1949～1959年美国《纽约时报》涉藏报道初探

1949～1959年,美国《纽约时报》对西藏进行了多篇报道。在对华遏制的冷战语境下,其涉藏报道带有鲜明的意识形态色彩。从西藏和平解放到1959年西藏叛乱,《纽约时报》涉藏报道的基调是以负面消息为主,丑化中央人民政府在西藏的形象,其中相关社论还对西藏事务进行舆论干涉,不但歪曲了中国的西藏政策和西藏的本来面目,也在一定程度上误导了西方公众对西藏的认知。     

美国国会“涉藏立法”的历史考察

近二十年来,美国国会通过立法活动提出并通过了一系列干涉中国西藏事务的"涉藏议案"。其主要内容包括:要求美国政府将对华政策与"西藏问题"挂钩;以"西藏人权"为借口干涉西藏事务;为"藏独"势力提供援助,等等。作为美国对华人权外交的组成部分,这些"涉藏议案"对中美关系产生了不容忽视的负面影响,不仅使美国对中国所谓侵犯"西藏人权"问题的干涉长期存在,而且也在很大程度上助长了西藏分裂势力在国外的分裂活动。     

西藏和平解放前后《纽约时报》对中国西藏的报道探析

在西藏和平解放前后大约两年的时间里,美国《纽约时报》对中国西藏的报道主要包括西藏和平解放的进程、西藏分裂势力的相关活动、联合国如何插手西藏事务、美国关于西藏政策的变化以及印度、苏联的态度等内容。认真梳理《纽约时报》对中国西藏的报道,可以看出冷战思维及西藏的地缘战略重要性是美国关注西藏局势发展的重要考量因素。这一时期美国主流媒体对中国西藏报道内容的选择凸显了美国政府的政治取向,充满了冷战色彩,报道反映了冷战时期美国西藏政策的历史性交化和美国对印度政策的具体行动目的,严重混淆了国际视听。     

1927-1937年国民政府的对藏政策及接管措施

抗战前十年是国民政府对藏政策的形成时期。国民政府一直以国家统一问题和边疆问题取代西藏的民族问题,并打下了传统治边政策的烙印。国民政府力图通过使西藏与内地在各方面融为一体的办法来接管西藏。在内忧外患的形势下,国民政府的对藏政策和措施只起到了避免西藏局势更加恶化的作用。     

英印私相授受侵藏权益与国民政府的处置

1947年印度独立前后,英印私相授受侵藏权益,严重危害了中国的国家主权与领土完整.国民政府曾以1943年《中英新约》签订为契机,设法解决英国侵藏过程中攫取的权益问题,此时又打算利用印度独立之机与印度签订友好条约,解决西藏问题,并对英印私相授受进行交涉与抗议.但是,由于国民党忙于内战,再加上一系列其他原因,国民政府没有能够解决英印间私相授受侵藏权益的问题.     

美国对印度第一个五年国防计划的援助和限制(1962—1965)北大核心

1962年中印边界发生冲突,为美国与印度形成遏制中国的战略共识及较为密切的军事关系提供了契机。印度尼赫鲁政府对国防政策进行全面反思与整顿,制定出以中国为主要军事防范对象的长期国防计划,并寻求美国和苏联等大国对其国防建设的支持。出于拉拢印度、遏制中国的冷战目标,约翰逊政府延续肯尼迪时期的基本政策,继续向印度提供较大规模的军事援助,不仅以此为筹码要求印度修改国防计划,而且试图索要更多的政治回报。围绕对“中国威胁”的判断和应对方式、国防建设的目标和手段等诸多核心问题,美印存在明显分歧。这些分歧反映的是美国在亚洲遏制中国的冷战目标与印度加快军事现代化进程的国家利益之间的抵牾,决定了美印关系发展的限度。无论是冷战时期还是今天,遏制中国的战略共识虽然能促成美印关系迅速升温,但不足以弥合二者国家利益的根本差异。     

1949年尼赫鲁访美的背景及失败原因

1949年尼赫鲁访问美国,是在印度经济发展需要向美国寻求援助和冷战向远东扩展的背景下进行的.但是,尼赫鲁此次美国之行并未获得成功.失败的原因在于首先,美印双方均误读了对方的政策.尼赫鲁拒绝放弃中立主义政策,不愿以公开加入西方冷战集团为代价换取美国的经济援助,而美国则自信可以经济手段达到其政治目的.其次,美国对其南亚政策的改变受制于南亚地区的权势分布结构,即敌对的印巴两国间的力量失衡,这决定了美国在印巴两国间不能有所偏颇.因此,美国学者所谓的美国得到印度的"机会"并不存在,"丢失"印度之说更无从谈起.     

