Chiang Kai-shek's reading: an inquiry based on Chiang's diary, 1920s–1940s

At different times of his life, Chiang Kai-shek entertained three different images of himself: saint, hero and revolutionary guru. The orientation of his reading roughly corresponded with these roles: to be a saint, he emphasized moral learning and self-improvement; to be a hero, he stressed military strategy and politics; and to be the guru for a revolution, he had an enduring interest in the histories of revolutions in other nations. He seldom took an interest in books about knowledge, leisure or entertainment, which had little connection with these three roles. Chiang was closer to a traditional Chinese intellectual than to his predecessor Dr. Sun Yat-sen in his knowledge structure, value orientation and behaviour codes. Although Mao Zedong was as devoted to old Chinese books as Chiang, Mao preferred history and classical literature while Chiang preferred Confucian classics. Mao read old books from a historical materialist point of view, whereas Chiang synthesized “Three Principles of the People” (Sanmin zhuyi) with Confucian doctrines.     

A Study of Public Finance within Wang Jingwei's Puppet Regime,by Pan Jian

Studying the original diaries of Chiang Kai-shek juxtaposed with its various compiled editions is much more important than simply distinguishing which edition is more or less authentic. The differences between the original and its copies resulted from deliberate efforts on the part of Chiang as well as his aid to edit and revise the original for public view. Hence, a comparison between the original and revised editions of the diary goes beyond the mere study of the authenticity of the editions and is of important historical value. This study examines original text from Chiang Kai-shek's diary and compares it with compiled editions produced by Mao Sicheng, who worked as Chiang's secretary in the early 1920s. Using entries primarily from the period of July 1926 as a case study, I carefully examine the similarities as well as the differences between the original diary of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao's copies, both the indexed version and the quoted entries in A Chronicle of Chiang Kai-Shek's Life which Mao compiled and which was published after Chiang passed away in Taiwan. I aim to show what changes were made to the original text in the published versions of Chiang's diary, and to deduce possible explanations of the changes and the ramifications of the modifications.     

肯尼迪政府与蒋介石“反攻大陆”

在冷战背景下,肯尼迪政府对蒋介石"反攻大陆"行动采取模糊政策,始终把危机限制在可控制的范围内,保持海峡形势适度紧张;既使台湾始终依附于美国,又保持了对大陆的持续压力,同时也避免了卷入与苏联或中国的直接冲突。后来由于国际国内形势变化,美国政府逐步转向反对蒋介石"反攻大陆"的立场,蒋介石也不得不实际上修改了自己的政策。     

Retrospect and prospect of overseas studies on Chiang Kai-shek and related topics

Mr Chiang Kai-shek is a key historical figure of twentieth century China. The studies of his life and thought have attracted many scholars' attention during his lifetime as well as after his death in 1975. In recent years, along with the opening of the archives of Academia Historica, the Chronological Events (Shilue gaoben), and the Diary of Chiang Kai-shek, once again the topic of Chiang has become a focus among China scholars who study the Republican period. Besides numerous conferences and workshops recently held in Taipei, Beijing, Hangzhou, and other cities in both mainland China and Taiwan, academic circles in America, Europe, and Japan have also held some seminars regarding Chiang Kai-shek. The current overseas studies on Chiang Kai-shek can be divided into two groupings geographically: the Euro–American group and the Japanese group. These two groups, plus those from Taiwan and Mainland China, have formed the four most important academic traditions. In spite of their different views and ideologies, these four are able to influence each other and even to come to similar conclusions. These can be summarized as a more positive image of Chiang whose major achievements include fighting the Japanese in WWII and building a modern China in various ways. This paper, relying on overseas research results, will try to help researchers understand the current situation of studies on Chiang Kai-shek in the world so as to lay a better academic foundation for their own further studies. However, because of all kinds of limitations, this paper will rely mostly on the research achievements of English and Japanese works. Research works in other languages and from other regions will have to wait for later efforts.     

Beyond the carrot and stick: the political economy of US military aid to China, 1945–1951

By applying the rent-seeking assumption and sifting through both the archival materials and published historical documents, this article revisits the US–China relationship during the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949) and the early Cold War period, when the United States was caught in the conundrum of aiding the Chinese Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek. As military aid is usually regarded as an important representation of broader economic aid, this research mainly concentrates on the US military assistance to postwar Nationalist China. This topic is important, as it signifies a direct American involvement in the Chinese Civil War, when the influence of the United States in postwar world politics was overwhelmingly predominant. As a result, postwar Chinese history might be reevaluated in a broader global postwar context. In addition, this article also tells the story about rent-seeking behaviors in the complicated US–China military relations during the early Cold War period at both micro and macro levels. When it came to US military assistance to China, the formulation of policy was perennially in the name of one's best interest.     

