Reform of the structural funds after 1999

In efforts to promote cohesion in the EU, the structural funds are an important instrument. The current mandate for the funds comes to an end in 1999, and it mill have to be renegotiated shortly against a backdrop of the start of EMU and probable enlargement of the EU. This paper reviews the principles governing the structural funds and looks at the problems they face in practice. It then considers possible reforms to meet the obligations on, and expectations of, the EU in the years to come, and what these would imply for different regions as well as the potential new member states.     

Reforming economic governance in Europe: exploring the road to effective coordination

The European Union is at a crossroad. In recent years it has been going through a major review of its institutional design without, however, clearly defining its role and scope. The credibility of its institutions is adversely affected by the widening gap between ambitious economic goals and the dismal performance of the economy in some member countries. Structural reforms have been progressing at a painfully slow pace. Popular support has been decreasing alarmingly. The need to confront poor economic performance and to embark on urgent market-structural reforms, as well as the problem of harmonizing national interests with those of the EU as a whole, have highlighted how the institutions and processes can be dovetailed. This article aims at contributing to the debate on economic governance and policy coordination in Europe. Looking at the genesis and the recent reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, it focuses on how the European Monetary Union macroeconomic policies are likely to be governed in the future and what the possibilities are for establishing effective economic and monetary governance. The Pact represents the most developed, albeit controversial, attempt to provide a framework for coordination of policies among sovereign states. Such coordination should help to achieve an appropriate fiscal–monetary mix, enhancing the credibility of monetary policy by insisting that member states governments do not spend more than they can finance through taxation. The Pact's recent revision is certainly the first step in the right direction, especially because it links macroeconomic stability with the goals of the Lisbon Agenda–job creation, market-structural reforms and social cohesion.     

The fragility of Europe's Willkommenskultur

In this guest editorial Chris Hann considers the refugee route via the Balkans to Germany that opened up in a big way in the summer of 2015. The influx of ‘economic migrants’, as most newcomers are widely perceived, is polarizing opinion throughout the member states of the European Union. Hann also detects a renewal of the old east‐west moral geographies, due in part to legacies of the socialist era in eastern Europe and the semi‐peripheral condition of the region today for European capitalism. Whereas most anthropologists tend to favor unconstrained mobility and hence call for the abolition of frontiers, Hann suggests that the solution cannot be so simple. Focusing on the interplay of economic and ethical factors, he urges empathy not only with all categories of refugees/migrants but also with the dispossessed in the societies that offer them a ‘welcome’.     

'Help! The Poles are coming': Narrating a contemporary moral panic

In the years and months prior to the May 2004 enlargement of the European Union, transitional periods of two to possibly seven years were imposed upon free movement of labour for immigrant workers from new (Eastern European) member states by a majority of ‘old’ member states. This article aims to scrutinize fear of mass migration from new member states by examining where (ir)rationality and political opportunism meet in the perception of this particular flow of labour migration as a cause for contemporary moral panic. To this purpose, the article starts with embedding the notion of fear of mass migration in literature on moral panics, risk society and the ‘othering’ of economic migrants as strangers and folk devils. By means of a case study narrative of the decision‐making process on the free movement issue in the Netherlands, it is subsequently demonstrated that ‘politics of fear’ are deeply rooted in the uncontrollability of mobilities of an unknown magnitude and an uncertain impact on, for instance, domestic labour markets. Beyond rationalizable concerns of job loss, however, labour migrants from new member states are also feared as threats to borders of morality and identity in Western European societies. The narrative's results are placed within a wider context of current boundary drawings with regard to migration in the enlarging European Union.     

When should the Central Europeans Join EMU?

This article first considers why central European countries wish to join EMU soon. The main reasons are the risk of macroeconomic instability they face outside the euro zone if they wish to grow quickly. At the same time, central Europe is highly integrated with regard to trade with EMU, so it is little exposed to asymmetric shocks that would require a realignment of exchange rates. Finally, it is argued that there is no cost in terms of slower growth from EMU accession, so that there is no trade-off, as has been claimed, between nominal convergence to EMU and real convergence to EU average GDP levels. Second, the article assesses whether central European accession to EMU would be disadvantageous to current members. It concludes that accession cannot increase inflationary pressure on existing EMU members, also as claimed, but that slow growing members of EMU might suffer increased unemployment, unless they increase the flexibility of their labour markets. Incumbent members may also be unwilling to share power with central Europeans in EMU institutions.     

