Science and the History of the Sciences. Conceptual Innovations Through Historicizing Science in the Eighteenth Century

Science and the History of the Sciences. Conceptual Innovations Through Historicizing Science in the Eighteenth Century. The historical reconstruction of science is linked to philosophical discussions of the eighteenth century in many ways. The historiography of philosophy and the historiography of science share the conceptual problem to assemble the multitude of scientific and philosophical practices under general concepts. The historical analysis of scientific progress offers a clue by problematizing definitions of “science” and “sciences” as well as the system of sciences as a whole. By analyzing these conceptual problems and the typology of historical enterprises of the eighteenth century, this paper will discuss the close interrelations which existed between philosophical and historical discourses of eighteenth‐century reflection on science.     

Duncan F. Gregory and Robert Leslie Ellis: second-generation reformers of British mathematics

The paper discusses some of the contributions of Duncan Farquharson Gregory and Robert Leslie Ellis to symbolical algebra and their views on the philosophy of mathematics with the aim of revisiting the accepted characterisation of the second generation of reformers of British mathematics found in Crosbie Smith and Norton Wise’s seminal Energy and Empire. It is argued that at least some of the features brought to the fore in their treatment of the work of Gregory and Ellis – namely “geometrical methods” in mathematics and “anti-metaphysical”, “non-hypothetical” and “practical” knowledge – cannot be straightforwardly upheld. On the one hand, Gregory’s generalisation of George Peacock’s symbolical algebra was connected to several natural philosophical considerations underlying the Scottish Newtonians’ “abstractionism” and “geometrical fluxional analysis”. On the other hand, Ellis’s idealist philosophy of mathematics and science insisted that the a priori necessary truths of mathematics could inform the “hypothetical part of scientific induction”. A more nuanced understanding of the place of the second generation of reformers within the analytical revolution in Victorian Britain should thus take into account the eclectic foundational position that arises from the work of Gregory and Ellis.     

Wissenschaft — Mathematik — Technik: Ihre Wechselwirkung in der Antike

The question whether there exists an interaction between ‘science’ (foreign text ignored) and ‘technology’ (foreign text ignored, esp. foreign text ignored) in Greek and Roman antiquity is discussed controversially until today. Especially representatives of the philologies strictly deny any form of relation, whereas modern scientists tend to take for granted that the current interaction between (exact) natural sciences and technology has always existed, at least since the beginning of real natural science founded by the ancient Greeks. This paper shows that both parties are right — at least in a certain way. Following current terminology and contents of ‘science’ and ‘technology’ there had been such an interaction — particularly with mathematics as linking element in so far as in antiquity especially foreign text ignored (mechanics) was regarded as applied mathematics and not as science. The strong interaction between pure mathematics and such fields of applied mathematics (namely mechanical technology) based on the fact that technological (mechanical) artefacts were properly constructed mathematically. Some of them are mentioned in this paper (astrolabes and sundials, waterclocks, tools and machines — especially lifting gears, bucket elevators, guns, pneumatic tools —, architecture of temples); in so far the supporters of an interaction between science and technology are right. However, the post-Aristotelian Greeks and Romans did not consider mathematics to be part of ‘science (of nature)’ as the post-kantian exact scientists do. Mathematics to them was a mere ‘art’ — consequently, in the mentioned cases there had been an interaction between ‘arts’ and of course not between ‘science’ and ‘art’ (technology); and in so far those are right who deny an interaction between natural science and technology. This shows that the contrariety of the answers to the question depends on the different terminology chosen. Following the current understanding of ‘exact natural science’ the answer is: yes; following the conception of ‘science’ in the self-understanding of Greek and Roman antiquity the answer is: no — and this is right as well! The reason for this apparent contrariety are just the different meanings and contents of ‘science (of nature)’ in antiquity and modern times.     

