The politics of education for globalisation: managed activism in a time of crisis

Since the 1990s, governments of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have begun to promote their foreign aid politics domestically via global education. This policy remit has its origins in civil society and has been combined with a stated aim on the part of governments to prepare populations for globalisation, but also to convince populations of the need for increased aid spending in the context of various challenges, including calls for aid effectiveness, large-scale protest by the metropolitan left and rising parochialisms that diminish cosmopolitan world views. In the context of the apparent spontaneity of political mobilisation globally, this article seeks to qualify the optimism of the political sociology and social movements literature on the network society by comparing two OECD government remits for global/development education in the UK and Australia, which are attempts to manage or socially engineer civic activism and engagement. The problem which this article addresses is that, on the face of it, state funding of ‘global education’ appears to be a success of the activism of educators combined with the networked advocacy efforts of development non-governmental organisations, except that it has occurred in tension with international drivers to use education to further global economic competitiveness and governments' desire to promote their own foreign aid spending in a climate of falling legitimacy. This phenomenon of state funding for global education might be considered an elaboration of network politics, but this article argues that it must equally be read, via Gramsci, as a hegemonic contest in the struggle for subject production appropriate to the global knowledge economy.     

The globalisation process and the Eastern bloc countries in the 1970s and 1980s

This article examines the position of the Eastern Bloc countries in the economic globalisation which spread in the last third of the twentieth century. The main emphasis is on the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Therefore two significant dimensions of economic globalisation have been selected: trade and capital-market transactions. The first part of this paper provides an outline of globalisation processes and their causes during the 1970s and 1980s. The second part deals with the role of Eastern bloc countries in globalisation trends, including an examination of the motivations and intentions behind their foreign-trade operations. This becomes the basis to explore the attitude of Eastern bloc countries to the institutions of globalisation (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the World Bank). As it turns out, it seems questionable whether the Eastern bloc countries had ever been able actively to determine the conditions of globalisation. They probably only had an influence as their very existence presented a line of demarcation to the global world: because of their own policies and because of the defence reactions of the West.     

Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the challenges of globalisation

This article critically examines the argument that the forces of globalisation will see the end of the foreign ministry in the context of Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). It suggests that globalisation is affecting the subject matter of foreign policy-making through four processes: diffusion, enmeshment, contradiction, and transformation. It then looks at three prominent challenges these processes have made to the work of DFAT: politicisation; the volume and contestation of information; and resource-cutting. It concludes that rather than being eroded by globalisation, DFAT has been forced to play a more assertive and diversified role, and that it has responded to these challenges in a highly creative way.     

Turning Point? The Volatile Geographies of Taxation

This article argues that the geographies of taxation offer an important but neglected insight into changes taking place in the nature of the contemporary state in the context of globalisation. Following Schumpeter's analysis of the “tax state”, the paper argues that, historically, the theory and practice of fiscal space are fundamental both to state form and to the possibility of political and social institutions. Despite this, the complexity and fluidity inherent in fiscal space has been obscured by the dominant normative conception of “the” fiscal state. As the concept of “fiscal sovereignty” becomes less and less salient in practice in the context of economic globalisation, it remains a powerful ideological concept for state governance. This paper reviews the primary contemporary accounts of fiscal space across a range of disciplinary contexts and scales of governance. Despite the expectation and or desire for some form of “fiscal globalisation” on the part of commentators, in practice what we see is an increased centralisation of state fiscal control coupled with a creeping individuation and privatisation of fiscal responsibility. This radical respatialisation of fiscal space has profound implications both for the state itself and for any prospect of the creation of a global “public domain” founded on a global fisc.     

Franco-German relations,Europe and globalisation

The new world order, characterised by the internationalisation of markets and national economies, challenges the socio-economic models of nation states and imposes new rules. Both 'Rhineland capitalism' and 'capitalisme à la française' are forced to adapt to these rapidly changing circumstances. This article analyses respective French and German differences in their approach to globalisation, with particular reference to foreign direct investment and industrial cooperation in Europe. It investigates whether Franco-German bilateralism is still a relevant approach to European integration as it seeks to respond to globalisation.     

