A delicate balance: Australia's ‘tilt’ to Pakistan and its impact on Australia–India relations

The Australia–India relationship has pivoted on more than the sale of uranium, and is not purely a narrative of neglect. While there have been some periods where bilateral relations received inadequate attention, the years 1947 to 1980 tell of a more complex story. During this time, many Australian diplomats and leaders worked hard to include India in Australia's foreign policy calculations. However, it proved difficult, arguably impossible, to negotiate a path for the Australia–India connection through the complexities of the India–Pakistan relationship and the strategic uncertainties of this most fragile of regions. Indian leaders, not without cause, constantly accused Australia of a ‘tilt’ to Pakistan. An examination of the Australian archives for this period reveals the inhibiting effects of the India–Pakistan conflict, particularly over Kashmir, on the development of a more fruitful Australia–India collaboration.     

Diplomacy in South Asia: a four-step grand plan for Kashmir

ABSTRACT

In this Commentary, I propose a bold, four-step plan which would address the question of self-determination for Kashmiris and hopefully resolve permanently the 70-year-old Kashmir issue which has poisoned Indo-Pakistan relations since Partition. Two important elements of this plan would be: first, the involvement of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group to assist Kashmiris, Pakistan and India in the mediation of the plan; and, second, the holding of four UN-supervised referenda which would be held simultaneously but counted separately: Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir; Kashmir valley; Jammu; and Ladakh. All Kashmiris would have three options: Join Pakistan, Join India or independence. As an incentive to India and Pakistan, the international community would deliver substantial economic assistance for the development of all parts of Kashmir. But as a quid pro quo for the economic aid package, there would have to be guaranteed free movement of people, capital and goods between all parts of Kashmir after the referenda, regardless as to which option had been chosen by the Kashmiris.     

Subjects or Citizens? India,Pakistan and the 1948 British Nationality Act

Independence in the case of British India occurred at relatively short notice in August 1947, but tying up the loose ends of empire stretched over years. Under these circumstances, the realignment of subjecthood and citizenship necessitated by decolonisation was protracted, and raised complex questions about identity in both the new states of India and Pakistan and the former imperial power itself. This article thus takes as its focus the drawn-out process of disengagement that followed formal independence in relation to one case study: the various ways in which Britain sought to square the working of its 1948 Nationality Act with Indian and Pakistani citizenship legislation that took shape in the 1950s. India and Pakistan faced the common challenge of establishing who now belonged within their new borders. Britain likewise was forced to recalibrate its ideas about nationality and think afresh about the rights of its subjects in view of the new sets of relationships that now linked colonies, old dominions and the ‘mother country’ within the Commonwealth. In practice, applying the 1948 Act's provisions in relation to India and Pakistan became infused with anxieties about ‘race’, which surfaced repeatedly as British officials in London, Delhi, Karachi and consulates around the world sought to manage its operation to suit British interests.     

The Making of an ‘All Weather Friendship’ Pakistan,China and the History of a Border Agreement: 1949–1963

China and Pakistan share what is widely known as an ‘all weather friendship’. The historical roots of this friendship can be traced to 1963, when the two countries entered into a border agreement that divided territory in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Since then, China has provided missile and nuclear technology to Pakistan. It has limited the potential for escalation in the time of war between India and Pakistan and is the largest economic investor in Pakistan. The benefits of this friendship for Pakistan are clear. Yet, there is little detail on what led to the making of the ‘all weather friendship’. This article provides a detailed account of Sino–Pakistani relations between 1949 and 1963. It argues that whilst the 1963 agreement led to a turning point, the Pakistani establishment – military and civilian – sought to engage China since 1949. They did so to create strategic options for themselves in the event that the US and the UK – Pakistan's main allies following independence – limited or worse, ended their support for Pakistan in its troubled relations with India. This article is based on primary sources available in the US, Britain, as well as recently declassified and hitherto unused papers in India.     

Schools of resistance – a brief history of student activism in Kashmir

This article traces the unique stance and nature of student politics in Kashmir. Drawing from an historical overview, it will argue that student activism in Kashmir is largely different from activism in India as it does not restrict itself to advocacy of student issues. Rather, it places itself squarely in the people’s struggle for self-determination and counter-colonial sentiment in the Kashmir Valley. Setting out from the pre-colonial era, the article first traces the evolution of Muslim political consciousness and the key role of education in this process. These changes will be drawn against the historical evolution of the Kashmir conflict to highlight the context in which the specificities of student activism in the Valley can be drawn out. The second section, which forms the bulk of the article, traces the history and nature of activism in Kashmir, drawing on major historical events, interviews with erstwhile and contemporary student leaders, and local memoirs. In doing so, the article aims to present the conjoining of student politics and a larger politics of self-determination in Kashmir post-independence, which is an important aspect of the emergence of Muslim identity in conflict with the occupying state.     

