Institutionalization,path dependence and the persistence of the Anglo‐American special relationship

One of the remarkable phenomena in post‐Cold War world politics is the persistence of the Anglo‐American special relationship (AASR) in spite of recurrent announcement of its death by pessimists. Current scholarship on Anglo‐American relations largely draws on interests and sentiments to explain the persistence of the AASR, ignoring other important contributing factors such as institutionalization. This article is the first to give serious consideration to the role of institutionalization in influencing the persistence of the AASR. By using the concept of path dependence, this article argues that the high‐level institutionalization in Anglo‐American intelligence, nuclear and military relations plays a seminal role in contributing to the persistence of the AASR in the post‐Cold War era. The institutionalized intelligence relationship is exemplified by the relationship between the UK's Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the US's National Security Agency (NSA), which is underpinned by the UKUSA Agreement. The institutionalized nuclear relationship is exemplified by a variety of Joint Working Groups (JOWOGs), which is underpinned by the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement. The institutionalized military relationship is exemplified by routinized military personnel exchange programmes, regular joint training exercises and an extremely close defence trade partnership. The high‐level institutionalization embeds habits of cooperation, solidifies interdependence and consolidates mutual trust between the UK and the US in their cooperation on intelligence, nuclear and military issues.     

Last charge of the knights? Iraq,Afghanistan and the special relationship

At the heart of the ‘special relationship’ ideology, there is supposed to be a grand bargain. In exchange for paying the ‘blood price’ as America's ally, Britain will be rewarded with exceptional influence over American foreign policy and its strategic behaviour. Soldiers and statesman continue to articulate this idea. Since 9/11, the notion of Britain playing ‘Greece’ to America's ‘Rome’ gained new life thanks to Anglophiles on both sides of the Atlantic. One potent version of this ideology was that the more seasoned British would teach Americans how to fight ‘small wars’ in Iraq and Afghanistan, thereby bolstering their role as tutor to the superpower. Britain does derive benefits from the Anglo‐American alliance and has made momentous contributions to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet British solidarity and sacrifices have not purchased special influence in Washington. This is partly due to Atlanticist ideology, which sets Britain unrealistic standards by which it is judged, and partly because the notion of ‘special influence’ is misleading as it loses sight of the complexities of American policy‐making. The overall result of expeditionary wars has been to strain British credibility in American eyes and to display its lack of consistent influence both over high policy and the design and execution of US military campaigns. While there may be good arguments in favour of the UK continuing its efforts in Afghanistan, the notion that the war fortifies Britain's vicarious world status is a dangerous illusion that leads to repeated overstretch and disappointment. Now that Britain is in the foothills of a strategic defence review, it is important that the British abandon this false consciousness.     

The Praelium Nuportanum by Isaac Dorislaus: Anglo–Dutch Relations and Strategic historiography1

This article investigates the Anglo–Dutch scholar and diplomat Isaac Dorislaus's sole published work, Praelium Nuportanum (PN; 1640), on the battle of Newport in 1600. After presenting some new or little known information about the work, it discusses PN's intellectual context and concludes that the work is a reminder of successful Anglo–Dutch cooperation in the past, of Dutch indebtedness to English assistance, and the Republic's importance as an ally for England, all relevant to the negotiations running in 1640 for an Orange–Stuart wedding, and their backgrounds in the British Civil Wars and Anglo–Spanish–Dutch relations at the time. After the troubles ensuing from Dorislaus's Cambridge lectures on Tacitus in 1627, PN shows the author reconciled with the Court and the Laudian faction. With respect to style and content, PN appears clearly Tacitist in style, with many direct quotations from Tacitus, but this Tacitism operates more on a literary than a political level. Much of PN's historical content is a reworking of Francis Vere's Commentaries (published 1657). From the perspective of the Protestant ‘Anglo–Scoto–Dutch public sphere’ recently discussed in the scholarship, PN might perhaps be read as a warning of the gradual emergence of an Anglo–Dutch Calvinist–parliamentarian ‘realm’ as a force opposing the Crown.     

Transatlantic financiers and the Civil War

This essay examines the sympathies and actions of transatlantic financiers in Britain during the Civil War. Motivated largely by their financial and ideological connection to the Northern states, major Anglo‐American banks sympathized with the Union and campaigned to keep Britain out of the conflict. Unable to procure the support of Britain's leading banking houses, the Confederacy turned to lesser capitalists and speculators for financial assistance. By highlighting Britain's economic links to the Northern states and pointing to the potential dangers of meddling in the conflict, financiers in the City of London provided statesmen in the Westminster Parliament with a powerful justification for the policy of neutrality.     

