New Caledonia's Independence Referendum: Re-Defining the Future

The historic independence referendum that took place on 4 November 2018 in New Caledonia marks the beginning of a potentially four-year self-determination process that is, like the French territory itself, unique. It is the final stage of a series of agreements that ended civil war over independence, and that have overseen peace in New Caledonia for 30 years. The referendum has highlighted the real achievements under the peace agreements, but also areas of deep difference, creating new uncertainties and risks to stability. While the November vote saw majority support for staying with France, it exposed continued ethnic division, with a sizeable Indigenous Kanak vote for independence, despite years of Accord compromises. The referendum is only the first of potentially two more divisive votes by 2022, to be preceded by local provincial elections in May 2019. Whatever the voting outcomes, the majority loyalists must take into account Indigenous independence aspirations in considering the major issues left over after the Noumea Accord's completion, if peaceful governance is to continue. UN decolonization principles present three options: independence, independence in some kind of partnership with France, or continued integration with France. So long as the answer remains ‘no’ to independence, this final process will demand serious dialogue between bitterly opposed parties, at the least about expanded local powers, re-defining governance in New Caledonia beyond the Noumea Accord.     

‘We Lost on the Numbers,But for Us It's a Victory’: New Caledonia's 2018 Referendum on Self-Determination

On 4 November 2018, more than 141,000 voters in New Caledonia went to the polls to determine the political status of the French Pacific dependency. A referendum on self-determination, the culmination of a 20-year transition under the 1998 Noumea Accord, posed the question: ‘Do you want New Caledonia to accede to full sovereignty and become independent?’

In an unprecedented turnout, 56.67 per cent of voters decided to remain within the French Republic, while 43.33 per cent voted Yes for independence. These figures, with a clear majority opposing full sovereignty, suggest a setback for New Caledonia's independence coalition Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS). In reality, the size of the Yes vote has disappointed partisans of the French Republic and opened the way for a second referendum in 2020.

After briefly outlining the 1998 Noumea Accord, the article details the results and participation rates in the November 2018 vote. It then focuses on different aspects of the referendum campaign, including: the role of opinion polling, administration of the referendum by the French state; disputes over electoral registration; international monitoring; key objectives of the anti-independence parties; grassroots campaigning by the FLNKS and the significance of the youth vote. It flags some issues in the aftermath of the referendum, as New Caledonians prepare for the next local elections to be held on 12 May 2019.     

The 2014 Elections in New Caledonia: A Precursor to Self-determination?

ABSTRACT

On 11 May 2014, voters in New Caledonia went to the polls to elect representatives to three provincial assemblies and the national congress. The election results reaffirmed the division between supporters and opponents of independence, as New Caledonians move towards a self-determination referendum scheduled before the end of 2018. The election results confirmed longstanding regional and political divisions. In the rural north and outlying Loyalty Islands, the FLNKS independence movement holds sway. In spite of a united mobilisation by a pro-independence coalition in the Southern Province, three competing anti-independence parties dominate the Southern assembly. The campaign highlighted issues that will dominate political debate in coming years: electoral reforms, economic and fiscal policy, the key role of nickel mining and competing alternatives to ‘exit’ the 1998 Noumea Accord. In the incoming congress, 29 conservative opponents of independence face 25 members of independence parties. This balance of forces in New Caledonia's political institutions and divisions within the loyalist camp means tension will be ongoing as the country moves closer to the scheduled referendum on self-determination – especially as France seeks to maintain its status as a midsized global power.     

The Limits of Influence: Australia and the Future of New Caledonia, 1975 to 1988

From the late 1970s Australian governments (led in turn by Malcolm Fraser and Bob Hawke) expected New Caledonia to become independent. France responded with suspicion. From 1983, however, reformist governments in Australia and France took apparently converging views. But tensions rose because of unrest in New Caledonia and conflict over French nuclear testing. Australia’s limited capacity to influence developments waned further in 1986 when Jacques Chirac became French prime minister and countered the Kanak nationalist movement. Foreign Minister Bill Hayden favoured moderating Australia’s position, but the issue became moot in mid-1988 when the rival forces in New Caledonia agreed to the truce embodied in the Matignon Accords. The different approaches of the Fraser and Hawke governments reflected philosophical differences, the personal stance of key players, influences from their political movements, and the challenges of changing circumstances. Decades later, with a referendum due by November 2018, Australia’s approach is likely to be cautious.     

‘Talking Itself Out of a Political Future’: Education and Australian Army Engagement with Papua New Guinean Independence, 1966–72

The Australian Army, while having a long association with Papua New Guinea after the Second World War and before independence in 1975, is often conceptualized as a small player in the decolonization process, of interest to scholars because of its cost and potential threat to democratic government. This article examines the Army’s education programme and associated policies in the decade before independence to argue that the institution was acutely aware of looming decolonization, and actively sought to create a national Papua New Guinean military by repurposing policies originally designed to serve Australia’s defence needs, in particular through ‘civic’ education. It embarked on this path without direction from the Department of Territories. While the results of ‘civic’ education are difficult to determine, this article shows that the Australian Army was engaged in the profound shifts occurring around it in Papua New Guinea.     

