Russia's Energy Policy: A Framing Comment

A prominent specialist on the Russian economy provides a framing comment on two preceding papers entitled "Russia's Energy Policy" (by Vladimir Milov, Leonard Coburn, and Igor Danchenko) and "Russia's Energy Policy: A Divergent View" (by Matthew J. Sagers). The author argues that Russia's current energy policy should be viewed as an outcome of competition between three overlapping programs. In this context, he identifies three policy models—the old Soviet, the liberal or oligarchic, and the most recent state capitalist. The latter is currently supported by President Putin, who prioritizes diversification of the country's economy at the expense of diminished investments in the oil and gas sector. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: L71, O13, Q40, Q48. 2 tables, 2 figures, 22 references.     

The Russian Military-Industrial Sector and Conversion

A retired senior CIA analyst assesses developments in conversion from military-related to civilian production in Russia's military-industrial sector over the period 1992-1994. Topics covered include recent economic performance of the military-industrial complex, the lack of congruence between “demilitarization” and “conversion,” reactions of the defense plant workforce and management to conversion, and the outlook for the machine-building sector over the near future. Although the focus of the paper is the military-industrial complex per se, the analysis also applies to Russian machine-building. 7 tables, 67 references.     

Russia's Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment: Insights into the Economy

A prominent British economist reviews the recent growth, partner-country composition, and sector composition of foreign direct investment in and out of Russia from a comparative international perspective, based on UNCTAD and Central Bank of Russia data as well as selected case studies. Two hypotheses are tested: that foreign policy significantly affects the host-country pattern of Russia's outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and that domestic institutions significantly impact the host-country pattern of Russia's OFDI and the sectoral pattern of its inward foreign direct investment (IFDI). Quantitative evidence of foreign-policy influence could not be found, while domestic institutional influences do appear to be present, most notably in the form of system-escaping OFDI.     

Russia's European policy under Medvedev: how sustainable is a new compromise?

This article argues that Dmitry Medvedev's term in office, despite the continuity in Russia's foreign policy objectives, brought about a certain change in Russia's relations with the European Union and the countries of the Common Neighbourhood. The western perceptions of Russia as a resurgent power able to use energy as leverage vis‐à‐vis the EU were challenged by the global economic crisis, the emergence of a buyer's market in Europe's gas trade, Russia's inability to start internal reforms, and the growing gap in the development of Russia on the one hand and China on the other. As a result, the balance of self‐confidence shifted in the still essentially stagnant EU–Russian relationship. As before, Moscow is ready to use all available opportunities to tighten its grip on the post‐Soviet space, but it is less keen to go into an open conflict when important interests of EU member states may be affected. The realization is slowly emerging also inside Russia that it is less able either to intimidate or attract European actors, even though it can still appeal to their so‐called ‘pragmatic interests’, both transparent and non‐transparent. At the same time, whereas the new modus operandi may be suboptimal from the point of view of those in the country who would want Russia's policy to be aimed at the restoration of global power status, it is the one that the Kremlin can live with—also after the expected return of Vladimir Putin as Russia's president. Under the current scheme, the West—and the EU in particular—does little to challenge Russia's internal order and leaves it enough space to conduct its chosen course in the former Soviet Union.     

Food Security and Russia's 2010 Drought

An American specialist on Russia's agricultural sector examines the progression and impact of that country's 2010 drought (the worst in a half-century), leading to a grain harvest one-third smaller than originally forecast. A particular focus is on the country's grain reserves and the government's response to drought in such areas as grain export policy and maintaining the size of the domestic livestock herd, responses which the author argues are conditioned by the drive for food security, a concept that has dominated the political discourse in tandem with resurgent economic nationalism during the post-Soviet period.     

Policing the near abroad: Russian foreign policy in the South Caucasus

This article tries to understand Russia's policies towards the South Caucasus and answer the question of whether there is a tension between Russia's interests and policies. An attempt is made to identify Russia's strategic interests in the region and the crucial factors that shape Russian policies. Based on the assumption that today's Russia gives de facto support to the secessionist regimes in Georgia, the author attempts to explain what the Kremlin's motives are in supporting the secessionist regimes. The author investigates whether Russian support for the separatist regimes in the South Caucasus is a reaction to the foreign policy orientation of the parent states or a part of Russia's security political interests. On the one hand, supporting instability in the South Caucasus cannot be a part of the Kremlin's strategic interests, because that can pose a threat to the North Caucasus. On the other hand, however, Russian policies are not designed to achieve long-term stability in the South Caucasus, and controlled instability seems to suit the Kremlin. Why Russia vies for coercive hegemony and supports secessionism are the central questions of this article.     