“Science can never demobilize”: the united states navy and petroleum geology, 1898–1924

This article traces how the US Navy crafted policy from the expert advice of American geologists. Between 1898 and 1924, the US Navy metamorphosed from a slow, coal‐burning fleet to a swift, oil‐burning one. The decision to convert naval vessels to oil consumed years of wrangling at the highest levels of the Department's bureaucracy. Central to this struggle was the guarantee of a secure petroleum supply in the face of perpetually bleak predictions by geologists suggesting that US oilfields might someday soon run dry. The Navy–geologist interaction influenced the Navy's decision to burn oil, as well as American land policy and tax law. The partnership led to increased government involvement in the oil industry and a prominent role for geologists in shaping federal oil policy.     

Executive diplomacy: multilateralism, unilateralism and managing American power

The clash between unilateralists and multilateralists dominates contemporary debate, with many assuming that American foreign policy must result from nothing more or less than a tug of war between the two. The practicalities of diplomacy at a juncture of competing viewpoints on American power reveal, however, that this old dichotomy simply has lost steam as a policy–making engine. Springing straight from today's front pages and centred in the transatlantic conversation over America's role in the world, this article throws into question how America and its allies grapple for international initiative. Managing American power demands a new concept—anchored as much in the social arena of consensus formation described by Jürgen Habermas as in the experience of corporate officers leading a large business. The article argues that the real world challenges facing America as unrivalled superpower have strained the old approach, and asks if managing American influence has to continue as an either/or choice between ‘going it alone’ or waiting for others to recognize new threats. Or might it instead transform into a quest for integrating key constituencies behind practical action?     

‘Marriage’, ‘Massage', Metaphor and Gender in US–Iranian Relations During the 1960s

Abstract

Although they were allies, during the 1960s relations between the United States and Iran were fraught with tensions. For American policymakers, Iran was an important Cold War client and oil-supplier in a turbulent region. It was vital, therefore, to maintain a good relationship with the Shah of Iran. Indeed, United States policy was based in large part on American assessments of the Shah as an individual. This article seeks to assess how the language and metaphors used by American policymakers to describe and understand the Shah reflected and informed United States policy. Officials within the Kennedy and Johnson administrations viewed the Shah through a highly gendered lens that magnified perceptions of him as a weak, highly sensitive and irrational leader – characteristics deemed to be overly feminine. This article therefore contends that US policy towards Iran was influenced by gender stereotypes as policymakers lamented their reliance on the Shah, who they deemed to be insufficiently 'masculine'.     

King Pym and his ‘Happy,Scrappy Jester’

The Reign of King Pym took mid 17th‐century studies in a new direction when it was published in 1941. Anglo‐American collaboration in the field in the 1920s and 1930s had been rooted in making available in print to a scholarly readership one of the private diaries of the Long Parliament. J.H. Hexter's book, produced at a time when Anglo‐American collaboration was temporarily on hold under pressure of global war, changed the direction of academic discourse by its format (monograph), content (a detailed study of a brief period in a unique parliament) and tone (brash and unrestrained by the idiom of the academy). The book scoped out the power of John Pym, but also its limitations, and introduced to scholarly debate a categorisation of political groupings in 1642–3 that held sway for 40 years. The first direct attacks on Hexter's work, beginning in the 1980s, were weakened by overstatement. In the forthcoming History of Parliament volumes, Pym's signal importance is reasserted, but Hexter's concept of the ‘middle group’ is found to be untenable.     

Noril'sk Nickel: A Global Company?

Two specialists on Russia's minerals industries examine the evidence supporting the argument that the Russian mining conglomerate Noril'sk Nickel can be viewed as a global company. Included among the criteria they assess are the geographic dispersion of the company's markets and operations, the diversified and multinational character of its ownership, whether it has matched the performance standards set by its major international competitors, and the effect of the company's ownership presence on the management style of its foreign operations. A particular focus is on how an ongoing conflict between two major Russian oligarch shareholders (Vladimir Potanin and Oleg Deripaska) has shaped Noril'sk Nickel's ownership and management structure, which is characterized by the continued (background) presence of the state, the lack of any organized policy for training a multinational management cohort, and the absence of a major block of foreign shareholders. In the end, they conclude that Noril'sk Nickel is not a genuinely global but rather a Tier-1 Russian company, albeit one with a global scale of operations.     

