Myths, Motivations and 'Misunderestimations': the Bush Administration and Iraq

This article explores the myths and motivations behind US foreign policy towards Iraq in America's 'war on terrorism'. It argues that the foreign policy of the Bush administration is widely misunderstood and that much of the debate about Iraq policy that has taken place has been conducted at an unhelpful level of analysis. It addresses arguments that the Bush administration is motivated by oil, revenge or hubris as well as the more mainstream arguments that an attack on Iraq would provoke instability through the entire Middle East, as well as encouraging further acts of and support for murderous terrorism; that there is no urgency to act against Iraq as containment and deterrence remain adequate means to manage this threat; and that Iraq should be a lower priority than dealing with North Korea. It does this by analysing the development of American foreign policy thinking on the war on terrorism, what motivates it, and why it rejects the arguments of its critics. The article explains the intellectual process by which the US decided upon this course of action and how Europe's failure to understand this process added to its incomprehension of American policy. It does not argue that European's opposition would have been swept aside had they better understood the Bush administration, the central disagreement about the necessity and prudence of military action versus containment remains, but that such an understanding would have allowed for a better and more focused level of debate than the one which has got us to this point. Nor does it argue that the Bush administration approach is necessarily persuasive or justified, merely that its case is reasoned and explicable in terms of America's foreign policy traditions.     

George W. Bush,Barack Obama and the future of US global leadership

The foreign policy world views of George W. Bush and Barack Obama differ dramatically. Bush made terrorism the focal point of his foreign policy and dismissed the idea that either allies or international institutions should constrain America's freedom of action. Obama sees terrorism as one of many transnational problems that require the cooperation of other countries to combat and, as a result, the United States must invest more in diplomatic efforts to build partnerships. Despite these differences, both presidents share one common conviction: that other countries long for US leadership. Bush believed that friends and allies would eventually rally to the side of the United States, even if they bristled at its actions, because they shared America's goals and had faith in its motives. Obama believed that a United States that listened more to others, stressed common interests and favored multinational action would command followers. In practice, however, both visions of American global leadership faltered. Bush discovered that many countries rejected his style of leadership as well as his strategies. Obama discovered that in a globalized world, where power has been more widely dispersed, many countries are not looking to Washington for direction. The future success of US foreign policy depends on the ability of policy‐makers to recognize and adapt to a changing geopolitical environment in which the US remains the most significant military, diplomatic and economic power but finds it, nonetheless, increasingly difficult to drive the global agenda.     

Obama and the third Bush term: towards a typology of Obama studies

In 2008, Barack Obama pledged to transform not simply his nation's domestic orientation but also its foreign policy and its reception abroad; he would be the ‘un‐Bush’ president. The books under review each offer a preliminary assessment of how far he has departed from Bush and how far he has adapted and improved his predecessor's approach. For some, Obama has been compromised in his international agenda, like Bush before him, by domestic constraints that have afflicted every modern US president; for others, his lofty ambitions have been hobbled by the enduring realities of global politics. This review offers a typology of assessments of Obama's foreign policy and suggests which is more accurate and why.     

George W. Bush, Idealist

There is much anger and confused grumbling these days outside the United States—and in Europe in particular—about the character of the Bush administration's foreign policy. Perceived American unilateralism is raising hackles and questions. This article contends that current trends in US foreign policy can be better understood by realizing that many senior Bush administration officials are not 'realists', at least as that philosophy of world politics is classically understood. Many of the resulting views—that, for example, threats to security often originate in ideology rather than material strength—are demonstrably correct and even hopeful in their faith in long-term historical trends. But there may be no getting around the essential contradictions required of US foreign policy in an age when America is the leading power, when a new global community of trading democracies is emerging, and yet when a number of distinctly old-style threats to the peace remain very much in evidence. Washington could do more to smooth the edges of those contradictions in order to point up the idealism and hopefulness of US policy.     