Internationalisation of the Chinese subnational state and capital: the case of Yunnan and the Greater Mekong Subregion

This article examines the participation of China's Yunnan Province in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) in order to understand the dynamics behind the regionalisation and internationalisation strategies adopted by a Chinese subnational state. It argues that the Yunnan case demonstrates the outflow of state capital—both national and provincially based—to have been instrumental in harnessing Beijing's and Kunming's political support for programs of subregional economic cooperation. This political support has led to a state capital alliance underpinning the economic expansion of provincial state capital into the GMS. It also argues that subregional governance arrangements, such as those featuring in the GMS, embed the competitive advantage of state capital through new forms of extra-territorial governance that ostensibly de-emphasises the political dimensions of state capital. The internationalisation of Yunnan subnational state is reflected in its political strategy of subregional governance. These changes point to complex rescaling of not just national state but also subnational states in Asia that find expression in variegated regional and subregional political projects.     

Women's citizenship claims,labour market policy and globalisation

Policy and research frameworks concerned with both analysing and advancing women's position in the labour market are still oriented to the assumption that the jurisdictional unit of production relations is the nation‐state. Historically all citizenship claims have been predicated on the jurisdictional integrity and sovereignty of the nation‐state. However, contemporary patterns of globalisation (flows of capital, labour and policy making networks) indicate these assumptions may be anachronistic. This paper tables the problems and suggests some of their implications for bow we approach policy‐related analysis of women's labour market position.     

Labor and globalisation: from Keating to Latham

This paper documents the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party's (FPLP) approach to globalisation under four different leaders, starting with Paul Keating in the early 1990s, and ending at the early stages of Mark Latham's leadership in 2004. It argues that, despite some notable differences, there was a considerable degree of consistency in Labor attitudes to globalisation under successive party leaders: globalisation was seen as inevitable, irreversible, as beneficial for the majority of the population, and as destructive to states' capacity to intervene in the economy. The paper suggests that a number of factors explain Labor's continued support for globalisation in the face of growing public discontent, including the pressures of international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and big business, ideological factors, and comparatively low levels of economic growth, both in Australia and internationally.     

The State of Free Speech

This article surveys the regulation of speech under the government of Prime Minister Howard so as to clarify the understandings of free speech that have been operant and to extrapolate from this debate to consider broader shifts in political forms. It reviews and contrasts liberal and republican conceptions of free speech and argues that what suffered most is the critical role free speech plays in ensuring popular sovereignty. It links this shift in the location of sovereignty with the changing role of the state in the context of globalisation and the demands from economic actors to remove impediments posed by certain forms of civic activism. Using this case, it theorises the apparently contradictory emergence of neoliberal and neoconservative trends, arguing that both undermine active citizenship.     

State functioning and state failure in the South Pacific

The South Pacific region features enormous variation in state performance. While Polynesian nations such as Samoa have proved to be relatively successful post-colonial states, Melanesian countries like the Solomon Islands are increasingly categorised as 'weak', 'failing' or 'failed' states. Drawing on a range of comparative studies by economists and political scientists in recent years, this article argues that cross-country variation in ethnic diversity between much of Polynesia and Melanesia is a key factor in explaining differences in state performance across the South Pacific. It shows how different kinds of ethnic structure are associated with specific political and economic outcomes, including variation in political stability, economic development, and internal conflict from country to country. In so doing, it helps explain why some parts of the South Pacific appear to be failing while others are relative success stories - and why this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.     

Economic crisis in Korea and the degraded developmental state

This article analyses the Korean developmental state since the late 1990s, and argues that the state has continued to play a weighty role in the economy. The state guided industrial and financial restructuring after the Asian economic crisis, and intervened to stimulate the economy during the 2008 global financial crisis. In doing so, state elites have displayed a distinctive form of economic leadership that is largely consistent with the developmental state. Rather than focusing predominantly on performance-related indicators of state strength such as growth rates, this article analyses the deeper aspects of the developmental state, specifically its internal functions and its collaboration with business. The article brings politics back into analysis of the developmental state by questioning the assumption that strong economic performance is necessary for the maintenance of close ties between the state and chaebol. Instead, economic performance is better understood as a predictor of patterns of conflict and cooperation. Long-standing ties between the state and big business have endured two significant economic crises, even if the performance of the developmental state has been degraded compared to earlier decades.     

