The British road to war: Blair, Bush and the decision to invade Iraq

The British decision to go to war against Iraq with the United States has been widely criticized for being based on inaccurate and exaggerated assessments of the threat posed by Iraq. This article shows that the case for military action made by the British government was based on a measured analysis of the threat, on the conviction that the continued containment of Iraq through sanctions was not effective or morally acceptable, and that the human rights violations of the Iraqi regime were of a such a scale that they could no longer be tolerated. The article then assesses the judgements of the British government in the light of the information that has come to light since the war against Iraq in 2003.     

Past,present, and future: the role of the Cold War in legitimising Danish foreign policy activism

The Cold War has had an extended life span in Danish foreign policy due to the establishment of a right-wing revisionist agenda. This article argues that this revisionism came to serve different contemporary purposes under the Anders Fogh Rasmussen governments. Externally it was used to legitimise the Danish participation in the Iraq War and came to serve as a tool to discipline the war-sceptical social democratic led opposition and secured parliamentary support for an offensive Liberal-inspired activism in Danish foreign policy. Domestically the revisionism became entangled with the overall cultural war that the Liberal-led government launched and thereby became a part of the overall ideological war that united the governing coalition from 2001 to 2011.     

Oil and the question of federalism in Iraq

The ‘oil question’ in Iraq has traditionally been viewed almost exclusively through the prism of ethno‐sectarianism. Disputes over the management and licensing of the hydrocarbon sector and over revenue distribution have been seen as a battle for power between Iraq's ethnic and sectarian communities, as if these were monolithic entities. This has led to a conviction—especially among US policy‐makers in post‐war Iraq—that solving the problem lies in a simple formula of apportioning control of the sector to decentralized authorities and dividing revenue proportionally. This view ignores the fact that disagreements over management of the sector and over revenue distribution reflect a deeper dispute that cuts across ethno‐sectarian lines. In reality, disputes are driven far more by the as‐yet‐unresolved issue of whether ultimate sovereign authority in Iraq lies with the central government or should be decentralized to regional and provincial governments. As the main source of revenue in Iraq, control over the oil and gas sector is critical to the success of these rival agendas. Consequently, compromise has been impossible to achieve, and neither side is willing to make concessions for fear of threatening their long‐term ambitions. Tactical maneuvering by different parties in the aftermath of the recent elections may provide some temporary respite to the oil and gas dispute, as Arab leaders in Baghdad seek to co‐opt the support of Kurdish parties to form a new coalition government. But an accommodation over the federalism question in Iraq still seems out of reach. This will not only hamper the legislative process and effective government in the coming years, but could also threaten stability, particularly along the fragile border that separates the Kurdistan Region from the rest of Iraq.     

从"伊拉克门"到"情报门"——美国对萨达姆政权政策探析

美国当代有两次所谓"伊拉克门"丑闻:一次发生在海湾战前,以美国纵容伊拉克发展大规模杀伤性武器借以改善美伊关系为特征;另一次又称"情报门",发生在2003年伊拉克战争前,以美国政府夸大伊拉克大规模杀伤性武器的威胁度和紧迫性,为发动伊战寻求借口为特征。两次"伊拉克门"特征迥异,却都与大规模杀伤性武器紧密相关。大规模杀伤性武器成为美国处理对伊关系、制定对伊政策的核心因素。两次"伊拉克门"期间,随着国际环境以及战略重心的改变,美国的伊拉克政策也发生了巨大的转变,美国对伊外交政策的务实主义本质在两次"伊拉克门"丑闻中得到了充分的体现。     

The Case for a Pre-emptive Strike,and so forth …

Abstract

This article is a response to the piece by Stephen Strehle in issue 5.1. It is recognized that a variety of theological and political perspectives come from the US, but argues that this is a poor illustration of contemporary political theology. Strehle, it is suggested, has a mistaken understanding of US history and represents a strand of American thought which has failed to acknowledge the faults of an imperial past, in particular the crimes committed against ‘native’ peoples. The war against Iraq is presented as a further illustration of an imperial mentality which pervades parts of US culture. Strehle fails to recognize the flaws apparent in the morality of the West. The critique of the place of just war theory in contemporary geo-political conflicts is challenged, as is the assertion that the church has a duty to follow the government of the day. The article ends with a recognition of the value of, and inspiration resulting from, much US political theological thought.     

