Spatial Price Discrimination in Two-Dimensional Competitive Markets

Intuition suggests that firms that can apply price discrimination make higher profits than firms that are restricted in their pricing policy. In this paper, we show that, in general, this is not the case. In the framework of a two-dimensional spatial model with elastic demand à la Lösch, we further investigate the interplay of transport costs, competition, and price policy. One of our results is that under realistic specifications of parameters each firm gains a monopolistic area in the center of its market that has the same shape as the entire market, but with a convexly or concavely distorted separating line, depending on the extension of the market.     

Transport Costs and Rural Development

Innovations that reduce costs of transport from rural locations may also reduce transport costs to rural areas. As transport costs fall, producers can afford to concentrate and achieve economies of scale. This paper explains an initially negative, but ultimately positive, relationship between reductions in transport costs and rural development. A two-region general equilibrium model with firm and worker spatial mobility highlights the firm and household location implications of costly transport-service use by both industry and agriculture in the context of scale economies and product differentiation. The computable general equilibrium model is initialized and verified with a bi-regional social accounting matrix and then used for simulations. Changes in relative transport costs are shown to affect relative regional wage rates, thus also determining the location of "production-cost-oriented" firms.     

SPATIAL PRICING IN INTERDEPENDENT MARHETS*

ABSTRACT. Conditions for spatial price equilibrium are derived for a set of firms in oligopolistic spatial competition, distributed at fixed locations in a heterogeneous region where consumer purchasing patterns are a probabilistic function of the price distribution rather than a deterministic function of proximity to firms. The resulting prices vary with accessibility to consumers or with the degree of local spatial monopoly, and result in non-zero profits for firms. Conditions describing the existence and stability properties of this spatial price equilibrium are defined, and are shown to be equivalent for two different hypotheses concerning disequilibrium pricing behavior: a partial price adjustment model and a Bertrand game. For two different profit goals, total profit maximization and profit rate maximization, it is shown that a spatial price equilibrium exists and is at least locally quasi-stable.     

POLLUTION MOBILITY,PRODUCTIVITY DISPARITY,AND THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POLLUTING AND NONPOLLUTING FIRMS

This paper first develops a model to characterize the equilibrium distribution of polluting and nonpolluting firms and then turns to the larger question of whether the equilibrium distribution is socially optimal. We find that the equilibrium distribution of polluting firms differs from the social optimum when they generate a large amount of stationary pollution and have much higher or lower productivity than clean firms. In these cases, conventional pollution control approaches generally do not bring about an optimal distribution. Consideration of transport costs along with productivity and pollution changes some of the classic results of the new economic geography literature.     

SPATIAL ASYMMETRIC DUOPOLY WITH AN APPLICATION TO BRUSSELS' AIRPORTS*

ABSTRACT In this paper, the problem of a city with access to two firms or facilities (shopping malls, airports, commercial districts) selling a differentiated product (shopping, flights) and/or offering a differentiated workplace is studied. Transport connections to one facility are congested. A model is presented for this asymmetric duopoly game that can be solved for a Nash equilibrium in prices and wages. A comparative statics analysis is used to illustrate the properties of the equilibrium. A numerical model is then applied to the two Brussels airports. Three stylized policies are implemented to address the congestion problem: expansion of transport capacity, congestion pricing, and a direct subsidy to the uncongested facility. Our results indicate that the degree of intrinsic differentiation between the two firms is crucial in determining the difference in profit and market share. Price and wage differences also depend on trip frequency and consumer preferences for diversity. Congestion pricing is the most effective policy tool but all three options are shown to have attractive attributes.     

FIRM HETEROGENEITY,MULTIPLANT CHOICE,AND AGGLOMERATION

We examine the organization and location choice of heterogeneous firms in a two‐region economy. When some high‐productivity firms engage in multiplant production, a reduction in transport costs causes two changes in a small region: the closure of plants by high‐productivity multiplant firms and the relocation of low‐productivity single‐plant firms to the region. In the presence of high‐productivity multiplant firms, therefore, a decline in transport costs reinforces the spatial sorting of firms by productivity, enlarging the productivity gap between large and small regions. Conversely, reducing investment costs weakens the spatial sorting effects on regional productivity disparities.     