Explaining,and explaining with,economic nationalism

This article rejects the widely held view that economic nationalism is an anachronistic economic doctrine in the age of globalisation. Rather than being the opposite of economic liberalism, as the conventional view maintains, economic nationalism is better understood as a generic phenomenon that can accommodate almost any doctrinal content, including economic liberalism. Economic nationalism is not so much about the economy as it is about the nation, as illustrated by literature on economic nations and national economic cultures. Such a broader conception of economic nationalism is then placed in the context of a larger ‘nationalising mechanism’ that sheds new light on a variety of phenomena discussed in the globalisation debate, such as economic performance, state disintegration, or cultural conflict, and success or failure in post-communist systemic change.     

Improvised Hybridity in the “Fixing” of Chinese Infrastructure Capital: The Case of Kenya's Standard Gauge Railway

The article explores the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the globalisation of China's infrastructure capital. Examining how accumulation strategies of Chinese SOEs are driven by a complex set of political and economic, state and private, interests, it foregrounds the inherently hybrid nature of China's state capitalism. We use Kenya's Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) as a case study to analyse how state infrastructure capital traverses borders, and the specific ways that contradictions of accumulation in China are relocated through the improvised hybridity of SOEs. In Kenya, China Road and Bridge Corporation, the main SGR contractor, shifted and adapted its strategies as the pursuit of economic productivity gave way to political priorities in China, simultaneously responding to changing socio-political circumstances in Kenya and across East Africa. Analysing these dynamics, we highlight the contingencies of, and limitations to, structural reorganisation of actually existing forms of state capitalism in China and beyond.     

The Liberal Paradox and the Politics of Asylum in Australia

This article interprets the politics of asylum in Australia in light of what James Hollifield calls ‘the liberal paradox’; that is, the trend amongst contemporary states towards greater transnational open-ness in the economic arena alongside growing pressure for domestic political closure. It begins with an outline of Australia's recent history of economic reform and of the discourse of globalisation that has been employed to legitimise the changes wrought by this transition. Focusing on the period from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, the article provides an account of anxieties associated with these changes and an analysis of government strategies to secure the support of disaffected sections of the electorate. Asylum policy is analysed in this context. The article shows how the policing of asylum seekers constitutes performances of political closure designed to assuage those made vulnerable by Australia's neoliberal economic trajectory. It argues that these politics of asylum are indicative of the tensions between transnational engagement and territorial closure faced by neoliberal states more generally.     

Revisiting the South Korean developmental state after the 1997 financial crisis

This study reassesses the conventional wisdom surrounding the developmental state of South Korea (hereafter Korea) since the 1997 Korean financial crisis. The conventional wisdom is that, as a result of the continued structural reforms prompted by the crisis, the Korean developmental state, inherently characterised by active or direct state intervention, strong economic and industrial policies, the chaebol-oriented economic policy, and labour exclusion, has finally begun to dissolve in earnest. In this study, we have considered whether that is really the case and also which theoretical implications can be drawn from this consideration. Analysis of the Korean developmental state following the 1997 crisis has indicated that, quite contrary to conventional wisdom, the developmental state has continued to prevail as a core policy framework of the Korean administrations even after the crisis. There is no doubt that the continued structural and market reform after the crisis certainly undermined the Korean developmental state to a certain degree, but that does not mean the beginning of the end of the Korean developmental state at all. For much evidence strongly indicates that the Korean developmental state still remains intact and strong despite the structural reforms, on account of the successive Korean governments’ assiduous and deliberate efforts to maintain and reinforce it. Even after the crisis, the Kim Dae-Jung and post-Kim regimes have hardly abandoned many of their market interventionist policies. Such market interventionist policies, which were routinely practised under the military regime in the 1960s and 1970s, diametrically contravene the argument that the Korean developmental state has begun to dissolve as a result of structural reform after the 1997 crisis. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Korean developmental state persists as usual. All this information, then, suggests that path dependence is in action in the case of the Korean developmental state, and this suggests a further hypothesis that the Korean developmental state is very likely to persist in the future as well, despite increasing globalisation pressure, given the strong path dependence.     