Iran's Shortsighted Policies in Iraq: Between Inflaming and Containing of Radical Sunni Islam: 2003–2015

The main goal of the 2003 war with Iraq of the coalition forces led by the United States was to topple Saddam Hussein's regime and establish a new political system that would adopt democratic practices. Iran, a country that deemed Saddam's regime to be a threat, considered this war to be very helpful in many ways — first because it put an end to Clinton's “dual containment” approach and would thus help Iran to become a regional superpower at Iraq's expense. Second, a war with Iraq could put an end to the decades of oppression of the Shi'a community in Iraq. This article argues that Iran's involvement in Iraq's internal affairs created chaos in Iraq and contributed to the sectarian conflict against Sunni terror groups, notably the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known by the Arabic name Daesh, a terror group with the most extreme form of Sunni Radical Islam ever known. The sectarian conflict that resulted from the above is now taking place between the Sunnis and the Shi'a of both Persian and Arab backgrounds and this clash could not have become as radical as it is without Iran's aggressive foreign policy. It should, however, be noted that Iran is not the sole player in the country and therefore its part in inflaming sectarian conflicts should be viewed through a realistic prism that allows other forces — domestic and foreign — to be seen as having influenced the events for their benefit.     

Questions of deception: contested understandings of the polls on WMD,political leaders and governments in Australia,Britain and the United States

The weapons of mass destruction (WMD) Saddam Hussein was said to possess were central to the justification the Australian Prime Minister gave for Australia's decision to go to war in Iraq. When no WMD materialised, poll data suggested that the public felt misled. But the same data suggested that support for both the government and the Prime Minister was unaffected. Among critics of the war, this generated a moral panic about Australian democracy and the Australian public—its commitment to the end justifying the means, its failure to receive a lead from the Labor Party, its widespread apathy. It also led to an intense debate about why the charge of not telling the truth had weakened public support for Blair and Bush but not for Howard. This article explores the concerns expressed by critics of the war in the face of polling that suggested that Australians were prepared to support a government and its leader that had misled them—deliberately or otherwise. It raises questions about the contrasts drawn between polled opinion in Australia, Britain and the United States. And it argues that the differences in the pattern of opinion across the three countries were not marked and that what had cost governments support were views about how the war was going, not the failure to find WMD.     

Who's making UK foreign policy?

The war in Iraq has intensified a debate about the extent to which Tony Blair's style of government is presidential, secretive, ad hoc, informal and susceptible to groupthink. But who is really making UK foreign policy? This article suggests that there is no simple or singular answer since the government simultaneously pursues multiple foreign policies involving different combinations of institutions, actors and external pressures. It then discusses New Labour's impact upon the four interrelated phases of the foreign policy process: formulation, interpretation, implementation and presentation. The author suggests that Blair's government has found it difficult to implement many of its foreign policy initiatives and has relied instead upon three ‘big ideas’, namely, multilateralism, Atlanticism and neo‐liberalism. To date, it has failed to resolve the practical tensions between these three commitments. The final section explores how the demand for open and accountable government has increased the importance attached to the presentation of foreign policy. This, in turn, has increased the importance of the news media as a battlefield on which the struggle for hearts and minds is taking place. Ironically, the government's unparalleled attempts to sell its foreign policies (both at home and abroad) has opened the policy process up to levels of scrutiny that it may not be able to withstand.     

