Fiscal Federalism and Social Well–Being in Australia

Australia’s federal system is characterised by both vertical and horizontal financial imbalance. This is overcome by Commonwealth-state transfer payments. The nature of such transfers has changed over time as attempts have been made to redefine fiscal federalism. Currently, the budgetary position of the states, notions of co-operative federalism, and pleas for micro-economic reform are altering the nature of government activity as more and more is left to market forces. Patterns of social well-being are changing and increased inter-regional differences are evident. The current system of transfer payments can cope with this but detailed monitoring of social well-being is needed as is debate over the meaning of equity in the Australian federal system.     

Trumping foreign policy: public diplomacy,framing, and public opinion among middle power publics

Even as the world’s sole superpower, the United States requires the cooperation of other states to achieve many of its foreign policy objectives. The President of the United States thus often serves as ‘Diplomat in Chief’ in public diplomacy efforts to appeal directly to publics abroad. Given Donald Trump’s antagonistic approach to foreign relations and widespread lack of popularity, what are the implications for support for US policy among publics abroad – particularly among middle power states allied to the US? While previous research on public opinion relying on observational data has found that confidence in the US President is linked to support for American foreign policy goals, the mechanisms at work remain unclear. Using original data from survey-based experiments conducted in Canada and Australia, this article seeks to clarify the effect of ‘presidential framing’ (presenting a policy goal as endorsed or not endorsed by Trump) on attitudes toward key policy issues in the Canada–US and Australia–US relationships. Results point to a negative ‘Trump framing’ effect in Canadians’ and Australians’ trade policy attitudes, but such an effect is not observed in other policy domains (energy policy in Canada, and refugee policy in Australia).     

Terrorism in the South Pacific? Thinking critically about approaches to security in the region

‘Not only is the Pacific a potential base for terrorist activities, but if we are not vigilant this is exactly what will happen’. This is the impression one gets from much of the recent academic and policy literature in Australia and New Zealand. However, while there is a need for Pacific Island states to be able to counter terrorist threats, there are very real problems which may result from recent moves to portray the South Pacific as a possible terrorist haven. In addressing issues such as the possible ‘over-securitisation’ of the region, in this article we argue that contemporary threat perceptions must be balanced with constant reassessments of the positive and negative ramifications of painting the region in this light. All local authorities must emphasise a law enforcement approach to countering terrorism. Most emphatically, however, cooperation with (not coercion against) other countries must remain the paramount consideration in any and every effort to combat this phenomenon within the region.     

Re-examining the Australian public's attitude to military casualties: post-heroic or defeat-phobic?

Australia, like most other developed democracies, is often alleged to suffer from ‘casualty phobia’. The perception that the Australian public will not tolerate casualties in foreign conflicts has shaped the decisions of both civilian and military policy makers. Measures taken to protect Australian forces from casualties may, for instance, also serve to increase the risk to civilians in the country to which they are deployed. The USA underwent a similar debate some years ago. Innovative public opinion research techniques—especially ‘survey experiments’ which allow researchers to establish causal relationships by consciously manipulating one variable while holding others constant—have established that the American public are not reflexively casualty-phobic and that the impact of casualties on public opinion can be outweighed by other factors, such as the public's confidence in the mission's overall success. In this article, the author replicates one of the key survey experiments from the US debate, suitably adapted to Australian conditions, with a nationally representative sample of Australian voters. The author finds that the same pattern holds in Australia as in the USA: casualties do lower public support for a given mission, but the mission's chances of success matter more.     

Invasion by invitation: the role of alliances in the Asia-Pacific

Alliances continue to occupy a prominent place in the Asia-Pacific's security architecture. For many regional states such as Australia and Japan, their respective alliances with the USA are the unchallenged foundations of their security. But when the rise of China is causing major change in the region, and when many countries are increasingly reliant on China economically, is the region's network of alliances any longer appropriate or useful? This article reviews alliances in theory and practice, and argues that, while alliances are unlikely to disappear, their utility is nothing like as clear-cut as many of their supporters would have one believe.     