美国对1962年中印边界冲突的反应

美国对1962年中印边界冲突反应与它的南亚政策息息相关。从印巴分治直到中美和解前夕,美国的南亚政策始终有服务于全球冷战的两个目标：力促印巴和解以防止共产主义集团乘机介入;以一切可能的手段使印度放弃中立政策并加入到西方集团。中印边界冲突在美国政府的南亚政策渐入困境时发生,给了美国决策者以莫大的期望,他们企图以其所谓的天赐良机达至以上主要针对中国的冷战目标。然而,中国正确政策及出神入化的实践大大强化了美国在南亚地区既有的结构性困境,使肯尼迪政府利用中印冲突的图谋以失败而告终。     

Pakistan's nuclear bomb: beyond the non-proliferation regime

Pakistan's status as a nuclear power, which was made manifest when it carried out six nuclear tests in May 1998, came under renewed international scrutiny following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001. Of most immediate concern was the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, which was believed to be vulnerable to Muslim terrorist groups with close links to the al-Qaida organization, headed by Osama bin Laden. However, the international crisis centering on the 'war against terrorism' is bound to revive debate about Pakistan's involvement in the nuclear non-proliferation regime; the risks of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir; and the need for tighter curbs on the export of nuclear technology to politically volatile regions in the Muslim world. These debates are likely to be overshadowed by Pakistan's own perceptions of the danger it faces of a military threat from a nuclear-capable India; its aspirations as a regional power; and its desire to be recognized as 'first among equals' in the Muslim world community of nations. Any attempt to draw Pakistan into the non-proliferation regime and to persuade it to assume its responsibilities as a nuclear power will need to address these concerns. Ultimately, however, it will be for Pakistanis to decide how long they wish to subordinate their country's economic well being to the pursuit of a nuclear programme whose priorities are defined by an unaccountable military regime.     

Nuclear fears,hopes and realities in Pakistan

In the four decades since Pakistan launched its nuclear weapons program, and especially in the fifteen years since the nuclear tests of 1998, a way of thinking and a related set of feelings about the bomb have taken hold among policy‐makers and the public in Pakistan. These include the ideas that the bomb can ensure Pakistan's security; resolve the long‐standing dispute with India over Kashmir in Pakistan's favour; help create a new national spirit; establish Pakistan as a leader among Islamic countries; and usher in a new stage in Pakistan's economic development. None of these hopes has come to pass, and in many ways Pakistan is much worse off than before it went nuclear. Yet the feelings about the bomb remain strong and it is these feelings that will have to be examined critically and be set aside if Pakistan is to move towards nuclear restraint and nuclear disarmament. This will require a measure of stability in a country beset by multiple insurgencies, the emergence of a peace movement able to launch a national debate on foreign policy and nuclear weapons, and greater international concern regarding the outcomes of nuclear arms racing in South Asia.     

Making of the Seventh NWS: Historiography of the Beginning of the Nuclear Disorder in South Asia

ABSTRACT

Efforts to explore Pakistan's nuclear weapons options had been underway since 1972 alongside Pakistan's quest for nuclear energy. However, the American concerns about Pakistan developing a nuclear weapons capability did not surface until after the Indian test in May 1974. The Indian nuclear test marked the beginning of the nuclear disorder in South Asia and paved way for Pakistan's nuclearization. This article assesses US non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan under the Gerald Ford administration from 1974 to 1977. The administration attempted to curb Pakistan's latent proliferation potential by pressuring France and Pakistan to cancel their plutonium reprocessing agreement. Though it remained unsuccessful in its attempts to restrain Pakistan's nuclear development, the administration tried to develop a quid pro quo with Pakistan by pushing the country to choose military aid over bomb. Pakistan chose the bomb for it felt that US non-proliferation policy in South Asia was skewed in favor of India.     