A SPATIAL COMPETITION APPROACH TO CENTRAL PLACE THEORY: SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES*

ABSTRACT. This paper investigates the potential offered by the model of spatial competition for the study of central place theory. We consider n firms selling m substitutable or complementary goods to a continuum of consumers evenly distributed along a linear segment. Consumers have the same income and the same utility function which is quadratic in the goods supplied by the firms and linear in the numeraire. The main results are as follows. (1) In any location equilibrium in which all goods are consumed everywhere, each good supplied by a single firm is sold at the market center. In Christaller's terminology, this means that when the exhaustive principle holds in equilibrium, highest-order goods are made available at the center. (2) When all goods (excluding the numéraire) are complements to each other and each good is sold by a single firm, there always exists an equilibrium in which all the firms locate coincidentally. (3) If the stores selling a given good are under the control of a single owner then, in any equilibrium for which the exhaustive principle holds, the stores are located in a way such that the total transport cost (borne by consumers) is minimized.     

UNIFORM SPATIAL PRICING

ABSTRACT Uniform spatial pricing means that a firm delivers its product to any customer at a fixed price, independent of location. Economic theory explains the use of uniform pricing by the added profit generated by absorbing freight charges of distant customers. I extend this insight by demonstrating that when demand elasticity and transportation cost are positively enough correlated, uniform pricing generates higher profits than mill pricing. I show that this result can better explain observed patterns of price policy choice by mail order and web firms. A second result is application of this idea to firms with many shipping facilities.     

Hotelling Games with Three,Four, and More Players*

Abstract. This paper extends the interval Hotelling model with quadratic transport costs to the n‐player case. For a large set of locations including potential equilibrium configurations, we show for n > 2 that firms neither maximize differentiation—as in the duopoly model—nor minimize differentiation—as in the multi‐firm game with linear transport cost. Subgame perfect equilibria for games with up to nine players are characterized by a U‐shaped price structure and interior corner firm locations. Results are driven by an asymmetry between firms. Interior firms are weaker competitors than their rivals at the corners. Increasing the number of firms shifts even more power to the corner firms. As a result, there is too much differentiation from the social perspective if n ≤ 3, while adding firms leads to a level of differentiation in equilibrium below the social optimum.     

PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION,PRICING POLICY AND EQUILIBRIUM*

ABSTRACT. This paper studies the price-location equilibrium of duopolists supplying differentiated goods and competing in a spatial market with elastic demand. We show that a price-location equilibrium exists under all three pricing policies traditionally considered by the literature: f.o.b. mill, uniform delivered, and spatially discriminatory pricing. We also show that firms always cluster at the market center. The second part of the paper studies the endogenous choice of pricing policy. A surprising feature of the resulting equilibrium is asymmetry. The greater the extent to which the goods are substitutes, the more likely is it that one firm will choose f.o.b. pricing and the other price discrimination. Finally, the welfare consequences of the analysis show some interesting trade-offs.     

LOCATING OUTSIDE A LINEAR CITY CAN BENEFIT CONSUMERS*

ABSTRACT We investigate the effects of restricting the locations of firms in Hotelling duopoly models. In standard location‐price models, the equilibrium distance between firms is too great from the viewpoint of consumer welfare. Thus, restricting the locations of firms and shortening the distance between them improves consumer welfare by reducing prices and transport costs. We introduce strategic reward contracts into location‐price models and find that, in contrast to the above result, restrictions on the locations of firms reduce consumer welfare. These restrictions reduce transport costs but increase prices by changing the strategic commitments of the firms.     

Cournot Retail Chains

In this paper a model of spatial Cournot competition among retail firms is devised and used to assess the effect of a variety of structural factors on retail prices and profits. The model illustrates the spatial chain of interaction that firms must anticipate to reach equilibrium when organized in chains or as independents. It shows the sensitivity of price to the location of stores, the number of stores per location, and transportation cost.     

A Spatial Price Determination Model for Multi‐Market Heterogeneously Distributed Resources: An Application to Forestry Markets in Sweden

The spatial dimension is a key paradigm in price determination, as attested by recent studies in the literature that highlighted the differential in market behavior between spatial and non‐spatial pricing settings. In this paper, we develop a model of spatial pricing for multi‐market heterogeneously distributed resources, with an application to the Swedish forestry sector. The focus of the model is to estimate the impact of spatial interaction on the demand for resources in terms of resource allocation, competition, and pricing. In its core, the pricing mechanism relies on a supply–demand framework. Using disaggregated data at the gridcell level for forest feedstock supply and harvesting costs in Sweden, we construct regional supply curves for each gridcell assuming a maximum transportation distance to delimit the potential market. Demand nodes are exogenously determined and are adjusted using a distance‐decay model to assess demand pressure across locations. We apply the model empirically to assess the impact on forest feedstock prices of a 20 TWh increase in biofuel production.     

