The Determinants of Policy Introduction and Bill Adoption: Examining Minimum Wage Increases in the American States, 1997–2006

Faced with long intervals between federal minimum wage increases in recent years, state legislatures are increasingly likely to take action. Motivated by the relative dearth of empirical work on minimum wages in the American states, this article considered various explanations to determine which factors are associated with legislative efforts to pass wage increases. Taking seriously the view that disagreements over the effects of minimum wage increases enhances the influence of political factors, we drew on the policy adoption and diffusion literature to examine how internal determinants (political and economic variables) and regional diffusion pressures relate to both the introduction and adoption of minimum wage legislation in the American states in the years between the last two federal minimum wage increases (1997–2006). Employing negative binomial regression to analyze annual bill introductions, we found that a number of political variables are related to the consideration of minimum wage increases. However, using event history analysis to examine annual adoptions of minimum wage increases, we found few of the same variables matter. We concluded with a discussion of the empirical results within the context of the broader policy literature and cautioned future scholars to consider seriously whether political factors exert distinct influences at different stages of the policy process.     

“Windows of Opportunity,” Revenue Volatility,and Policy Punctuations: Testing a Model of Policy Change in the American States

The growing evidence of policy change patterns characterized as punctuated equilibrium has increasingly directed the attention of policy scholars to the question of what factors cause them. The present study attempts to address this emerging question by developing a comprehensive, multifactorial model and testing it with state budget data. Specifically, based on theories of information processing and agenda setting, it develops a conceptual framework that models punctuated policy change as a function of two main factors: institutional friction (consisting of institutional constraints, legislative streamlining mechanisms, information‐processing capacity, and bureaucratization) and policy windows (consisting of revenue volatility, change in party control, and budget cycle). In doing so, the study pays special attention to cyclical revenue fluctuations whose effect has never been subject to empirical test. Regression analyses reveal that policy window factors including revenue volatility, changes in party control of the governorship and the House, and a budget cycle play an important role in creating policy punctuations.