Political change in the Arab oil monarchies: from liberalization to enfranchisement

The oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf region have typically been portrayed as patriarchal autocracies characterized by traditional tribal rule that have taken on the characteristics of a modern state. The historical debate on these rentier states has centred on how their substantial oil income since the 1970s has allowed them to pacify their citizenry from making demands for enfranchisement. Power was thus firmly able to rest with the elites. Since the end of the Cold War, winds of change flamed the desire for reform and the late 1990s saw significant political changes. The empirical data indicates that this pace has increased, albeit at differential speeds, within the context of the post‐9/11 war on terror. Interestingly, this has been the case despite turmoil in Iraq and a shift to the right in Iranian politics. The fundamental drivers of reform in the Arab oil monarchies continue to be the ruling elites themselves, however. The character of the reforms does appear to be mainly liberalizing rather than democratizing, but developments in some oil monarchies suggest that this process can be viewed as an early or intermediate stage of a wider enfranchisement of civil society.     

The Evolution of Administrative Systems in Kuwait,Saudi Arabia,and Qatar: The Challenge of Implementing Market Based Reforms

The dramatic plunge in oil prices since the second half of 2014 poses serious challenges for the oil dependent states of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, and revives their interest in accelerating the implementation of market‐based reforms such as outsourcing, privatization, and public–private partnerships. This article challenges the assumption that these reforms offer a panacea for administrative change, and argues that while they might appear to be a solution to the growing fiscal constraints in the three Gulf states, considerable administrative, cultural, economic, and political barriers hinder their effective implementation. The conclusion reached is that western labels of market‐based reforms offer limited options for the three states in the absence of strong political will to make fundamental reforms that could alter the state–society relations. It is suggested that further theorization of administrative change is required in cultural contexts, such as the Gulf region, where administration and society are intertwined, and where trying to minimize the role and size of the state, poses a direct threat to the political legitimacy of the ruling elites.     

ASEAN as a “Rules-based Community”: Business as Usual

Abstract

In establishing the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN political elites emphasised their commitment to the rule of law. The definition of the rule of law adopted in the ASEAN Charter mirrored UN reforms that recognised the rule of law as interlinked with democracy and human rights. This commitment raises questions, given the various tactics employed by the grouping’s authoritarian and post-authoritarian regimes to silence dissent. This article critically assesses this apparent shift in regional governance. It first maps the inclusion of rule of law rhetoric in agreements since ASEAN’s foundation, and then examines the form and implementation of dispute settlement mechanisms. It finds that dispute settlement mechanisms have consistently retained the scope for protracted political and bureaucratic negotiation between disputing parties, and “opt out” clauses that enable their contingent application. These findings undermine claims regarding the development of a “rules-based community”, and indicate the continuation of rule by law rather than rule of law. The emphasis placed on ASEAN’s rule of law reforms by elites suggests, then, the rebranding of this political project in support of the ASEAN Economic Community so as to create confidence for investors in the region’s juridical environment.     

Partial texts: Representation,colonialism and agency in pacific history ∗

Abstract

The great ruling and sacred families of Polynesia were the senior representatives of tribal groupings or clans claiming a common homeland, or cult, and sometimes canoe tradition. Using the traditional framework of Polynesian history the inter‐island links and marriage patterns are examined in the four traditional periods, the age of the gods, the legendary period of the national or tribal ancestors, the semi‐legendary first genealogical period and the fourth period which commences with an ancestor from whom living chiefs can trace their descent without contradiction. A fifth period dealing with the great families since European contact and the rise of independent monarchies is also introduced. Particular emphasis is given to the interdependent yet dichotomous nature of tribal culture, the principal example being the relationship between Tonga and Samoa which originally appeared to be culturally distinct but socially one unit made up of two moieties. While modern political boundaries are largely artificial the great families continue to be mutually interdependent forming exogamous alliances and sharing a sense of pan‐Polynesian identity. The great sacred families, in contrast, tend to favour endogamous unions, a pattern emerging in modern Tonga indicative of a process of sacralisation.     

From Demographic Transition to Fertility Boom and Bust: Iran in the 1980s and 1990s

Although it is widely recognized that demographic transition is not an uninterrupted process, demographers and population economists have treated short‐term swings in fertility with a measure of curiosity. Iran's experience of population growth after the Revolution in 1979 points to a double paradox of a steep and unprecedented surge in population growth in the 1980s followed by a swift restoration of fertility decline in the 1990s. Both periods have been characterized by extensive socio‐economic and institutional changes combined with radical and far‐reaching sways in Iran's post‐revolutionary population policy. This article applies standardized decomposition analysis to separate out and quantify the proximate components of change in the crude birth rate during these two fertility ‘boom’ and ‘bust’ phases. The aim is to ascertain to what extent structural/demographic or behavioural factors can explain the dynamics of change in fertility and population growth in Iran since the late 1970s. Our findings point to a hitherto neglected role of population momentum in initiating the ‘Islamic baby boom’ as well as a more limited role for population policy in explaining the genesis(rather than the momentum) of both boom and bust phases.     