Beyond ethnonationalism: Transnational mobilisation and framing in Kashmir's freedom movement

Since Indian Administered Kashmir's (IAK) ‘summer of unrest’ of 2010, greater attention towards the contemporary Kashmir azadi, or freedom, movement has led to more active transnational organising by Kashmiris studying abroad as well as other young people who sympathise with this movement. Indian political elites have predominately framed the azadi movement as a separatist movement. However, this perception had not been shared by many Kashmiris who argue the territory has never legally been a part of India. The perception of being a separatist movement from outside of Kashmir has also shifted with a growing body of literature documenting human rights abuses alongside raising awareness to an international community of activists, which has led to an evolution of the azadi movement into a movement for social justice and human rights. This has been facilitated by social media spaces and heterogeneous activist groups framing their movement as aligned with other social justice movements and anti-discrimination campaigns. Framing the Kashmir self-determination movement as a human rights issue appeals to a wider spectrum of non-Kashmiri activists, especially those already involved in campaigns against the marginalisation of certain groups.     

Nuclear doctrines and stable strategic relationships: the case of south Asia

This article offers a discussion of nuclear doctrines and their significance for war, peace and stability between nuclear‐armed states. The cases of India and Pakistan are analysed to show the challenges these states have faced in articulating and implementing a proper nuclear doctrine, and the implications of this for nuclear stability in the region. We argue that both the Indian and Pakistani doctrines and postures are problematic from a regional security perspective because they are either ambiguous about how to address crucial deterrence related issues, and/or demonstrate a severe mismatch between the security problems and goals they are designed to deal with, and the doctrines that conceptualize and operationalize the role of nuclear weapons in grand strategy. Consequently, as both India's and Pakistan's nuclear doctrines and postures evolve, the risks of a spiralling nuclear arms race in the subcontinent are likely to increase without a reassessment of doctrinal issues in New Delhi and Islamabad. A case is made for more clarity and less ambition from both sides in reconceptualizing their nuclear doctrines. We conclude, however, that owing to the contrasting barriers to doctrinal reorientation in each country, the likelihood of such changes being made—and the ease with which they can be made—is greater in India than in Pakistan.     

瑞宝阁藏金铜佛像研究 (二)西北印度造像(7-12世纪)

印度西北部的贵霜王朝建于公元45年,定都于犍陀罗。至公元2世纪前期,贵霜王朝的统治者推崇佛教,大建寺塔,雕凿佛像,开凿石窟寺。     

Geopolitics of landlocked states in South Asia: a comparative analysis of Afghanistan and Nepal

ABSTRACT

Foreign policies of landlocked states have been a topic of interest for scholarship on international relations but the landlocked states in South Asia have received negligible attention. Due to their geographical realities, South Asian landlocked states that include Afghanistan, Bhutan and Nepal, depend on their neighbours for trade with the outside world. A range of factors place landlocked states in an unequal relationship with their coastal neighbours. While these factors include the superiority of coastal neighbours in terms of economy, population size, and military strength, we argue that their landlockedness plays a crucial role. To further investigate the role of landlockedness, this study compares the foreign policy decisions that guide India-Nepal and Afghanistan–Pakistan relations. Based on the assessment of historical, economic and geopolitical factors, we argue that India and Pakistan exploit their landlocked neighbours to achieve their national interests. Frustrated by the treatment of their coastal neighbours and the presence of new trade opportunities have compelled Afghanistan to use its closeness with India to counter over-dependence on Pakistan and Nepal has enhanced cooperation with China to overcome its reliance on India, thereby creating a new geopolitical dynamic within South Asia.     

Mountbatten and India, 1948–64

This article brings to light Lord Mountbatten's continuing links with India after 1948 - a neglected aspect of his life and career. It probes his involvement and influence in Indian affairs through his personal relationships and professional experience. In doing so, it presents Mountbatten as the personification of the change in Indo-British ties from those of empire to dominion and beyond. On the three key issues of Hyderabad, arms sales, and Kashmir, this article evaluates his role as a ‘friend of India’ in the West as well as a conduit for the British government(s) of the day to reach out to Nehru. Considering the scope and limits of ‘influence of friendship, it shows that Mountbatten remained characteristically involved in India after his departure and this was appreciated by both Nehru and his British counterparts. Mountbatten epitomised the old ties, which continued to bind India to Britain, after the empire and through the Commonwealth. His views were offered and sought; how much they influenced remains a matter of emphasis, but that he was involved cannot be denied. The weakening of Mountbatten's involvement and influence after Jawaharlal Nehru's death in 1964 represented the wider, generational weakening of Indo-British association.     