Attitudes toward War in the United States and Iran

Understanding the determinants of attitudes toward war is important for the prevention of military conflicts and the promotion of peaceful conflict resolution. To examine American and Iranian attitudes toward war, questionnaires were administered to American and Iranian college students in the United States and Iran respectively. The results of the study revealed that American students generally have more positive attitudes toward war than Iranian students. Since most Iranians in the sample experienced eight years of war with Iraq whereas Americans never had direct experience of war, it was predicted that direct experiences of military action could explain this cross-national difference. Among Iranians those who experienced the Iran–Iraq war had more negative attitudes toward war compared to Iranians who did not have such experiences. The results further demonstrated that being authoritarian, religious and male were independently related to having positive attitudes toward war in both samples.     

Strategic Interaction and the Iran–Iraq War: Lessons to Learn for Future Engagement?

Using an interdisciplinary approach combining international relations and Middle Eastern studies, this research examines the Iran–Iraq war using the concepts of strategic interaction and reciprocity as theoretical anchors to illuminate more fully than previous investigations how these two states arrived at the point of war in 1980. Through a case study methodology, the findings demonstrate mixed results for the applicability of IR theory to fully explain the Iran–Iraq war. In particular, as a key interactive element of dyadic relationships, it was proposed that the accumulation of past interactions was likely to propagate future behavior with past conflictual interactions increasing the likelihood of future conflictual interactions and vice versa. The observed findings however indicate that time moderates this relationship such that shorter temporal periods are required to support the role of accumulation in influencing future relations.     

Syria's mutating civil war and its impact on Turkey,Iraq and Iran

Recent trends in the Syrian civil war have caused important shifts in alignment among neighbouring states. The conflict has exhibited a sharp turn towards ethno‐sectarian violence, fighting among rival factions of the opposition and loss of central command over peripheral districts. In conjunction with the rise of the radical Islamist movement called the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, these developments precipitated a raging, multisided battle that spread across Syria's northeastern provinces, and sparked renewed sectarian conflict inside Turkey and Iraq. Turkey and Iran responded to the growing ethno‐sectarianization of the civil war by taking steps to conciliate the largely autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), as well as one another. Rapprochement with the KRG alienated Turkey and Iran from Iraq, prompting Iraqi officials to step up military operations along the Syrian frontier. These moves set the stage for large‐scale intervention in Iraq by ISIL, which further weakened Iraq's positon in regional affairs. The resulting reconfiguration of relations accompanied a marked increase in belligerence by non‐state actors, most notably the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which buttressed Turkey's newfound ties to the Kurdistan Regional Government and Iran.     

How was Howard's war possible? Winning the war of position over Iraq

While a range of accounts have engaged with the important question of why Australia participated in military intervention in Iraq, few analyses have addressed the crucial question of how this participation was possible. Employing critical constructivist insights regarding security as a site of contestation and negotiation, this article focuses on the ways in which the Howard Government was able to legitimise Australian involvement in war in Iraq without a significant loss of political legitimacy. We argue that Howard was able to ‘win’ the ‘war of position’ over Iraq through persuasively linking intervention to resonant Australian values, and through marginalising alternatives to war and the actors articulating them.     

When a pigmy acts as a giant: the role of the Italian representatives in the Brussels constitutional convention

The Italian representatives in the Brussels Constitutional Convention played a greater role than expected. The Italians, who many thought would be destined to a role as pigmies in the Convention because of ideological differences and the personal mistrust they carried from their domestic arena, acted mostly as giants in the contributions they provided to the final text. The representatives of both the government and the opposition identified a series of points upon which they agreed and which were introduced in the final document. These positions, although not federalist, were much more advanced than those described as ‘intergovernmental’ or ‘confederal’. There were many reasons for this. The deliberative method adopted in the Convention probably helped this convergence. Certainly, the Italians wanted to keep open the dialogue with the main EU member‐states at a moment when the war with Iraq was undermining it, and the Italian representatives in the Convention shared a pro‐European attitude, while this attitude was being called into question in the domestic arena by the Berlusconi government.     