Lights,power and the moral economy of early medieval Europe

By the beginning of the early Middle Ages the convention that each church should have a light burning at all times on the altar was strongly established. This paper examines how elites promulgated this idea and benefitted from their ability to furnish lighting material (oil and wax) when this was becoming scarce and expensive. This seeming generosity helped to give the power of rulers a moral quality, but at the same time their insistence that to provide for the lights was a universal obligation meant that the social base of those who could provide for the lights broadened. It is argued here that growth in the number and types of people giving for the lights diluted the moral power that came from giving, but that it also allowed a much broader section of society to participate in the moral economy.     

Intellectuals,Economic Reform and Social Change: Constraints and Opportunities in the Formation of a Nigerian Technocracy

Crisis and economic reforms have changed the status of intellectuals and their relations with dominant élites and policy makers. Because of the technical and ideological nature of these reforms, policy makers have tended to rely on intellectuals as opposed to bureaucrats to shape the agenda of change. This has converted a large number of intellectuals into technocrats and undermined the fabric of academic life in universities. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in developing countries with a large middle class and an economic or financial base that ensures some degree of independence from the multilateral financial institutions. Understanding the success or failure of economic reforms in developing countries requires some analysis of the complex relations between technocrats and political leaders and the societal constraints both sets of actors face. This article explores these issues in the context of Nigeria, whose academic community, bureaucrats and professionals grew in leaps and bounds in the 1970s, following an oil-induced boom. The crisis of the 1980s led to attempts at economic reform and a highly programmed strategy of political change in which academics played a leading role. The article examines the effectiveness of intellectuals in government, and compares the Nigeria case with technocratic experiments in Ghana, Botswana and Côte d?Ivoire.     

Rising Sino-Japanese competition: perspectives from South-East Asian elites

One of the biggest challenges for the East Asian region today is the Sino-Japanese relationship. Starting with the fishing trawler incident in September 2010, followed by Japan's nationalisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, this relationship is experiencing an escalation of tensions in most, if not all, areas of the bilateral relationship. In response to the intensifying competition, China and Japan have elevated the importance of South-East Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in their foreign policy strategies. Focusing on how elites from five South-East Asian states—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam—perceive the engagement of China and Japan with the region, this article poses two questions: (1) How do South-East Asian elites view the Sino-Japanese competition? and (2) How do South-East Asian elites view the role of ASEAN in managing the competition? The analysis here concludes that while some South-East Asian elites see opportunities in the Sino-Japanese competition, they nevertheless do not perceive it as an issue of critical significance. Instead, the concern lies generally with major-power dynamics, and particularly with Sino-US relations. ASEAN is viewed to lack the ability to manage the negative consequences of the Sino-Japanese competition, although its external balancing function has perceptibly helped to restrain any escalation of major-power tensions.     

CONSTRUCTION SACRIFICE,RUMORS AND KIDNAPPING SCARES IN MANGGARAI: FURTHER COMPARATIVE NOTES FROM FLORES

R.A. Drake in Oceania (59:269–79) analyzed rumor panics in Borneo about the purported need for children's heads in concrete construction initiated by the state, as a form of ideological warfare. These rumors are ways of dealing with ambiguous situations and expressions of anxiety. The plausibility of these rumors, he argues, lies in the experience that tribal Borneo has had with state governments, most particularly during colonial times when head-hunting activities were suppressed. The present article looks at a similar rumor complex found in the district of Manggarai in Western Flores within a different cultural and historical context. Manggarai rumor panics center on European missionaries who have been in their region since the beginning of the century and who have been responsible for most of the concrete construction there. This rumor expresses the Manggarai's ambivalence towards foreigners which may be particularly understood, also, in light of their experience with slave-raiders up to the beginning of this century.     