Russia and China: converging responses to globalization

This article compares the impact of globalization on the political systems and political economy of Russia and China since the beginning of their respective reform periods. Overall, it argues that both should now be viewed within the paradigm of ‘developmental states’. The article first presents some comparative economic statistics on the changes that have taken place. Second, it looks at the converging attitudes of the two regimes towards industrial restructuring and privatization, highlighting the continued role that they both reserve for state direction. This includes an orientation towards national industrial champions. Third, the evolution of policies of both states towards guided democratization are discussed leading to an assessment of the importance of nationalism in their responses to globalization, particularly in the recent doctrine of ‘sovereign democracy’ of Putin's United Russia party. Finally, the article argues that a greater wariness towards western recipes for political and economic development will frame the efforts of both states to construct a more cooperative bilateral relationship.     

EMU versus the regions? Regional convergence and divergence in Euroland

There is currently considerable interest in and debate overthe impact of increasing European economic and monetary integration(EMU) on the regions of the EU. Opinion is sharply divided overwhether EMU is leading to regional economic convergence or regionaleconomic divergence. This paper examines the theoretical argumentsand empirical evidence for these opposing views, and presentssome additional analysis of patterns of regional productivitytrends and employment growth over the period 1975–98.The picture that emerges is a complex one: whilst worker productivityshows only very weak convergence across the EU regions (a processwhich halted altogether after the mid-1980s), regional employmentgrowth has been sharply divergent. Although there is littlesupport for the claim that EMU will lead to regional convergence,these findings suggest that until much more detailed investigationof the specific impacts on particular types of region is undertaken,the regional implications of EMU will remain a contentious issue.     

The euro crisis and European citizenship: The euro 2001–2012 – celebration or commemoration? (Respond to this article at http://www.therai.org.uk/at/debate)

The Eurozone crisis has highlighted the problems of European economic integration, but what effects is it having on social cohesion in the European Union? Using symbolic, historical and anthropological perspectives this article examines the relationship between the single currency and European citizenship. I argue that the roots of the crisis lie in the euro's origins. Economic and monetary union (EMU) was an assemblage of two very different rationales: one economic and based on neoliberal assumptions, the other political and geared towards forging social cohesion among Europeans. Binding Europe through a common currency was always a risky endeavour, placing heavy expectations on the identity‐effects of money. EU leaders also seemed curiously oblivious to the possible negative effects that weaknesses in the euro might have for European solidarity. Drawing on theories of money and its role as a technology of citizenship and symbolic boundary marker, I argue that the euro continues to symbolize European integration, only now it has come to symbolize the cleavages and tensions that divide Europe. Paradoxically, one effect of the Eurozone crisis is not fragmentation but an acceleration of the deepening of European economic governance. However, the centralization this entails imposes heavy costs on the EU's peripheral members and raises concerns about the future of democracy in Europe.     

From the Atlantic to the Bug,from the Arctic to the Tigris? The Transformation of the EU and NATO

Both the European Union and NATO are now committed in principle to substantial enlargement. It remains doubtful, however, how far member governments are making a success of further enlargement, let alone thinking through its strategic implications. Yet the process of dual enlargement will define the future security, political and economic structures of the European region. During the past year west European governments have extended promises of eventual membership to the western Balkan states and to Turkey; while the future positions of Ukraine, Russia, the Caucasus states and the southern Mediterranean associates all raise delicate policy issues. Hard choices remain to be made about the adaptation of these organizations to eastern enlargement, and about the management of relations with the near neighbours who will remain outside.     

Leadership coalitions and change: the role of states in the European Union

The role of states in the European Union has not diminished over the history of the organization's institutional development. On the contrary: since the fall of the Berlin Wall, member-state influence over Union affairs actually seems to have grown. This is attributable both to the weakening of the supranational elements and to the expansion of intergovernmental activity in key policy areas. Added to this, the growth in the number of EU member states, and the diversity that now exists in an EU of 25, have reinforced the network of relationships, both bilateral and multilateral, between member states. Consequently, the EU has both centripetal and centrifugal forces at work, with member states drawn together in a continuing formal integration process and driven towards building tactical associations among themselves.
This article discusses the relationship between the formal and the informal layers of integration in Europe, and points to the changing constellations and coalitions among the current member states. Special attention is given to the cleavages that emerged between the EU governments over the negotiations on treaty reform, from the Treaty of Maastricht to the Treaty on the European Constitution. With regard to the power structure within the EU, the article outlines the perspectives of a 'Big Three' core coalition as successor to the Franco-German motor.     

