Tactical Flexibility: Libyan Foreign Policy under Qadhafi, 1969–2004*

On September 1, 1969, a group of junior Libyan Army officers took control of the Libyan government in a bloodless coup d'état. After the coup, the group formed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), chaired by Muammar al‐Qadhafi. In the four decades following, Libya faced numerous foreign policy challenges. The Qadhafi regime took on a distinctly anticolonial flavor that mirrored the revolutionary political trends of Egypt under of Gamal Abdul Nasser. This change in foreign policy posture shook Libya's relations with the United States and the United Kingdom and initiated the degradation of Libyan–Western ties. Under Qadhafi's leadership, Libya chose an ideological path for that focused on the strengthening of sovereignty while pursuing policies of unity and anti‐imperialism. This often put Libya at loggerheads with the West, and at times with its neighbors. Nevertheless, Qadhafi maintained popularity among his constituency. ¹ His domestic fame was the product of a carefully constructed persona that gave him the charismatic appeal necessary to maintain leadership during the latter quarter of the twentieth century and into the new millennium. Publicly, Qadhafi highlighted the similarities between himself and Libya's rural working class. He lived in a tent, and wore modest clothing. He fancied himself a devout Muslim, and praised the wisdom of the Libyan masses. He connected with his constituency through rhetoric that illustrated the stability of his policies over time, and their connection to the ideas that originally made him popular. This argues that the source of Qadhafi's charismatic power lay in his rhetoric, which connected Libya's foreign policy decisions to his foreign policy vision, the basis of his charismatic leadership. Qadhafi articulated his foreign policy vision during his first major speech to the Libyan people in September 1969, and he referred to it time and again when speaking about major Libyan foreign policy decisions. To demonstrate, this article describes the basis of Qadhafi's leadership authority and defines the parameters of his vision. Then Qadhafi's rhetoric surrounding major shifts in Libyan foreign policy is analyzed to show its congruence with his foreign policy vision. The rhetoric surrounding the Libya–Egypt war, the end of Libya's Chad intervention, Libya's surrendering of the two Lockerbie bombing suspects to be tried under Western authority, and Qadhafi's denunciation of the weapons of mass destruction programs—all major shifts in Libyan foreign policy—demonstrate how Qadhafi was able to maintain a single message, and thus his authority, over his first 35 years in power based on values established in the early days of his revolution. The flexibility of his vision enabled Qadhafi to maintain authority, while tactically adjusting Libyan foreign policy positions.     

The United States and Bahrain: Interpreting the Differentiated U.S. Responses to the Arab Spring

We examine how the United States' response to the situation in Bahrain can be differentiated from that in Libya and Egypt based on a comparative content analysis of the U.S. administration's press releases, remarks, and interviews during the first three months of the Arab Spring movement. Our findings indicate that although the level and duration of violence were comparable, the U.S. government response was strikingly different with the support given to the Bahraini government, in contrast to the critical stances adopted towards Libya and Egypt. We explain how the United States' lack of political incentive to act and concerted support by its allies were influential factors for the United States' differentiated policy during the Arab Spring.     

Geographical knowledge and scientific survey in the construction of Italian Libya

Studies of colonialism and imperial cultures have increasingly recognized the roles of geographical knowledges in European efforts to construct the colonial world materially and imaginatively. Simultaneously, the discipline of geography has undergone a thorough self-critique of its part in the constitution of colonial space. This article discusses the imbrication of geographical knowledges and colonialism in Italy, and especially how the production and circulation of geographical knowledges about Libya worked hand in hand with its territorial occupation and control. In particular, the article discusses the expeditions directed and co-ordinated by the Italian Geographical Society that were despatched into the Saharan interior in the early 1930s to produce 'scientific' representations of the region. The article examines the roles of geographical sciences in the construction of Italian Libya, but particularly how this performance of 'colonial science' surveyed Libya's populations and contributed to their classification as 'primitive' and 'Other'. These conclusions supported Italian authority in the region, but also reinforced the development of a 'colonial consciousness' among Italians as African space and peoples were rendered legible by European epistemologies.     