Ukraine’s unfinished natural gas and electricity reforms: one step forward,two steps back

ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to explain Ukraine’s natural gas and electricity sector reforms, to outline the challenges facing these two sectors going forwards and to identify prospects for renewables. It makes three core arguments: First, the regulatory templates promoted by the European Union do not lend themselves to swift implementation. This is because the EU’s approach has been supply-driven, in the sense that it exports regulatory templates already developed within the EU; it is not, therefore, a suitable problem-solving measure for a crisis-stricken country with limited capacities and powerful vested interests. Second, there has been very slow progress made in innovative and creative shifts in Ukrainian energy transition policy, showing a lack of commitment to the transformation and modernisation of energy systems that should in principle be based on the promotion of new business models backed up by reformed political, regulatory and industrial infrastructures. Third, Ukrainian elites have been formally open to the flow of rules as evidenced by a number of agreements concluded between the EU and Ukraine. But, in practice, the pre-existing, deep-seated preferences of those elites have perpetuated the opaque gas trading system, resulting in them being very selective about the rules that they are actually prepared to adopt.     

Understanding large-scale institutional change

A remarkable reform in modern Swedish political history was the transformation of the local government structure between 1952 and 1974. In a mere 22 years, the number of municipalities was reduced from 2,498 to 277. This study aims to answer how such large-scale reforms could come about politically, particularly since much of the literature on institutions and political reform asserts that carrying out large-scale political change should be a difficult task. Two opposing stories of institutional change are presented: evolutionary accounts, which see the amalgamations as rational adaptations to changing circumstances, are contrasted with a social conflict perspective, which explains amalgamations in terms of their distributional consequences. By investigating the processes leading up to this vast restructuring of Swedish local political geography, we demonstrate that an understanding of these reforms as rational adaptations to changing circumstances, made on the basis of consensus among leading political actors, is not accurate. The reforms were not as uncontroversial and non-conflictual as they often have been portrayed. Our results weaken the evolutionary approach to institutional change, whilst supporting the social conflict perspective.     

城市化、城市边缘群体与伊朗伊斯兰革命

20世纪50年代末60年代初巴列维国王发动白色革命,自上而下地推行一揽子经济改革计划,包括土地改革、工业化、扫盲、扩大世俗教育、限制宗教势力等。此后的伊朗,在石油繁荣的带动下,经济发展进入快车道,城市化进入加速发展期。城市化迅猛推进导致伊朗阶级结构嬗变。一方面,两大传统精英阶层乌里玛和巴扎商人的中心地位丧失而渐趋边缘化;另一方面,两大新生阶层即城市新移民和现代知识分子由于政治排斥而被边缘化。传统精英阶层因为利益受损对现实不满,新生阶层则受制度排斥而反对政府。随着伊朗政治生态的恶化,四大阶层走向联合,最终推翻了巴列维王朝。     

The legacy of Atatürk: the limits of conditionality in Turkish European Union membership negotiations

There exists a significant and sustained difference between the ability of the European Union to successfully socialise those member states who have joined since the fall of Communism, and its apparent inability to similarly socialise Turkey. Despite some impressive legal and constitutional reforms since 2001, a key shortcoming remains, the unwillingness of many in the Turkish judiciary to implement those revised standards in a consistent way. Existing explanatory accounts of this inability would focus on the credibility of the Union offer of membership, the duration of negotiations or the importance of Turkish domestic standards. None of these, however, are able to account for why Turkey seems to occupy a half way position, exhibiting reformed laws but unreformed legal practice. To address this shortcoming this article shall combine existing scholarship on the importance of domestic normative contestation within Turkey with an appraisal of the shortcomings of the Union's conditionality policy itself that emerge from the conceptual studies of conditionality.     

The politics of water security in southern Saskatchewan

This paper examines long-term water and resource management in Saskatchewan. Agriculture has long sustained Saskatchewan's economy, but the province experienced a resource boom in oil and potash in the 2008–2015 time period. What potential water-related risks are posed by oil and potash? And is the province able to balance the short-term economic gains of these developments with the long-term goal of water security? The research is based on interviews with policy elites in the province of Saskatchewan and argues that four factors explain why the government continues to favour industry over water security: low-issue salience, economic and political interest, ideology, and political culture.     

Beyond the Property Rights Approach: Welfare Policy and the Reform of State‐Owned Enterprises in China

During the pre‐reform era, Chinese state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) operated not only as firms, but also as mini‐welfare states, providing employees with lifetime employment, inexpensive housing, free health care, and pensions. Since China’s market transition began in the late 1970s, however, SOEs have had to bear increasingly heavy burdens for welfare provisions to their employees. The steep increase in welfare spending has not only eroded the base of state revenue, but has also impeded further SOE reforms. To lighten welfare burdens upon SOEs and to remove institutional obstacles to marketization and privatization embedded in the existing welfare system, the Chinese state has imposed many welfare reforms aimed at shifting responsibilities for welfare provision from SOEs to a combination of government, enterprises, communities, and individuals. This article examines the belated welfare reforms in China’s state sector and their impact upon the reform of SOEs. It finds that reform implementation has been sluggish. To achieve the policy goal of welfare reforms, high degrees of state autonomy and capacity are needed.     