War in Iraq, Revolution in America

In this lecture in honour of John Whitehead, Strobe Talbott reflects on the history of the international system, the emergence of the nation-state and the role the US has played in the formation of post-Second World War international institutions. He draws a distinction between the typical Westphalian nation-state, exemplified in Europe, and the United States, a nation based on the 'exertion of political will and championship of political ideas'—a distinction that helps to account for the strain of 'exemplary exceptionalism'; in the history of US foreign policy. Turning to a dichotomy of approach in the foreign policy of the current Bush administration, the author draws attention to the continuation of a tradition of 'moral clarity' on the one hand and on the other hand the introduction of a new concept that saw the preeminence of American power reordering a dangerous world. He believes the Bush 'revolution' in foreign policy reached its peak with the Iraq war and that there is now hope the US will recommit itself to the international institutions severely damaged over the past two years and will begin a new era in which America takes a leading role within a multilateral framework.     

Innovation and precedent in the Kosovo war: the impact of Operation Allied Force on US foreign policy

The 1990s was a period of strategic innovation in US foreign policy. Operation Allied Force in particular represented an important step in the contorted evolution of America's attitude towards the use of force in the post-Cold War period. That operation demonstrated the growing influence of humanitarian concerns and the extent to which America was willing to reconsider Cold War criteria on the prudence and utility of force in support of its foreign policy. In its decision to intervene in Kosovo, the Clinton administration also divided opinion among the military. This, in effect, reduced the premium placed on the counsels of the armed forces and made it easier for the Bush administration subsequently to ignore their advice. Furthermore, having fought the war multilaterally through NATO, Operation Allied Force made America more wary of doing so again. In other words, the intervention set a number of precedents and left a significant legacy for the way in which US foreign policy was pursued in the decade that followed. This legacy is considered in two parts: the first analyses those issues associated with the use of force debate; the second considers how the Kosovo experience affected US attitudes to coalition warfare.     

The ideological roots of failure: the application of kinetic neo‐liberalism to Iraq

This article argues that American policy towards Iraq went through four major shifts between the invasion in 2003 and the announcement of the surge in 2007. The best way to understand the Bush administration's evolving policy towards Iraq is by examining the ideological parameters within which it was made. The article assesses various approaches to understanding the relationship between ideology, policy making and foreign policy, concluding that ideology shapes the paradigm and analytical categories within which foreign policy is made. A major change in foreign policy originates either from the decision‐maker consciously recognizing and attempting to rework the ideational parameters within which policy is made or in reaction to ‘discrepant information’ or ‘anomalies’ that destabilize the paradigm and its analytical categories. The article goes on to examine the extent to which both neo‐liberalism and neo‐conservatism shaped George W. Bush's foreign policy. It identifies a series of major analytical categories that originate from within these two doctrines and shaped policy towards Iraq. The article argues that the four major shifts in Bush's policy towards Iraq were forced upon the administration by the rising tide of politically motivated violence. Ultimately this violence forced Bush to abandon the major analytical categories that, up to 2007, had given his policy coherence. In order to extricate his administration from the quagmire that Iraq had become by 2006, Bush totally transformed his approach, dropping the previously dominant neo‐liberal paradigm and adopting a counter‐insurgency doctrine.     

Plausibly deniable: mercenaries in US covert interventions during the Cold War, 1964–1987

This article examines the role and the significance of professional mercenaries as an instrument of US covert action programmes during the Cold War. Arguing that even small groups of these ‘career mercenaries’ used as advisors and so-called force multipliers could potentially make a difference in small-scale proxy wars in the Global South, the author asserts a process of institutional learning in which mercenaries became a possible substitute for official military advisors. While western mercenaries were rewarding targets for communist propaganda and caused discord on the foreign policy level, the greater danger were unintended side effects on the domestic level, including the formation of a paramilitary subculture within the USA.     