The Ecology of Command: U.S. Pacific Command and the Environment of the Pacific Rim

Abstract

Environmental ethicists speak fervently about the impact of human activity on the sustainability and survivability of Earth's community. But often these discussions fail to acknowledge one human activity more powerful and with the potential for greater destruction than any other— the United States military and its "empire of bases" encircling the globe. Military operations, both peacetime missions and contingency operations, and military installations stamp a large footprint on the earth's environment. From the atmospheric nuclear tests in the Bikini Atoll to the removal of the coral reef at Diego Garcia, the environment of the Pacific Rim has been shaped by the demands of U.S. national security. This paper examines the environmental footprint of U.S. Pacific Command. Secondly, it suggests that the exigencies of U.S. military presence need to be included in discussions of environmental ethics.     

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests

The rapid and unpredictable changes in the Middle East collectively known as the “Arab Spring” are posing tremendous challenges to U.S. policy formation and action. This article will explore and evaluate evolving U.S. policy in the Middle East and its potential implications. There has always been a tension in American foreign policy between pursuing American “values” (foreign policy idealism) and protecting American “interests” (foreign policy realism). For decades, the United States has sought to “make the world safe for democracy,” while at the same time often supporting repressive, nondemocratic regimes because of national security or economic self‐interest. The tension between these two fundamentally distinct policy orientations has become even more pronounced as the United States tries to respond to the Arab Spring uprisings. Why did the United States actively support the rebels in Libya but not the protestors in Syria or Bahrain? Is there an emerging, coherent “Obama Doctrine” on intervention in Arab countries, or was Libya just a “one‐off” event? These are some of the questions that this article will attempt to answer.     

Trade and peace: the EU and Gaddafi's final decade

This article examines the effectiveness of the EU's use of trade to induce peace in Libya during Gaddafi's final ten years in power, between 2001 and 2011. During this period, the EU implored and reiterated through rhetoric, policy and the exchange of goods and services that trade was to be used as a tool to maintain peace and prevent conflict. Indeed, this peace‐through‐trade assumption is at the heart of the EU, which was founded on the notion that economic interdependence ameliorates potential causes of conflict. Initially, this article embeds its argument in the theory concerned with the relationship between trade and peace, followed by tracking the development of the EU's policy. The main body of the article then provides evidence which goes against the assumption that the trade–peace relationship is positively correlated. Specifically, it is argued that the EU's peace‐through‐trade policy failed in this instance due to the fact that it failed to take into account the Libyan context: namely, the Middle Eastern state's ethnographic and historical makeup; the weapons of mass‐destruction programme and the subsequently induced sanctions; Gaddafi's rule and attempts at reform; as well as the 2011 conflict. All these factors amalgamated to ongoing conflict in Libya during Gaddafi's final decade in power despite EU–Libyan trade continuing to take place during this timeframe.     

Fortuitous Consequence: The Domestic Politics of the 1991 Canada-United States Agreement on Air Quality

Following more than a decade of negotiations, the Canada-United States Agreement on Air Quality entered into force on March 13, 1991, with the signatures of then-Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and US. President George Bush. Why was it so difficult for Canadian and US. negotiators to reach agreement? I argue that Canadian and U.S. domestic politics were the primary impediments to resolving the U.S.-Canada acid rain dispute. This article thus casts the dispute in terms of a pair of domestic environmental policy problems, whose timely and complementary solution, furthermore, required executive initiative as the handmaiden of ecological crisis. Heightened public concern about the threat of acidic air pollution in Canada prompted Mulroney's efforts to reduce acid rain. In the United States, a likewise critical change in the public's perception of air quality as a national emergency created the mass support necessary for Bush's federal acid rain control initiative     