Throwing the Baby Out with the Bathwater: Australia’s New Policy on Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration and its Impact in Asia

Abstract

Treaties allowing investors to initiate arbitration claims directly against host states for illegally interfering with cross-border investments are becoming increasingly common in Asia, but Australia announced in 2011 that it will no longer include such protections in future treaties. The backdrop to this decision includes keen interest from Asia in foreign direct investment (FDI) into Australia’s resources sector, meaning that potential investors may not be significantly deterred by a lack of arbitration provisions in future treaties. This article argues, however, that Australia’s policy shift risks undermining the entire investor-state arbitration (ISA) system, with the earliest impact being felt by major pending treaty negotiations by Australia with Japan, China and Korea (respectively); and that the shift may significantly reduce FDI flows or have other adverse effects. The article criticises the cost-benefit analysis of ISA protections in one pivotal study conducted in 2010 by an Australian Government think-tank, arguing that this assessment is insufficiently nuanced. Instead, the article presents a justification for more tailored and moderate changes to ISA provisions in future treaties. Its tentative interest-group analysis suggests, however, that there may be surprisingly few public or private constituencies that would prefer such moderate reforms, and that most may well prefer the more extreme position recently adopted by Australia, despite the damage that will be done to the ISA system as a whole. The article also argues that Australia’s policy shift and think-tank analysis may make Asian countries more cautious about ISA, especially those (like the Philippines and Vietnam) which have traditionally been more cautious about this dispute resolution system.     

The Development of Environmental Administration in Queensland and Western Australia: Why are they Different?

Western Australia and Queensland are often seen as the most developmentalist states in the Australian federation, largely because they remained less developed for longer and have seen much mineral and agricultural development in the latter part of the twentieth century. Developmentalism is usually seen as anathema to a commitment to environmental policy, which most states have taken on in response to environmentalism in the same period, yet these two developmentalist states exhibit markedly different trajectories in response to this environmentalist stimulus. This paper explores the reasons for these differences, finding a variety of causal factors including both socioeconomic influences (such as affluence and demographics), political structures, and personalities and the force of ideas. It suggests that we should be wary of monocausal explanations of such differences.     

The Use of Armed Forces in Law Enforcement: Legal,Constitutional and Political Issues in Australia

In Western democracies armed forces perform a variety of internal functions. This paper examines the principles and issues relating to the use of the Australian Defence Force in the enforcement of law against individual citizens and aliens. This function is normally the responsibility of the police but there are pressures in Australia and overseas for the wider use of armed forces in this field. Traditional restraints on the employment of armed forces in this capacity date back to parliamentary resistance to the power of the Crown. Several barriers, constitutional, legal and institutional, have developed to ensure that the executive cannot easily abuse its necessary control over the armed forces in a way that endangers civil liberties. While there is no serious danger of such abuse at present, several issues need to be monitored.     

The new resource politics: can Australia and South Africa accommodate China?

The material transformation of the Chinese economy is forcing a concomitant process of political adjustment—and not just in China. Other states are being forced to accommodate the ‘rise of China’. In this context, this article first presents a comparative analysis of China's impact on two countries, Australia and South Africa, which have little in common other than a wealth of natural resources and a possible status as middle powers; this is a particularly useful exercise because these states are geographically distant and have very different political structures and general developmental histories. Second, the authors consider how China's bilateral ties look from a Chinese perspective in these two very different relationships. Such an analysis serves as a reminder that resource dependency is a two‐way street. The article argues that underlying material realities are constraining and to some extent determining the domestic and foreign policies of three very different states that otherwise have little in common.     

Enhanced European Union–Australia security cooperation through crisis management

ABSTRACT

Since January 2003, the European Union (EU) has launched over 30 civilian and military crisis management missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy. These missions have involved the participation of both EU member states and third states. In order to help facilitate the participation of third states in these missions, the EU established the Framework Partnership Agreements on crisis management, setting out the legal framework for third-state participation. In April 2015, Australia became the seventeenth country to sign such an agreement with the EU. This agreement reflects both the common interest and values shared by Australia and the EU and the extent to which EU–Australia relations have evolved and deepened over the years. In addition, the increased engagement and socialisation of Australian military and civilian personnel with individual EU member states through their participation in such operations as the International Security Assistance Force operation in Afghanistan, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Combined Maritime Force have further facilitated opportunities for security cooperation at the EU level. Shared concerns and interests on counterterrorism, counter-piracy, instability and capacity-building have also opened up opportunities for increased cooperation between the EU and Australia. This article assesses the significance of the Framework Partnership Agreements on crisis management for EU–Australia relations within the area of security cooperation, and examines future prospects for cooperation.     