Security and democracy: the ASEAN charter and the dilemmas of regionalism in South‐East Asia

In November 2007, the heads of the ten member governments of the Association of South‐East Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed a charter that will, once ratified, give the association a legal personality. The charter, significantly, requires more of its members than a reassertion of the traditional ASEAN norm of non‐interference and the practice of consensus. The charter lists a number of novel goals among the organization's purposes: ‘to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ In view of the wide economic and political disparities between the member states of ASEAN, this article examines whether strengthening democracy would in fact facilitate ASEAN's goal of becoming an integrated political, economic and security community. Rather than enhancing an integrated community, democratization would arguably create a faultline between the more politically mature and economically developed states and a northern tier of less developed, authoritarian single‐party dominant regimes in South‐East Asia. Moreover, given China's emerging political and economic importance to the region, such a strategy would, as if by an invisible hand, draw the more authoritarian ASEAN states into China's less than democratic embrace. This article concludes that rather than strengthening democracy, ASEAN's charter needs urgently to reinforce practices of rule governance and mechanisms of market integration to enhance both ASEAN's economic profile as well as the region's autonomy.     

Power Shifts in the European Union? The Case of Spatial Planning

This paper seeks to describe power shifts in the European Union's multi-level system of governance in the area of spatial planning. It begins by investigating, through the economic theory of federalism, the increasing 'Europeanization' of member states' policies that produces asymmetrical power shifts towards the European Union. It draws from German, Spanish and British case studies which confirm such shifts to the European Union level as well as to sub-national levels of government, although there is a tendency for competences to be shared between the European Union, national governments of the member states and sub-national authorities.     

Benevolent hegemon,neighborhood bully,or regional security provider? Russia’s efforts to promote regional integration after the 2013–2014 Ukraine crisis

Russia has tried to use economic incentives and shared historical and cultural legacies to entice post-Soviet states to join its regional integration efforts. The Ukraine crisis exposed the weaknesses of this strategy, forcing Russia to fall back on coercive means to keep Kiev from moving closer to the West. Having realized the limits of its economic and soft power, will Russia now try to coerce post-Soviet states back into its sphere of influence? Fears of such an outcome overestimate Russia’s ability to use coercion and underestimate post-Soviet states capacity to resist. Rather than emerging as a regional bully, Russia is trying to push Eurasian integration forward by becoming a regional security provider. The article relates these efforts to the larger literature on regional integration and security hierarchies – bridging the two bodies of theory by arguing that regional leaders can use the provision of security to promote economic integration. Despite initial signs of success, we believe that the new strategy will ultimately fail. Eurasian integration will continue to stagnate as long as Russia’s economic and soft power remain weak because Russia will be unable to address the economic and social problems that are at the root of the region’s security problems.     

No and after: options for Europe

The French and Dutch ‘no’ votes in referendums on the European Union Constitutional Treaty have thrown the EU into turmoil. The messages from both referendums are that public dissatisfaction with European integration is widespread and there is a disjuncture between the views of citizens and those of elites. The original purpose of the process that produced the Constitutional Treaty was to bring the EU closer to its citizens. However, the text that was negotiated was an unwieldy document intended to satisfy diverse requirements but difficult to explain concisely. After the completion of negotiations some governments, for reasons of political expediency, took decisions to hold referendums on the treaty, but the future of The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe that took three years to complete is now uncertain. Furthermore, member states are divided about whether to press ahead with ratification after the two recent ‘no’ votes. What is the range of alternatives to member states if they wish to salvage the treaty or component parts? Finding a way through this current situation is the task the British government faces as it takes on the EU presidency from 1 July 2005.     

A common European foreign policy after Iraq?