蒋经国留学苏联述论

蒋经国在留学苏联期间,受到苏共和斯大林的重视,被吸收为苏共党员并送入高级军事院校深造,其命运随中国革命形势和中苏关系的变化而动荡起伏,他留苏12载,深入苏联政治和社会生活,历经肃托、农业集体化、肃反等各种运动,目睹苏联的种种弊端,对苏联从向往到怀疑,最终彻底背离。苏联通过蒋经国影响蒋介石,使中苏关系形成有利于苏联态势的期冀最终没有实现。     

蒋介石与黄埔建军

黄埔军校的建立,催生了一支区别于中国传统军队的新型军队,在中国近代历史上具有重大意义。作为黄埔军校校长,蒋介石对军校有着十分重要的影响,从政治、组织、思想等方面,为军校构架了一个基本的轮廓。     

论蒋介石与抗战期间的军事会议

在长达八年的抗日战争中,随着国际反法西斯战争形势与中国正面战场抗击日军的历次会战态势的变化,蒋介石连续召开一系列军事会议,制定并调整了对日作战方针,检讨了各次会战,策定了相应的战略战术,从中反映出蒋介石对形势的估计、对敌我双方军队的认识等,比较能够符合实情,也产生了一定的积极作用。但从总体上讲,蒋介石的话是“耳边风”,一吹就过,对国民党军队的劣根性改造无济于事。     

Chiang Kai-shek’s faith in Christianity: the trial of the Stilwell Incident

Chiang Kai-shek’s faith in Christianity has long been a controversial issue. Some have held that his faith was genuine while others have claimed that it was merely a posture to curry favor with the Americans. Now that the Hoover Institution has released Chiang Kai-shek’s diaries, historians are in a better position to explore this long-ignored part of Chiang’s life. This paper will examine Chiang’s faith as it developed during the Stilwell Incident, the most serious crisis of US–China military cooperation during World War II. While facing American pressure to grant military command to General Joseph W. Stilwell, Chiang reveals in his diaries how he relied on his faith in the Bible, how he interpreted the Bible, and how he applied his understanding of the Bible to his political decision making. An examination of Chiang’s diary during this crisis will help us understand his practical relationship with Christianity, which in turn will provide insight into Chiang’s attitudes and methods in dealing with the Stilwell Incident.     

中美关系史上一件\"谜案\"的历史考察 --\"罗斯福下令史迪威除掉蒋介石之说\"辨析

近年来,开罗会议期间罗斯福指令史迪威清除蒋介石的说法出现于国内许多论著中.本文从罗斯福对华政策、开罗会议期间罗斯福与蒋介石关系、美在华中国通对蒋介石的态度等方面对这一说法进行了辨析,指出开罗会议期间罗斯福指令史迪威干掉蒋介石的说法纯属子虚乌有.     

司徒雷登与战后中国的"新革命运动"

战后中国的"新革命运动"是由司徒雷登发起的,其目的是通过国民党政府内部的改革,把CC系的势力排除出去,让自由主义势力进入政府并掌握政权,以维持国民党政权的统治,对抗中国共产党领导的革命运动.由于"新革命运动"是建立在错误的基础之上,司徒雷登试图通过"新革命运动"挽救国民党统治的努力最终失败.     

The basic structure of Chiang Kai-shek's diplomatic strategy

As a leader of the Republic of China, Chiang Kai-shek carried on Sun Yat-sen's legacy of using diplomacy as a force in the modern era and planned to rely on diplomacy to revise China's unequal treaties with foreign powers. Chiang elaborated on Sun's ideas and maintained that diplomacy as a war without battles worked more effectively than wars with battles. Faced with the threat of Japanese invasion, he upheld the strategy of using one foreign country to control another. He expected the outbreak of a war between Japan and the Soviet Union or between Japan and the United States so that a war between Japan and China could be avoided. Chiang engaged in active diplomacy aimed at turning these expectations into reality. His diplomatic strategy had an impact during the Anti-Japanese War.     