Reforming the Italian constitution

Abstract

The third parliamentary Bicameral Committee established to reform the Italian constitution conducted its business from January to June 1997. The results have been controversial and have attracted a great deal of criticism. The Committee's recommendations are subject to amendment by parliament and must then be approved (or rejected) in a general referendum. The Committee ended up recommending what is essentially a French‐style semi‐presidential system. It is accompanied by an electoral law that offers a premium of an additional 20 per cent of the seats to the majority, 55 per cent to be elected in simple majority electoral districts, and 25 per cent to be distributed nationally on a proportional basis. PDS leader Massimo D'Alema, chair of the Committee, has claimed victory since the Commitee produced a positive outcome, yet in fact he has certainly lost since he preferred a strong ‘premier’ model and a majority runoff electoral system. The Committee demonstrated that small parties, especially the former Christian Democrats, can exert influence over larger ones, that the parries retain firm control over the process of institutional reform, that the three major party leaders — D'Alema, Berlusconi and Fini — preferred their own reciprocal legitimization over the attainment of any major reform, and that Italy's political‐institutional transition is not yet over. Indeed, the proposed reforms are likely to prove neither sufficient nor adequate.     

‘Annamese Coolies’ at Australian Ports: Charting Colonial Geographies of Emotion,and Settler Memory,from French Vietnam to New Caledonia via Interwar Australia

In 1927, a ship carrying indentured Vietnamese workers travelled down the eastern coast of Australia on its way to New Caledonia. The movement of the Ville d’Amiens steamer through Australian waters sparked protests against alleged ‘French slavery’ and, eventually, moved politicians to recall the ‘injustice’ of the ‘pre-White Australia’ era. This article uses the Ville d’Amiens episode as a portal through which to explore the nexus between geographies of colonialism and of emotion. It argues that colonial and national power operated in pervasively ‘triangular’ ways, via the interplay of an affective triangle – of guilt, shame and pride – and a geo-political triangle – of French Vietnam, Australia and New Caledonia. Further, the article calls for greater exploration of the historical, geo-spatial contingencies of memory, motion and emotion.     

Transformations in contemporary Quebec nationalism, 1960–2020: A shift in the sources of collective animosities

This article is interested in the shift of the object of hostility, which historically fuelled Quebec nationalism. The main targets of discontent have long been the ‘rest of Canada’ and the lower socio-economic status of Francophones. After the 1995 independence referendum, the feeling of dissatisfaction with Canada, and even resentment, gradually faded. This retreating within Quebec's borders has led many French-speaking Quebecers to become concerned about the conditions that make possible the preservation of their cultural and linguistic heritage in North America. This shift has meant that the source of concern is now individuals and groups who do not share this heritage rooted in Western Judeo-Christian values or who are perceived not to adhere to the concerns related to the preservation and development of the French character and the dominant values within the ‘Quebec nation’. The expression of these concerns has manifested itself primarily in debates about the place religion should occupy in public and civic spaces since the mid-2000s.     

Political parties at critical junctures: explaining the decisions to offer referendums on constitutional change in the United Kingdom

This article investigates the Labour and Conservative parties’ decisions to offer referendums on constitutional change. We focus on Labour’s Scottish devolution referendum and the Conservatives’ EU referendum. Rather than responding to public demand, we argue each party offered referendums based on short-term electoral calculations. Both parties believed their commitments would resolve intra-party dissension, neutralise emergent electoral threats and expand their electorate. While each party won the subsequent election, the referendums produced long-term unintended outcomes counter to their initial objectives: an invigorated Scottish National Party and an impending EU exit. Ultimately, the consequences of both may lead to Scottish independence.     

The Legacy of Bernard Narokobi and the Melanesian Way

ABSTRACT

This special issue on the life and legacy of Bernard Narokobi documents and contextualizes Narokobi's life and thought. A central figure in Papua New Guinea's transition from Australian territory to independent nation, Narokobi was a jurist, philosopher, and poet who is best remembered for making ‘the Melanesian Way’ an important theme – if not the guiding ideological principle – in the discourse of independence in Papua New Guinea. In looking closely at Narokobi's biography, the collection also contributes to a growing body of work on political life writing in the Pacific. The collection speaks to Narokobi's role as a theorist of Oceanic modernity more broadly, one who deserves a place alongside two other important philosophers of Pacific independence, Epeli Hau‘ofa and Jean-Marie Tjibaou, as one of the main visionaries of Pacific decolonization and Oceanic modernity of the post-war period.     

