British Surrenders and the South African War, 1899–1902

Based on primary research, this article examines more than 1000 cases of surrender in the British Army during the South African War, 1899–1902. It concludes that the majority of surrenders were caused by five conditions: faulty leadership, the removal of effective leadership through injury or death, lack of necessary supplies, decisive disadvantage in terms of numbers and the use of questionable tactics by the enemy. An examination of surrender gives insight into morale, resource allocation, discipline, decision-making and military law.     

British Policy Towards Military Cooperation with the Republic of South Africa, 1961–1975

The early 1960s were a turbulent time in South Africa; the Sharpeville Massacre provoked condemnation from the international community, which, with the acceleration of decolonisation, was turning increasingly against Pretoria. The decision to withdraw its re-application to the Commonwealth in October 1960 further isolated South Africa. Despite this, UK–South African military cooperation remained largely unaffected until the pivotal Simonstown Agreement's termination in 1975. This article explores this relationship and explains why British policy-makers consistently maintained links with an overtly racist regime. UK–South African military cooperation was persistently controversial and engendered frequent criticism from African members of the Commonwealth and from campaigning groups such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement, whose membership included Labour ministers. Concurrently, Pretoria was viewed as an important Cold War ally, particularly in the context of the build-up of Soviet naval incursions into the Indian Ocean from 1968 onwards. This article will analyse how British officials attempted to navigate its military relations with South Africa under such heated circumstances.     

South Africa and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935–6

The Italo-Ethiopian War led to an extensive debate in the Union of South Africa about the future of the League of Nations’ system of collective security. The different political and social groupings in the dominion interpreted the meaning of the war for the Union from a diversity of perspectives. The Italian aggression in East Africa reverberated in the context of concurrent debates about the Union's position in relation to the British Empire. These debates were influenced by the tensions between Afrikaners and English-speaking South Africans but also by disagreement within the Afrikaner community about South African policies vis-à-vis the British Empire. The Afrikaner-dominated Union Government had to navigate between its commitments to the League on the one hand and criticism from the extreme nationalist Afrikaner opposition on the other, which claimed that South Africa's sovereignty was diminished by Britain's leading role in the League. As a mandatory power in South West Africa, the Union was also concerned to sustain League principles in order to safeguard its sub-imperialist aspirations on the continent. The public debates were strongly influenced by a discourse on ‘civilisation’, which not only reflected ambiguous views of the status of Ethiopia as a member of the League of Nations, but also raised questions about the stability of white hegemony in a segregationist state.     

The Dutch social democrats and the South African war, 1899–1902

This article examines the attitude of the Dutch Social Democrats towards the South African War (1899–1902). At the beginning of the war the SDAP (Social Democratic Workers’ Party) had three seats in the Staten‐Generaal (Parliament). By 1902 this had increased to seven. The South African War created a wave of nationalism in the Netherlands. The Boers were of Dutch descent, and the Dutch generally saw the war as their own. As much as it wanted to assist the Transvaal, the Dutch government, however, could not afford to annoy Britain upon whom she depended for commercial protection of her East Indian colonies. In Social Democratic circles there was a mixed reaction to the war, particularly as their enemy, the Dutch bourgeoisie, had taken the side of the Boers. Arguments were raised for and against on the one hand, humanitar‐ianism and the law of nations, and on the other, historic‐materialistic considerations. The organs of the SDAP—De Sociaaldemokraat and later Het Volk—supported the Boer cause. Their internationalism almost compelled the Social Democrats to stand aloof from the chauvinistic Dutch bourgeoisie. They pointed out that the Netherlands, with its policy on Acheh, an independent sultanate on Sumatra, was in actual fact also an imperialistic nation. Anti‐British sentiment among the Social Democrats rose sharply when the Amsterdam diamond cutters also became victims as many lost their jobs in the wake of the war. Chamberlain (the British Colonial Secretary) and Kitchener (British Commander‐in‐Chief) were seen as war criminals. When, towards the end of 1901, the Amsterdam Water Transport Leagues attempted to organise an international boycott of British shipping, the SDAP sympathised with the plan, but did not give its official approval. Nothing came of the attempt. The Dutch Social Democrats reluctantly accepted the peace, feeling that the Boers would in the future be exploited by British capitalism.     

