试论萨尔浒大战与清初满族兵家谋略

清王朝是中国历史上最后一个封建王朝,满族统治者以武功定天下,从统一女真各部到与明王朝逐鹿中原,发生了无数次惊心动魄、指挥高超的战争与战例,形成了具有鲜明民族特点的兵家谋略。其中萨尔浒大战是清王朝与明王朝公开对抗后发生的第一次具有战略意义的重大战役,在中国军事史上占有重要地位,而且是清初满族兵家谋略的典型战例。下面笔者试对萨尔浒大战与清初满族兵家谋略的关系加以论述。一　加强军队建设萨尔浒大战与清初满族兵家谋略的军事基础满族是一个文明晚进的少数民族,当中国古代军事已经发展为两千年文明史时,满族社会中…     

二战前英国绥靖政策的起迄问题——与陶樾同志商榷

陶樾同志在《世界历史》杂志1980年第3期上发表的《两次大战期间英国的外交政策与欧洲均势》一文中,认为“英国的绥靖政策是从1937年5月底内维尔·张伯伦主政后才真正开始贯彻执行的”,绥靖政策的结束是在1939年3月31日,“即德军占领布拉格后的十六天,张伯伦突然代表英法两国宣布全力支持波兰政府、保证波兰的独立”这一天。对此,本人谈点与陶樾同志不同看法,以求赐教。 一 丘吉尔在其《回忆录》中,写到张伯伦在1939年对波兰予以保护一事时指出:英国对德国“放任、安抚、绥靖的政策执行了五六年之久”。由此推断,他认为在张伯伦上台前的     

1929-1933年大萧条与伦敦世界经济会议

1929—1933年大萧条,摧毁了一战后重建的世界经济格局。国际联盟为缓解危机而召开的伦敦世界经济会议,则成为新旧世界经济体系的转折点。英国企图借助美国的金融实力,恢复由其主导的世界经济传统秩序;美国则希望终结以英国为核心的世界经济传统秩序,倡建全球经济新秩序。伦敦世界经济会议最终未就任何实质性问题达成协议。会议之所以失败,是因为英法与美国在如何协作对付危机的问题上思路迥异,而会议的失败则为美国以后构建由其主导下的世界贸易金融合作机制奠定了基础。     

超越凡尔赛:美国共和党政府的国际秩序思想及其对欧洲稳定与安全的追求(1921—1929)

20世纪20年代,美国共和党政府从其保守的国际秩序观念出发,试图利用强大的经济实力在两个方面纠正凡尔赛体系的弊端,以实现欧洲的稳定与安全:一是削减德国的战争赔款,并在此基础上向德国和欧洲输入美国的资本,实现欧洲经济的复兴以及促进德国融入欧洲;二是以停止贷款相威胁促使欧洲国家实现安全合作,解决《凡尔赛条约》引发的欧洲边界与安全问题。作为一战后威尔逊重建国际秩序活动的继续,共和党的这些努力一度获得相当的成功,不仅降低了凡尔赛体系的掠夺性和不公正性,而且促进了法德之间的和解与"欧洲协调"观念的复兴。但是,共和党政府的一些政策失误导致20世纪30年代经济大危机的爆发,使其促进欧洲稳定与安全的政策最终失败。     

二十世纪三十年代中期法国外交政策的演变

二十世纪三十年代逐步形成的绥靖政策是以英、法帝国主义为主角的。这种政策的产生和推行,有着深刻的历史原因和国际背景,给人类造成了严重的后果。这些问题国内史学界已发表了不少论文。这里不再论述。然而,有这样一个问题:推行绥靖政策对英国来说,反映了它外交政策的连续性。因为在此之前相当长的历史阶段内,英国所奉行的是“均衡政策”。而对法国来讲,一方面,法、德是世敌,第一次世界大战后,法国对战败的德国,一直采取强硬政策,力图最大限度地削弱德国,使之不能东山再起。     

1919年英国軍队反战行动史略

1918年11月初,第一次世界大战已迅速接近尾声。协约国的军队到处对趋于瓦解的四国同盟发动猛攻、此时,保加利亚和土耳其已退出战争。11月3日,奥匈政府也投降了。德国军队逐渐放弃法国和比利时的疆土。11月7日,德国代表越过战线并向法军统帅部请求停火。所有英国人民,包括武装部队在内,焦急地等待着军事行动停止的消息。在英国本身情况恶化的影响下,群众对结束战     