U.S. Civil Society Assistance to Egypt: Thinking Long Term

The interim Egyptian government's excoriation of U.S. support for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the country has sparked a crisis that some analysts have called the worst deterioration of United States–Egypt relations in history. As Cairo's smear campaigns against the civil society community foment public mistrust among many Egyptians of NGO activity and foreign funding, U.S. policymakers and practitioners face new challenges in supporting civil society work in Egypt. For a number of reasons, however, Washington's assistance to Egypt should and almost certainly will continue, even if the environment for civil society activity in the country does not improve. Grantors and implementers must think seriously, therefore, about long‐term strategies for assisting civil society development in Egypt, which will require at least some coordination with a government that may be suspicious of U.S. efforts. By standing firm on red lines, improving public messaging in Egypt, carefully fostering local ownership of projects, remaining strictly neutral in identifying grantees and diversifying partnerships, distinguishing between short‐term foreign policy objectives and long‐term efforts to assist civil society development, and using varied democracy assistance tools appropriately, the United States can assist NGOs in Egypt in a way that gives them—and democracy—the best chance for success.     

The Limits of Multilateralism: Making Policy for the Philippines, 1945–1950

On 1 September 1969, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi seized power in Libya, abolishing a pro-Western monarchy and launching a revolution that combined elements of Nasserism and Islamic radicalism. American policymakers quickly came to regard the Libyan revolution as anathema after Qaddafi expropriated U.S. oil companies and forced the Pentagon to relinquish its air base outside Tripoli. Misinterpreting the new regime's increasingly radical nationalism as evidence of Soviet subversion and failing to appreciate the broad appeal of resurgent Islam, the Nixon and Ford administrations froze arms sales to Libya and provided covert support for anti-Qaddafi forces. After Jimmy Carter's bid to improve relations with Libya backfired, tensions escalated dramatically during the 1980s, when Ronald Reagan branded Qaddafi as a terrorist and a Soviet stooge and unleashed the Sixth Fleet and the CIA in an unsuccessful bid to effect regime change in Libya that was punctuated by the U.S. air raid on Tripoli in April 1986. Qaddafi's erratic behavior and his supersized ego, of course, always made dealing with him a diplomatic nightmare, but the blend of covert action and gunboat diplomacy that Nixon preferred and that Reagan perfected only made a bad situation worse.     

Libya and the state of intervention

The international response to the crisis in Libya has been remarkably quick and decisive. Where many other cases of mass atrocity crimes have failed to generate sufficient and timely political will to protect civilians at risk, the early response to Libya in 2011 has shown that the United Nations Security Council is able to give effect to the ‘responsibility to protect’ norm. While not an implementing party in a legal sense, the Australian government has taken a forward-leaning diplomatic stance in helping to mobilise broad support for addressing this crisis. In light of the ongoing political controversy over armed humanitarian intervention, the Libya case shows that state-based advocacy for R2P matters, given the on-going need to bolster the legitimacy of the principle. A discussion of Canberra's diplomatic activity is a prelude to an examination of the proceedings of the UN Security Council and the two key resolutions, the second of which gave effect to the forcible action. The article then considers three dimensions of the Security Council's implementation of the responsibility to protect: the language of the resolutions and the intriguing absence of a textual reference to the international community's responsibility to act; the expansive mandate for civilian protection in Security Council resolution 1973; and the first unanimous referral to the International Criminal Court, with novel support from the United States of America.     

The Influence of Organizations and Institutions on Wetland Policy Stability: The Rapanos Case

This paper uses a case study of wetland regulation in the United States to develop elements of a theory about institutional stability and change in policy processes involving large public organizations. This theoretical approach draws on the Institutional Analysis and Development framework to understand events that are not well explained by other policy theories. Our approach accounts for the theoretically unexpected outcomes of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Rapanos v. United States, which stood to change the way the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regulate the filling of wetlands. We propose a typology of institutional types that operate inside public organizations, and use process tracing to show how tacit institutions, those created informally within public organizations, can play key roles in determining the outcomes of policy processes. In the Rapanos case, informal coordination mechanisms enabled regulators and members of the regulated community to preserve substantially the pre‐ruling status quo. The key role of these microlevel interactions in shaping the macrolevel behaviors of public organizations underscores the importance of further research investigating how, in similar cases, different behavioral mechanisms interact in often complex and unexpected ways to determine the outcomes of policy processes.     