Observations on Changes in Russia's Comparative Advantage, 1994-2005

A senior Japanese specialist on Russia's economy and its oil- and gas-producing sectors calculates that country's Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA), Revealed Comparative Disadvantage (RCD), and Trade Specialization Index (TSI) on the basis of foreign trade data compiled by Russia's Federal Customs Service. The focus is on changes in comparative advantage of Russia's major export and import commodities over the 1994-2005 period. The results of the analyses make it possible to test the assertion that the increasing competitiveness of oil and gas exports (and secondarily those of armaments, selected base metals, roundwood, and fertilizers) must compensate for declining competitiveness in (and increasing imports of) meat, plastics, and automobile production and stagnation in the machinery sectors. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: F02, F14, 011. 4 figures, 8 tables, 11 references.     

Can Russia Compete in the Global Economy?

A noted British economist and analyst of current developments in Russia investigates that country's competitiveness in global merchandise export markets by seeking to determine its trade specialization and comparative advantage in a global context. In search of consistent trends, the author compares Russia's scores in 2000 on the Balassa Index of Revealed Comparative Advantage with those of 2004, and also for that year with a selected list of international competitors (Brazil, India, China, Turkey, and the United States) as well. He then discusses recent (through June 2006) government efforts to stimulate export growth in sectors currently underrepresented in Russia's trade profile and assesses prospects for improvement in the balance of Russia's export profile. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: E20, F14, F40. 7 tables, 20 references, 1 appendix.     

Russia's Energy Policy, 1992-2005

A team comprising a former Russian policymaker and American analysts of the current Russian energy policy examines the course of that policy and its limitations during the post-Soviet period. In the process, they critically analyze key problems in Russia's oil, gas, coal, and electricity sectors that represent a potential drag on growth of the entire Russian economy and at the very least call into question the sustainability of further increases in exports to the West. The authors explore in considerable depth and detail both the factors underlying the recent increase in government intervention in the energy sector and the likely consequences for domestic production, consumption, resource security, and critical exports. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: L71, O13, Q40, Q48. 11 figures, 3 tables, 29 references.     

Oil Exploration in Russia: Prospects for Reforming a Crucial Sector

Two seasoned observers of the Russian oil industry analyze the country's policy response to developments in its mineral resources base (often perceived as an exploration crisis), with a focus on oil. The authors review and discuss trends in exploration (including its organization and efficiency), recent developments in its financing, and the reorganization of exploration activity. The evolution of Russia's licensing system is presented, drawing attention to changes that have affected incentives, risks, and barriers to potential resource users, both Russian and foreign. Also identified are conflicts between the objectives of resource managers and broader political goals and interests. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: L710, Q310, Q380, Q410. 4 figures, 40 references.     

Existential nationalism: Russia's war against Ukraine

‘If Russia stops fighting, there will be no war. If Ukraine stops fighting, there will be no Ukraine’ is the sentiment used by Ukrainian protesters mobilising against Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Such a sentiment signifies the stakes of a war where Ukraine is a democratic nation-state fighting for its right to exist against a Russian invasion. Meanwhile, Russia is fighting for a version of Ukraine that is subservient to Russia's idea of what Ukraine should be as a nation-state: under a Russian hegemon geopolitically, where Ukraine's national idea and interpretation of history can be vetted and vetoed by the Russian state. While nationalism scholarship equips us to study Russia's war against Ukraine through the lens of Russian ethnic nationalism and Ukrainian civic nationalism, the ethnic/civic dichotomy falls short of unpacking the more pernicious logics that pervade Russia's intentions and actions towards Ukraine (demilitarisation and de-Nazification). Instead, this article explores the logics of Russia's war and Ukraine's resistance through the concept of existential nationalism where existential nationalism is Russia's motivation to pursue war, whatever the costs, and Ukraine's motivation to fight with everything it has.     

The narratives of exclusion and self-exclusion in the Russian conflict discourse on EU–Russian Relations

The article focuses on the interplay of the narratives of ‘exclusion’ and ‘self-exclusion’ in the Russian discourse on EU–Russian relations. Since the late 1990s, this discourse has acquired an increasingly conflictual orientation, whereby the official foreign policy objectives of ‘strategic partnership’ with the EU and Russia's ‘integration with Europe’ are increasingly problematised across the entire Russian political spectrum. In the analysis of the Russian conflict discourse we shall identify two at first glance opposed narratives. Firstly, the EU enlargement has raised the issue of the expansion of the Schengen visa regime for Russian citizens, travelling to Europe. Particularly acute with regard to Kaliningrad Oblast', this issue has also generated a wider identity-related discourse on the EU's exclusionary policies towards Russia. Secondly, the perception of Russia's passive or subordinate status in EU–Russian cooperative arrangements at national, regional and local levels resulted in the problematisation of the insufficiently reciprocal or intersubjective nature of the EU–Russian ‘partnership’ and the increasing tendency towards Russia's ‘self-exclusion’ from integrative processes, grounded in the reaffirmation of state sovereignty that generally characterises the Putin presidency. This article concludes with the interpretation of the two conflict narratives in the wider context of debates around the project of European integration.     