《艾登备忘录》与二战末期英国对藏政策

《艾登备忘录》是英国政府1943年制定的对藏政策。其内容延续了英国一贯主张的“宗主权”理论,并以“西藏自治”来要挟中国政府。古德使团依照此政策在拉萨鼓动西藏自治之后,英国外交部又决定反思其西藏政策,但遭到印度政府和印度事务部的反对。从总体来看,无论《艾登备忘录》的提出,还是英国对藏政策的波动,都是出于英国对华总政策的需要。     

1949年尼赫鲁访美的背景及失败原因

194 9年尼赫鲁访问美国 ,是在印度经济发展需要向美国寻求援助和冷战向远东扩展的背景下进行的。但是 ,尼赫鲁此次美国之行并未获得成功。失败的原因在于 :首先 ,美印双方均误读了对方的政策。尼赫鲁拒绝放弃中立主义政策 ,不愿以公开加入西方冷战集团为代价换取美国的经济援助 ,而美国则自信可以经济手段达到其政治目的。其次 ,美国对其南亚政策的改变受制于南亚地区的权势分布结构 ,即敌对的印巴两国间的力量失衡 ,这决定了美国在印巴两国间不能有所偏颇。因此 ,美国学者所谓的美国得到印度的“机会”并不存在 ,“丢失”印度之说更无从谈起     

中印关系的发展历程及前景展望

1950年4月1日中国与印度建立了外交关系。1954年两国共同倡导了和平共处五项原则。20世纪50年代末,由于印度在西藏问题上的错误立场和政策,导致中印关系由热变冷。60年代,印度坚持以非法的麦克马洪线为边界,并在军事上推行     

达旺历史归属论

文章认为,门隅地方古代史是我国西藏地方史的一个组成部分,在与西藏地方史一道融入中华民族整体发展史的进程之中,达旺成为门隅政治、宗教、文化中心.英国入主阿萨姆后在相当长时期内沿袭了沿喜马拉雅山南侧坡脚的传统习惯线.1910年英属印度提出战略边界计划,谋图将传统边界线北移至山脊,目的在于建立封锁印度民族解放运动的防火墙.英国对战略边界在达旺地区的走向多次修改,但根本目的没有改变,是在不同形势下出于维护对印度殖民统治需要而做出的扩展或收缩的调整,战略边界计划及有关活动是英国单方面作为.直至1951年中国西藏地方政府仍然对达旺进行有效治理.     

George W. Bush,Barack Obama and the future of US global leadership

The foreign policy world views of George W. Bush and Barack Obama differ dramatically. Bush made terrorism the focal point of his foreign policy and dismissed the idea that either allies or international institutions should constrain America's freedom of action. Obama sees terrorism as one of many transnational problems that require the cooperation of other countries to combat and, as a result, the United States must invest more in diplomatic efforts to build partnerships. Despite these differences, both presidents share one common conviction: that other countries long for US leadership. Bush believed that friends and allies would eventually rally to the side of the United States, even if they bristled at its actions, because they shared America's goals and had faith in its motives. Obama believed that a United States that listened more to others, stressed common interests and favored multinational action would command followers. In practice, however, both visions of American global leadership faltered. Bush discovered that many countries rejected his style of leadership as well as his strategies. Obama discovered that in a globalized world, where power has been more widely dispersed, many countries are not looking to Washington for direction. The future success of US foreign policy depends on the ability of policy‐makers to recognize and adapt to a changing geopolitical environment in which the US remains the most significant military, diplomatic and economic power but finds it, nonetheless, increasingly difficult to drive the global agenda.     

India's ‘non‐alignment’ conundrum: a twentieth‐century policy in a changing world

The idea of non‐alignment has remained a central component of Indian identity in global politics that is manifest in continuities: since independence in 1947 India has been in pursuit of strategic autonomy, a quest that in practice has led to semi‐alliances fashioned under the cover of non‐alignment and shaped by regional dynamics. In this setting, the rise of China now raises an interesting conundrum for Indian policy‐makers as New Delhi seeks to balance the benefits and risks of an increasingly assertive neighbour and a network of alliances with like‐minded countries. This article approaches this enigma by delineating continuities of non‐alignment from the early roots of the policy, through the Cold War‐era and into the modern‐day international system. Though domestic factors have had a significant influence on the trajectory of Indian foreign policy, the continuities of non‐alignment have prevailed through changes in leadership and domestic vicissitudes. By exploring the foundation of non‐alignment and how India has operationalized the policy, this article maintains that to some extent continuity will persist: India will likely continue its rhetoric in favour of strategic autonomy while moving closer to the West and its allies in practice. Yet in order to effectively balance China's growing influence, India will need to be more assertive in building these alliances, as the success of its modern‐day pursuit of strategic autonomy may well rest on a strong foundation of strategic partnerships. The coming to office in May 2014 of the National Democratic Alliance government led by Narendra Modi has signalled a move away from even the rhetoric of non‐alignment, with significant implications for the future of Indian foreign policy.     

The fateful Indian recognition of West Germany, 1949

India’s recognition of West, but not East, Germany was the foundation of an inconsistent policy on Germany from India and many other non-aligned countries. It was the outcome of a lack of professionalism, indecisiveness, the pragmatic considerations of a junior Indian diplomat in Berlin, and the laconic approval of the anti-communist secretary-general of the Ministry of External Affairs, Girja Shankar Bajpai. Neither Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru nor his advisor V.K. Krishnan Menon were involved at all. Officials around Foreign Secretary K.P.S. Menon held that the GDR should also be recognised in due course, but did not exercise sufficient influence. India would stand by its decision for 23 years and thereby set an example for other non-aligned countries.     