Revisiting the Linkage: PDD 25, Genocide in Rwanda and the US Peacekeeping Experience of the 1990s

After the successful US–UN action in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, by the mid-1990s Washington's enthusiasm for multilateral action had already faded away. This was evident after the ‘Black Hawk Down’ disaster of the US Mission in Somalia in October 1993 and the release of a much more restrictive peacekeeping policy in May 1994 (PDD-25). The US inaction during the following Rwandan genocide in spring 1994 was then seen as the obvious consequence of the American ‘trauma’ in Somalia, as well as the symbol of Washington's withdrawal from peacekeeping commitments. However, in the light of new archival documents a different scenario emerges. This article shows that the consequential link, often stressed by the literature, between the Somali disaster, the release of PDD-25 and American inaction in Rwanda is much less straightforward. This suggests that the policy in Rwanda was not just a consequence of the Somali debacle and that the reasons for US inaction toward the genocide must be gauged within a broader set of factors. The study of Washington's policy in Rwanda thus becomes a significant case to investigate some broader patterns of post-Cold War American foreign policy and to re-evaluate the US peacekeeping experience of the 1990s.     

‘Once and For All’: The Fourth UN World Conference on Women and the Institutionalisation of Women's Human Rights in American Foreign Policy

Though the slogan predates the Fourth UN World Conference on Women, ‘women's rights are human rights’ has become inextricably linked to US First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton's keynote address at the 1995 Conference in Beijing. The speech turned a line socialised by transnational feminist organisers into a State Department mantra with long-lasting policy ripples still felt today. This article uses new sources from the Office of the First Lady to examine the intra-departmental dynamics, policy architecture and domestic political considerations that shaped the content of the speech and the Clinton Administration's conception of women's rights as human rights. Early documents show that a focus on human rights was not inevitable, as other policy areas were better developed with more public support. But fear of rollback from previous international standards, external pressures from civil society, a desire to link foreign policy with domestic political aims and ultimately a strong backlash to American participation at the Conference on the basis of China's human rights record all elevated women's human rights as a US delegation priority.     

‘Tailoring the Millions‘; the Women Workers of the Leeds Clothing Industry, 1880–1914

Abstract

This article concerns the ways in which J. &; P. Coats, the major British multinational company manufacturing cotton thread, did business in Latin America before 1945. The company carried out a total of some 21 foreign direct investments in six countries, including Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, exemplary business practice among British contemporaries. The evidence on origins, performance and management, drawn from the company's archives for the first time, begins to fill a long-standing gap in the history of British business in Latin America. To this point, most studies have focused on the tertiary and primary industries. In the light of the extensive business interests of J. &; P. Coats alone, further research may show that the significance and role of British manufacturing companies, seemingly minor actors in Latin American economies, was much greater than has been assumed.     

Foreign Policy and an American Christian Democratic Party

This article explores the implications of the Judeo-Christian tradition's influence on the United States for the foreign policy of an American Christian Democratic Party. If there were to be such a party in the United States, it would not have to create a new set of ideas and principles out of whole cloth. In fact, an articulation of an American Christian Democratic foreign policy would largely consist of an effort of resourcement, rediscovering and applying anew foundational principles at the core of the American experiment. This article develops this insight in two main foreign policy areas: national security and economic.     

A Feminine Atlas? Sacagewea,the Suffragettes and the Commemorative Landscape in the American West, 1904-1910

This article examines how American suffragettes sought to reinscribe women's lives and experiences into the canon of American historical narratives about the 'conquest' of the West as part of their wider campaign for an enhanced female role in public life in the early years of the twentieth century. The analysis focuses on the centenary of Lewis and Clark's early nineteenth-century explorations into the Pacific North-west. The renewed interest in the exploration of the West during this centenary gave women activists an opportunity to develop a modified, and more explicitly female, version of events in which the previously obscure figure of Sacagewea, the young Native American women who had guided Lewis and Clark, assumed a more central position. The idea of Sacagewea as a historical role model for modern American womanhood was assiduously cultivated in several historical and literary texts that have been explored in detail elsewhere. This article is primarily concerned with the hitherto unexamined, but closely related, campaign to commemorate Sacagewea's achievements by physically reinserting her image into the emerging cultural landscape of the West in a series of statues erected to her memory at various points on her epic journey. The article concludes by considering some of the ironies associated with this new emphasis on the female contribution to the Lewis and Clark narrative. Though a necessary corrective to earlier masculine accounts, the cultivation of Sacagewea by white, educated and well-to-do American women served only to underscore the persistence of other divisions within early twentieth-century American society, particularly surrounding the vexed question of 'race'.     