试析德国对英布战争的中立政策

英布战争期间,德国奉行中立政策,严格约束本国官员、商人行为,拒绝援助布尔人和参与俄国所主张的集体干涉行动。德国中立政策的出台与执行是出于所谓最大限度维护自身利益的考虑。借助中立,德国暂时性地获取了巨大的战略利益:独占西萨摩亚,强化了太平洋地区的影响;顺利通过海军法案,加强海军建设,加速世界政策的执行。但是中立也加重了英国对德国外交政策的怀疑,加深了两国间的不信任感。德国谋求实现与英国合作的计划破产,俾斯麦所担忧的两面夹击状况出现了。     

太平洋战争爆发后英国对国共关系的报道与尺度

太平洋战争爆发之前,英国政府对中国共产党及其领导的军队的真实情况缺乏了解,在国共关系中一直支持国民党。太平洋战争爆发后,英国驻华记者开始对中共领导的抗日军队予以关注,对国共关系进行深入报道,对国民党封锁抗日根据地的做法和新闻审查政策进行批评。1944年,英国驻华记者格尔德对国共关系的系列报道和对国民党的批评,不仅引起了国民政府的不满,还引发了英国内部对驻华记者报道审查制度的争议。在各部门的协调下,英国政府出台了关于中国内政和国共关系报道的原则,并在一定程度上促进了英国朝野对国共关系和中国共产党的了解。     

种族隔离制度与1985年英国对南非政策的调整

1985年,南非局势的持续恶化与国际社会制裁压力的不断增加,迫使英国撒切尔政府考虑调整其对南非的“接触和对话”政策。对此,英外交部建议采取措施提高英国政策的可信度并避免陷入孤立,其核心策略是通过与欧共体就南非问题达成共同声明来捍卫英国的基本利益,并借此抵制英联邦更为严厉的制裁措施。然而,撒切尔却反对任何形式的经济制裁,双方各执己见,从而导致英国的政策调整异常艰难。经过一系列博弈后,撒切尔在平衡经济与政治利益诉求,保持英国南非政策自主性和灵活性的前提下,有选择地接受了欧共体《卢森堡协议》,此后又在拿骚英联邦会议上做出策略性妥协。撒切尔政府对南非政策进行的调整是英国实用主义外交传统的体现,其根本目的是为了以最小成本实现英国整体利益的最大化,但这种偏袒南非政府的做法在事实上延长了南非种族隔离制度的寿命。     

30年代英国对德政策浅析

希特勒上台后,德国进一步暴露了要同其它西方大国争霸和重新夺取殖民地的野心,越来越明显地成为同英法争夺欧洲霸权的主要对手。但是,在３０年代中期以前,英国仍继续其在２０年代推行的“扶德抑法”政策,企图通过制造法德之间的“均势”和对抗谋求自己对欧洲事务的支配权。３０年代中期后,迫于德国威胁进一步增大的压力,英国不得不停止“扶德抑法”,开始拉着法国对德国实行有限度的绥靖政策,以维护其在世界范围内的霸权地位。在欧洲战争爆发前夕,它又大搞祸水东引,企图利用苏德战争坐收渔人之利。     

1933年希特勒在德国上台与法国的反应

1933年1月30日,希特勒就任魏玛共和国总理,标志着德国纳粹化的开始。德国国内形势的恶化引起了法国的严重不安。但是．由于法国当时正面临严重的财政危机,因此,在希特勒上台次日组阁的达拉第政府不得不将如何恢复财政平衡视为第一要务;同时法国国内相当一部分人对与希特勒新政权达成和解还抱有幻想,这最终促使法国政府在对德政策方面采取了“理智而冷静”的政策,没有作出过激的反应。     