9/11 and the Past and Future of American Foreign Policy

Does the national security strategy of the Bush administration constitute a radical new departure or does it possess clear links to past American policies? Is the Bush strategy motivated by the perception of threat, the pursuit of power, or the quest for hegemony? This article argues that the policies of the Bush administration are more textured and more conflicted than either its friends or its foes believe. They are also less bold and less likely to offer enduring solutions. In fact, they constitute a surprising departure from the ways most former US administrations have dealt with ‘existential’ threats in the twentieth century. By championing a ‘balance of power favouring freedom’ and by eschewing the ‘community of power’ approach propounded by Woodrow Wilson, Bush and his advisers are charting a unilateralist course for times of crisis, a course neither so popular nor so efficacious as its proponents think. But the unilateralism is prompted by fears and threats that must not be dismissed or trivialized by critics of the administration.     

Iraq and the limitations of American foreign policy in the Middle East

The Bush administration has manoeuvred itself into an exquisite dilemma. Iraq is by all reasonable assessments a foreign policy calamity and perceptions of American power and legitimacy are at an all time low. All the options available to the US in dealing with the situation carry significant costs. For the US to extricate itself from Iraq it must engage with regimes that it claims it has an existential and intractable conflict with, such as Iran and Syria. This is a direct outcome of the failure of the Bush administration to acknowledge the realities of the situation in Iraq and the complexities involved in solving this crisis. It also highlights a much greater problem with current US foreign policy towards the Middle East, namely an ignorance of the interconnected nature of conflicts and tensions in the region. Approaching Iran and Syria regarding the Iraqi crisis would signal a positive shift away from the current values-driven unilateralism towards a more realistic and flexible policy to further US national interests.     

The double interregnum: UK–US relations beyond Blair and Bush

The downturn in relations between the UK and the US under the premiership of Gordon Brown presents an interesting opportunity to analyse the nature of the relationship between the two states. Brown's policy of creating distance between his approach and that of his predecessor, Tony Blair, and between himself and President Bush, offers a case‐study in whether it is possible to be cool towards an incumbent leader while remaining close to the state he leads. In other words: is it feasible to be anti‐Bush and pro‐American? It also provides an opportunity to analyse the role of political timing in inter‐state relations. By appearing driven by reaction to the events of 2003 despite taking office in 2007, Brown put himself out of step with the prevailing mood of the time. By also acting as if the Bush administration was a lame duck counting out its time to retirement in 2009, Brown allowed himself to be outmanoeuvred in his bid for America's attention by the conciliatorily pro‐American new leaders of France and Germany. By acting as if the Bush administration is a political interregnum, the Brown government has invited the United States to treat his own administration the same way. The result is a dual interregnum in UK–US relations, with each incumbent leader awaiting the political demise of the other before better relations can be resumed.     

‘Quacking like a duck’? Bush II and presidential power in the second term

It seems a truism of American politics that second presidential terms are destined to be less successful than the period of office which they follow and yet there is very little academic analysis as to why this is the case. Whether there are inherent or structural features of the US political system that unduly affects second-term presidencies and what impact these features might have on the remainder of the Bush administration is the subject of this article. While the impact of this phenomenon is analysed in general, particular attention is focused on the effect of American foreign policy since the Bush presidency, because of Iraq, this subject will ultimately determine the success or failure of the second term. This focus also reflects the fact that second-term administrations tend to be dominated by a focus on foreign policy. The article argues that despite being returned to power with a considerable number of political advantages compared with previous presidents at this stage of their tenure, the Bush administration is already displaying many of the characteristics of an underachieving second term. The article consists of three sections: part one examines the presidential record and analyses the contention that second terms are somehow different; part two sets out the reasons that might account for this factor; and part three applies these factors to the Bush administration to see which of these features apply to the present incumbent and thus what can be expected for the remainder of his second term in office until January 2009.     