PRICE AND LOCATION CONJECTURES IN MEDIUM- AND LONG-RUN SPATIAL COMPETITION MODELS*

ABSTRACT. This paper examines medium-run and long-run equilibria in unbounded (circular) and bounded (linear) one-dimensional multifirm markets. A price-location adjustment model is outlined that dows simulation of the spatial equilibrium when these firms anticipate reactions from their nearest spatial rivals. Thus, the market equilibrium is derived from the interdependent but atomistic decisions of the competing firms and is not imposed by some outside observer or agency. Ail conjectures are exogenous; the three well-known price conjectures (Greenhut-Ohta, Hotelling-Smithies, and Losch) are highlighted; and the relevant comparative statics are provided.     

Product Differentiation and Location Choice in a Circular City*

Abstract. The paper analyzes spatial competition among firms that sell substitute and/or complementary products. The firms first choose locations on the perimeter of a circular city and then compete in quantities (à la Cournot). Both linear and convex (quadratic) transport costs are considered. In general, multiple location equilibria are encountered. Complete agglomeration, partial agglomeration, and complete dispersion are possible. Convex (quadratic) transport cost substantially shrinks the set of equilibria obtained under linear transport cost. In general, the results obtained for a larger number of firms selling complementary products are strikingly different from those obtained under a duopoly.     

Price Variation in Spatial Oligopolies

The “geography of price” is being given renewed attention by geographers and economists. This paper examines spatial price variation in both unbounded (circular) and bounded (linear) one-dimensional markets. Firms compete for consumers in the short run by adjusting price until the Bertrand equilibrium is reached in the market. While firms act as spatial oligopolists in specific market segments, the profit-maximizing price of any given firm depends directly and indirectly upon the spatial-economic properties (locations, marginal costs) of all other firms in the market.     

PRICING POLICY REACTIONS TO AGGLOMERATION IN A MARKET WITH SPATIAL SEARCH*

ABSTRACT. Price dispersion (variation) and agglomeration are common characteristics of spatial markets, in particular, markets with imperfect consumer information and search. However, pricing and location strategies in these markets are not well analyzed since spatial search is difficult to model without restricting the spatial dimension of the problem. This paper analyzes pricing and location strategies in a market with spatid search using a probabilistic modeling strategy that does not restrict search patterns in the plane. Specifically, the analysis considers the pricing strategy of an isolated firm in response to the agglomeration of competing firms. Results indicate that spatial and temporal price dispersion are effective responses to competitors'agglomeration. However, the relative effectiveness of these strategies varies with market conditions. In addition, agglomeration can have some counterintuitive effects. This paper also provides insights into existing theories of spatial search and spatial competition in spatially-restricted (linear and circular) markets.     

MILL PRICING AND SPATIAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION MONOPOLY PERFORMANCE AND LOCATION WITH SPATIAL RETAIL MARKETS*

ABSTRACT. Most of the monopoly spatial price discrimination literature explicitly assumes uniform population density over space. It also implicitly assumes that firms (plants) are spatially isolated from each other with production and retail points that coincide in location. While departures from these assumptions have been explored separately in the literature, it remains to examine performance and location when these assumptions are relaxed simultaneously. What emerges in this paper is a model where density functions approximate a pair of cities isolated from other cities. Each city has its own retail market, while the location of a single production or wholesale point is determined by characteristics of the two markets. Comparisons of mill pricing and spatial price discrimination found in the spatial monopoly literature can be interpreted as special cases of the more general framework provided here.     

Spatial inequality and urban costs: Revisiting the home market effect

This paper investigates how the interactions between product differentiation, transport costs, and urban costs determine the spatial inequality in a general‐equilibrium model. We shed light on the interrelation between different definitions of home market effect (HME) in literature. While the wages in the large region are always higher, the HME in industrial distribution occurs in a limited range of parameters, implying that the HME in factor price is more pervasive. Moreover, we show that the reverse HME is the more common outcome. It indicates that neglecting urban costs in theoretical methodologies tends to overestimate the existence of HME. We also disclose how a change in urban costs or transport costs affects regional inequalities and welfare.     

Competition and Efficiency in a Spatial Setting

In this paper our primary concern is with a spatial model of competing firms in a regional industry. The firms are producing for an extraregional market and are located so as to gain exclusive access to a dispersed raw-material input. After outlining the form of the industry long-run average cost curve, we specify the equilibrium outcome, both for the individual firm and the regional industry. We demonstrate that the industry long-run supply curve does not coincide with the industry long-run average cost curve. We further show that the outcome in the spatial model results from the separation of firms, each firm having its own domain, part or all of which becomes its supply area.