Too many Scotlands? Place,the SNP,and the future of nationalist mobilization

Scottish nationalism has always had a ‘geographical problem’ in the sense that support for its central goal, the independence of Scotland from the United Kingdom, has had much more backing in some regions and localities than it has had in others. In the 1970s and 1980s the geographical pattern to this support, at least as expressed in votes for the Scottish National Party (SNP), seemed very clear. Suddenly the picture changed between 2011 and 2016, to the extent that the whole of Scotland, notwithstanding the overall ‘No’ vote on Scottish independence in the 2014 referendum, seemed to be lining up to some degree or another in the ‘nationalist column.’ As quickly, this proved ephemeral. As of 2017, the future of the central goal of Scottish nationalism is once more in doubt because of a new geography of support and disaffection that seems to reflect a number of recent trends in attitudes towards voting for the SNP. The article maps the course of the older and newer geographies of Scottish nationalism in terms of the overall political economy of the country, given its proponents’ heavy emphasis on economic themes, and the ways this is refracted through place-to-place social and economic differences across the country.     

An Exemplary Leader?: New Zealand and Decolonization of the Cook Islands and Niue

ABSTRACT

New Zealand is proud of its decolonization record: Prime Minister Peter Fraser’s role in developing provisions for non-self-governing territories in the United Nations; New Zealand’s support for the 1960 declaration on colonialism; its leadership on decolonization in the Pacific; the innovative decolonization solution of self-government in free association with New Zealand adopted by the Cook Islands in 1965, and similar arrangement by Niue in 1974. This record is ascribed to a New Zealand belief in self-determination. Closer examination shows many officials, ministers and parliamentarians were opposed to self-government for the Cook Islands, and concerns lingered about Niue. The arrangements reached reflected New Zealand’s reluctance to let go. Yet self-government was granted, in the context of a reassuring New Zealand view of itself as the centre of the South Pacific region. With new competition for influence in the region, it is important that New Zealand does not seek to constrain the Cook Islands’ and Niue’s self-government and potential future self-determination.     

Scotland's post-referenda futures

In the midst of chaotic Brexit negotiations and the failing political processes of Westminster, the Scottish National Party (SNP) is preparing to call a new independence referendum, arguing that Scotland should not be taken out of Europe against its will. As the SNP begins campaigning for a new referendum, two different visions of Scotland’s independent future emerge: one based on concrete economic and welfare policies championed by the party, the other, an unofficial activist-driven orientation of the future as ‘empty’. The first makes the future tangible, populated with wishful images and achievable goals. The second promises the future as a blank slate, to be authored only after a successful independence vote. These two orientations exist in tension with one another, in continuous negotiation as they are played out on the SNP campaign trail.     

‘The Scum of France’: Australian Anxieties towards French Convicts in the Nineteenth Century

Between the 1860s and the early decades of the twentieth century, escaped and liberated French convicts from the penal colony in New Caledonia arrived on Australian shores, raising concerns about physical as well as moral contamination. This article combines Australian sources with French consular and ministerial archives to examine the impact this little-known episode of trans-imperial history had on the early Australian federal process. The arrival of the convicts and former convicts played on at least two levels. It highlighted the colonial authorities’ weak powers in asserting their territorial sovereignty and policies and pitted them against both Great Britain and the French. Further, the constant nudging of these unwelcome neighbours disrupted the ongoing disavowal of the colonies’ convict past.     

A spin of the wheel? Defence procurement and defence industries in the Brexit debates

Whether a ‘Brexit’ would threaten the United Kingdom's national security has become a central theme in the run‐up to the in/out referendum on EU membership. Although national security has been a central facet of both the ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’ campaigns thus far, there has been little mention of the implications of a Brexit for UK defence industries or defence procurement, let alone formal debate or analysis. The article addresses this gap by analysing the potential implications of a Brexit for defence procurement and industries in the UK and the EU member states. The first section analyses the policy context for a Brexit by exploring existing levels of EU defence procurement integration in the UK's and Europe's defence industries. The second section draws on Jozef Bátora's ‘institutional logics’ framework to identify two pro‐Brexit and two pro‐Remain narratives, each employing differing assumptions on the relative benefits of national sovereignty and closer EU integration The final section analyses the way in which these ‘logics’ or narratives will be deployed by their advocates in the run‐up to the UK's EU referendum. The article concludes that the national security battleground in the 2016 referendum will be fought over competing narratives and arguments, partly because there is a dearth of data and evidence concerning UK and EU defence procurement and industries, which renders this crucial area of national security vulnerable to the politics of spin.     