Le postmoderne expliqué aux enfants. Correspondance 1982–85

In the early modern period, the European concept of “nobility” was rarely used to describe the upper classes of the societies born in the British or in the French Americas. The presence of French nobles in New France or in the French West Indies and the emergence of the native gentry in parts of the British Empire have been much studied. But the social impact of elites has not been fully recognized by Atlantic historians—due, perhaps, to a bias towards “authentically” New World systems of social recognition based upon wealth, emphasizing supposedly greater possibilities of social mobility. This paper takes a comparative perspective to the social meanings of being a noble or being a gentleman in both empires. It concludes that there were few substantive differences between French nobles living in the metropolis and in the colonies because legal definitions of the French noblesse were strictly determined by the Crown. The essence of the French nobility was, in theory, the same in Versailles, in a remote rural parish of France or in Quebec. The story was very different for British colonial gentlemen who encountered countless difficulties to be socially accepted by their metropolitan counterparts. The paper explores the consequences of the chasm between British metropolitan and colonial upper classes and assesses solutions taken by colonial gentlemen to be fully integrated in the gentry of Great Britain.     

Memory that governs by itself? Appropriations of Versailles memory

Abstract

Versailles memory has been a cornerstone of the traditional paradigm of lieux de mémoire. However, its transnational dimension has never been fully explored. Covering more than three centuries, this article identifies three antagonistic patterns of transnational Versailles memory that carry ambivalent references to ‘Europe’: war versus peace; monarchical versus republican legitimization; and universalistic versus particularistic conceptions of power. Actors referred to Versailles’ architecture to substantiate their positions toward French hegemonic ambitions: from counter-buildings by the Sun King’s rivals; political redefinitions during changing regimes after 1789 via Franco-German rivalries in the War of 1870; international reactions to the Peace Conference in 1919; and up to Versailles as a World Heritage Site. Analysing these three constitutive patterns, this article challenges the dominant Franco-centrist Versailles master narrative as non-French actors contested such hegemonic views. References to Versailles as a symbol of both American and Brazilian national independence also bring out global dimensions of Versailles memory.     

雅尔塔体制的形成与苏联势力范围的确立

苏德战争之前 ,苏联通过与希特勒德国的合作与争夺 ,在其西北部扩张领土和建立势力范围的努力获得初步成功。第二次世界大战期间 ,苏联以战场上的胜利为基础 ,使盟国逐渐地同意了苏联关于领土和边界、安全保障和势力范围的大部分要求。最后 ,苏联和西方国家以妥协和谅解的方法确立了划分它们势力范围的雅尔塔体制     

英国与德国的重新武装

对于20世纪50年代前期德国的重新武装,英国初则支持美国的大西洋联盟框架而反对法国建立欧洲军的普利计划;在美国对法妥协的斯波福德计划失败后。转而对普利计划采取较积极的态度;法国计划失败后,又通过艾登计划最终将德国重新武装纳入大西洋联盟框架。上述政策的变化受到两大因素的制约,即美国压力下重新武装德国的迫切性和重新武装的框架——大西洋联盟还是超国家的欧洲机构。前决定了英国对法国计划态度的转变,后则决定了英国不会加入欧洲防务集团并始终希望建立大西洋联盟框架。实际上,英国的方针是一贯的,造成法国计划失败的主要原因还在于法国人自己。     

Nationalism, racism and propaganda in early Weimar Germany: contradictions in the campaign against the "black horror on the Rhine"

During the early 1920s, an average of 25,000 colonial soldiers from North Africa, Senegal and Madagascar formed part of the French army of occupation in the Rhineland. The campaign against these troops, which used the racist epithet ‘black horror on the Rhine’ (schwarze Schmach am Rhein), was one of the most important propaganda efforts of the Weimar period. In black horror propaganda, images of alleged sexual violence against Rhenish women and children by African French soldiers served as metaphors for Germany’s ‘victimization’ through the Versailles Treaty. Because the campaign initially gained broad popular and official support, historians have tended to consider the black horror a successful nationalist movement bridging political divides and strengthening the German nation state. In contrast, this essay points to some of the contradictions within the campaign, which often crystallized around conflicts over the nature of effective propaganda. Extreme racist claims about the Rhineland’s alleged ‘mulattoization’ (Mulattisierung) increasingly alienated Rhinelanders and threatened to exacerbate traditional tensions between the predominantly Catholic Rhineland and the central state at a time when Germany’s western borders seemed rather precarious in the light of recent territorial losses and separatist agitation. There was a growing concern that radical strands within the black horror movement were detrimental to the cohesion of the German nation state and to Germany’s positive image abroad, and this was a major reason behind the campaign’s decline after 1921/22. The conflicts within the campaign also point to some hitherto neglected affinities between the black horror and subsequent Nazi propaganda.     

