A nuclear North Korea and the stability of East Asia: a tsunami on the horizon?

This article aims to assess the strategic implications of North Korea's nuclear development. It calls into question the conventional wisdom that Pyongyang's atomic weapons will not only undermine the state of deterrence on the Korean peninsula, but also will trigger a nuclear domino effect throughout East Asia. A nuclear-armed North Korea, I argue, still cannot win a major victory over the South and the United States; Pyongyang's bombs somewhat decrease—rather than increase, as many believe—the risk of US preventive attack. And the regional US military presence as well as the available missile defence technology is sufficient to persuade Seoul and Tokyo not to pursue nuclear arsenals for the foreseeable future. While I reject the alarmist view, I find that North Korea's armament nevertheless carries two significant—albeit less grave—risks that have received little scholarly scrutiny. First, I argue that the risk of inadvertent war through pre-emption will increase with Pyongyang's armament. I also argue that the strengthening of US alliances in the region as well as the US development of a missile defence capability in response to the North Korean threat could exacerbate the security dilemmas among major powers. I conclude, however, that these potential dangers do not markedly threaten regional stability.     

Extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia: redundant or resurgent?

A number of commentators have claimed that the strategic relevance of extended nuclear deterrence is declining in the twenty‐first century. This claim is based on three key arguments. First, that the positive effects of extended nuclear deterrence have been exaggerated by its proponents; second, that the rational actor logic underpinning extended nuclear deterrence is increasingly redundant; and third, that extended deterrence using conventional weapons is equally, if not more, effective as extended nuclear deterrence. This article applies these arguments to East Asia, a region where nuclear weapons continue to loom large in states' security equations. In applying each of the above arguments to the East Asian context, the analysis finds that not only is extended nuclear deterrence alive and kicking in the region, but also that in the coming decades it is likely to become more central to the strategic policies of the United States and its key allies, Japan and South Korea. Despite predictions of its demise, US extended nuclear deterrence remains a critical element in East Asia's security order and will remain so for the foreseeable future.     

A good international citizen? Australia at the World Summit on Sustainable Development

Australia has often been identified as a middle power in foreign policy terms. This article assesses the worth of the concept in understanding the role of Australia in global environmental governance. Using a case study of the role played at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, it assesses whether Australia conformed to a classic middle power role, building coalitions as a ‘good international citizen’ or whether its role was more like a veto state, preventing positive change. This is done via a reflection of Australia's Summit priorities and an assessment of its impact over the Summit outcomes. The article shows that Australia was able to offer leadership in certain specific areas, but overall domestic policy preferences, a growing mistrust of multilateralism, and a strong defence of the national interest meant that Australia played the role of a veto state, often in coalition with the United States of America.     

‘The Claims of Asia and the Far East’: India and the FAO in the Age of Ambivalent Internationalism

If any nation were poised to actualize the developmental promises that the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) extended to the international community, it was India. India's independence came in the wake of devastating famine in Bengal and the fears of its recurrence, and the nationalists who had midwifed India's freedom staked their legitimacy to the promise of food for all. Yet from independence, the FAO played only a marginal role in India's agricultural development, its projects reflecting a winnowing scale of ambition. From early investigations into the improved cultivation of basic food grains, the FAO's projects grew increasingly modest by the time of the Green Revolution, revolving around modest improvements to capitalist agriculture, from wool shearing to timber and fishery development. Instead, India drew more substantively upon resources made available by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the United States Technical Cooperation Mission and occasional Soviet largesse. Meanwhile, the Indian most associated with the FAO, B.R. Sen (Director-General, 1956–1967), struggled to align the Organization's capacities with India's scarcity crises, even as his own understanding of famine drew upon his experience as India's Director of Food during the Bengal Famine.     

Commemoration in Australia: A memory orgy?

Australia's commemorations of the First World War have thus far been massive at both the government and local levels, reflecting and affirming the dominance of the memory of war and the ANZAC ‘legend’ in the national political culture. The commemorations in 2014–15 triggered some debate about the commodification of the memory of war and the possibility of commemoration fatigue, but the centenary of the key commemorative event, the landing at Gallipoli on 25 April, attracted large crowds and blanket media attention. Whether Australians of culturally diverse backgrounds engaged with these centenary commemorations, and how strongly they identify with the ANZAC legend as the dominant narrative of Australian nationalism, however, remains unclear.

澳大利亚对一战的纪念迄今在政府和地方层面都大张旗鼓,反映并肯定了在国家政治文化中战争记忆以及澳洲军团传说的岿然不移。2014-15年的纪念活动引发了关于战争记忆被商品化以及纪念疲劳症的辩论,虽然一些关键事件如4-25的加里波利登陆的百年纪念日吸引了大众以及媒体的关注。不过文化背景各色各样的澳大利亚人士是否都参与了这些百年庆典,他们在多大程度上将澳洲军团的传说当做澳大利亚民族主义的主流叙事,这些都不清楚。     

Has the Cold War returned to East Asia?