Men Making Home: Masculinity and Domesticity in Eighteenth‐Century Britain

Eighteenth‐century England is, for many scholars, the time and place where modern domesticity was invented; the point at which ‘home’ became a key concept sustained by new literary imaginings and new social practices. But as gendered individuals, and certainly compared to women, men are notable for their absence in accounts of the eighteenth‐century domestic interior. In this essay, I examine the relationship between constructs of masculinity and meanings of home. During the eighteenth century, ‘home’ came to mean more than one's dwelling; it became a multi‐faceted state of being, encompassing the emotional, physical, moral and spatial. Masculinity intersected with domesticity at all levels and stages in its development. The nature of men's engagements with home were understood through a model of ‘oeconomy’, which brought together the home and the world, primarily through men's activities. Indeed, this essay proposes that attention to how this multi‐faceted eighteenth‐century ‘home’ was made in relation to masculinity shifts our understanding of home as a private and feminine space opposed to an ‘outside’ and public world.     

Arthur Schopenhauer: Manuscript remains,volume IV; The manuscript books of 1830–1852 and the last manuscripts

This article presents and compares aspects of Charles Taylor's and Hans Blumenberg's seemingly opposing views about agency and epistemology, setting them in the context of the tradition in German ideas called ‘philosophical anthropology’, with which both align their thinking. It presents key strands of this tradition, from their inception in the late eighteenth century in the writings of Herder, Schiller and others associated with anthropology to their articulation by thinkers such as Max Scheler, Arnold Gehlen and Karl Löwith in the early twentieth century. The main issues here are: man's status as part of nature or as ‘radically divorced’ from nature; the possibility of objective knowledge of man versus the epistemological status of human ‘meaning’; the view of knowledge as abstraction versus ‘concrete’ or ‘lived’ experience. Within these parameters the article contrasts Taylor's emphasis on ‘engaged’ agency, embedded in discourses, bodies and predispositions, with Blumenberg's sense of our ‘indirect’ relation to reality: ‘delayed, selective, and above all “metaphorical”’. It concludes that each position may be traced back to a key strand in philosophical anthropology: the one emphasising man's unique freedom, the other that sees man's grasp of reality as uniquely interwoven with a background of meanings.     

Scottish Common Sense,association of ideas and free will

ABSTRACT

The philosophical debates that unfolded in Enlightenment Britain left a deep mark on the mindset of future generations of thinkers. A clear echo of eighteenth-century disputes over the meaning of human liberty is heard in the subsequent confrontation between materialists and idealists. In more recent times, a number of arguments developed by compatibilist and incompatibilist philosophers still resemble more old-fashioned positions. However, the aim of this paper is to evaluate the differences between Joseph Priestley’s defence of “necessitarianism” and Thomas Reid’s elaboration of counterarguments to support “metaphysical liberty” – as the two doctrines were known in the late eighteenth century – on the background of their methodological assumptions and the different styles of their reasoning. I contend that a different adoption of the Newtonian scientific method, which they brought to bear on the study of the human mind, is key to understanding the way they endeavoured to defend necessity and liberty, respectively. I also argue that their interpretation of the nature of causality importantly shaped the arguments they put forth in attacking each other’s position.     

Épistémologie 1900 la tradition Française

The paper reviews the French tradition on epistemology and the reaction of the philosophical milieu in the early XX^th century against the crisis of philosophical concepts induced by the development of science. The 1^st International Congress on Philosophy of 1900 in Paris shows that philosophy tries to confirm her hegemony on sciences, but for this, philosophers have to embark into history of science. History of science becomes for philosophy the means to keep the highest place in the whole realm of knowledge: philosophers become historians of science and supervise historical institutes. It is still possible to show quite a continuity between the philosophical questions of 1900 and some similar problems raised in the years between the two world wars, especially by Gaston Bachelard.     