More than a storm in a teacup: the defence and security implications of Scottish independence

In September 2014 the people of Scotland will vote on whether to become an independent nation, with the defence and security of Scotland proving to be one of the more vociferous areas of debate. This article argues that defence and security implications of this referendum are far more fundamental than either the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ campaigns have admitted. It makes four points. First, it suggests that the Scottish government's plans for defence and security in NATO and the EU are at odds with its proposed armed forces and that Scotland may well find itself having to make far greater commitments to defence to assure its allies. Second, it argues that a vote for independence will represent a game‐changing event for the remainder of the United Kingdom's defence and security, which will have significant consequences for the United Kingdom's partners and allies in NATO, the European Union and elsewhere. Third, the article contends that even a vote against independence will have a long‐term impact, in that the ‘West Lothian question’ and Scottish support for nuclear disarmament influence the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review. Finally, the article highlights how this issue has revealed weaknesses in the think‐tank and academic communities, particularly in Scotland. The independence vote does, therefore, represent ‘more than a storm in a tea cup’ and thus there needs to be far greater engagement with these issues within the United Kingdom and elsewhere.     

Book Reviews

In early 1971, two Canadian unionists travelled to New Caledonia on a technical mission of assistance to the territory's unions. At the airport in Nouméa, however, the territorial authorities refused the unionists entry. For the French government, the interest of the United Steelworkers of America in New Caledonia represented a threat to the stability and competitiveness of the territory's nickel industry. The visit was also seen as a manifestation of growing American influence on New Caledonia's economic and political development at a time when the French were increasingly concerned about the territory's attachment to France. Yet efforts by the territorial authorities in Nouméa to prevent the visit were complicated by other French and Canadian concerns. Neither Canada nor the metropolitan government of France wanted an international incident that might jeopardise France–Canada relations, which were improving slowly after several years of acrimony.     

Gulliver unbound. Possible electoral reforms and the 2008 Italian election: Towards an end to ‘fragmented bipolarity’?

This article considers the systemic effects of the electoral reform approved by the centre-right in December 2005, and the factors that led to the crisis of the Prodi government, highlighting the way in which the issue of electoral reform and the likelihood of an electoral referendum contributed decisively to the breakdown of the fragile coalition maintaining the Prodi government in office. The article then analyses the ‘game’ surrounding possible electoral reforms, examining the interweaving of the preferences and vetoes of the various political actors, showing how these were influenced by the strategic aims of each actor and by the process of re-structuring of the party system. Finally, the new configuration of the political supply as it took shape in the run up to the 2008 general election is analysed, showing how this new format derives from the actors’ strategic adaptation to the electoral rules in force, and how the election may signal the end of a period of Italian politics marked by ‘fragmented bipolarity’.     

International reactions to the Scottish referendum

The referendum on whether Scotland should become an independent country will be held on 18 September 2014. This article reflects on the evolution of foreign governments' attitudes towards the referendum since its confirmation in October 2012, and on their expectations should a ‘yes’ vote result. With few exceptions, they have adopted a policy of non‐intervention, treating the referendum as the UK's domestic affair. President Obama's expression on 5 June 2014 of his desire for the UK to remain ‘a strong, robust, united and effective partner’ may, however, be seen as a sign of increasing apprehension abroad. Concerns of foreign governments aroused by the referendum include the diminution of the UK's power and role in international affairs, the possible encouragement of other secessionist movements, and disturbance to international organizations and alliances. It is commonly assumed that Scotland would become a reasonably prosperous and reliable small state. But how would the rest of the UK (rUK), a much more powerful and populous country, respond to ‘the loss of Scotland’? How would it affect the UK's already unsettled relations with the EU, including the prospect of a referendum on EU membership? Despite many uncertainties and a febrile political atmosphere, it is widely expected abroad that Scotland and rUK would settle into a cooperative relationship after a difficult transitional period, and that an independent Scotland would be accepted into the EU and NATO if it displayed flexibility on important issues.     

Stuck in a Rut: The Problem with Australia's Electoral Apparatus

The origins of the distinguishing features of the Australian Electoral Commission can be found in nineteenth-century South Australia, when that colony led the world in electoral administration. It was the first jurisdiction to develop a professional, permanent, independent election management body, with salaried electoral officials, and to pursue continuous, State-initiated enrolment. South Australia evolved this way because, to extend path dependence terminology, it was ‘locked out’ of inefficient British practices. After Federation in 1901, the new Australian Electoral Office, largely based on the South Australian model, continued the tradition. One unique and defining feature was the strong, permanent role of divisional returning officers –‘Electoral Kings’, in the words of the first Australian Chief Electoral Officer. The ‘Kings’ were an integral component of much that was good about Australia's way of running elections. However, this structure is no longer the most appropriate for an organisation such as the AEC. It has long outlived its usefulness and is holding the Commission back. And, perhaps ironically for an organisation with a long record of resistance to political interference, it is House of Representatives politicians, of all major parties, who are restraining the AEC from adopting sensible arrangements. The AEC is now, in path dependence terms, ‘locked in’ to inefficient practices.