当前浙江华侨回国定居现象探析

针对近年来移民回流现象,用抽样调查的定量方法,对回浙定居华侨的人口社会学特征进行了归纳;对影响华侨回国定居的经济、政治因素进行了分析;认为当前华侨回国定居主要是为了恢复国内户口,方便经商、读书和生活等,其本身还具有很强的国际流动性。我国政府有关主管部门应当实施积极的华侨回国定居政策,以顺应经济全球化和人权保障的时代潮流。     

Unpacking administrative rank: Intercity competition and the remaking of local state space in China

The literature on interurban competition emphasizes that market rules as an external coercive power dominate local state space conductive to economic growth. Is there another external coercive power, other than the market as a hidden hand, to promote and mitigate interurban competition? Addressing this question, this paper specifies that the Chinese state's political efforts to downplay the role of the market in, and remake the rule of, interurban competition could have far reaching implications for urban political economy. The two cases are Ruili and Wanding, two border cities located on the edge of China's southwestern borderland adjacent to Myanmar. While reranking is supposed to balance out the inefficiencies of market principles in interurban competition, multiple rounds of reranking in Ruili and Wanding in the past seven decades indicate that this political orchestration can accelerate interurban competition into a cutthroat game for economic growth and thus create problems for macro economic management. Nevertheless, it can become a political tool to revamp the game by strategically selecting some cities as nodes of development at the sacrifice of urban fortunes of other cities. In this process, market rules operate in parallel with, and sometimes succumb to, the principle of political order from above. This finding expands the geographies of the state: the co-constitution of the local and the national becomes necessary and pragmatic since interurban competition is not a territorially-conditioned endeavor, but remains open to extralocal stakeholders—upper-level governments in this case—who can remake local state space.     

Sub‐state nationalism and the welfare state: Québec and Canadian federalism

ABSTRACT. This article examines the relationship between sub‐state nationalism and the welfare state through the case of Québec in Canada. It argues that social policy presents mobilisation and identity‐building potential for sub‐state nationalism, and that nationalist movements affect the structure of welfare states. Nationalism and the welfare state revolve around the notion of solidarity. Because they often involve transfers of money between citizens, social programmes raise the issue of the specific community whose members should exhibit social and economic solidarity. From this perspective, nationalist movements are likely to seek the congruence between the ‘national community’ (as conceptualised by their leaders) and the ‘social community’ (the community where redistributive mechanisms should operate). Moreover, the political discourse of social policy lends itself well to national identity‐building because it is typically underpinned by collective values and principles. Finally, pressures stemming from sub‐state nationalism tend to reshape the policy agenda at both the state and the sub‐state level while favouring the asymmetrical decentralisation of the welfare state.     

Sir Otto Niemeyer,the bankrupt state and the federal system

One of the main myths about Australian political and economic history relates to the intervention in economic policy making in the 1930s by the Bank of England through the mission of Sir Otto Niemeyer. This article argues that Niemeyer's advice was not heeded. Rather, parallels between what he demanded and the Premiers’ Plan were largely confined to the level of rhetoric as part of a strategy to regain access to the London capital market. State expenditures were reduced gradually according to local political calculations and fiscal priorities, and not in step with the timetable set by the Bank of England. Far from weakening and dividing the Australian state, the federal separation of powers led to the gradual introduction of fiscal austerity, as state governments had little option but to maintain their role in complementing capital accumulation and facilitating social legitimation.     

South Africa’s form of globalisation: a continental posture paradox for insertion and dependence

The fashionable form of globalisation has perpetuated Africa’s incapacity for auto-centeredness. As promises of political and economic reforms did not materialize and as economically powerful states continued to be indifferent, most African states resorted to the strategy of self-interest for international legitimacy and faith in foreign direct investment (FDI) and aid. Departing from its portrayal as a relatively developed, competitive and civil-minded state in Africa, South Africa reinvented modernity in the hope of servicing similar self-interests. I argue that South Africa’s form of globalisation is paradoxical. While positing as a voice for the voiceless and leader of African renaissance, that country simultaneously mediated Africa’s relations for appropriation of neo-liberal principles. Occurring predominantly through political and economic liberalisation, globalisation of Africa is ‘an old story’ of insertion for dependence on foreign capital. I show that South Africa’s neo-liberal agenda in Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), as well, engendered openness to imports. Given the commonalities between GEAR and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), I argue that the latter is South Africa’s instrument of ‘reintegrating’ Africa. I also illustrate that South Africa’s foreign economic policy in Africa and NEPAD are founded on the marginalisation thesis, misreading of the paradoxical operations of neo-orthodoxy globalisation in Africa and the thinking that South Africa is suffering due to its geographical association with Africa. I conclude that that country’s form of globalisation will further empty Africa of its capacity of auto-centeredness and engender openness to imports, which are yet to deliver continental recovery.