FAMILY,KINSHIP AND REVOLUTION: THE RUSSIAN NOBILITY, 1917-23

Abstract

This article examines the importance of family and kin to the Russian nobility during the Russian Revolution. It focuses on the experiences of four interrelated families to show how nobles used family connections for a variety of purposes prior to I9I7. This helped them to maintain their predominant position within tsarist society. The article argues that these links continued after the revolution, helping nobles survive everyday hardship and official persecution under the new regime; in some cases, surprisingly large family ‘communities’ of nobles emerged. These communities persisted into the I920S and even when they disbanded the wider family maintained its central position in noble life.     

MEMORY,MEMORIALS, AND COMMEMORATION1

According to a popular view, the past is present here and now. This is presentism combined with endurantism: the past continuously persists through time to the present. By contrast, I argue that memories, memorials, and histories are of entities discontinuous with present experiences, and that the continuity between past and present in them is a construct. Memories, memorials, and histories are semantic means for dealing with the past. My presupposition that past and present are different is supported by grammar: as verbal tenses show, the past is not present here and now, for otherwise it would not be past. A failure to note this difference is a lack of chronesthesia, a sense of time specific to human beings. I argue that presentism fails to account for the temporal structures of memory and the changes in perspective as we switch from the present to a past situation. My account is perdurantist in the sense that it allows for temporal parts of things such as memorials or tombstones, as well as events such as wars or commemorations. But my main goal is to outline a semantic approach to the past: the tie between past and present actions and events is the semantic ground–consequence relation: a past event is the antecedent grounding a present situation, explaining why it is the case. In addition, I show how we refer to the past by means of two rhetorical figures of speech: synecdoche, using the (emblematic‐) part‐whole relation for relating the past to the present by transposing its sense; and anaphor, which has a deictic function—it points back toward the past. In references to the past, the deictic field is a scene visualized by the speaker and addressees: the deictic field is transposed from a perceptual to an imaginary space.     

INTENTIONALISM,INTENTIONALITY, AND REPORTING BELIEFS1

The dominant view of twentieth‐century analytic philosophy has been that all thinking is always in a language, that languages are vehicles of thought. The same view has been widespread in continental philosophy as well. In recent decades, however, the opposite view—that languages serve merely to express language‐independent thought‐contents or propositions—has been more widely accepted. The debate has a direct equivalent in the philosophy of history: when historians report the beliefs of historical figures, do they report the sentences or propositions that these historical figures believed to be true or false? In this paper I argue in favor of the latter, intentionalist, view. My arguments center mostly on the problems with translation that are likely to arise when a historian reports the beliefs of historical figures who expressed them in a language other than the one in which the historian is writing. In discussing these problems the paper presents an application of John Searle's theory of intentionality to the philosophy of history.     

Crane,Elaine Forman The Poison Plot: A Tale of Adultery and Murder in Colonial Newport,Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 257 pp., $32.95, ISBN 2131-1 978-1-5017

Elaine Forman Crane’s The Poison Plot opens with the core challenge facing her as a scholar and author. “How,” she asks, “to frame a narrative that more closely resembles fiction than most nonfiction works, while remaining faithful to the historical record?” (xi). It is a matter of historical record that Newport, Rhode Island, resident Benedict Arnold petitioned to divorce his wife, Mary Arnold, in 1738 and that his petition accused her of attempting to poison him. Whether she had, in fact, poisoned him and her motivations for doing so, by contrast, remain unknown, particularly because there are no surviving documents from her perspective. The Poison Plot also poses readers with challenges. What can a reader gain from a historical monograph whose conclusions must, by their very nature, be rooted more in circumstantial evidence and speculation than in concrete documentary evidence? In what contexts might readers approach this book?     

CHOOSING NOT TO LOOK: REPRESENTATION,REPATRIATION, AND HOLOCAUST ATROCITY PHOTOGRAPHY1

This essay considers, from ethical and historical‐critical perspectives, alternatives to unconditional public access to Holocaust atrocity photographs. Photographic images have become the common coin of public awareness and historical information about the Holocaust. For the generations immediately following the genocide, atrocity photos and images of Nazi crimes served as vital testimony. For succeeding generations, however, access to certain “recirculated” images (Barbie Zelizer) has created a sense of familiarity with the Holocaust and with the National Socialist era that may prevent, rather than facilitate, engagement with the historical subject, particularly for students. Few of the victims of the Shoah pictured in either the best known or the least circulated images were willing subjects. As such, the bulk of Holocaust and National Socialist photography should perhaps fall under the same category as the results of Nazi medical experiments: they have been rendered inadmissible because they are ethically compromised materials, made without the participants’consent. While I am not advocating the wholesale destruction of Holocaust photographs, I will suggest that removing them from view or “repatriating” them might serve Holocaust memory better than their reduction to atrocious objects of banal attention. Just as the Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 provided a mechanism for the reclassification of human remains, from ethnographic to spiritually sacred artifacts, we should consider what a similar reclassification of Holocaust photographs could offer. Have Holocaust atrocity photographs reached the limits of their usefulness as testimony?