The coming revolution in foreign affairs: rethinking American national security

For the last two decades the US has pursued what some analysts have called the ‘fantastical idea’ of military transformation that would enable the US to change the very nature of war. Known as the ‘revolution in military affairs’, this process would use technology to provide the US with battlefield dominance that no opponent could overcome. Motivated by the politics of the Cold War, however, this exit from reality has proved less than effective in what has become known as the ‘war on terror’. The US has been pulled into nasty, ‘small’ wars, against enemies utilizing asymmetric tactics. The Bush administration has tried to destroy these groups through the use of military force, failing, or even worse refusing, to recognize that these enemies feed off the economical, political and social rot of weak and failing states. For the last eight years the US government has addressed the symptoms of a problem rather than the actual disease. If America wants to make serious progress with the most pressing national security risks, the next American president must enact a revolution in foreign affairs that sees a massive overhaul and substantial investment in the State Department and USAID. A critical mass of research exists to illustrate the links between development and security—it is time Washington gets serious and embraces a conception of security that is more holistic, and ultimately, more effective.     

For all the Wrong Reasons? Re‐evaluating Truman,Domestic Influences,and the Palestine Question

This essay is a re‐evaluation of President Harry Truman's foreign policy in Palestine and whether his decision‐making was influenced by domestic issues, events and attitudes. The article both weighs in on the current debate of whether Truman was susceptible to electoral influences and the Jewish vote, and argues that Truman never knowingly placed American interests in jeopardy by going against the recommendations of his State Department. Rather, the advice of his closest aids convinced him that a pro‐Zionist policy would not detriment American interests in the Middle East. Thus, Truman could then seek to gain political and electoral advantages from a policy that he believed was already in America's best interest. In addition, I will argue that American anti‐Semitism and a revival of nativist attitudes in America resulted in an environment in which America would not accept its share of the displaced persons. As a result, Truman advocated a policy of refugee Zionism with regards to the Palestine Question, which ultimately undermined the British, who were too weak to uphold the Palestine Mandate following the war. Thus, the influence of American domestic issues took many forms and was one integral factor in the eventual outcome of the Palestine Question.     

Last charge of the knights? Iraq,Afghanistan and the special relationship

At the heart of the ‘special relationship’ ideology, there is supposed to be a grand bargain. In exchange for paying the ‘blood price’ as America's ally, Britain will be rewarded with exceptional influence over American foreign policy and its strategic behaviour. Soldiers and statesman continue to articulate this idea. Since 9/11, the notion of Britain playing ‘Greece’ to America's ‘Rome’ gained new life thanks to Anglophiles on both sides of the Atlantic. One potent version of this ideology was that the more seasoned British would teach Americans how to fight ‘small wars’ in Iraq and Afghanistan, thereby bolstering their role as tutor to the superpower. Britain does derive benefits from the Anglo‐American alliance and has made momentous contributions to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet British solidarity and sacrifices have not purchased special influence in Washington. This is partly due to Atlanticist ideology, which sets Britain unrealistic standards by which it is judged, and partly because the notion of ‘special influence’ is misleading as it loses sight of the complexities of American policy‐making. The overall result of expeditionary wars has been to strain British credibility in American eyes and to display its lack of consistent influence both over high policy and the design and execution of US military campaigns. While there may be good arguments in favour of the UK continuing its efforts in Afghanistan, the notion that the war fortifies Britain's vicarious world status is a dangerous illusion that leads to repeated overstretch and disappointment. Now that Britain is in the foothills of a strategic defence review, it is important that the British abandon this false consciousness.     

‘An Angel Directs the Storm’: The Religious Politics of American Neoconservatism

Abstract

In his inaugural speech, President George W. Bush suggested that the mission of America to spread freedom and democracy in the world is a divinely authored mission. The intention first announced in Bush's inaugural to globalize an American Christian vision of freedom and democracy, and of free market capitalism, reflects the theological underpinnings of the neo-conservativism of the Bush administration. In this article I trace the remarkable continuities between the neo-conservative political theology of Bush and his acolytes and more mainstream Niebuhrian approaches to democracy and the ‘manifest destiny’ of America. I then subject the emergence of an American imperium, and the political theology associated with it, to a critique in dialogue with early Christian critics of Roman Empire, and with the Christian pacifist tradition as recently retrieved by North American theological ethicists John Howard Yoder and Stanley Hauerwas.     