蒋介石的反“台独”立场述论

二战结束以后尤其是偏安台湾一隅的四分之一世纪里,蒋介石始终坚持反台独立场,不仅对岛内外台独组织及其活动坚决取缔,严厉打击,而且对日本政府及右翼政客支持台独的行径进行了谴责,对其策动台湾当局独立的建议予以拒绝。这是台独势力在此期间未能坐大和两个中国、一中一台图谋未能得逞的重要原因之一。     

The re-examination of Chiang Kai-shek's returning virtue for malice policy towards Japan after the victory of the Anti-Japanese War

After victory in the Anti-Japanese War, Chiang Kai-shek issued the famous radio speech “Letter to Soldiers and Civilians of the Whole Nation as well as the Peoples of the World after the Victory of the Anti-Japanese War.” The main idea of this speech was long interpreted as “returning virtue for malice” (or “good for evil”), a basic principle of the Kuomintang's policy towards Japan. Many scholars who have considered the returning virtue for malice policy in the postwar period include the following major issues: first, China repatriated Japanese prisoners of war and the Japanese diaspora with mercy; second, China allowed the Tenno, or imperial, system to be preserved in Japan; third, China did not participate in the occupation of Japan; and fourth, China gave up the right to ask for war reparations from Japan. This article examines the above four issues to reevaluate the returning virtue for malice policy. The first issue seems to reflect the Chinese national character of being lenient with others. However, it was in fact due to Chiang's anti-Communist strategy and the declared policy of the United States of eradicating Japan's influence in China. With regard to the second issue, Chiang's attitude was merely to let the Japanese people make their own choice, while the fate of the Japanese Tenno system was entirely determined by the US occupation authority, on which Chiang had little influence. The third issue was mainly the outcome of Chiang's focus on domestic political struggle in the postwar era in China. As for war reparations, China actually made efforts to obtain them in the beginning, but had to give up its right eventually. The decision-making process in the Kuomintang government was restrained by American policy and subordinated to Japanese pressure. Thus, it is not persuasive to summarize the basic principle of Kuomintang postwar policy towards Japan as returning virtue for malice.     

鲍罗廷与国民政府迁移中的政治角力

第一次国共合作时期发生的国民政府迁移问题及其解决,是国民革命由盛及衰的重要转折。鲍罗廷为代表,以国民党左派、国民党中的反蒋派和共产党人为一方,与蒋介石为另一方展开角力。从搁置迁都之议,到党政中枢迁移武汉,在不同的阶段中,鲍罗廷整合各路资源,提出关键性的建议,为迁都问题的解决发挥了举足轻重的作用。迁都之争的胜利不能巩固,有其一定的必然性,并与鲍罗廷的战略、策略相关。     

蒋介石与宋明理学

本文通过对《蒋介石日记》的解读与论证,从新的角度证明了“宋明理学”对蒋介石的道德取向、人格塑造及思想理念的潜在影响。     

The return of Xinjiang to Chinese central control during the late period of the Sino–Japanese War: a reappraisal based on Chiang Kai-shek's Diary

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, while considering taking back the Japanese-occupied areas, the Nationalist government also started to think of recovering the frontier regions, which had been somewhat out of China's control under the influence of a major ally of China, the USSR. For a long time, Xinjiang had a very close relationship with the Soviet Union under the rule of Sheng Shicai, and the central government of China had little direct control. In April of 1942, Sheng Shicai, suspicious of a Soviet conspiracy to overthrow his rule, conducted mass arrests in Xinjiang, causing a sudden deterioration in the relationship between Xinjiang and the Soviets. At first, the Soviet Union attempted to intimidate Sheng in order to prevent him from turning to the central government, but failed. Paying no heed to the alienation policy of the Soviets, the Nationalist government soon decided to buttress Sheng in an effort to place Xinjiang under centralized control. The Nationalist government first set out to take back the diplomacy of Xinjiang, followed by expropriation of formerly Soviet-controlled enterprises and forced removal of Soviet military advisors, experts, technicians and army personnel from Xinjiang. In the meantime, a large number of party, government, economic, cultural and educational personnel were dispatched by the central government to Xinjiang to infiltrate various sectors. With the weakening of his own power and increasing conflicts with the central government, Sheng Shicai planned another turn of events. By executing a new round-up, this time to cleanse Xinjiang of the central government's forces, Sheng re-oriented his regime towards the Soviet Union. Yet his gesture was turned down by the USSR because of his loss of credibility. Well prepared militarily, the Nationalist government eventually forced Sheng Shicai to leave Xinjiang, which then was almost fully restored to the authority of the central government.     

抗战胜利后蒋介石对宪政的态度

随着抗战进入尾声,蒋介石对宪政的态度由消极变为积极,而战后的新形势和日益临近的宪政对其政治策略产生了重大影响。政协会议上,蒋对中共和中间势力做出重大让步。政协决议对国民党宪政设计的更改,在国民党内激起轩然大波,蒋发觉事态发展已出乎自己预料之外。国民党六届二中全会上,蒋对宪政的态度暗中转变。在蒋的默许下,国民党虽未公开撕毁政协决议,但政协决议事实上已不能为国民党所执行。会后,蒋介石受党内强硬势力影响,对宪政的态度从温和的积极一变而为强硬的积极。中共态度也随之强硬,最终国共两党在宪政问题上分道扬镳。