Taking as read the wide range of other instruments that the EU has for international influence (enlargement, aid, trade, association and other arrangements, etc.), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), under pressure from the Kosovo conflict, has been shaped by two important decisions in 1999: the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to give the EU a military capability when NATO as a whole is not engaged, and the appointment as the new High Representative for the CFSP of a high-profile international statesman rather than a senior civil servant.
A major European effort will still be needed if Europe is to be effective militarily, whether in the EU/ESDP or NATO framework. The management of the CFSP has been held back by the doctrine of the equality of all member states regardless of their actual contribution. This in turn leads to a disconnect between theory (policy run by committee in Brussels) and practice (policy run by the High Representative working with particular member states and other actors, notably the US). It has been difficult for Javier Solana to develop the authority to do this, not in competition with the Commission as so widely and mistakenly believed, as with member states themselves, and particularly successive rotating presidencies. It is important that misdiagnosis does not lead to politically correct solutions that end up with the cure worse than the disease. Ways need to be found to assure to the High Representative the authority to work with third countries and with the member states making the real contribution, while retaining the support of all. Then, with its own military capability, the EU can have a CFSP that is the highest common factor rather than the lowest common denominator, with member states ready to attach enough priority to the need for common policies to give Europeans a strong influence in the big foreign policy issues of the day.     

Aid for trade and ecologically sustainable development in Australia’s international aid program

In September 2015, Australia, along with 193 member states of the United Nations, signed the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The facilitation of international trade and increasing foreign aid for developing countries were emphasised as crucial means for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. An important role was assigned to the international Aid for Trade initiative, which is about stimulating economic growth in developing countries through removing constraints to trade. Australia has been a strong supporter of the Aid for Trade initiative since it was launched at the World Trade Organization’s Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 2005. Aid for trade has become a central plank of the ‘new development paradigm’ of Australia’s international aid program. This article analyses the conceptualisation and practice of aid for trade in Australia’s aid, with a focus on how it links to ecologically sustainable development. It argues that Australia’s aid for trade is reinforcing the neo-liberal development paradigm in which environmental dimensions are overall neglected and private sector development and free trade are prioritised. In order to achieve international and national development goals of poverty reduction and sustainable development, environmental sustainability needs to be fully integrated into the growing aid for trade portfolio of Australia’s international aid.     

From crisis to catharsis: ESDP after Iraq

For many observers, the Iraq crisis spelled the end for EU ambitions in the defence sphere. The profound public and bitter divisions that emerged were seen as illustrative of the insuperable problems confronting ESDP. This article argues, however, that the reverse is in fact the case. Far from sounding the death knell for ESDP, the crisis has had a cathartic effect in compelling the member states to face up to and resolve the major ambiguities that had always threatened to undermine EU defence policies. Consequently, these member states have, in the months following the war, laid the basis not only for a more modest but also for a more effective ESDP.     

UK cyber security and critical national infrastructure protection

This article is intended to aid the UK government in protecting the UK from cyber attacks on its Critical National Infrastructure. With a National Cyber Security Centre now being established and an updated National Cyber Security Strategy due in 2016, it is vital for the UK government to take the right approach. This article seeks to inform this approach by outlining the scope of the problems Britain faces and what action the UK government is taking to combat these threats. In doing so, it offers a series of recommendations designed to further help mitigate these threats, drive up cyber resiliency and aid recovery plans should they be required. It argues that complete engagement and partnership with private sector owner–operators of Critical National Infrastructure are vital to the success of the government's National Cyber Security Strategy. It makes the case that for cyber resiliency to be fully effective, action is needed at national and global levels requiring states and private industry better to comprehend the threat environment and the risks facing Critical National Infrastructure from cyber attacks and those responsible for them. These are problems for all developed and developing states.     

The quest for good government and development in Africa: is NEPAD the answer?

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) states that democracy and good governance are preconditions for development. Given the fact that Black Africa is currently suffering widespread economic crisis and political disorder, how probable is it that electoral politics as it has been instituted over the last decade will lead to good government—which all, inside and outside Africa, now claim is the basis for sustainable economic growth? On the face of it, the argument is simple: democracy should reduce the scope for conflict and make good government more likely. In turn, good government should bring about the political stability, the institutional consolidation and the operation of the rule of law that are universally seen as the necessary framework for investment. Greater investment should facilitate economic growth. Growth provides the foundations for development. This article investigates the extent to which the political changes that have occurred in the last decade have made the possibility of good government and development more likely in Africa. It offers an analysis of why it is that the nature of politics in Africa today makes good government difficult and reconsiders the changes that have taken place in the exercise of power over the recent past.