The perils of a trade-first US foreign policy

The end of the Cold War, the advent of globalisation, and new horizons in trade theory, all seem to point out to the need for a new American economic strategy. Indeed, for many they beg for the implementation of economism as the new US foreign policy doctrine. The managed trade policy (1993-1996) of forcibly opening foreign markets for the benefit of corporate America showed much of what is wrong with a trade-first agenda in foreign affairs: it accomplished nothing in terms of economic gain while creating dangerous spillovers into other foreign policy areas--such as political and security bilateral relationships--thus endangering the broader goals of US foreign policy. A foreign policy that puts trade at the top of the agenda is unwarranted, probably unsustainable, and ultimately counterproductive. Moreover, it is hardly the most important tool by which the economic wellbeing of most Americans can be enhanced. The return of low productivity figures and a slowing American economy may well rekindle calls for a policy of managed trade. Such calls must be rejected and the lessons of the recent past must be heeded.     

The war on terror in American grand strategy

The 9/11 attacks made the war on terror the central plank of American grand strategy. Yet despite its importance in shaping US policy choices, there has been considerable confusion over how the war on terror relates to foreign policy goals. This article attempts to locate the war on terror within American grand strategy and makes three claims. First, it argues that the Bush administration's approach to the war on terror rests on a false analogy between terrorism and fascism or communism. This has led to misinterpretations of the goals of the war on terror and to a persistent misuse of American power. Second, it suggests that the central purpose of the war on terror should be to de‐legitimize terror as a tactic and to induce states to assume responsibility for controlling terrorists within their borders. American grand strategy should be focused on creating a normative anti‐terror regime with costly commitments by linchpin states—defined as great powers and crucial but endangered allies such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—rather than on conducting regime change against rogue states on the margins of the international system. Success in the war on terror should be measured not by the perceived legitimacy of discrete US policy choices, but by the number of these crucial states who accept the de‐legitimation of terrorism as a core foreign policy principle and act accordingly. Third, it argues that bilateral enforcement of an anti‐terror regime imposes high costs for US power and puts other elements of American grand strategy— including the promotion of democracy and the promotion of human rights—at risk. To reduce these costs and to preserve American power over the long‐term, the US should attempt to institutionalize cooperation in the war on terror and to scale back ambitious policy choices (such as achieving a democratic revolution in the Middle East) which increase the risks of state defection from the anti‐terror regime.     

和平队的历史文化渊源

和平队创建于20世纪60年代肯尼迪政府时期,它是作为一个对外志愿援助机构的面目出现的.之所以在美国出现这样一个援外志愿者组织,除了肯尼迪政府对美国对外政策的调整的现实考虑,更主要是美国具有和平队所提倡的历史文化传统,如美国社会广泛存在的志愿者精神、美国历史上形成的边疆传统和拓荒者精神以及往届政府的政策实践等.     

America as a European power: the end of empire by integration?

Is the postwar partnership between Europe and America now a historical artefact? Much depends on whether the notion of America as a ‘European power’ still holds. The US attained this status through a strategy of ‘empire by integration’, extending its postwar ‘empire’ through negotiation and support for European integration, and envisaging a collectively powerful Europe as fundamental to the health of its most important security alliance. The election of George W. Bush, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the war in Iraq are often seen as producing deep ruptures both in American policy towards Europe and the transatlantic alliance. Yet, the embrace of a new US policy of ‘disaggregation’ of Europe is unproven, and in any event unlikely to mark a permanent shift. The US and Europe are surprisingly close to agreement on ends for the international order. Conflict over Iraq has obscured a significant increase in policy cooperation and convergence of strategy in the war on terrorism.