Books Received

Abstract

YEARS FROM NOW, historians seeking a barometer of the decline in popular support for the Iraq War need only read Bob Woodward's trilogy on the George W. Bush administration's foreign policy. The first volume, Bush at War, which exanfines the planning for the war in Afghanistan in 200l, borders at times on the hagiographical.¹ The sequel, Plan of Attack, which examines the military and diplomatic approach to war in Iraq in 2oo3, is more reserved. Bush himself receives even-handed treatment, but many of his subordinates, in particular the secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and the civilian leadership in the Pentagon, are severely criticized. Woodward's disillusionment is complete by the summer of 2oo6, when he published the dfird and final volume, State of Denial, which details the failures of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, and shows no sign of the patriotism that coloured the earlier work. Bush at War, written with the smoke from 9/11 wafting in the airs could praise because it does not focus on Iraq: few objected to the means used and the ends pursued in Afghanistan. But Plan of Attack and State of Denial seek to explain a manifestly unpopular war.¹     

Was Iraq an unjust war? A debate on the Iraq war and reflections on Libya*

This article is based on a debate held on 22 March 2011 at Chatham House on ‘Was Iraq an unjust war?’ David Fisher argues that the war fully failed to meet any of the just war criteria. The war was undertaken to disarm Iraq of its WMD but the evidence that it had such weapons was inadequate. There were concerns about the justice of the cause, reinforced by doubts that those initiating military action avowedly on behalf of the UN had the requisite competent authority to do so, given the absence of any international consensus in favour of military action. The doubts were further reinforced by concern that action was being undertaken too soon and not as a last resort. Crucially, no adequate assessment was undertaken before military action was authorized to seek to ensure that the harm likely to result would not outweigh the good achieved. The individual failures mutually reinforced each other, so building up cumulatively to support the conclusion that the war was undertaken without sufficient just cause and without adequate planning how to achieve a just outcome following military action to impose regime change. It thus failed the two key tests that have to be met before a war can be justly undertaken, designed to ensure that military action is only initiated if more good than harm is likely to result. By contrast, current coalition operations in Libya are, so far, just. This is a humanitarian operation undertaken to halt a humanitarian catastrophe that is taking place, with wide international support, including authorization by the UN Security Council. Nigel Biggar argues that the fact that the invasion and occupation of Iraq suffered from grave errors, some of them morally culpable, does not yet establish its overall injustice. All wars are morally flawed, even just ones. Further, even if the invasion were illegal, that need not make it immoral. The authority of moral law trumps that of international law, and where the politics of the Security Council prevent the UN from enforcing the law, unauthorized enforcement could be morally justified. Further still, massive civilian casualties do not by themselves make an unjust war. The decisive considerations are those of just cause, last resort and right intention. Proportionality is not among them, because estimating it is far too uncertain. The persistently atrocious nature of the Saddam Hussein regime satisfies just cause; evidence of collapsing containment grounds last resort; and the Coalition's costly correction of early errors proved the seriousness of its good intentions. In sum the invasion and occupation of Iraq was, despite grave errors, justified. Regarding Libya, Biggar notes the recurrence of conflict over the interpretation of international law. He wonders how those who distinguish sharply between protecting civilians and regime change imagine that dissident civilians are to be ‘kept’ safe while Qadhafi remains in power. Against those who clamour for a clear exit‐strategy, he counsels agility, while urging sensitivity to the limits of our power. What was right to begin may become imprudent to continue.     

War is its Own Justification: What Americans Think about War

Abstract

The authors deal with the morality of war in American culture. They argue that a war ethics that was characteristic of the Cold War has given way to a warrior ethics as it has developed in post-Vietnam America, in print media, popular sentiment, and film. According to this warrior ethics, the citizenry's support for soldiers, regardless of the justice of war, is understood to create social solidarity. Wars are easily justified because, at bottom, war is understood to be its own justification. It unites a country. This popular conception of war both props up more high-minded, political rationales for war and undermines traditional just war ethics. The article uses the war in Iraq as a case study. It analyzes the Bush administration's defense of the war alongside similar accounts of the just war theory given by Richard John Neuhaus, Michael Novak, and George Weigel.