New Delhi’s All-India War Memorial (India Gate): Death,Monumentality and the Lasting Legacy of Empire in India

This paper traces the colonial and postcolonial histories of one of India’s most iconic structures, New Delhi’s All-India War Memorial. Designed and built by Edwin Lutyens immediately after the Great War, the memorial commemorated both Indian soldiers who had died in defence of the empire and the reason for such human sacrifice. As such the memorial reaffirmed and celebrated Britain and India’s unbreakable imperial bond, now strengthened by the fiery crucible of war. After independence in 1947, India took ownership of the memorial by renaming it India Gate to symbolise the country’s transition from what it had been to what it was becoming through India’s passion to be free. In the process, the memorial was re-evaluated and re-imagined in ways that transformed this site of unwelcome colonial memory into one of India’s most important symbols of national renewal. And yet this new interpretation remained as highly contested and problematic as its original colonial meaning. While the memorial became a site of national cohesion for many, it also perpetuated a colonial politics of division along communal (religious) and inter-communal (caste) lines that has eroded a sense of well-being and security for significant sections of the Indian community. Today, India Gate serves as a symbol of both national renewal and national fragmentation.     

1971年印巴危机期间美国的难民政策与美印在难民问题上的角力

1971年印巴危机是冷战时代一次具有重大国际影响的地区危机。危机期间,因受东巴内战与印巴冲突的双重影响,大量东巴居民逃往印度,沦为难民。东巴难民持续涌入印度不仅是东巴危机转变为印巴危机的主要诱因,同时也是导致南亚持续紧张、敌对氛围难以消解的重要根源。为妥善解决难民问题,美国积极谋划,投入大量人力、物力、财力,意图妥善解决难民问题,化解危机。但是美国采取的积极措施并未减缓危机冲突的不断升级。在处理难民问题的过程中,美巴政策协调趋于一致,而印度与美巴在难民问题上的政策倾向却渐行渐远。归根究底,是否应该在难民问题上附加最终促成东巴独立的政治条件是美巴与印度的根本分歧所在。而这一根本分歧的悬而未决最终成为引爆第三次印巴战争的导火索。     

On the frontlines of the law: Legal advocacy and political protest by lawyers in contested Kashmir (Respond to this article at http://www.therai.org.uk/at/debate)

This article analyzes the role of Kashmiri lawyers working in a context of conflict, militarization and political resistance in Kashmir Valley, India. It finds that the Kashmir Bar Association, operating under conditions of state control that are maintained and legitimized through the law, constitutes an authoritative normative community and powerful institutional actor, working within the parameters of the Indian legal system while simultaneously supporting and maintaining solidarity with the movement for self‐determination, and contesting the legitimacy of Indian state rule. The association's decidedly moral vision of the law offers an alternative form of legal imagination that draws on transnational normative frameworks and practices to challenge the legal provisions and legal failures that function to legitimize human‐rights violations taking place under conditions of militarization. As we show in this article, the recent crisis period in Kashmir has posed challenges to KBA lawyers, as they negotiate and assess their relationship to the state, their place in the struggle for self‐determination, and the promise and potency of law as a strategy for social change.     

Cultural Factors in U.S.-India Relations

Book reviewed in this article:
Andrew J. Rotter, Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964     

The Archaeological Survey of India and Communal Violence in Post‐independence India

This article argues that that the discipline of archaeology as practised by the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) significantly contributed to communal violence in post‐Independence India. The essay investigates several legacies handed down from the colonial ASI to the post‐Independence ASI, with a goal of explaining the contribution of archaeology to the ongoing disturbances at Ayodhyā in Uttar Pradesh. The colonial ASI was marked by four characteristics: it was a monument‐based archaeology based on geographical surveys, literary traditions and Orientalist scholarship. These four characteristics combined to form a traditionalist, location‐driven excavation agenda that privileged specific holy sites in the post‐Partition era, sustaining the violent disagreements between Hindu and Islamic populations of India and Pakistan.     

The trials and travails of the Islamic State in Pakistan

While Pakistan is in many ways an ideal location for transnational terrorist groups due to state weakness, Islamic State has had difficulty making headway in the country. In this article, the authors argue that Islamic State’s failures in Pakistan are due to competition from other groups. Drawing on the terrorist competition literature and interviews with Pakistani counterterrorism officials, the authors find that the presence of other groups in Pakistan meant there was little demand for what Islamic State offered. Islamic State relied on splinter groups and defectors for recruitment, which alienated mainstream groups and harmed the group’s capacity. Islamic State’s competition problems were exacerbated by its internationalist ideology, which was at odds with that of many groups in Pakistan, and allowed opposing groups to present themselves as reasonable alternatives to other actors. Despite Islamic State’s lack of success, it and its allies have still engaged in extreme violence in Pakistan as a result of attempts to outbid other groups. This article has implications for fighting terrorism in Pakistan and more generally.