Attitudes Towards Divided Government and Ticket-splitting in Australia and the United States

Divided party government has become a frequent occurrence in both the United States and Australia in recent years. In the United States, Morris Fiorina has argued that this result is intentional on the part of the voters, who do not fully trust either party to govern by itself. We test this theory in both the United States and Australia by comparing the voting patterns of those who prefer divided versus united party government. It is hypothesised that Fiorina's theory will actually work better in Australia than in the United States, due to the presence of a strong party system as well as a voting system for the Australian Senate that facilitates strategic voting on behalf of small parties. Indeed, near-identical logistic regression models demonstrate that Australians' attitudes about divided government are a very significant predictor of straight-ticket voting even when a host of other factors is controlled for, whereas in the United States such attitudes are insignificant.     

The Indigenous Challenge to Westphalian Sovereignty

Indigenous peoples achieved a diplomatic success in 2007 when the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly endorsed the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This paper analyses why this occurred, and assesses what the Declaration means for state sovereignty. It highlights two reasons why the Global Indigenous Caucus gained widespread endorsement for a Declaration that strongly affirms Indigenous self-determination. First, as a transnational advocacy network the Caucus used a boomerang pattern of lobbying, by engaging the support of powerful allies. Second, the Caucus understood that the concerns of African states about territorial integrity differed from the concerns of states like Australia about external scrutiny of human rights. The Declaration enhances the likelihood of such scrutiny without threatening the territorial integrity of states.     

The national security implications of solar geoengineering: an Australian perspective

ABSTRACT

Given current emissions trends an increase in global temperatures in excess of 2°C is highly likely in the coming century. In this context, it seems increasingly probable that states may consider solar geoengineering as a stop-gap climate response. Solar geoengineering refers to measures that aim to alleviate some measure of global warming by intentionally increasing the amount of the sun’s energy that is reflected into space. Currently the two most discussed solar geoengineering techniques involve either marine cloud brightening or dispersing aerosols in the stratosphere. These techniques could be relatively inexpensive, are within the technological capacities (after a brief period of development) of technologically-advanced countries, and could have an almost immediate impact on temperatures. Yet, while solar geoengineering might potentially be utilised to manage some climate-linked security threats, it itself would create new security challenges. Consequently, this paper explores potential international security implications for Australia if a regional state, or group of states, initiates a solar geoengineering program. We conclude that since solar geoengineering is unlikely to become a first-order international issue, disputation over solar geoengineering will likely reflect, or act as a proxy for, wider patterns of state interaction. However, scenarios in which China and the United States take different positions, or in which there are divisions among regional powers, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, India and Singapore would pose the greatest threat to Australia’s national security.     

Illegal fishing and Australian security

The security impact of illegal fishing is not well understood. Where illegal fishing is recognised as a security problem, the focus has been on fish as a natural resource, the depletion of which can have impacts on food security, individual livelihoods, and the economic survival of states relying on illegal fishing. We argue that a focus on fish as a natural resource obscures the other security challenges the crime of illegal fishing poses to Australia. As this paper explains, illegal fishing overlaps with drug, human, weapon and other contraband trafficking and smuggling; irregular maritime arrivals; and maritime piracy. In addition, like other easily transported, high value resources, illegal fish can fund insurgencies and other types of political violence. Understanding illegal fishing as a security challenge will improve Australia’s national security policy. First, it acknowledges fish as a vital natural resource, implicated in economic, ecological, and human security; second, it analyses how illegal fishing interlinks with other maritime crimes; third, it challenges the effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement of illegal fishing; fourth, it presents an opportunity for effective regional cooperation; and finally it highlights the benefits of regional cooperation in responding to illegal fishing.     