The rise of a non-democratic China as the world ‘s second largest economy, still officially subscribing to Communism or ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ as its ideology1^?1 In Xi Jinping's first speech as the new Chinese leader, after assuming his position as Party Secretary at the 18^th Party Congress in November 2012, he declared that, “we will ensure that our Party will remain at the core of leadership in advancing the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics”. Xinhua report on 19 November 2012. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012cpc/2012-11/19/content_15939817.htm. By adopting the term “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” – zhongguo tese de shehui zhuyi, the Chinese Communist Party has argued that it has not abandoned socialism by introducing foreign capital and the opening up the Chinese economy to market forces. See for example a report on Deng Xiaoping's remarks to visiting Japanese delegation in 1984, “Build Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” People's Daily, 30 June 1984. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1220.html., has raised the spectre of the return of the Cold War to Asia with the United States and China on opposing sides, with China backed by Russia, its former Cold War ally. But to what extent are there historical parallels between the Cold War and the current East Asian international relations system?     

Contextualising Australia–Japan security cooperation: the normative framing of Japanese security policy

On July 1, 2014, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe's cabinet commenced a historic transformation of post-war Japan's security policy by overturning previous interpretations of the constitution's pacifist clause, Article 9. The Cabinet Decision on the Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect Its People stated that collective self-defence was consistent with the constitution and, consequently, Japan would immediately develop a more proactive and less constrained security policy. But while this outcome may seem sensible and overdue from a realist perspective of Japan's standing as a mature democratic nation in an increasingly difficult geopolitical situation, the manner in which it is being enacted may seriously undermine the normative legitimacy of Japan's new security identity. In this article, the author examines how Shinzō Abe's administration has attempted to shape the norms surrounding security policy revision in Japan, and how these norms, in turn, have affected or constrained Abe's agency. This is done with specific reference to the external contexts of the USA's ‘rebalance’ policy and the deepening of Japan's security relationship with Australia, with a view to anticipating how normative turmoil might impact on the potential of this relationship.     

Anglo-American followers or Antipodean iconoclasts? The 2008 TRIP survey of international relations in Australia and New Zealand

This article examines the results of the world's largest ever survey of international relations (IR) scholars with an eye to establishing the particularities of the discipline in Australia and New Zealand. The survey covered the areas of teaching, research, the structure of the profession and scholars’ views on foreign policy. From these results, this paper compares IR in New Zealand and Australia, and discusses the extent to which the discipline in these two countries is distinctive from its overseas counterparts, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom. The particular areas of focus include the degree to which the field in Australasia conforms to or differs from US or Commonwealth identities; epistemological and gender divides; the distinctive foci of what IR scholars in both countries teach and research; which publications are favoured and disfavoured; and the contrasting linkages between academia and the world of government and policy. We conclude with some suggestions about how the field in both countries might be improved.     

Cross‐border cooperation: A major element in regional policy in East Central Europe

Borders in East Central Europe have become much more permeable over the past ten years as formalities have been simplified and many new crossing points have opened. At the same time cooperation in border regions has increased, thanks mainly to resourcing through EU ‘Inrerreg’ programmes, to include a range of business, cultural and conservation interests. In many cases these arrangements have been formalised through Euroregions which have become an indicator of good international relations. The paper reviews these trends with reference to examples and pays particular attention to environmental projects and the joint planning initiatives being undertaken in a number of the Euroregions. At a time when regional policy has been generally weak, cross‐border cooperation has contributed significantly to cohesion and it is also a good indicator of stability in the region. However, the impact has been greater in the north than in the Balkans and the first round of EU eastern enlargement will have implications for cooperation across the new external borders.     

From the “Cleavage” of Central Asia to Greater Khurasan: History and Historiography of Late Antique East Iran

The history of Central Asia is normally considered peripheral to those of the civilizations that surrounded it—Marshal Hodgson termed it a civilizational “cleavage.” However, in the early Islamic period this region, particularly its southern and western parts, emerges as the dominant entity of Greater Khurasan to play a central role in the affairs of the Islamic Caliphate. This paper considers the history of the region, dubbed East Iran, before this rise to importance and proposes a different historiographical approach focusing on the developments in East Iran during the period of late antiquity and in interaction with the Sasanian Empire. It is proposed that the Greater Khurasan emerged as the result of the merging of the socio-cultural worlds of East Iran and that of the Sasanian Empire.