The Failed European Union: Franco-German Relations during the Great Depression of 1929–321

French scholars have led a revival of interest in inter-war efforts at European integration and the prominent role played by the French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand. Franco-German rapprochement was integral to this effort, but with the death in October 1929 of his like-minded German counterpart, Gustav Stresemann, it is generally held that Berlin adopted a more confrontational foreign policy even before Hitler took power. However, this article demonstrates that in spite of a series of upsets, an intense and sustained effort continued during the years of the Great Depression (1929–32) to forge Franco-German détente. This culminated in September 1931 in a Franco-German treaty that established the mechanisms for far-reaching integration of the two countries’ economies, with a customs union and European union as the ultimate goals. It then examines in detail how and why this remarkable effort collapsed during 1932, paying particular attention to an unforeseen crisis in trading relations and the impact of a media scandal surrounding the publication of Stresemann's memoirs. Despite this failure, efforts to integrate Europe around a Franco-German axis between 1929 and 1932 can nonetheless be understood as part of a deeper process that survived Hitler and saw the emergence of the current European Union.     

Anglo-American Rivalry in the Middle East: The Struggle for the Buraimi Oasis, 1952–1957

Some French writers, most notably Jean-Baptiste Duroselle and André Tardieu, have argued that French strategic interests during the early decades of the twentieth century had been seriously harmed because, alone among the Great Powers of Europe, France lacked a ‘diaspora’ in the United States. As a result of this, they have claimed, France had no advocacy group prepared to defend the interests of the European ‘kin state’ at a time when France’s great rival, Germany, was amply endowed with a sizeable demographic presence in the United States, willing to speak out in defence of Germany and its foreign policy. Moreover, a second large European diaspora had become established in the United States, whose numbers would swell after the mid nineteenth century: the Irish. Not necessarily committed to promoting German interests, the Irish-Americans did militate strongly and consistently against British interests, such that by the time France and Britain had become close security partners preceding and during the First World War, what worked against British interests would also work against French ones. This article constitutes a critical examination of the Duroselle-Tardieu thesis regarding France's allegedly ‘missing’ diaspora, and cautions against attributing too much geo-strategic influence to either the German-American or Irish-American ‘lobby’.     

Fiasco: The Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance That Never Was and the Unpublished British White Paper, 1939–1940

This article is about the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations in 1939 for an alliance against Nazi Germany and about how the British government later tried to represent those negotiations to public opinion. The first part of the essay presents the Soviet point of view on the negotiations and how the British and French governments, though mainly the British, reacted to Soviet alliance proposals. It is a fresh representation of the Soviet perspective from published and unpublished Russian language sources.

The second part of the essay focuses on how the British sought to represent the abortive negotiations through a white paper, placing the blame for failure on the Soviet Union. France opposed publication because, however carefully prepared, the white paper showed that the Soviet side had made serious alliance proposals with precise, reciprocal undertakings which the British government was reticent to entertain. The French were all the more annoyed because the white paper omitted to underline that they had been more receptive to Soviet proposals.

The trilingual, multi-archival evidence presented in the first part of the essay effectively supports the French perception of the white paper and more generally of the failed tripartite negotiations.     

Beyond ‘Parade Ground Soldiers’: French Army Assessments of the British in 1918

When the Germans launched their Spring Offensives of 1918, they placed tremendous pressure on the alliance between Britain and France. While French and British soldiers had formed strong relations through mutual cooperation at the Somme in 1916, the French experiences at Verdun and during the mutinies of 1917 had changed the way they viewed the war and, most crucially, how they would view any allied failures. When the British were forced to retreat following the beginning of Operation Michael in March 1918, the French reacted with fury. This article examines the nature of the French evaluations of the British during 1918 and the extent to which they judged their ally to have failed them. By using the collections of the Commissions de contrôle postal for the French army during the war, it will show the depths to which French opinion of the British fell in the first half of the year but also how British actions towards the war’s conclusion managed to restore some of their honour in French eyes.