Australia’s submarine technology cooperation with Japan as burden-sharing with the USA in the Asia-Pacific

Australia, Japan and the USA are all facing dual pressures that require them to do more with less. Internationally, they deal with the challenge of managing China’s rapid rise. However, domestically, they must cut government spending and reduce government debt. With internal balancing effectively ruled out as a long-term solution, the three states are seeking ways to optimise external balancing, or cooperation with like-minded states. This article focuses on Australian motivations regarding the recent proposal for submarine cooperation with Japan, and places it in the context of longer trends that poise the USA, Australia and Japan for even greater trilateralism in the future. Australia’s proposal to buy submarines from Japan, should it go through, would cement Australia and Japan’s fledgling security relationship in steel and coin. For Australia, it would help it to overcome its undersea capability gap, and Japan could set a precedent to re-enter the global weapons market if all goes well. Furthermore, Australia can use defence-technology cooperation with Japan to signal to the USA the seriousness of its commitment to burden-share in pursuit of regional security and determination to politically support the USA’s ‘Pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific. However, domestic politics have begun to play an important role in Australia, with a ‘spill’ motion against Prime Minister Tony Abbott barely overcome by a backroom deal with the opposition to build the submarines domestically, and this is an important development to keep an eye on.     

Bonded but not embedded: trust in Australia-Indonesia relations,Keating & Suharto to Turnbull & Jokowi

The aim of this article is to use theories of bonded and embedded trust to explain the ‘roller-coaster’ nature of the Australia-Indonesia relationship. An examination of Prime Minister Keating and President Suharto as a case of bonded trust between leaders reveals the value such a relationship has in building trust in bilateral relations. However, it also reveals that such trust cannot survive changes in leadership if it has not become more broadly embedded in both government and society. This is particularly problematic given Australia’s tendency for rapid leadership and ministerial turnover across the past decade. While President Joko Widodo and Prime Minister Turnbull were able to develop a warm relationship which helped to reset the relationship and enabled them to navigate diplomatic incidents, Malcolm Turnbull’s recent political demise only serves to further highlight the necessity of building trust between societies. Without trust, cooperation between the two states will be limited. Building trust between societies will be required if Australia wants to develop a trusting relationship with Indonesia capable of undertaking deeper forms of cooperation on more sensitive issues – something which will be fundamental to Australia’s ability to navigate growing strategic uncertainty in the region.     

‘Australia in this Matter is under Some Scrutiny’: Early Australian Initiatives to the Rhodesian Problem, 1961–64

Abstract

Australia’s attitude towards the problem of Rhodesian independence in the early 1960s has been largely ignored by the literature on the subject. Not unnaturally, the focus of recent research and scholarship has been Australia’s response to Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965 and the absence of any appetite for sanctions against the white minority regime. This lack of enthusiasm is often interpreted as symptomatic of an abiding sympathy not only for ‘kith and kin’ but also for Rhodesia’s white supremacist policies, which are invariably conflated with Australia’s own racially discriminatory practices. While senior Australian policymakers were uncomfortable with the notion of alienating people with whom they shared traditional political, economic and sentimental ties, they showed no support for the perpetual domination of the African population by Europeans, and indeed, accepted both the desirability and inevitability of black majority government. With this in mind, they worked hard to contribute to a genuine solution to the Rhodesian problem in the early 1960s and were deeply critical of Britain for refusing to adopt positive action. Although Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies continued to struggle with these competing forces, he too recognised the irresistible nature of black rule and acted accordingly.     

Mining,morality and the obligations of fossil fuel exporting countries

In this article I argue that countries exporting fossil fuels, such as Australia, have an obligation to bear some of the costs of the harms caused by the use of those fuels. I argue that there is an analogy between other harmful exports – medical waste, tobacco, unsafe jobs, uranium – and fossil fuels. If this is the case, then current methods for allocating emissions and responsibilities for their harms are inadequate and more complex than they appear. I consider several counter-arguments to this claim, such as that it does not recognise the benefits of coal and that exporters are not really responsible. Finally, I consider some of the consequences of this argument and claim that Australia and other fossil fuel exporters ought to have a higher ‘carbon budget’ if this argument is true and that exporters ought to bear a higher share of the costs of climate harms.     

Estimating Historical Total Fertility Rates for Australia and Its States

Abstract.

Australian Bureau of Statistics Total Fertility Rate (TFR) statistics are available from 1921 for Australia, and for census years between 1947 and 1966 for the states, and then on an annual basis from 1971. Using historical, statistical publications, annual TFRs for Australia and the states dating back to federation in 1901 were calculated directly in years where data are available and estimated indirectly via the standardized fertility ratio in other years. For some periods where direct TFR estimation was applied, age-specific births used in the numerators of fertility rates must be estimated from partial data. Combined with Australian Bureau of Statistics data, the authors’ estimated TFRs contribute an uninterrupted time series of national and state TFRs for Australia from 1901 to 2011.