Anglo-Iranian Treaty Negotiations: Reza Shah,Teymurtash and the British Government, 1927–32

From 1927 to 1932, wide-reaching negotiations took place between Reza Shah's court minister, ‘Abdolhossein Khan Teymurtash, and the British Legation in Tehran, the aim of which was to resolve all outstanding issues and to normalize relations between the two countries on the basis of a general treaty. This article examines these Anglo-Iranian negotiations with a particular focus on the thorniest issues—Iran's territorial claims in the Persian Gulf, particularly its claims to sovereignty over Bahrain, Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands. Though an agreement was never reached, an examination of the content and conduct of these negotiations offers some valuable insights into the unique features of Iranian nationalism and Iranian ambitions in the Persian Gulf during the Reza Shah period.     

Iran in the Nazi New Order, 1933–1941

Despite a succession of scholarly studies over the years, the relationship between Reza Shah’s Iran and National Socialist Germany has not been fully explored. Rather than focusing on the supposed Aryan ideological sympathies that bound the two countries together, this article argues that the real driver of the German–Iranian relationship in the 1930s was economic and based in the mutual interaction of state economic initiatives. It states that Iran’s place in Nazism’s economic system was the outcome of two factors: the “New Plan” of Reich Economics Minister Hjalmar Schacht, and its focus on clearing agreements as a motor for depression-era trade, and the connections of Schacht’s system to Reza Shah’s strategy to modernize Iran. In exploring this issue the article focuses on relations between Germany and Iran during three distinct moments: first, the period from 1918 to 1928 and the working out of a new relationship after the First World War; secondly the period of Schacht’s New Plan in Iran in the mid-1930s; and finally the period from the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 to the British–Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941. During this last period Iran both belonged to the Nazi–Soviet trade zone created by the Pact and attempted to defend its neutrality.     

The Chinese Maritime Customs at War, 1941–45

The origins of the Foreign Inspectorate of the Chinese Maritime Customs are well known; the succession crises after Inspector Generals Hart and Aglen well covered in the literature; and the Maze Inspectorate has received a good deal of attention. However, one significant feature of the newly opened Inspectorate Archives is the weight of post-1937 material it contains, and the light it can throw upon the administration of Lester Knox Little, inspector general in 1943–50, on the Japanese-controlled Customs in occupied China, and on the erosion of foreign and especially of British dominance in the service. This paper outlines the rocky transition from Sir Frederick Maze to Little (and in Japanese-occupied China to Inspector General Kishimoto Hirokichi), and explores the impact of this transition and of the Sino-Japanese war on the position of the Customs and on its activities between 1941 and 1945. The Customs found a role for itself in unoccupied China, and remained a useful tool for the Guomindang state, although British diplomats surrendered their long-held claim that a British national should run the service. What preserved a foreign role in the Customs after Pearl Harbor was not the support of foreign diplomats, but the relations of senior staff with high-ranking Chinese government officials.     

Repatriating the Japanese from New Caledonia, 1941–46

This paper considers the negotiations for the repatriation of the Japanese residents of New Caledonia who were transferred to Australia for internment after the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific theatre of World War II. It shows that whilst the Japanese residents’ place of origin was New Caledonia, it was deemed instead to be Japan, and they were repatriated to Japan either as part of the Anglo–Japanese civilian exchange of September 1942 or after the cessation of hostilities. The paper also shows that the Australian government had security concerns regarding the Japanese before and during the war but was willing to repatriate the Japanese to New Caledonia after the war should the New Caledonian authorities have been willing to accept them back. The New Caledonian authorities’ decision not to accept the Japanese back in New Caledonia resulted in their repatriation to Japan even though some expressed the wish to return to New Caledonia.     

British Perceptions and Responses to Sultan Ali Dinar of Darfur, 1915–16

This article illustrates how British perceptions of Sultan Ali Dinar of Darfur, in the context of the First World War, led to the downfall of his sultanate in 1916. It shows how the paranoia of the ‘imperial mind’ amplified the threat of militant Islam, personified by Ali Dinar, through the conviction that he was involved with outside enemy forces. British certainty of Ottoman and German complicity in the sultan's belligerence was presented with great intensity by officials, a conviction which formed a central justification for this extension of British rule in Saharan Africa. British officials actively propagated the idea of outside forces having a pernicious influence on Ali Dinar's bellicosity. Through their dogged insistence on this interpretative trope, the British elided other complex factors that informed the sultan's defiance, and misunderstood the internal divisions and stresses in Darfuri society that limited the effectiveness of his jihad. This article goes beyond existing studies by presenting a close analysis of the colonial record to examine in greater detail these two perceptions of Ali Dinar as ‘Muslim fanatic’ and ‘Turco-German co-conspirator’. In a new departure from existing works, this article analyses British views of Ali Dinar after Darfur was occupied, explores the sultan's motivations for his declaration of jihad against the British, and sheds light on the responses of ordinary Darfuris to their sultan‘s doomed defiance of the region's dominant power.