Lester B. Pearson’s Temple University Speech Revisited: The Origins and Evolution of the Proposal for a Bombing Pause

Lester B. Pearson’s speech at Temple University in April 1965 suggesting a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam enraged United States President Lyndon B. Johnson, who in private the next day at Camp David strongly rebuked the Canadian prime minister. While their stormy encounter has become the stuff of legend, just how the controversial proposal for a bombing pause appeared in Pearson’s speech in the first place has received far less attention. Making use of new archival material, including the private diary of Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Marcel Cadieux, among other original sources, this article revisits previous accounts of the Temple speech, offering new details on the origins of the proposal for a bombing pause and examining the hitherto unknown but crucial drafting changes that were made prior to its becoming public. In doing so, this article sheds new light on one of the most significant events in the history of Canadian–American relations.     

Skiffle in the U.K.: the indigenization of a musical genre

ABSTRACT

This article examines the creation and diffusion of skiffle, and analyses how it emerged from the transatlantic flow of popular music from the United States to the United Kingdom, and the process by which it became “indigenized” in the U.K. I have also looked at the salience of race, the legacy of English music hall song traditions, and the idea of indigenization of music in post-WWII Britain. I have highlighted how skiffle eventually became “English,” its later impact on popular music in the U.K. in the 1960s and thereafter, and the complexities inherent in the idea of musical genre.     

The Budapest Memorandum and Russia's intervention in Ukraine

Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States extended security assurances to Ukraine in December 1994 in an agreement that became known as the Budapest Memorandum. This agreement was part of a package of arrangements whereby Ukraine transferred the Soviet‐made nuclear weapons on its territory to Russia and acceded to the Treaty on the Non‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non‐nuclear weapon state (NNWS). Russia's violations of the Budapest Memorandum, notably its annexation of Crimea, could have far‐reaching implications for nuclear non‐proliferation and disarmament because of the questions that Russia's behaviour has raised about the reliability of major‐power security assurances for NNWS parties to the NPT. Doubts about the reliability of such assurances could create incentives to initiate, retain or accelerate national nuclear weapons programs. Moreover, because the Budapest Memorandum included restatements of UN Charter provisions and principles articulated in the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co‐operation in Europe, Russia's disregard for the Budapest Memorandum has raised fundamental questions about the future of international order. The Russians have demonstrated that, despite economic sanctions and international condemnation, they are prepared to disregard longstanding legal and political norms, including those expressed in the Budapest Memorandum, in pursuit of strategic and economic advantages and the fulfilment of national identity goals. Unless Russia reverses its dangerous course, the fate of the Budapest Memorandum may in retrospect stand out as a landmark in the breakdown of international order.     

How Oil Twists the Hegemon's Arm: The Case of the United States and Saudi Arabia and Their Ambivalent Partnership

The U.S.–Saudi relationship is often seen as an oxymoron. These allies have differed in their foreign policy interests — varied in the need, one for the other — but never severed ties. When the 9/11 attacks are added to the mix, questions are raised about why these ambivalent allies continue to tolerate each other. This study argues that although the United States is the preponderant power, Saudi Arabia has primacy in the energy market. This has caused both countries to remain allies through the different oil crises, the 9/11 attacks, and in spite of the Arab‐Israeli conflict. This contravenes the hegemonic stability theory about alliance formation and duration. Saudi Arabia's roles in the 1973, 1979, 2008, and 2012–2015 oil crises all demonstrate its ability and willingness to act independently of the United States. The fact that it can do this and still maintain its strategic partnership with the United States is incredulous. This invites a revision of the hegemonic stability theory since strong and persistent defection from the hegemon's wishes should catalyze some comparable form of punishment or a severance of the relationship.     