Protecting the sterling area: The chifley government's response to multilateralism 1945–9

In 1942 the Australian Labor government accepted multilateralism in the form of Article VII of the Anglo‐American Mutual Aid Agreement. Some historians have argued that this was the beginning of a turning point in Australia's economic history: a movement away from the declining British empire towards the United States. I have two arguments in this article. The first is that Labor's acceptance of multilateralism did not lead, at least in the first five years after the war, to a deterioration in Australia's economic relationship with the United Kingdom. The reverse was true. Because of the acute shortage of dollars in the postwar world, Australia was obliged to expand her trade within the sterling area and to discriminate against American goods. The second argument is that although the Chifley government supported multilateralism as a theoretical concept, it opposed vigorously what it regarded as the Americans’ precipitate moves to dismantle the sterling area. The Chifley government sought to protect this cooperative system of exchange and import controls as a bulwark against the dollar shortage and against the possibility of a depression spreading from America.     

The China Hearings: America's Shifting Paradigm on China

This article attempts to fill a hole in rapprochement literature by examining the 1966 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the People's Republic of China. Historian Michael Lumbers contends that the China hearings served as a watershed in American attitudes toward China. This article explains how and why this change occurred. The China hearings contributed to Sino-American rapprochement in two different ways. One, the witnesses suggested to the public a new policy toward China, containment without isolation. The popularity of containment without isolation and the Johnson administration's use of it in their policy reorientation suggest that the China hearings had an effect. The hearings were not only a turning point, but also the culmination of a larger process. It demonstrated that American sentiment toward China had clearly moved away from hostility and toward cooperation. And during the 1960s, scholars of East Asian studies served as opinion leaders in this process.     

Chancellor Erhard's silent rejection of de Gaulle's plans: the example of monetary union

In the 1960s, French president de Gaulle's ambition to create a ‘European Europe’ depended heavily on German support. This article illustrates and reinterprets the crucial attitude of Ludwig Erhard by focusing on his role after the signing of the Elysée treaty in January 1963, and his reaction to a secret (and since forgotten) French proposal for monetary union in March 1964. The evidence shows that Erhard, fundamentally a moderate Atlanticist, was profoundly affected by the pressure of the Kennedy administration not to harbour Gaullist ideas. Indeed, as German chancellor Erhard feared that America might cease to defend Europe if de Gaulle's idea of a more independent Europe were to gain ground in Germany. Hence Erhard simply ignored any French move perceived to be contradictory to US policy. The article adds an element to the complexity of Franco-German relations in the 1960s while providing an example of how American power was exercised during the Cold War.     

Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence: An International History

This article focuses on Australia's response to the joint Anglo-American effort to expand military facilities on the island of Diego Garcia in early 1970s. The primary emphasis will be on the Whitlam government's rationale behind its diplomatic manoeuvre towards great power rivalries in the Indian Ocean and its supportive position towards the concept of building the Indian Ocean as a peace zone. It argues that the Whitlam government's policy towards the international diplomacy around Diego Garcia contributed to the shaping of a unique Australian foreign policy, one free from attachment to British and American considerations, although still mindful of the need to factor the interests of the UK and the USA into Australia's calculations of its own best interests.     

The ethno‐religious ambitions of the Roman Catholic Church and the ascendancy of communism in post‐war Poland (1945–50)

ABSTRACT. This paper differentiates between centrifugal and centripetal aspects of ethno‐nationalism to help account for the ascendancy of communism in the immediate aftermath of World War II in Poland. It argues that the directing of social antipathy to defined out‐groups allowed the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) to manage social anger and that the Roman Catholic Church's ethno‐religious agenda was aligned with the PPR's ethno‐nationalist policy. Furthermore, it is contended that the Church's toleration of hostile actions directed at minority communities supported the PPR's management of social anger. The paper concludes that the Church, despite its manifest intentions and contrary to contemporary perceptions, played a role in the PPR's achievement of hegemony.     

‘Suppose They were to Do It in Mexico’: The Spanish Embargo and Its Influence on Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy

The US arms embargo during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) can play a key role in our understanding of the transformation of American strategic thought in the late 1930s. The embargo's most well-documented causes are isolationist sentiment, the influence of the Catholic vote in the New Deal coalition and the forceful diplomatic leadership of Britain's Foreign Office in European affairs. Less well known is the importance of Latin America, which was considered throughout the conflict in the debates about lifting the Spanish embargo. This article examines the Spanish embargo and the reasons behind it. It also analyzes the Latin American dimension of Roosevelt's Spanish policy. By doing so it reveals how the perceived threat of Fascist penetration in Latin America influenced US diplomacy regarding Spain. Since that threat was first perceived, Washington began to fear the consequences of a Francoist military victory. It considered that the success of German and Italian military interventions in Spain could encourage similar initiatives in Latin America. The lessons learned in Spain reinforced Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy in Latin America and, at the same time, also provided a subtle reasoning for abandoning continental isolationism.