"As a moral problem, war is ultimately a problem of policy, and therefore a problem of social morality." John Courtney Murray     

'International community' after Iraq

One frequently hears statements about the damage done to the 'international community' by disagreements about the invasion and occupation of Iraq. It is clear from the general nature and frequency of its use that the term 'inter‐national community' has an important political function in generating legiti‐macy for those who act in its name. It is also clear from its popular usage that 'international community' means very different, and often quite opposed, things to different people. Why is the strong term 'community' chosen when 'inter‐national society' might be more useful? Longstanding debates within political theory and the English school provide helpful insights into why people use this term in the ways that they do. This article will argue that international community implies a deep and robust sharing of identity, and that in relation to the Iraq war, the most important meaning of it equates broadly with the West. The authors look at the effect of the war on the western international com‐munity through its impact on NATO, the EU, the UN, the WTO and public opinion. They further argue that the evidence from these sources does not yet suggest that the western international community has been fatally damaged.     

The desert of the real and the simulacrum of war

As the global war on terror bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, a new inter‐and intra‐service struggle emerged within the military, between what we might call the ‘transformationists’ and the ‘neotraditionalists’. The transformationists put their faith in network‐centric warfare and precision munitions to resolve the intractable political, civil and religious conflicts of the twenty‐first century. The neotraditionalists, in contrast, go back to the future for lessons, to the ‘low‐intensity conflicts’ of Malaya and Vietnam, the ‘small wars’ that Marines fought in Central America in the interwar period, and even the instructions given to American servicemen deployed to assist the British occupation of Iraq during the Second World War. Lumped together under the rubric of ‘irregular warfare’, two new watchwords have had emerged from the neotraditionalist camp: ‘counter‐insurgency’ and ‘cultural awareness’. As the neotraditionalists reach out to social scientists to assist them in their efforts, a secondary civil war has erupted in the universities over whether academics should become involved in the new war efforts. Based on a week spent embedded with the 1/25th Marines at 29 Palms and extensive interviews with key proponents and critics, this article maps (and reflexively questions the practice of mapping) the future of warfare as it is planned, taught, gamed and operationalized by the US military.     

A war in search of a rationale

The recent publications of memoirs by former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet and former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith have reopened the debate over the origins of the Iraq War. Both men—who were widely blamed for the ‘intelligence failure’ on weapons of mass destruction and the exaggerated connection between Al‐Qaeda and Iraq—purport to set the record straight about what really happened inside the Bush administration during the run‐up to the war. Yet, both men have actually produced books marked by a strange combination of self‐pity and disingenuousness. This article looks at their attempts at self‐justification in light of the growing evidence that the decision to invade was made in mid‐2002; if true, their arguments that they were participating in a genuine policy debate rather than a search for a rationale become problematic. Rather than exculpating themselves, their memoirs instead serve as damning indictments of both men, showing how Tenet and Feith enabled the President's decision to wage war on Iraq as a matter of choice rather than necessity.     

The Polish contribution to protection of the archaeological heritage in central south Iraq,November 2003 to April 2005

Abstract

Iraq is the cradle of modern civilization, the land of ancient Mesopotamia, and thus unparalleled in its wealth of heritage sites. For years, with its strong Antiquities Law and its professional State Board of Antiquities and Heritage, Iraq protected its antiquities successfully. But since the beginning of the 1990s, many archaeological sites have been looted. Following the Second Gulf War (2003) the Polish government has attempted to assist Iraq. Since November 2003 the Polish Ministry of Culture has been delegating archaeologists for purposes of documentation, intervention and protection of the archaeological monuments located in the central southern part of Iraq, the core land of ancient Babylonia and Sumer. In close cooperation with Iraqi archaeologists, twenty-four projects valued at US$680,000 have been implemented between January 2004 and April 2005, involving aerial and ground reconnaissance and salvage recording of the most threatened archaeological sites. The Polish team has also conducted education and awareness training of the Coalition forces detachments to promote respect for heritage.