Letter to the Movement: Antiwar Strategies on the Eve of Destruction and Occupation

Author's Intro: This is a two‐part essay on antiwar strategy and tactics. The first part was finished a few hours after George Bush's TV announcement that the US would invade and begin bombing Iraq. The second part was finished in mid‐May 2003, as the US occupation forces formally announced their colonization of Iraq, with cracker Tommy Franks goose‐stepping around Iraq as the latest jewel in the American empire. The question remains for the whole world, especially for those of us living in what is more appropriately named than ever “the belly of the beast”: What are we going to do about the United States?     

The Arab Uprisings and the United States: The Dichotomy Between Balancing Stability and Upholding Commitment to Democracy

The Arab Spring, a revolutionary movement for democracy that swept across the Arab Middle East in 2010, has contributed to the downfall of several oppressive authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. The movement represented several uprisings that placed the United States in a precarious position. While the uprisings have shaken U.S. policy to the core, they also presented a historic opportunity for American policymakers to craft a new and comprehensive policy that is compatible with the much‐coveted principles of democracy, freedom, and justice in a region that has historically been unable to grasp such principles. This article argues that the American administration under President Barak Obama squandered this opportunity by pursuing an incoherent and inconsistent policy. This policy revealed Obama's support of the uprisings calls for political reforms that aligned with American liberal values. However, the policy also reflected a commitment to ensure security and stability by maintaining autocratic regimes the protesters hoped to overthrow. This article demonstrates that the policy lacked consistency and clarity as it shifted from one uprising to another.     

A cartographic fade to black: mapping the destruction of urban Japan during World War II

In this paper we examine the history, production, and use – practical and rhetorical – of maps created by the United States government during World War II as related to the development and execution of aerial bombing policies against Japan. Drawing from a range of maps and primary documents culled from libraries and archives in the United States, we argue that maps provide an important, and hitherto neglected, means through which to trace the exploration and eventual embrace of the incendiary bombing of Japan’s cities. In particular, our aim is to show how maps, along with the men who made and used them, played a central role in the planning and prosecution of air raids on urban Japan. We also address the mobilization of American geographers into the war effort, the re-configuration of America’s spatial intelligence community during World War II, and the ways in which maps were constructed in the context of total war.     

Obama's “Smart‐Power” Strategy,One Year On: The Case of the Middle East

A year ago, President Obama was cheered into the White House. His election represented hope for many, not just in the United States, but around the world. Charged with such force and charisma, unprecedented in U.S. Presidential history, he promised the much needed change that America and the world are waiting for. Obama's election was more of a rebirth that represented hope, “Yes We Can,” to regain the credibility of the United States lost during the last decade.     

Visions of Statesmanship Across The Atlantic: Presidential Masculinity and the American Response to Benito Mussolini

This article explores how hegemonic masculinity forged discourses of modern statesmanship in the United States and Italy in the first three decades of the twentieth century. It unpacks the ‘presidential masculinity’ of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson and compares these gendered performances of political leadership in the United States to Benito Mussolini's Fascist rule in Italy during the 1920s. In doing so, this article contends that the manliness of these three modern leaders rested on a contrasting of pairs: if Roosevelt embodied the hegemonic ideal of the ‘frontiersman-as-president’, Wilson personified its ‘unmanly’, bourgeois-liberal countertype and thereby engendered the initially hospitable view of Mussolini's Fascist masculinity in the United States during the Jazz Age. The article covers the publications in The Atlantic Monthly to reveal how the American disillusion with Wilson's liberal internationalism transformed the Duce into a Fascist surrogate for Roosevelt. In a decade of political, economic and social upheaval, the transatlantic ‘public relations state’ in both the United States and Italy discursively positioned Mussolini as the personification of the masculine ideals of acumen, willpower and virility for the American public; a ‘Doctor-Dictator’ who, akin to Roosevelt, became a symbol of modern manliness that signified stability, progress and reform. In the process, the Duce's Fascist manhood shaped hegemonic ideals of statesmanship across the Atlantic while hinting at the paltry support for the liberal democracies of the West.