‘All Signs Indicate that Gestapo Agents Murdered Him’: Soviet Disinformation,the Katyn massacre and the Raoul Wallenberg Case, 1945–7

In the years 1945–52, that is, between Raoul Wallenberg's incarceration in the Lubianka prison in Moscow (6 February 1945) and the first Swedish demand for his return (11 February 1952), more than fifty people provided the Swedish Foreign Ministry with diffuse and often contradictory information about his whereabouts. This article argues that a number of these testimonies may have been part of a Soviet campaign of disinformation aimed at diverting the Swedes' attention away from Moscow and to have them believe that Wallenberg had died in Hungary. The appearance of messages to this effect by February–March 1945 may indicate that the Soviets had already decided at this early point never to let Wallenberg return alive, or at least to construct an option that would allow for such a decision. In August 1947, after twenty-six Swedish diplomatic approaches on account of Wallenberg over the course of two and a half years, the Soviets handed over a note signed by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinskii that declared that Wallenberg had presumably died in Hungary. The note had the desired effect. No Swedish diplomatic approaches on Wallenberg were made for the next five years. This article argues that the Vyshinskii note was an extraordinary measure taken by the Soviets finally to get the message of Wallenberg's death in Hungary through to the Swedes. The Soviet disinformation regarding the 1940 Katyn massacre provides an interesting point of reference for understanding the way in which the Soviets tried to mislead Sweden over Wallenberg.     

关于冷战问题研究的几点思考

二次世界大战改变了由欧洲人支配世界近5个世纪的国际关系格局。二战时的同盟美国和苏联,战后不久便分道扬镳。形成各自的政治军事集团。在政治、军事、经济以及思想意识形态方面进行全面对抗。欧洲成为东西方冲突的焦点．是两极格局形成的标志。由于双方大搞军备竞赛,导致“冷战”在全球范围内展开。对冷战研究,西方学术界存在着不同看法,在美国有所谓“正统派”和“修正派”的学术之争,他们在冷战问题上的分歧,主要体现在政治意识形态方面。他们的观点,为研究冷战提供不同的视野。     

Orme Sargent,Ernest Bevin and British Policy Towards Europe, 1946–1949

Upon his appointment as Foreign Secretary in July 1945, it was widely expected that Ernest Bevin would make a clean sweep of the permanent officials in the Foreign Office. However, Bevin decided against staffing changes and eventually came to trust and even like these officials. This paper explores the relationship between Bevin and his Permanent Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office between 1946 and 1949, Sir Orme Sargent. Despite their initial concerns about one another in 1945, this relationship turned into one of mutual friendship by the time of Sargent's retirement in 1949. Both were driven by similar motivations in their conception of British foreign policy. They both believed that Britain was a Great Power and had a place in Europe. The congruence of views between them is clear in the examination of Anglo-French relations (culminating in the Anglo-French Treaty of 1947) and in the signature of the Brussels Treaty. This paper will show that while Bevin had a policy, so did his most senior advisor, and that the Foreign Secretary was not adverse to taking advice either. Beyond high policy, a close working and personal relationship developed between the two men.     

A Matter of Courtesy: The Role of Soviet Diplomacy and Soviet “System Safeguards” in Maintaining Soviet Influence on Czechoslovak Science before and after 1968

In 1969, a few short months after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, Sergei I. Prasolov, advisor to the Soviet Ambassador in Prague, informed František Šorm, President of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, at a formal meeting that he welcomed Šorm's suggestion to intensify scientific exchange between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Šorm politely declined this offer. Behind the veneer of diplomatic courtesy on the part of both actors, a real drama was taking place. Šorm and the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences had actually never formulated such a request. To the contrary, since the late 1950s the academy had repeatedly pointed out that the Soviets were incapable of coordinating scientific activities in the Eastern Bloc. The Soviet system of academic cooperation within the Eastern Bloc had already begun to collapse after the Geneva Summit of 1955, where the Soviets opened the door to international collaboration across the Iron Curtain. Yet it was only in the late 1960s that the Soviets realized that while they dominated large-scale international collaboration, they had lost control of internal developments within the Eastern Bloc.     

略论杜勒斯对苏战略的早期思想背景（1919—1952）

杜勒斯的对苏战略构想和政策主张与其早期经历和思想有着密切的关联。杜勒斯对苏战略观的政治哲学基础是他早年形成的“和平变革”论,其思想根源包括在冷战初期即已基本定型的苏联观,即他对苏联“挑战”的性质、对外目标与手段、战略上的优势和弱点等问题的基本判断。联系这个思想背景,可以从杜勒斯令人目眩的多种表象背后,看到一条清晰而又前后连贯的政策思路。可以说,杜勒斯的对苏战略构想就其本质而言是一以贯之的,其逻辑顺序可以概括为“共处—竞争—高压—变革”。     

Time to Grow Up? Canadian Understandings of Revolutionary Cuba to the Missile Crisis of 1962

The Cuban missile crisis was a moment during the Cold War when rhetoric, brinkmanship, and politics intersected with notions of masculinity, empire and colonization to nearly disastrous ends. The crisis occurred at a moment of transition in Canada in which Canadians were profoundly concerned over the state of Canadian–Cuban relations and Canada’s place in the world. This article examines how previous understandings and preconceptions of “Cuba”—such as feminized and infantilized images of Cuban leader Fidel Castro in political cartoons and editorials in newspapers – influenced how Canadians understood the crisis, their nation and how the Canadian government should interact with other powers. While both negative and positive images of Castro and Cuba were present in Canadian public discussion, Canadians utilized the same imagery to argue that their government should act in its own best interests after the missile crisis.     

