs were explicitly created to improve their housing conditions.     

HOUSING SUBSIDIES AND URBAN HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR*

ABSTRACT. This paper examines how housing subsidies affect housing and location demands in a monocentric market, identifying the extent to which policies prompt targeted populations to congregate more or less intensely in the central city. Various subsidies are studied: rents based on ability to pay, lump-sum housing aid, housing vouchers, and subsidies based on percentage of rent. The demand effects are seen to hinge critically upon whether or not subsidies are tied to binding consumption restrictions. Policy impacts are shown to be identical for both CBD employed and locally employed consumers targeted for the housing policies.     

LOCATION AND MARKET POWER HOTELLING REVISITED*

ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the determination of industry structure in a product market, given a monopolistic factor market. The characteristics of industry structure examined include the number of firms, their pricing and locational pattern. It is shown how a monopolistic factor owner–a landowner–structures the product market in order to extract maximum rent. Asymmetry characterizes the resulting locational pattern. All the product market firms charge different prices in equilibrium. No matter how large the number of firms competing in the product market, the landowner can always guarantee himself positive profits. The paper concludes with a discussion of possible applications and tests of the theory.