China’s Evolving Policy towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under Xi Jinping

Despite international pressure to condemn North Korea (DPRK), China’s successive leaderships have dealt carefully with Pyongyang, especially vis-à-vis its nuclear weapons program. This moderate stance reflects the two countries’ decades-long relationship, summarised in the Chinese idiom that Pyongyang and Beijing are “as close as lips and teeth”. Nevertheless, the DPRK’s third nuclear test in February 2013 raised enormous challenges for the new Xi Jinping leadership to maintain the previous DPRK policy focused on the status quo and stability on the Korean Peninsula. China’s attitudes and policies towards the DPRK after the provocative third test signified a possible reorientation of Beijing’s DPRK policy. This generated repercussions in the countries concerned and prompted debates among experts. This article asks how these events should be understood and what their implications are for the Xi leadership’s policy on the DPRK, the stability of the Korean Peninsula, and Northeast Asia. Given China’s competitive relations with other major powers, we conclude that the Xi leadership will not abandon the DPRK; indeed it will reinforce the policy of strengthening China’s influence over it. Nonetheless one aspect of doing so will involve China opening up to other – cooperative, multilateral – approaches to reinforcing stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.     

20世纪40-50年代美国对中国西藏政策的历史演变

The U.S. policy toward Tibet has always changed in accordance with the U.S. international strategy and the U.S. foreign policy toward China. Before the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, the U.S. admitted Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. During the Cold War, due to its anti-communism strategy, the U.S. began to consider recognizing the independence claim of Tibetan separatists, especially after 1959, when the Dalai Lama was exiled abroad. However, the U.S. government has not openly admitted Tibet is an independent country, because, in the light of the historical development of Tibet within China, claims of independence cannot be substantiated and therefore Tibetan separatism cannot win the recognition or support of the majority of countries in the world.     

The Long Goodbye: British Agency in the Creation of Navies for India and Pakistan

The armed forces of India and Pakistan draw legacies from a common British imperial past. British influence persisted in the navies that emerged from independence and partition on the South Asia subcontinent. Complaints over treatment and other grievances in the colonial Royal Indian Navy underscored a major mutiny in February 1946, prior to division of warships, shore-based establishments and personnel between the two countries. The transformation into truly national navies was long and involved, buttressed by continued reliance on British professional expertise and arms transfers. While the Admiralty offered warships on the basis of association with the commonwealth and defence cooperation in the Indian Ocean, navies in India and Pakistan led by senior British officers pursued distinct agendas and force structures that more and more looked towards potential war against each other. Louis Mountbatten, the last British viceroy, intervened often in naval matters before and after partition, encouraging Indians and Pakistanis to build up naval forces suited to national needs as well as serving British interests and imperial defence commitments during the early Cold War. Continued British presence impaired full nationalisation and the assumption of higher leadership roles by qualified indigenous naval officers in the newly independent commonwealth nations.     

海外印度移民及印度政府的侨务政策

作为人口大国之一 ,印度与中国一样 ,有着庞大的海外移民群体及其后裔。目前 ,海外印度人已超过二千万人 ,分布在 1 1 0个国家和地区。上世纪 90年代以来 ,随着海外印度人对所在国和印度影响的增强 ,海外印度人在印度及海外都引起了比以前更多的关注。印度政府采取了一系列措施 ,以吸引更多的海外印度人投身印度国内的经济建设 ,为印度的发展作贡献。本文概述海外印度移民的基本情况 ,分析海外印度人与印度的联系及对印度的影响以及印度政府对海外移民的政策 ,希望从中能得到某些启示 ,从而对中国的侨务政策提供某些参考和借鉴。     

周恩来赴印度三次规劝十四世达赖喇嘛

西藏和平解放后,1956年4月成立了西藏自治区筹备委员会,着手进行民主改革。西藏上层分裂分子大为恐惧,在西康地区发动武装叛乱。1956年11月,印度邀请十四世达赖喇嘛参加释迦牟尼涅槃2500周年大会。国外敌对势力和流亡的西藏上层分裂分子包围达赖,鼓动"西藏独立",策反随行官员,致使达赖和随行官员思想混乱并滞留印度。1956年底,周恩来在访问印度期间与达赖进行了三次谈话,阐明了党的方针政策,教育随行官员和达赖的家人,争取印度总理尼赫鲁的支持,为达赖最终安全返回西藏起到了关键作用。     

毛泽东关于西藏民主改革的认识与决策

西藏民主改革是西藏在和平解放的基础上由封建农奴制到人民民主的历史性变革和发展,是西藏完成反帝反封建的民主革命任务的里程碑。这是在以毛泽东为核心的中共中央第一代领导集体根据西藏和平解放后不同阶段的实际,正确认识和处理西藏民主改革的历史必然性与社会基础、时机与条件、策略与步骤以及性质与前途等问题,并依此相应地作出和平协商、"六年不改"、赎买和"稳定发展"等方针政策的指导下开展和实现的。正是在这一历史进程中,西藏由和平解放、筹备成立自治区至民主改革,跨越几个世纪而成为人民民主的西藏。