The Unhelpful Notion of ‘Renaissance man’

The current journalistic use of the term ‘Renaissance man’ to describe someone whose work straddles boundaries between today's specialisms is a hindrance to understanding almost any aspect of the culture of the Renaissance — a culture within which both ‘art’ and ‘science’ had meanings different from those they have now, the most significant intellectual division being between the learned and the practical traditions. We look first at the learned tradition of the universities (where teaching was in Latin). The people considered include William Harvey, Johannes Kepler, Galileo Galilei, Nicolaus Copernicus, Regiomontanus and (very briefly) Isaac Newton. Within the practical tradition, centred on workshops, we consider the state shipyards in Venice (where Galileo claimed to have learned much), workshop practices in general and the emergence of the notion of ‘Fine Arts’. The individuals considered include Piero della Francesca, Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo Buonarroti and Raphael, as well as the famous clockmaker Jost Bürgi (who taught Kepler about algebra). We conclude by considering the transfer of skills between these two traditions. There are several areas of overlap, but here we concentrate attention on the story of algebra. Algebra was invented by al-Khwarizmi (whose name gives us the term ‘algorithm’) in the ninth century, within learned mathematics, in Baghdad. In the West, elementary algebra, derived from al-Khwarizmi's work but in the simplified form of problems, became part of ‘practical mathematics’. Slowly, from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, developed forms of algebra crossed over into the learned tradition. This is as much a matter of crossing social barriers as of crossing intellectual ones. Eventually, the practical tradition as a whole became absorbed as an elementary part of the learned one.     

Huygens’ stargazing scientists: the idea of science in Cosmotheoros

This paper deals with the book Cosmotheoros (1698), in which Christiaan Huygens presented his concept of a universe made up of many inhabited planets. Recent interpreters of this work have focused especially on cosmological issues presented in the book. Cosmotheoros, however, comprises also various philosophical ideas. In this paper I want to focus on the concept contemplator coeli – stargazer. The stargazer was the embodiment of the philosophical ideal of the contemplative way of life that appeared in classical philosophy and astronomy. I want to argue that Huygens followed on from the idea of the stargazer and used it in his hypothetical construction of extra-terrestrial life. At the same time, however, he altered this idea in such a way that it corresponded better to the ideals of science at the end of the seventeenth century. In Huygens’ concept, the noble contemplator coeli turned into the modern scientist who works with other scientists on the advancement of mankind’s knowledge of nature. Huygens’ stargazers are a good example of how strikingly the basic assumptions of knowledge of nature in the early modern period changed with regard to classical antiquity.     

Shakespeare as a method. Carl Schmitt’s reading of Othello and Hamlet

While in the 1960s Allan Bloom suggested to read William Shakespeare’s works through the prism of political philosophy, a decade earlier Carl Schmitt used the works of English poet in a reverse way: he read political philosophy and history through Shakespeare. Deprived – under the influence of Leo Strauss – from the possibility of considering Thomas Hobbes a decisionist thinker, Schmitt in his ‘Hamlet or Hecuba’ used Shakespeare’s most famous work to interpret origins of disappearance of the state of emergency from English soil. Shakespeare was seen by Schmitt as a writer who captured the Sixteenth and seventeenth century changes in thinking about sovereignty and the state. Interestingly, Schmitt did not use Shakespeare as method for the first time: in first decades of twentieth century, in his diary, he made ‘Othello’ a prism through which he read his love life. Because the author of ‘The Concept of the Political’ is one of the less methodologically cohesive writers of twentieth century, his usage of Shakespeare twice, in different circumstances, is interesting. In an article, author links ‘Hamlet or Hecuba’ with Schmitt’s geopolitical works and presents Shakespeare’s works as the coherent method of interpretation in Schmitt’s philosophy of decisionism.     

Philosophers,Naturalists, and Antipodean Encounters, 1748-1803

This article addresses a complex nexus of discourse and praxis: varying Enlightenment visions of Man; emergent ideas about human differences; and encounters between European scientific voyagers and Indigenous people in New Holland (Australia) and Van Diemen's Land (Tasmania) at the start of the nineteenth century. Discursively, I trace two strands of ‘anthropological’ thinking. One, philosophical and economic, is epitomized in French and Scottish stadial theory. The other is naturalist and culminated in Buffon's natural history of man. Both were appropriated from the late eighteenth century by a nascent science of race. With respect to praxis, I chart the reciprocal impact of metropolitan theory, antipodean experience and local agency by selective comparison of materials produced by the voyages of Matthew Flinders and Nicolas Baudin in Australian waters in 1801–1803.     