Boer Propaganda During the South African War of 1899–1902

This article examines Boer propaganda on commando during the South African War by analysing how the two Boer governments and the military leadership endeavoured to inspire a citizen army and to keep the men in the field. In the South African War a commando was a Boer fighting unit, more or less the equivalent of a British regiment, and ‘on commando’ meant ‘in the field’. For the first seven months of the conflict, two important pro-Boer newspapers, De Volksstem and The Standard & Diggers' News were distributed on commando; carefully used, they exercised a significant impact on the combatants' morale. Later, in the guerrilla phase of the war, local newspapers, notably De Bazuin and De Zoutpansberg Wachter, often published under trying conditions, took their place. Furthermore, Boer officers played an important role by fanning patriotism in the ranks with their inspirational rhetoric. The Boer perception that his military and political cause was both just and noble before God was a useful propaganda tool, as were official war reports; they could, in addition to truths, include carefully selected half-truths and flagrant untruths.     

Apartheid on Trial: South West Africa and the International Court of Justice, 1960–66

The deputation of Basuto chiefs to England in 1907 provides an example of close co-operation between traditional African chiefs, educated black activists, and white humanitarians in pursuing to the heart of empire the claims of Africans seeking remedy for injustices suffered under colonial rule. The deputation arrived at a time when the Colonial Office felt severely constrained in its ability to fulfil its responsibility of trusteeship towards its African subjects in colonies which were ‘on the eve of responsible government’. This article highlights the support provided in England by Frank Colenso, the son of Bishop Colenso of Natal, in partnership with his sisters in Natal, and argues that, though failing in its immediate aim, this black-led initiative led to a strengthening of relationships between black South African activists and white British-based humanitarians. It also provided an impetus for the development in England of a loosely knit informal organisational framework able to provide material, moral, and political support for South African political activists who were to visit England in deputations from the newly formed South African Native National Congress (forerunner of the ANC) to pursue their grievances against the South African government in the second and third decades of the twentieth century.     

Race,Masculinity and Imperialism: The British Officer and the Egyptian Army (1882–1899)

In recent years, there has been increased historical interest in the way in which Western militaries have understood, interacted with and represented Oriental native peoples. However, the influence which the Western perception of the Orient had on the British officers seconded to reform and lead the Egyptian Army between 1882 and 1899 has been overlooked. This oversight is particularly surprising since the reformation the Egyptian Army and its use in the re-conquest of the Sudan between 1896 and 1899 constituted one of the main British military commitments to the Middle East at the height of Empire. Consequently, an examination of the reformation of this force offers the opportunity to examine not only the construction of British racial ideas and their influence on imperialism, but also how they directly affected British actions in Egypt and Sudan. In order to fill this gap in the historiography, this article examines how Western ideas on race, masculinity and imperialism affected the British reformation and leadership of the Egyptian Army as well as how the Europeans attached to the force represented the region in their writing. It argues that the notion of Oriental inferiority quickly became institutionalised amongst the British officers seconded to the force and this not only had a major influence on how the Egyptian Army was both reconstituted and led, but also on how those Europeans attached to the force wrote about their experiences.     

Out of Arabia: British Strategy and the Fate of Local Forces in Aden,South Yemen,and Oman, 1967–76

The British engagement with Oman from 1967–76 came at a time when other imperial and defence commitments were being reduced in the Gulf region and elsewhere. Following the ignominious retreat from Aden, the British chose to support the Omani regime in its conflict with Communist-inspired insurgents (1970–6). This article gives context to the dichotomy of outcomes in southern Arabia and examines the role of local military forces in the counter-insurgencies. It demonstrates that Britain's domestic political considerations, regional strategic requirements, and concerns for its global reputation, rather than counterinsurgency operations and the local forces, were the main drivers of outcomes. Insurgents and local actors nevertheless responded to changes taking place in and around Oman, recalibrating their decision to co-operate or resist on their own terms, and changes in the international support for the insurgents were decisive. The key argument is that the dynamic combinations of international support, British strategic assumptions and miscalculations, and local agency, were crucially important to the outcomes in the region. The ‘fate’ of those who had allied with, or resisted, the British, needs to be set in this context.     

A transnational history of immigration restriction: Natal and New South Wales, 1896–97

This article investigates the creation of Natal's 1897 Immigration Restriction Act and traces the legislative connections between southern Africa and Australia. It describes Natal's anti-Indian agitation of 1896–97 and argues that the colony's government initially sought to solve the ‘Asiatic question’ by adopting a racial immigration bill passed in New South Wales in 1896. However, the threat of violent extra-legal action by white settlers convinced the Natal government to replace this bill with one that made no direct reference to race. Natal ministers realised that racial legislation would face constitutional obstacles and were anxious to enact a restrictive immigration law without delay. The new Act was partly modelled on American immigration legislation and, though not explicit on race, its educational test was primarily designed to restrict Indian immigration. The Natal law was in turn used as the basis for Australian immigration legislation. Given these transnational connections, Natal's response to the ‘Indian question’ should be placed in a global context.