Upper Paleolithic raw material economies at Üçağızlı cave, Turkey

This paper addresses variation in lithic raw material economy within the early Upper Paleolithic at Üçağızlı cave (south-central Turkey). The stratigraphic sequence documents some 12,000 years of the early Upper Paleolithic, entailing changes in lithic technology, raw material exploitation, and game use. Although the same lithic raw materials were exploited throughout the sequence to make quite similar ranges of products, there are marked changes in the ways raw materials from different source areas were treated, including patterns of transport and raw material consumption. The concept of technological provisioning is used to understand changing strategies for procuring and managing supplies of flint from different source locations. Shifts in raw material economy are argued to represent responses to changes in residential mobility and the scale/duration of occupations at the cave itself: data on cultural features and foraging strategies provide independent evidence for these shifts in land use. Results have implications for more nuanced approaches to investigating of lithic raw material economies and the significance of “raw material transfers.”     

Minority–Majority Relations in the Schelling Model of Residential Dynamics. 住宅动态迁移Schelling模型中的少数‐多数关系

The Schelling model describing segregation between two groups of residential agents, reflects the most abstract, basic view of noneconomic forces motivating residential migrations: be close to people of “your own” kind. The model assumes that residential agents, located in neighborhoods where the fraction of “friends” is less than a predefined threshold value F, try to relocate to neighborhoods where this fraction is F or higher. For groups of equal size, Schelling's residential pattern converges either to complete integration (random pattern) or segregation, depending on F. We investigate Schelling model pattern dynamics as a function of F in addition to two other parameters—the ratio of groups' numbers, and neighborhood size. We demonstrate that the traditional integration–segregation pattern dichotomy should be extended. In the case of groups of different sizes, a wide interval of F‐values exists that entails a third persistent residential pattern, one in which a portion of the majority population segregates while the rest remains integrated with the minority. We also demonstrate that Schelling model dynamics essentially depend on the formalization of urban agents' residential behavior. To obtain realistic results, the agents should be satisficers, and the fraction of the agents relocating irrespective of the neighborhood's state should be nonzero. We discuss the relationship between our results and real‐world residential dynamics.