5. TIME GARDENS: HISTORICAL CONCEPTS IN MODERN HISTORIOGRAPHY

This article argues for the analysis of temporal concepts such as “age,” “century,” and “epoch,” “past,” “present,” and “future,” formed during the Enlightenment, as an approach to the study of the history of modern historiography. Starting from the basic distinction of “empty” and “embodied” time in Leibniz's and Newton's dispute of 1715 about the philosophical nature of time, it traces the episteme of the eighteenth century using the metaphor of a “time garden” for describing some basic features of enlightened historiography. Finally, the paper discusses the consequences of the increasing employment of concepts of embodied time for the future development of the historical sciences.     

Big Philosophical Questions: Why They Matter and Why They Are Still Around

Big philosophical questions—about the mind, the idea of the good, justice, beauty, knowledge—have been the prime interest of philosophers ever since Plato first raised them in his dialogues. However, regardless of how hard philosophers have been trying to find answers to them, it seems that all they have ever managed to do was to find reasons for disagreements, and, on the whole, to have failed to reach a consensus on pretty much anything. Some philosophers now claim that there hasn’t been much progress in philosophy, especially when compared to the sciences. I take up this verdict and try to refute it, first by offering an alternative view on what counts as progress, and then by analyzing big philosophical questions and their relevance for our intellectual and practical pursuits. I argue that, due to the distinctive nature of philosophical curiosity, coming up with answers to the big philosophical questions is an ideal that can hardly be met, but that philosophy nevertheless delivers various benefits, intellectual and practical, which the proponents of the No-Progress View tend to ignore.     

Doxographical or Philosophical History of Philosophy: On Michael Frede's Precepts for Writing the History of Philosophy

Summary

In a series of articles from the 1980s and 1990s, Michael Frede analysed the history of histories of philosophy written over the last three hundred years. According to Frede, modern scholars have degenerated into what he calls a ‘doxographical’ mode of writing the history of philosophy. Instead, he argued, these scholars should write what he called ‘philosophical’ history of philosophy, first established in the last decades of the seventeenth century but since abandoned. In the present article it is argued that Frede's reconstruction of the history of histories of philosophy is historically problematic.     

Priestley in Germany

ABSTRACT

The paper focuses on the reception of Priestley in Germany, which is remarkable for the huge and assiduous interest it raised in different philosophical milieus. Priestley’s dynamical conception of matter, his explanation of the functioning of the brain, and of the production of material ideas are at the basis of the new form of materialism that develops in Germany in the late 1770s, and which differs completely from the model of mechanical materialism Germany was used to in earlier decades. Indeed, the German reception of Priestley’s ideas begins surprisingly early, just one year after the publication of his edition of Hartley’s Observations on Man (1775), and traverses the two final decades of the eighteenth century with a considerable number of reviews and references in the main philosophical journals and works of the time. In 1778, his introduction to the Observations was translated into German and presented in the form of a manifesto of a new materialistic philosophy compatible with the claims of morals and religion. Within a few years, Priestley became the unavoidable reference point for the most relevant theological and philosophical discussions concerning the nature of matter and spirits, the place of God, the possibility of human freedom, and the legitimacy of free thinking.     

Histories of analytic political philosophy

This paper sets out an agenda for the study of the history of analytic and post-analytic political philosophy. It builds on a growing literature on the history of analytic philosophy to make three main suggestions. First, analytic philosophy arose as part of a wider shift from the developmental historicism of the nineteenth century to more modernist modes of knowledge. Second, analytic philosophy included a wide range of approaches to moral and political issues, many of which reflected distinctive concepts of analysis, logic, and science. Third, analytic philosophy only became widespread when the work of Quine and Wittgenstein moved it in a more post-analytic direction. Crucially, the move toward post-analytic philosophy inspired people to rediscover and reinvent other traditions, including liberal humanism, democratic republicanism, virtue ethics, and historicism. The resulting history provides a fluid and diverse understanding of arguably the most powerful philosophical movement of the twentieth century.     