Observations on the Geographical Dimensions of Russia's Resource Abundance

A UK-based authority on Russia's economic geography examines the geographical dimensions of Russia's resource abundance, devoting particular attention to the spatial redistribution of resource rents generated by extraction, primary processing, and fabrication. After establishing Russia's credentials as a "resource-abundant economy," the author identifies the country's resource regions and considers their relative importance in terms of population, territory, and national economic contribution. He then considers the various dimensions (and different geographies) of resource rent, focusing on the oil and gas sector. The paper extends Gaddy and Ickes' (2005) macro-economic assessment and discusses the consequences of rent redistribution for interregional income flows as well as Russia's territorial cohesion. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: O11, O13, O18, Q30. 5 figures, 1 table, 55 references.     

Missed Opportunities: Winston Churchill,the Air Ministry,and Africa, 1919–1921

Relying on a thorough examination of relevant archival documents housed in several European archives, this paper analyses Austrian Chancellor Metternich's Near Eastern policy from 1829 to 1833 with special attention paid to Austria's relations with Russia. Its primary goal is to refute some already deep-rooted claims relating to Metternich's attitudes towards Russia and the Ottoman Empire from 1829 to 1833 and to offer a different assessment of his role in the diplomatic concert to the one generally held by proving firstly that Metternich did not fear Russia's policy towards the Ottoman Empire during this period, secondly that his policy was consistent and the meeting in Münchengrätz in 1833 was not such an important turning point in the Austrian—Russian relations but simply the climax of the already existing good relationship between the two conservative Powers, and, finally, that no Austro-Russian quid pro quo was agreed upon in this North Bohemian town, which means that Metternich did not have to give up Austrian interests in the Near East for the Russian support in the West because both countries' interests in the two areas were identical. Finally, the paper attempts to point out the fact that though Metternich's policy definitely was conservative, it cannot be sufficiently explained by such a superficial single-word labelling because much of his rationality based upon an in-depth analysis of the affairs lay beyond it, at least of those issues concerning the Eastern Question in the early 1830s.     

Contest and conquest: Russia and global internet governance

For more than a decade, Russia's foreign policy has sought to challenge the international consensus on a number of issues. Today, as the international internet ecosystem is becoming more volatile, Moscow is eager to shift the western narrative over the current global internet governance regime, in which the United States retains considerable leverage. In a context wherein states increasingly forge links between cyberspace and foreign policy, this article explores Russia's deepening involvement in internet governance. The disclosure by Edward Snowden of the US government's wide net of online surveillance contributed to legitimize the Russian approach to controlling online activity. While the struggle around the narrative of internet governance has been heating up since then, Russia actively seeks to coordinate internet governance and cyber security policies with like‐minded states in both regional forums and the United Nations. By introducing security concerns and advocating more hierarchy and a greater role for governments, Moscow is contributing to the politicization of global cyber issues and seeking to reshape the network in accordance with its own domestic political interests. Indeed, the Russian leadership has come to consider the foreign policy of the internet as the establishment of a new US‐led hegemonic framework that Washington would use to subvert other sovereign states with its own world views and values.     

Principles in the pipeline: managing transatlantic values and interests in Central Asia

After a decade of relative neglect post‐Soviet Central Asia has become a foreign policy priority for the transatlantic community. Both the United States and Europe have engaged with the region in recent years in pursuit of new strategic interests, including maintaining military basing access in support of coalition operations in Afghanistan and securing the export of Central Asian oil and gas to the West. Despite this period of renewed engagement, however, the quality of democratic governance within the region remains poor, especially in comparison with other post‐communist regions that successfully completed their political transitions. In fact, the United States and the European Union have often tempered promoting their Central Asian democratization agendas in order to maintain access to these strategically important fixed assets. The transatlantic struggle to balance the pursuit of strategic interests and democratic values has been rendered more difficult by Russia's recent resurgence as a regional power. Backed by the Central Asian governments, Moscow has challenged the purpose and influence of western‐based international and non‐governmental organizations in the region, thereby further diminishing the transatlantic community's capacity to promote sustained democratic reforms.     