THE ROLE OF FINNISH LEFTISTS IN SOVIET–FINNISH ARTISTIC EXCHANGES DURING THE LATE SOCIALIST PERIOD

The article examines artistic exchanges between the USSR and Finland from the viewpoint of the Finnish left. After WWII, Finland was in a difficult geopolitical position; although not occupied by the USSR, it received little support from the West and so remained an independent capitalist democracy, with little foreign leverage. The Soviet influence was felt in many areas, and throughout the Cold War, Finland received many more world-class Soviet artists than any other Western country. This was in part a consequence of Finland’s proximity to the USSR, but the Finnish Communist Party, a major domestic political force, also played a role. Immediately after the war, organizations associated with the Finnish Communist Party enjoyed a virtual monopoly over such exchanges, but this began to change in the mid-1950s. Around that time, the USSR began to allow Finnish artists to train and perform at its world-class arenas, and many of those Finnish students had links with the political left. Based on interviews and supported by archival material from Finland and Russia, the article explores the role of the Finnish left in these artistic exchanges.     

Icebreakers in Anglo-Russian Relations (1914–21)

Foreign supply to Russia in the First World War is familiar terrain, but although the present paper engages to some degree with the military, diplomatic, and especially economic aspects of the subject, its primary affiliations lie elsewhere. Its principal purpose is to discuss the icebreakers on which it concentrates not only just before but also just after Russia's withdrawal from the First World War, with a view to contrasting the first phase of the ships' history with the second and so highlighting the perennially ambivalent character of the Anglo-Russian relationship. On the way, it touches on questions of geography, English local history, environmental history, the history of technology, and, even, towards the end, Russian literary history.     

对日和约与朝鲜停战谈判

朝鲜战争的爆发迫使美国最终确定了单独媾和的对日和约新方针,并且期待战局好转而实现对日媾和;美国为了阻止中国出席旧金山会议,在对日和约签订之前采取了拖延谈判的策略;旧金山会议后美国急于停战,而因对日和约在远东陷入困境和被动局面的苏联和中国却决心在停战谈判中坚持强硬的和不妥协的立场,以便在朝鲜战场吸引和消耗美国的力量。这就是在冷战大背景下对日和约与朝鲜停战谈判之间的微妙关系。     

论澳大利亚参与朝鲜战争的原因

从外交演进的轨迹来看,澳大利亚参与朝鲜战争是谋求在地区乃至国际性事务中发挥积极建设性作用,并树立英联邦国家的自主外交形象。广义地分析,澳大利亚参加朝鲜战争是西方资本主义阵营对社会主义阵营采取的敌对行动。从狭义的角度来理解,澳大利亚参与朝鲜战争是为了消弥澳大利亚与美国之间的分歧,密切与美关系,其最终目的就是为建立澳美同盟创造条件。     

A Post-Imperial Cold War Paradox: The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement 1958–62

As the recent and current French military interventions in West Africa have illustrated, France succeeded in establishing long-lasting security relationships with its former colonies during the transfer of power. In Britain’s case, by contrast, decolonisation was largely followed by military withdrawal. This was not, however, for lack of trying. The episode of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement clearly illustrates that Britain, driven by its global cold war military strategy, wanted to secure its long-term interests in sub-Saharan Africa. The agreement was first welcomed by the Nigerian elite, which was not only anglophile and anti-communist, but also wanted British military assistance for the build-up of its armed forces. Yet, in Nigeria, the defence pact was faced with mounting opposition, and decried as a neo-colonial scheme. Whereas this first allowed the Nigerian leaders to extract strategic, material and financial concessions from Britain, it eventually led to the abrogation of the agreement. Paradoxically, Britain’s cold war grand strategy created not only the need for the agreement, but also to abrogate it. In the increasingly global East-West struggle, the agreement was strategically desirable, but politically counterproductive.     

冷战期间西方边疆理论的发展

文章对二战后至冷战结束前的西方边疆理论进行了探讨,认为冷战期间的边疆理论所反映的是这一历史阶段国家对自身利益界限的理解和认识,其发展是人类社会生产力提高和世界形势变化的结果。     

The Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Korean truce negotiations

The outbreak of the Korean War caused the U.S.A. to become determined in excluding the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the signing of which is hoped to be hastened by winning the Korean War. Before the signing of the treaty, the U.S.A. intentionally delayed the Korean truce negotiations in order to prevent the PRC from attending the San Francisco Peace Conference. After the signing, the U.S.A. preferred an immediate cessation of hostilities in Korea, whereas the Soviet Union and the PRC, bogged down in the Far East by the terms of the treaty, were determined to take a hard-line stance, hoping that the U.S.A. would become tied down and drained on the Korean battlefield. Thus, there was a subtle relationship between the treaty and the negotiations in the context of the Cold War. Translated by Chen Dan from Shixue Jikan 史学集刊 (Collected Papers of History Studies) 2006, (1): 66–75