Population and poverty in dependent states: Latin America considered

"Malthusians maintain that rapid population growth aggravates poverty, while Marxists contend that social formations determine its nature and extent. Each perspective is incomplete, however, since it ignores the insights of the other. Latin American states, characterized by dependent capitalism formations and dominated by ruling elites, are generally incapable of solving the problems of population and poverty. Since population growth under dependent capitalism weakens labor's bargaining position against capital, reduced population growth is emphasized as a labor empowerment strategy the poor can implement on their own to improve their socioeconomic conditions."     

Can civic nationalism reduce corruption? Transnational and translocal insights from Solomon Islands

Some scholars and practitioners argue that the key to addressing corruption in poor countries lies in citizens eschewing patronage ties and embracing civic nationalism. This view has led some to suggest that a corruption-busting nationalist sentiment can be encouraged by exposing elites from poor countries to the liberal values of relatively well-governed rich ones. However, thus far few scholars have attempted to understand the complex ways that different types of mobility shape perceptions about nationalism and corruption. This article examines the role mobilities play in shaping attitudes towards nationalism and corruption amongst stakeholders connected to anti-corruption reforms in the Pacific Island nation of Solomon Islands. It finds that highly mobile elites framed corruption and nationalism through two distinct concepts: transnationalism (conceiving the world as comprising territorially divided states) and translocalism (which focuses on local connections developed through [im]mobilities). Transnational framings, shaped by international travel and international indices, stressed the importance of promoting civic nationalism to fight corruption. Translocal framings, reinforced by everyday experiences, were more sceptical of both anti-corruption and nation- and state-building efforts. Findings provide insights into why anti-corruption reforms in post-colonial contexts are so challenging, and the potential for reimagining the relationship between nationalism and anti-corruption.     

Unstable stability: Turkish politics at the crossroads?

The Justice and Development Party has been in power in Turkey since 2002 after a sweeping victory. The party has since implemented a successful economic stabilization programme and led the country into membership negotiations with the European Union. The educated modern‐urban segments of the population, however, continue to harbour suspicion that the government party has a secret agenda of turning Turkey into an Islamic state. Although the evidence for such a fear is not fully convincing, it can be understood within the broader framework of Turkish modernization which was carried out by a highly centralized state in the cultural‐educational domain in an uncompromising fashion, generating a social bifurcation between the moderns and the traditionalists. After the transition to competitive politics, elected politicians worked to curb the power of the state elites that have been the exponents of modernization policies. Supported also by economic development that has expanded society's power against the state, the political elites have worked to expand their scope for decision‐making. Such redistribution of power in society has been problematical and has twice resulted in military interventions. The shift in the balance of power in favour of the political (elected) elite is nearing completion. The struggle is currently centered on the election of a new president by the parliament in May 2007 because historically the presidency has been seen as a position that counterbalances the preferences of the political elite by those of the state elite. Although likely to cause perturbations, the president will be elected by the Justice and Development Party. Consolidation of Turkey's democracy is continuing.     

Shifting State–Business Relations in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Post‐2014

This study aims to explore how state–business relations in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have been developing following the fall in oil prices in 2014 and the subsequent increased pressure to implement economic reforms. The main argument is that due to a combination of factors, the positions of the established business community vis‐à‐vis the ruling powers in those countries have become weaker. The factors are: 1) economic pressure and necessity to reform since the 2014 decline in oil prices; 2) the generational shift and subsequent centralizing tendencies in the ruling circles in some of the states; and 3) increased geopolitical rivalry and antagonism between the GCC members, including intensified competition for foreign investment and external political support. Meanwhile the governments have acquired more control over commercial activities that used to be the realm of the business elite. Although these changes are happening to a varying extent and at a different pace in each GCC country, the trend is recognizable in all six.     

The Eurozone crisis and Italian corporate governance: the end of blockholding?

This article explains the process of change in domestic corporate governance. An actor-centred coalitional approach is applied to the Italian case to show how the main features of domestic corporate governance are a product of behavioural patterns (i.e. informal institutions), rather than formal legislation. Leveraging their superior financial means, business elites act as institutional incumbents shaping these informal institutions according to their preferences. It is argued that a change in corporate practices is more likely to be triggered by a socio-economic crisis, which weakens the domestic elite’s influence, rather than a legal reform. These findings call into question the excessively formalistic approach of many corporate governance scholars, and are confirmed by the Italian trajectory. After having resisted 20 years of liberalising legal reforms aimed at eroding their power, Italian blockholders are now being forced, as a consequence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, to dismantle their cross-shareholding networks.