Russia,humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: the case of Syria

Western analysis perceives Russian approaches to issues of humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as running counter to western‐inspired international norms. This debate has surfaced with some vigour over Russia's policy in the Syria conflict where, in order to protect its strategic interests in Syria, an obstructionist Moscow has been accused of ignoring humanitarian considerations and allowing time for the Assad regime to crush the opposition by vetoing a resolution threatening to impose sanctions. While Russian approaches are undoubtedly explained by a desire to maximize its growing political influence and trade advantages to serve its legitimate foreign policy interests, and while Moscow's attitudes to intervention and R2P exhibit important differences from those of the major western liberal democracies, its arguments are in fact framed within a largely rational argument rooted in ‘traditional’ state‐centred international law. This article first highlights key arguments in the scholarly literature on intervention and R2P before going on to examine the evolution of Russian views on these issues. The analysis then focuses on the extent to which Moscow's arguments impact on international legal debates on the Libya and Syria conflicts. The article then seeks to explore how Russian approaches to intervention/R2P reflect fundamental trends in its foreign policy thinking and its quest for legitimacy in a negotiated international order. Finally, it attempts to raise some important questions regarding Russia's role in the future direction of the intervention/R2P debates.     

Tidings from a Faraway East: The Russian Empire and Morocco

In 1898 the Russian Empire opened a consulate in Tangier, its first formal diplomatic mission in Morocco. This article examines the reasons behind Russia's approaches to the Sultanate in the wider context of Russian relations with the Arab Middle East. Russia's policy toward Morocco reflected a desire to build influence in the Arab world through ‘soft’ power - peaceful diplomacy laden with benevolent cultural and economic values. Strikingly, much Russian diplomatic rhetoric emphasized or pretended to cultural commonalities between Russia and the Middle East, focused on shared experiences of Islam, to position Russia as an influential ‘honest broker’ between Morocco and encroaching Western imperialist powers. This did not prevent France's establishment of a protectorate in 1912, but Russian goals in Morocco remained consistent through the First World War and up to the time of the Revolution of 1917, and mirrored efforts elsewhere in the Arab world.     

Geopolitics versus geoeconomics: the case of Russia's geostrategy and its effects on the EU

Geopolitics and geoeconomics are often addressed together, with the latter seen as a sub‐variant of the former. This article shows the usefulness of differentiating them at a conceptual level. By juxtaposing traditional geopolitics and geoeconomics, we suggest that they have remarkably different qualities and implications for their targets, on both national and international levels. Importantly, these include the formation of alliances, and whether they are driven by balancing, bandwagoning or underbalancing dynamics. An analysis of Russia's shifting geostrategy towards Europe shows these differences in practice. Russian geoeconomics has long been successful as a ‘wedge strategy’, dividing the EU. As a result, the EU has underbalanced and its Russia policies have been incoherent. The observable tendencies in 2014–15 towards a more coherent European approach can be explained by the changing emphasis in Russia's geostrategy. Russia's turn to geopolitics works as a centripetal force, causing a relative increase in EU unity. Centripetal tendencies due to heightened threat perception can be observed in the economic sanctions, emerging German leadership in EU foreign policy, and discussion on energy union. The analysis calls for more attention to the way strategic choices—geopolitics versus geoeconomics—affect the coherence of threatened states and alliance patterns.     

Russia resurgent? Moscow's campaign to ‘coerce Georgia to peace’

Russia's military incursion into Georgia in August 2008 and formal recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia raise fundamental questions about Russian regional policy, strategic objectives and attitudes to the use of armed force. The spectacle of maneouvre warfare on the periphery of Europe could form a watershed in post‐Cold War Russian relations with its neighbourhood and the wider international community. The speed and scale with which Russia's initial ‘defensive’ intervention to ‘coerce Georgia to peace’ led to a broad occupation of many Georgian regions focuses attention on the motivations behind Russian military preparations for war and the political gains Moscow expected from such a broad offensive. Russia has failed to advance a convincing legal case for its operations and its ‘peace operations’ discourse has been essentially rhetorical. Some Russian goals may be inferred: the creation of military protectorates in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; inducing Georgian compliance, especially to block its path towards NATO; and creating a climate of uncertainty over energy routes in the South Caucasus. Moscow's warning that it will defend its ‘citizens’ (nationals) at all costs broadens the scope of concerns to Russia's other neighbour states, especially Ukraine. Yet an overreaction to alarmist scenarios of a new era of coercive diplomacy may only encourage Russian insistence that its status, that of an aspirant global power, be respected. This will continue to be fuelled by internal political and psychological considerations in Russia. Careful attention will need to be given to the role Russia attributes to military power in pursuing its revisionist stance in the international system.