Histories of analytic political philosophy

This paper sets out an agenda for the study of the history of analytic and post-analytic political philosophy. It builds on a growing literature on the history of analytic philosophy to make three main suggestions. First, analytic philosophy arose as part of a wider shift from the developmental historicism of the nineteenth century to more modernist modes of knowledge. Second, analytic philosophy included a wide range of approaches to moral and political issues, many of which reflected distinctive concepts of analysis, logic, and science. Third, analytic philosophy only became widespread when the work of Quine and Wittgenstein moved it in a more post-analytic direction. Crucially, the move toward post-analytic philosophy inspired people to rediscover and reinvent other traditions, including liberal humanism, democratic republicanism, virtue ethics, and historicism. The resulting history provides a fluid and diverse understanding of arguably the most powerful philosophical movement of the twentieth century.     

REPORT Neurology of the Arts Mansell Bequest Symposium at the Medical Society of London 30 April–1 May 2001

Philosophical instruments were designed to examine phenomena experimentally, rather than by naturalistic observation alone. In the nineteenth century, some instruments were called philosophical toys because they provided popular amusement as well as experimental assistance. They were applied widely in natural philosophy, but attention here is directed particularly to manipulations of perceived space and time and their influence on art. One of the earliest instruments, which had a profound impact on art as well as science, was the camera obscura. It assisted image formation in art before it was applied as an analogy to the eye at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Later philosophical toys were used to address visual perception of motion and depth. Development was initially driven by the need for stimulus control so that the methods of physics could be applied to the study of perceptual phenomena. The principal instruments were invented in the first half of the nineteenth century, and they consisted of simple contrivances that manipulated time and space in ways that had not previously been appreciated. They included thaumatropes, phenakistoscopes, stroboscopes, anorthoscopes, stereoscopes, tachistoscopes, and chronoscopes. Several of these philosophical toys proved to be phenomenally popular, particularly when combined with photography.     

Philosophical instruments and toys: optical devices extending the art of seeing

Philosophical instruments were designed to examine phenomena experimentally, rather than by naturalistic observation alone. In the nineteenth century, some instruments were called philosophical toys because they provided popular amusement as well as experimental assistance. They were applied widely in natural philosophy, but attention here is directed particularly to manipulations of perceived space and time and their influence on art. One of the earliest instruments, which had a profound impact on art as well as science, was the camera obscura. It assisted image formation in art before it was applied as an analogy to the eye at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Later philosophical toys were used to address visual perception of motion and depth. Development was initially driven by the need for stimulus control so that the methods of physics could be applied to the study of perceptual phenomena. The principal instruments were invented in the first half of the nineteenth century, and they consisted of simple contrivances that manipulated time and space in ways that had not previously been appreciated. They included thaumatropes, phenakistoscopes, stroboscopes, anorthoscopes, stereoscopes, tachistoscopes, and chronoscopes. Several of these philosophical toys proved to be phenomenally popular, particularly when combined with photography.     

Folgen der Emigration deutscher und österreichischer Wissenschaftstheoretiker und Logiker zwischen 1933 und 1945

The paper begins by delimiting the scope of ‘logic’ and ‘philosophy of science’ and goes on to present the biographies and select bibliographies of 36 émigré scholars from Germany and Austria working in these fields. An evaluation of this material, and of data on societies, congresses, lecture series, books and periodicals on logic and philosophy of science, is then undertaken. Against the rich background of activity in the 20s and 30s of our century, there is manifest a rapid decline of high-ranking research in the philosophy of science and (to a lesser degree) in logic in Germany and Austria. Since, with one exception, émigré logicians and philosophers of science did not return after the breakdown of the Third Reich, recovery in these fields has been extremely slow. Pertinent knowledge had to be re-imported, and a satisfactory level has been reached only with the coming of a new generation.